Political Communication

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upcp20

Issue-Related Learning in a Gubernatorial Campaign: A Panel Study

Stephen C. Craig a, James G. Kane a & Jason Gainous b

a University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA
b University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS, USA

Available online: 16 Aug 2006

To cite this article: Stephen C. Craig, James G. Kane & Jason Gainous (2005): Issue-Related Learning in a Gubernatorial Campaign: A Panel Study, Political Communication, 22:4, 483-503

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584600500311501

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
Issue-Related Learning in a Gubernatorial Campaign: A Panel Study

STEPHEN C. CRAIG, JAMES G. KANE, and JASON GAINOUS

This study is based on data from a three-wave telephone panel survey conducted during the 1998 governor’s race in Florida. The evidence suggests that a considerable amount of issue-related learning (having to do with candidate policy stands and group endorsements) took place over the course of the general election campaign, though substantial differences were observed from one issue area to the next. Further analysis indicates that learning was especially likely to occur among voters (a) who were more knowledgeable about political affairs to start with ( Confirming that the so-called “knowledge gap” may be exacerbated during campaigns), (b) who scored high on a measure of advertising negativity (for one candidate but not the other), and (c) who early in the campaign, read their local newspaper less frequently. Consistent with prior research, TV news appears to have done little or nothing to boost issue-based learning among the electorate.

Keywords campaign learning, campaign communication, voter knowledge, voter competence, negative advertising, campaign advertising

Democratic theory has never been specific about how much information and knowledge is needed in order for individuals to be able to fulfill the obligations of effective citizenship. Most would agree, however, that at a minimum one must have a basic understanding of the policy differences that exist between candidates for office and between the parties they represent. Without such an understanding, the public will be unable to cast its ballots wisely and, hence, unable to hold elected leaders accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, more than half a century of empirical research has left the distinct impression that “voters have a limited amount of information about politics, a limited knowledge of how government works, and a limited understanding of how governmental actions are connected to consequences of immediate concern to them” (Popkin, 1991, p. 8).

Stephen C. Craig is Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida. James G. Kane is Adjunct Professor with the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning at the University of Florida. Jason Gainous is Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Southern Mississippi.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Address correspondence to Stephen C. Craig, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 117325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325, USA. E-mail: scraig@polisci.ufl.edu
Much of the knowledge that citizens possess concerning candidate and party differences is presumably acquired within the context of spirited electoral competition, though some scholars contend that campaigns “provide little, if any, information to the electorate . . . and that whatever information is disseminated by the campaigns is distorted by the mass media and even ignored by voters” (Alvarez, 1997, p. 7). Indeed, candidates do not always take clear positions or address the issues of greatest concern to voters (but see Ansolabehere, Snyder, & Stewart 2001; Spiliotes & Vavreck, 2002) and, when this happens, it is hardly surprising that there is a high degree of confusion and uncertainty about who stands for what. Yet campaigns also provide the single most “compelling incentive [for the average person] to think about government” (Riker, 1989, p. 1). According to Gelman and King (1993), for example, the instability in public opinion polls that frequently occurs during presidential elections is a result of information flow; that is, as voters acquire more information about candidates and issues, and as they incorporate that information into their decision-making processes, they eventually find themselves able to make decisions that are consistent with their political attitudes, beliefs, and interests. It seems likely that if this type of learning takes place during high-visibility presidential campaigns, then it should happen in at least some races for lower office as well since most candidates will initially be less familiar to voters than their counterparts at the top of the ticket.1

This is the question we address here. Skeptics notwithstanding, numerous studies have demonstrated that a significant amount of learning about candidate issue positions takes place during election campaigns (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Patterson & McClure, 1976; Bartels, 1993; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Alvarez, 1997). What is less certain is the extent to which (a) different media (especially newspapers vs. television news vs. campaign ads) contribute to such learning, (b) the tone of a campaign (positive vs. negative) affects issue awareness, and (c) patterns of learning are similar at all levels of electoral competition (presidential vs. subpresidential). It is our hope that the present study, based on data from a three-wave panel survey conducted during the 1998 gubernatorial election in Florida, will shed new light on the ways in which campaigns do or do not provide citizens with the information they need in order to effectively exercise their most fundamental democratic right.

Sources of Issue Learning in Campaigns

The Medium of Communication

Communication scholars agree that, for most people most of the time, the primary source of campaign information is the mass media. Despite their usual preoccupation with the horse race (campaign strategy and poll results; see Sigelman & Bullock, 1991; Just et al., 1996; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) and with scandals and candidate gaffes (Sabato, Stencel, & Lichter, 2000), both newspapers and television provide a considerable amount of issue-related information to voters. Not everyone would agree, of course. In their landmark study of the 1972 election, Patterson and McClure (1976, p. 54; see also Robinson & Levy, 1986) concluded that television news “may be fascinating. It may be highly entertaining. But it is simply not informative.” As for newspapers, the absence of local coverage in Pittsburgh due to a strike had no noticeable impact on voter knowledge in the 1992 campaign; the evidence in this case was, according to Mondak (1995, p. 99), “shattering for any theory of print superiori.”

Even less respect is afforded a third channel of campaign communication: paid ads,
which are regarded by many critics as little more than “self-serving puffery and distortion” (Popkin, 1992, p. 164). Yet campaign ads as a whole contain more issue content than they are typically given credit for (West, 2001; Geer, 1998); one can even argue that “candidate messages are almost inextricably about both issues and character at the same time, as they gravitate toward issues that amplify their self-presentation, and as they stress aspects of their pasts and their personalities that reinforce their policy concerns” (Just et al., 1996, p. 88). If candidates sometimes fail to make specific policy commitments in their ads (or other public statements), they may do so for strategic reasons—or, alternatively, they may be remembering the harsh treatment often given to politicians who venture beyond the usual sound-bite approach (e.g., George McGovern’s welfare plan in 1972, or Walter Mondale’s 1984 promise to fight the budget deficit by raising taxes). As Michael Robinson said, “Fresh ideas come out [in the news] sounding less like new and more like dumb” (cited in Patterson, 1993, p. 159).

The proof, however, is ultimately in the pudding. It may be that a sufficient amount of issue information exists for voters who pay attention and that others “know little about issues because they are uninterested, not because the information is unavailable” (Zhao & Bleske, 1998, p. 14). Nevertheless, one of the most critical functions of election campaigns in a democracy is to educate the public about important issues, and about competing candidates’ stands on those issues. We are interested in gauging the extent to which this happened during the 1998 campaign for governor in Florida. Regardless of whether the informational glass is judged to have been half-empty or half-full, did voters exhibit greater awareness of candidate positioning at the end of the campaign than at the beginning? And if so, can the increase be linked to voters’ differential levels of attentiveness to campaign coverage in the newspapers or on TV, to paid ads, or to some combination of these?

While we know from prior research that a certain amount of learning takes place during campaigns, there is no consensus as to the relative contribution of different communication channels to that learning. Some studies suggest that voters learn more from reading newspapers than from watching television news programs and that, in fact, the latter adds little or nothing to one’s ability to place candidates on key issues (Patterson & McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980; Robinson & Levy, 1986; Choi & Becker, 1987; Berkowitz & Pritchard, 1989; Weaver & Drew, 1993). Others indicate that TV news may be a significant source of issue awareness after all (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Bartels, 1993; Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Weaver & Drew, 1995, 2001; Zhao & Chaffee, 1995; Graber, 2001). And then there are studies which raise the possibility that campaign ads convey at least as much issue information to voters as do newspapers and television. Patterson and McClure (1976, pp. 116–117), for example, found that “on every single issue emphasized in presidential commercials [in 1972], persons with high exposure to television advertising showed a greater increase in knowledge [about the candidates’ positions] than persons with low exposure.” Survey data from a Michigan congressional district in 1974 revealed that voters’ awareness of candidates and their issue positions was enhanced by both television and radio advertising (Atkin & Heald, 1976). Briens and Wattenberg (1996) reported that, at least in the latter stages of the 1992 presidential race, ad watchers were better informed about candidates’ issue positions than either newspaper readers or TV news watchers; the obvious conclusion seemed to be that “political advertising contributes to a well-informed electorate” (p. 185). Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), using an experimental design, also obtained results that run counter to conventional wisdom: “Though political advertisements are generally ridiculed as a
serious form of campaign communication,” they observed, “our results demonstrate that they enlighten voters and enable them to take account of issues and policies when choosing between the candidates” (p. 59).

Not everyone is ready to jump on the campaign ad bandwagon. The results of a 1992 two-wave panel survey in North Carolina led Zhao and Bleske (1998; also see Zhao & Bleske, 1995) to conclude that respondents who paid more attention to ads tended to learn less about candidates’ issue positions. This finding may have been anomalous, or it may provide “one case in which some members of the advertising audience [were] misled and their issue learning hindered. It supports critics’ distrust of political commercials and also supports the [emergence of] professional ‘ad watchers’ who monitor and expose misinformation” (Zhao & Bleske, 1998, p. 27). Such a result reminds us that ads, like newspapers and TV news, are likely to have a greater effect under some conditions than under others (Drew & Weaver, 1998). Researchers have yet to determine with any degree of precision which conditions enhance the ability of which media to facilitate voter learning during campaigns.

The Tone of Political Advertising

While the literature on negative advertising has expanded exponentially in recent years (e.g., Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 1991; Lau & Pomper, 2004; Sigelman & Kugler, 2003), relatively little attention has been given to the question of how advertising tone affects campaign learning. An exception is Brians and Wattenberg (1996), in which people who recalled seeing negative ads during the 1992 presidential race were significantly more likely than those who did not to be aware of the candidates’ issue positions. Many voters claim not to like negative campaigning and consider it to be misleading and/or unethical (Garramone, 1984; Just et al., 1996; Pinkleton, 1997; but see Hill, 1989), and yet candidates continue to employ attack strategies because of their presumed effectiveness in helping to win elections.

We will not be addressing this question directly in the present study (for a review, see Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbitt, 1999; see also Lau & Pomper, 2004). Instead, our concern here has to do with whether negative advertising is more or less likely than positive advertising to facilitate issue learning during election campaigns. When either type of ad contains information about the policy positions of candidates, to what degree is that information received and assimilated by the target audience? Voters themselves do not consider negative ads to be especially helpful (Pinkleton & Garramone, 1992), but the jury remains out. As previously noted, Brians and Wattenberg (1996) discovered a significant relationship between recall of negative ads and issue awareness in their analysis of the 1992 American National Election Study. Similarly, an analysis of Senate elections between 1988 and 1992 led Kahn and Kenney (2000) to conclude that negative advertising is especially important in helping voters to accumulate information about challengers. In controlled experiments, however, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995; see also Geer & Geer, 2003) found positive and negative ads to be equally informative.

Thus, what is probably the strongest justification for negative advertising (i.e., that it provides information without which it would be “much more difficult for the voters to make intelligent choices about the people they elect to public office”; Mayer, 1996, p. 450) is based upon an assumption that may or may not be true. There are indications that the issue content of political advertising as a whole, and presumably of negative ads in particular, has increased in recent years (West, 2001). We therefore hypothesize, first, that campaign ads will make a contribution to voter issue awareness independently of
any learning that results from exposure (or attention) to campaign coverage in the newspapers or on television. Second, regardless of the processes involved—for example, that negative ads are more frequently recalled (Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Brians & Wattenberg, 1996), that they contain more issue information than positive ads (Kaid & Johnston, 1991; Geer, 2000; West, 2001), that negative information is given greater weight than positive information (Lau, 1985) and is thus more helpful in assisting voters to discriminate between the candidates (Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990), or that negative ads heighten feelings of anxiety, which in turn cause voters to seek out more information about candidates’ policy stands or other attributes (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993)—we expect to find that increases in issue awareness over the course of a campaign are more closely associated with exposure to negative rather than positive advertisements.

**Data and Measures**

The present study uses data from a three-wave telephone panel survey conducted by the Florida Voter polling organization during the 1998 campaign for governor of Florida. Our initial interviews (late July-early August) were conducted with 628 individuals, randomly chosen from a list of all registered voters living in Broward (including Fort Lauderdale) and south Palm Beach counties in the southeastern part of the state. Wave 2 interviews (N = 402) were completed in late September and early October, and Wave 3 interviews (N = 301; 47.9% of the original group) in November beginning on election night. The results reported below are limited to the 301 respondents who participated in all three waves.

Most of the research reviewed earlier is based on analyses of either cross-sectional surveys (which do not take into account the amount of information that people bring to the campaign and, hence, do not allow for measurement of individual-level change) or experimental data (which cannot fully capture the dynamics of a real-life campaign). Most of it also centers on presidential elections, where trends and relationships may vary from what one would find in races for congressional, state, and local office. Our study is hardly unique in its use of panel data (Berelson et al., 1954; Patterson & McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980; Bartels, 1993), in the fact that issue learning is examined within the context of an actual campaign below the level of president (Atkin & Heald, 1974; Choi & Becker, 1987; Weaver & Drew, 1993; West, 1994; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Zhao & Bleske, 1995; Kahn & Kenney, 1999), or even in the inclusion of three potential sources of learning during campaigns: newspapers, TV news, and paid ads (Patterson & McClure, 1976; Berkowitz & Pritchard, 1989; Weaver & Drew, 1993; Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Just et al., 1996; Alvarez, 1997). On the plus side, though, we also are able to compare the impact of positive and negative ads and, because our panel encompasses three waves, to determine whether issue learning is more likely to take place early or later in the campaign (Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Holbrook, 1999). Moreover, this study is one of the few to look at gubernatorial politics (see Choi & Becker, 1987; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995), a level of electoral competition that is in some ways similar to, but in other ways quite different from, the race for the White House.

None of the above is intended to suggest that our approach is without shortcomings. First, there is the fact that we employ survey data alone, that is, relying solely on respondent self-reports of exposure and attention to various media and to negative versus positive information as conveyed by campaign ads (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1996; Iyengar & Simon, 2000). Second, the focus on a single community raises some obvious concerns...
about the extent to which our findings can be generalized to other settings—though, traditionally, panel studies of media effects have relied on local samples (Berelson et al., 1954; Patterson & McClure, 1976) in order to control respondents’ media environments. Third, a potentially serious problem in any panel survey is that which stems from the inevitable process of respondent mortality. As previously noted, less than half of our original sample participated in all three waves. If the sociodemographic and political characteristics of this group differed markedly from those of the individuals we interviewed at Wave 1, then our results and conclusions would be called into question. Fortunately, this did not happen. Not only did the final panel have substantially the same characteristics as the original sample in all important categories (including age, education, gender, race, and party identification) but, perhaps equally important, its choice for governor was within two percentage points of the actual outcome.10

**Election Backdrop: Bush Versus MacKay**

The early front-runner for governor in 1998 was Miami businessman Jeb Bush, son of former President George Bush and younger brother of the president-to-be, who had run for and lost the same office 4 years earlier by the closest margin in Florida’s history. Although making only his second bid for elective office, that earlier campaign and, no doubt, his family ties gave Bush an extremely high profile among voters: Statewide polls showed his name recognition level to be consistently above 90% during the year leading up to the election. Bush’s opponent was Democratic Lieutenant Governor Buddy MacKay, a former congressman and loser in his 1988 U.S. Senate race against Connie Mack (also in an incredibly close contest). In Florida, the lieutenant governor is elected on a ticket with the governor and has no formal constitutional role apart from replacing the latter in case of death or incapacity—which is exactly what MacKay did (briefly) following the sudden death of Governor Lawton Chiles in December 1998. Although less of a sure thing than Bush, MacKay entered the election year as his party’s undisputed leader for the gubernatorial nomination; the obscurity of his office notwithstanding, he had name recognition in the 80% range (91% in Wave 1 of our Broward-south Palm Beach survey).

Both candidates escaped a primary challenge, and neither had begun any individual campaign advertising prior to the first survey in July-August.11 As a result, the situation in late summer was one in which the candidates were personally well-known, but their positions on the issues were not. As prior research (especially at the presidential level; see Bartels, 1988, 1993; Patterson, 1980; Popkin, 1991) has shown, many voters obtain a considerable amount of information during the prenomination phase, and surveys that do not begin until the general election are unable to capture the issue-based (or other) learning that may already have taken place. In principle, our study is problematic in this regard. Yet with no serious primary competition on either side, and with most campaigning prior to Labor Day being of the “inside politics” variety, one could anticipate that voter awareness of the policy positions of these two extremely well-known public figures would be limited. As we shall see momentarily, it was.

Our sampling area (coinciding with the circulation market of our sponsor, the *South Florida Sun-Sentinel*) included all of Broward County and portions of south Palm Beach County. In 1998, over 900,000 of the estimated 1.7 million residents were registered to vote, most as Democrats (53% vs. 34% Republican). Considering its size, the media market is somewhat limited. Broward County, which makes up the largest portion of our study area, has no television stations of its own; instead, residents must rely on TV news
from Miami and, in some parts of the county, Palm Beach. Although these nonlocal stations regularly cover developments in Broward, such stories frequently take a back seat to reporting on events closer to home. As for print, the region is served principally by two major newspapers: the Sun-Sentinel and, to a lesser extent, the Miami Herald. Both papers are fairly traditional in their approach to news coverage, and both contained numerous stories relating to the 1998 race for governor.

**Dependent Variables: Issue and Group Support Awareness**

Our analysis centers upon two separate aspects of issue-related learning among voters. The most familiar of these is a battery of questions that was introduced as follows:

> Next, I’m going to read a brief series of statements. After each, I’d like you to tell me which of the two major candidates for governor, Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush, is more likely to favor the statement, if you happen to know. Let’s start with “thinks we don’t need any more gun control laws.” Do you think MacKay or Bush is more likely to favor this position, or don’t you know?

The gun control query (correct answer: Bush) was followed by six others: “supports vouchers for students in underperforming public schools” (Bush), “wants to guarantee that 40 percent of the state budget goes to public education” (MacKay), “believes that a woman should have the right to have an abortion in most instances” (MacKay), “wants patients to have the right to sue their HMO when they’re denied proper care” (MacKay), “has pledged not to raise taxes” (MacKay), and “wants to appoint a statewide drug czar to fight drug abuse” (Bush).

Our challenge in preparing this list was to identify, in advance of the public campaign, (a) issues that one side or the other, or perhaps both, could be expected to emphasize in their communications with voters (directly via ads and indirectly through print and broadcast media), and (b) issues on which the two candidates offered a relatively clear-cut choice. Five of the seven issues we selected ended up meeting these standards to a greater or lesser degree. Bush’s proposal for a drug czar was something of a trial balloon; it came and went with scarcely any notice being paid by the press or by the MacKay camp. Also, both candidates (for strategic reasons) handled the no-new-taxes pledge fairly quietly, and in a manner not entirely consistent with their respective parties’ images. It is therefore not surprising that neither of these items scaled with the others in an index of issue awareness.

A second set of questions was included in the survey, relating to group bases of support for the two candidates:

> Now I’m going to ask you if you happen to know which groups and organizations are currently supporting either Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush for governor. The first is police organizations—do you think they are supporting Buddy MacKay or Jeb Bush, or is this something you’re not sure about?

In addition to law enforcement (correct answer: Bush), respondents were asked to name the candidate supported by teacher organizations (MacKay), environmentalists (MacKay), the Christian Coalition and other conservative religious groups (Bush), and tobacco companies (Bush). Our intent was partly to have surrogates in place for issues (or clusters
of issues) that had not yet emerged at Wave 1 but might arise later in the campaign, such as school prayer, credentials for teachers in public schools, environmental problems related to the Everglades or other ecologically sensitive areas, and so on; in each instance, we expected that the candidates’ positions would be relatively clear and predictably different from one another.15

Apart from specific (and often short-term) issues, however, prior research has shown that voters tend to associate the Republican and Democratic parties and their leaders with particular sociopolitical groups and organizations—associations which stem from the tendency for each party, over time, consistently to represent the interests and policy views of certain segments of society better than others (Craig, Martinez, & Kane, 1999). Many voters will be aware of these party-group linkages regardless of whether or not there is a campaign under way, just as they will know that one prospective candidate for president or governor favors Policy A while another prefers Policy B. But for the electorate as a whole, the level of awareness should increase as more cues become available from the media or from candidates themselves. We therefore combined the five items described above in an index of group support awareness that was expected to behave, for the most part, in the same fashion as our measure of issue awareness.16

The frequency of accurate candidate-issue and candidate-group associations is shown in Table 1 (which includes both actual and corrected percentages17). In Table 2, we display the magnitude of change occurring between each of the waves. Several observations are in order. First, except for abortion (which was a major issue in the 1994 governor’s race when Jeb Bush ran against Lawton Chiles, and which voters clearly perceive as being a point of division between the parties; see Adams, 1997), fewer than half—and

### Table 1

Learning in the 1998 Florida governor’s race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corrected</td>
<td>Corrected</td>
<td>Corrected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue awareness</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun laws</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School vouchers</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient rights</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group support awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Coalition</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco companies</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Data were derived from a South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July–November 1998 (N = 301). The first set of entries for each wave indicates the percentage of all panel respondents who matched the appropriate candidate with a policy position or group endorsement. The second set of entries presents these percentages corrected for guessing (see text).*
usually fewer than one third based upon corrected estimates—of all respondents at the beginning of the campaign were able to connect any policy stand with the candidate taking it. Similarly, the Christian Coalition “and other conservative religious groups” (which had been strongly in Bush’s corner 4 years earlier) represented the only instance where a majority could successfully link a group with the candidate that group was supporting. Thus, as we already have pointed out, the candidates for governor in 1998 were well-known by the electorate, but in a relatively superficial way.

This changed somewhat as the campaign unfolded. Among our five issues, the greatest amount of learning was evident for school vouchers: By November, 67.9% (corrected) knew that Jeb Bush advocated the use of vouchers—a huge increase of 44.6 points over the preceding 3 months. And even though many voters knew at the start where Bush and MacKay stood on abortion, a considerable amount of learning (20.2 points corrected) took place there as well. The other three issues (especially education and patient rights) saw more modest improvements in voter awareness, which is hardly surprising given that they did not receive nearly as much attention from the media and candidates as did vouchers and abortion.

Among group support awareness variables, the biggest gains by far occurred for police organizations: In Wave 1 of the survey, respondents were equally likely to name Bush and MacKay (16.9% each, for a corrected total of exactly zero) as the preferred candidate of official law enforcement; by November, a respectable 54.5% (corrected) knew that the GOP standard bearer had received the endorsement of the Police Benevolent

### Table 2

Magnitude of change (learning) in the 1998 Florida governor’s race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue awareness</th>
<th>Wave 1 Corrected %</th>
<th>Wave 2 Corrected %</th>
<th>Wave 3 Corrected %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun laws</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School vouchers</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abortion</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patient rights</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group support awareness</th>
<th>Wave 1 Corrected %</th>
<th>Wave 2 Corrected %</th>
<th>Wave 3 Corrected %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalists</td>
<td>–2.0</td>
<td>–2.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Coalition</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>–2.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco companies</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data were derived from a South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July–November 1998 (N = 301). Entries indicate change in the percentage of respondents who match the appropriate candidate with a policy position or group endorsement. The first set of entries for each of the three time intervals is based on actual percentages, the second set on percentages corrected for guessing (see text and Table 1).
Stephen C. Craig et al.

Association and similar organizations. With the Bush campaign having saturated the state's airwaves with a series of ads attacking MacKay for being soft on crime, we anticipate that this may be one area where issue-related learning is directly and substantively related to one's attentiveness to those ads.

The remaining four group associations exhibited less change. A majority of voters (51.8% corrected) knew in July-August that the religious right was supporting Bush, and only 7.7% were added to that number over the ensuing 3 months; total gains were not much higher for teachers (14.3 points corrected) and environmentalists (11.0 points). Apart from law enforcement, the greatest amount of learning occurred for tobacco companies: 60.9% (corrected) named Bush as the favored candidate in Wave 3, up 22.0 points from our initial survey. This is somewhat puzzling since tobacco did not play a prominent role in the 1998 governor’s race. It was in the news, however, because of an enormous out-of-court settlement between tobacco companies and the state government (the former having been sued by the latter) and because of the ensuing controversy over how much of that settlement should be part of the fee paid to attorneys (traditionally a Democratic group) who had represented the state on a contingency basis. Perhaps these events led some voters to conclude that tobacco companies were behind Bush, or, more simply, it may have been a case of people applying longstanding party stereotypes (Rahn, 1993); that is, big business is usually pro-Republican, so big tobacco must be pro-Republican in Florida. Still, even if the latter is true, the campaign appears to have played at least some role in activating those stereotypes for many individuals.

Independent Variables

Results so far demonstrate that learning did occur during the 1998 gubernatorial campaign in Florida. Our next task is to estimate the relative contributions made by news coverage and paid ads (both positive and negative) to that learning. Along with Price and Zaller (1993) and others, we agree that being exposed to the news is not the same as “getting” it—and that by relying solely on self-reports of exposure (or surrogates such as education), survey-based studies may underestimate the effects of mass media on citizens’ attitudes and perceptions. Thus, as an indirect measure of “habitual news reception” (Zaller, 1996), the analysis below also employs a six-item index of general political knowledge as one of the independent variables.18

Further, we have attempted to distinguish between mere exposure and “attention” to media news coverage and campaign ads (assuming that attention would have a greater impact on issue learning). Respondents were asked in Wave 1 to indicate how many days in the past week they had read a daily newspaper, and how many days they had watched the local news on TV. Against this backdrop of exposure, they were asked in Waves 2 and 3 (a) how much attention (from a great deal to none) they had been paying to news on TV and radio about the campaign for governor19; (b) whether they had read about the campaign in a newspaper and, if so, how much attention they had been paying to newspaper articles about it; (c) whether in the past few weeks they recalled seeing or hearing any Bush ads on TV or radio and, if so, how much attention they had been paying to them; and (d) whether they recalled seeing any MacKay ads and, if so, how much attention they had been paying. The last two items ($r = .71$ at Time 2 and .70 at Time 3) were used to create a simple additive index tapping overall attentiveness to campaign ads.

Our analysis also includes measures of interest in the campaign and in “government and public affairs” generally, as well as party identification (the standard 7-point scale),
partisan strength (combining strong Democrats with strong Republicans, weak Demo- 
crats with weak Republicans, and so on), and demographics (gender, education, age, 
race). Finally, perceptions of campaign negativity were captured in Waves 2 and 3 with 
the following questions:

As you know, some campaigns are mostly positive, that is, candidates talking 
about their own record and qualifications—but others are mostly negative, 
that is, candidates criticizing something about their opponent. Overall, would 
you say that the Bush campaign for governor this year has been very positive, 
somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative? What about the 
MacKay campaign for governor—overall, would you say that it has been 
very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, or very negative?

Scores on each of these items ranged from 1 (very positive) to 5 (very negative).20

Results

Our first pass through the data is presented in Table 3, where the variables to be ex-
plained are issue and group support awareness in Wave 1 (July-August). As noted ear-
erlier, these results provide a snapshot of the electorate before Bush and MacKay started 
airing their TV and radio spots, and before news coverage of the campaign was as 
prominent as it would later become. Using binomial generalized linear models with a 
logit link function (Gill, 2001), we see essentially the same pattern in both instances: 
statistically significant coefficients indicating higher levels of substantive knowledge among 
individuals who were well-informed about and interested in politics generally, who ex-
hibited a high degree of interest in the nascent campaign, who possessed a strong attachment 
to one of the parties, and who watched television relatively infrequently.21 In es-
sence, politicized voters, especially if they also were partisan and watched less local 
news on TV (but regardless of how often they read the newspaper), were more knowl-
edgeable voters in the campaign’s initial stages.

Results shown in Table 4 are for Waves 2 (September-October) and 3 (November). 
We follow common practice here in employing three sets of independent variables: (a) 
one’s prior scores on issue or group support awareness (Time 1 in the first two columns, 
Time 2 in the next two); (b) several other first-wave measures including exposure to 
newspapers and TV news, political knowledge, general interest in politics, direction and 
strength of partisanship, gender, age, education, and race; and, most important, (c) con-
temporaneous measures of attention to the campaign in newspapers and on television, 
overall level of attention to paid ads on radio and TV, perceived negativity of the Bush 
and MacKay campaigns, and, in Wave 3, an item indicating exposure to the single 
debate that was held (and broadcast on both TV and radio) between the two contenders. 
With Wave 1 factors (or Wave 2 as appropriate) in the equation, regression coefficients 
can be interpreted as representing the impact of an independent variable on changes in 
the dependent variable over the course of the general election campaign (Markus, 1979).

Not surprisingly, prior levels of issue and group support awareness are the best 
predictors of an individual’s scores on these same variables as measured in Waves 2 and 
3. Among the other variables displayed in Table 4, political knowledge has the most 
consistent effect on issue-related learning, that is, those who knew more about current 
events initially tended to acquire more information during the campaign.22 In addition, 
negative advertising by Bush is significant in three of our four models (greater perceived
### Table 3

Predicting issue and group support awareness in Wave 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Issue awareness</th>
<th>Group support awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper exposure</td>
<td>.024 (0.016)</td>
<td>.027 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV news exposure</td>
<td>.050* (0.019)</td>
<td>.056* (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.272* (0.029)</td>
<td>.343* (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign interest</td>
<td>.240* (0.058)</td>
<td>.340* (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General political interest</td>
<td>.234* (0.057)</td>
<td>.254* (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan strength</td>
<td>.167* (0.052)</td>
<td>.238* (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID/Republican</td>
<td>-.214 (0.186)</td>
<td>-.233 (0.195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID/Democrat</td>
<td>.384* (0.178)</td>
<td>.197 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female)</td>
<td>-.030 (0.081)</td>
<td>-.046 (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>-.013* (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.001 (0.016)</td>
<td>.010 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (Black)</td>
<td>-.199 (0.161)</td>
<td>-.097 (0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.574 (0.161)</td>
<td>-2.769 (0.166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null deviance</td>
<td>1,302.64*</td>
<td>1,394.96*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual deviance</td>
<td>974.08*</td>
<td>967.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Data were derived from a *South Florida Sun-Sentinel* panel survey of registered voters, Wave one, July–August 1998. Entries are unstandardized binomial regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).

*df = 576.

*p ≤ .05 (two-tailed).
negativity being associated with higher levels of learning), as is newspaper exposure in both Wave 2 equations (less learning occurring among voters who frequently read the newspaper, though this relationship is no longer evident in the campaign’s closing days).

Attentiveness to the campaign as reported either in the newspaper or on local TV news programs, perceived MacKay negativity, and debate exposure have no discernible impact on learning, while the coefficient for attention to the candidates’ TV ads approaches conventional levels of significance \( (p \leq .10) \) only for issue awareness and only in Wave 3; to the extent that simple exposure to TV news, interest in the campaign and in politics generally, and partisan strength exert an influence, it is indirect, that is, operating through the effects these variables have on initial levels of issue and group support awareness (see Table 3). Demographic factors play a limited role, though two of them (education and age) are associated with the learning of group support in one of the waves. While calculation of the difference between null deviance and residual deviance at the bottom of Table 4 indicates a decent overall fit for our model (Gill, 2001), it is clear that the data presented here do not tell us everything that we would like to know about the origins of individual differences in issue-related learning during the 1998 gubernatorial campaign in Florida.

**Conclusion**

Very few citizens know where each candidate stands on every important issue that might arise over the course of an election year. As Popkin (1992, p. 168) explained:

Campaigns are blunt instruments, not scalpels. They are for ratifying broad changes in direction that have been worked out between campaigns or for rejecting incumbents and their policies. The reformist hope that campaigns can raise new and complicated issues or bring Americans to a deeper understanding of the most complex issues facing the country is misguided.

Nevertheless, campaigns do inform. The findings presented here are consistent with a great deal of prior research which suggests that learning takes place—not on every issue perhaps, or in every electoral contest, but certainly in those instances where candidates talk about policy and about the similarities and differences between themselves and their parties on those issues. Such was the case in Florida’s race for governor in 1998. Were voters as well-informed as democratic theory suggests they might have been? Of course not. Were they better informed in November than they had been in late summer? Absolutely, and by a considerable margin on some issues.

As to the factors that help to shape issue-related learning, our results raise serious doubts about the centrality of the mass media; if anything, exposure to newspapers and local TV news had a negative impact (the latter indirectly) in the Bush-MacKay contest, while attentiveness to campaign coverage in either medium appears not to have affected learning at all. What mattered most was general political knowledge and prior awareness of candidate issue stands and sources of group support, with the informationally rich becoming even richer as the flow of information increased over time. In addition, the oft-maligned negative campaign provided a boost to the levels of substantive knowledge exhibited by some voters; specifically, although overall attention to paid ads had no effect on learning, perceptions of Bush (but not MacKay) negativity were associated with issue awareness in late September/early October, and with both issue and group support awareness in our post-election survey. For whatever reason (e.g., they were
Table 4  
Predicting changes in issue and group support awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue awareness</td>
<td>Group support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue/group support</td>
<td>.246* (.036)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness (T1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue/group support</td>
<td></td>
<td>.204* (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awareness (T2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper exposure (T1)</td>
<td>-.049* (.021)</td>
<td>.005 (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV news exposure (T1)</td>
<td>.009 (.024)</td>
<td>-.021 (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to campaign:</td>
<td>.070 (.050)</td>
<td>.078 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>newspapers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to campaign:</td>
<td>.012 (.061)</td>
<td>-.018 (.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV news</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall attention to TV ads</td>
<td>.011 (.030)</td>
<td>.067 (.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived Bush negativity</td>
<td>.180* (.041)</td>
<td>.123* (.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived MacKay negativity</td>
<td>-.005 (.040)</td>
<td>.025 (.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubernatorial debate</td>
<td></td>
<td>.073 (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge (T1)</td>
<td>.188* (.038)</td>
<td>.156* (.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign interest</td>
<td>.184 (.091)</td>
<td>.055 (.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General political</td>
<td>.087 (.072)</td>
<td>.035 (.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest (T1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan strength (T1)</td>
<td>.020 (.066)</td>
<td>-.012 (.075)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID/Republican (T1)</td>
<td>.040 (.237)</td>
<td>-.267 (.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID/Democrat (T1)</td>
<td>.263 (.223)</td>
<td>.249 (.246)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more memorable, more informative, more frequently aired, or more effective at engaging people’s emotions and stimulating their desire to learn), Bush’s attacks appear to have had a greater impact than did the candidate’s positive message (or, for that matter, MacKay’s messages both pro and con). Negative campaigning is not always a good thing but, when it helps voters to learn what they must know in order to cast an informed ballot, neither should we judge it to be without any redeeming value.

In conclusion, this study suggests that some (though by no means all) of the same dynamics that are evident in presidential elections may apply in high-level subpresidential contests as well. Future research should examine campaigns for a broader range of offices while also looking more closely at alternative communications channels—including direct mail, which is a crucial element in many state and local races. Finally, we encourage researchers to continue trying to develop improved measures of media attentiveness and campaign negativity. Until we have a better idea about the kinds of messages voters encounter over the course of a campaign, our estimates of the impact of those messages (on learning, candidate choice, or anything else) will necessarily be problematic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2</th>
<th>Wave 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue awareness</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group support awareness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female (T1))</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T1)</td>
<td>(.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (T1)</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T1)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (T1)</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T1)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (Black) (T1)</td>
<td>-.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T1)</td>
<td>(.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null deviance</td>
<td>666.97a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual deviance</td>
<td>389.47c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data were derived from a South Florida Sun-Sentinel panel survey of registered voters, July–November 1998. Entries are unstandardized binomial regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Independent variables (left column) are measured in the same wave as the dependent variable unless otherwise noted. T1 = Time 1; T2 = Time 2.

*a df = 352.
*b df = 286.
*c df = 334.
*d df = 267.
* p ≤ .05 (two-tailed).
Notes

1. Along these lines, people appear to learn more from presidential debates about candidates with whom they are relatively unfamiliar (Holbrook, 1999, p. 79).

2. For their part, the American public rates the performance of the news media generally, and TV news in particular, as “adequate,” that is, “neither an abysmal failure [n]or a tremendous success” in terms of its political coverage (Dautrich & Hartley, 1999, p. 90).

3. Among the potentially important sources of campaign learning not considered here are magazines (Robinson & Levy, 1986; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992), so-called “nontraditional media” (Hollander, 1995; Weaver & Drew, 1995), opinion leaders (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948), direct mail advertising (Weaver–Lariscy & Tinkham, 1996; Vavreck, Spiliotes, & Fowler, 2002), and campaign events of one sort or another (Holbrook, 1996; Shaw, 1999); radio news (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Weaver & Drew, 1993) will not be examined separately but rather in combination with its TV counterpart (see note 19). In addition to the factors discussed above, our analysis will assess the impact of candidate debates on learning.

4. Despite a higher proportion of ads stressing personal traits rather than issues (Geer, 1998), such learning is especially likely to take place during primaries (Bartels, 1988; Popkin, 1991) when candidates, and their policy views, are less known to begin with (see also note 1). As a result, our focus on the general election poses a somewhat sterner test of the learning hypothesis than might otherwise be the case.

5. Some scholars contend that neither newspapers nor TV news facilitates learning to any appreciable degree (Price & Zaller, 1993) or, alternatively (and perhaps most plausibly), that it depends less on the medium per se than on the content of the message being delivered (Norris & Sanders, 2003).

6. Even if attack ads are not generally popular among voters, some types of attacks are regarded as more legitimate than others (e.g., Johnson–Cartee & Copeland, 1989, 1997; Green & Rourke, 2000).

7. Exposure and attention obviously are not the same thing (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Zhao & Bleske, 1995; Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; see also Price & Zaller, 1993; Zaller, 1996). While many studies use measures of the former, it is the latter that should have the stronger impact on issue learning or almost any other attitude and/or behavior that might be of interest to communication scholars.

8. The panel was commissioned by the South Florida Sun-Sentinel, which the authors wish to thank for its generous support of this project. Additional information can be obtained from Florida Voter directly (954-584-0204), or from the Graduate Program in Political Campaigning in the Political Science Department at the University of Florida (352-392-0262).

9. While respondent mortality contributes to an increased margin of error (plus or minus 5.6 points, compared with 3.9 for the original sample), an N of 301 cases is sufficient to meet the required assumptions of the estimating procedures employed in our analysis. One might wonder whether participation not only in one but in three surveys may have sensitized some respondents to the campaign and caused them to be more attentive than they otherwise would have been to issue information about the candidates. Fortunately, the patterns of learning reported in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that this was not a serious problem (cf. Bartels, 2000). First, there were some issue areas where the levels of information were only slightly higher at the end of the campaign than at the beginning; thus, any sensitizing that took place was selective in its impact. Second, most learning took place between Waves 2 and 3 of our survey, but on at least two issues (education and patient rights) it happened earlier; we consider it unlikely that the experience of being interviewed would have encouraged respondents to seek out information about different issues at different times.

10. One difference that emerged had to do with the tendency for less-informed people to drop out of panel surveys at disproportionately high rates (Price & Zaller, 1993). Consistent with this pattern, members of our panel scored significantly higher than other respondents on measures of general political knowledge, interest in government and public affairs, and interest in the campaign for governor; they also were very likely to have made it to the polls on election day.
(92% self-reported turnout). The two groups had roughly equal levels of formal education, however.

11. The Republican Party did broadcast a number of so-called “party-building” ads, most of which centered around Jeb Bush and his family (and lacked any real issue content).

12. “Relatively clear” does not necessarily mean “polar opposite.” For example, Bush endorsed higher spending for public education but refused to commit to the 40% share of the state budget urged by MacKay.

13. Alpha for this index (scored as the number of correct candidate placements out of five possible) were .67 in Wave 1, .66 in Wave 2, and .62 in Wave 3. Apart from their failure to scale, the omitted items showed little or no evidence of voter learning during the campaign.

14. Some of these connections (MacKay and teachers) were stronger and more explicit than others (Bush and tobacco).

15. As it happened, none of the issue types listed here became major points of contention during the campaign.

16. Alphas were .72 in Wave 1, .72 in Wave 2, and .64 in Wave 3. As with issue awareness, scores were determined by the number of correct identifications made by respondents out of five possible.

17. The second, fourth, and sixth columns in Tables 1 and 2 are based on percentages that include a correction for guessing. This correction was calculated as the percentage wrong subtracted from the percentage right, setting aside those who said they do not know; cf. Patterson (1980).

18. Respondents were asked to name the job held by Janet Reno (U.S. attorney general), the branch of government whose responsibility it is to determine whether a law is constitutional, which party has the most members in the U.S. House and in the Florida state legislature (Republicans), how much of a majority is required in each chamber for Congress to override a presidential veto, and which party is more conservative than the other at the national level. Alpha was .61 for this scale, which was asked in its entirety only in Wave 1 of our survey.

19. One might wonder whether we have confused matters by asking about TV and radio together (both here in terms of news coverage, and also with regard to campaign ads). The truth is that not many respondents relied on radio for political information: Asked where they got most of their “news and information about state and local politics,” 42.5% said television, 39.9% local newspapers, 6.6% radio, and 3.3% friends and family. Nevertheless, it is clear that what we are testing with these measures is the impact of attention to TV and radio (or electronic media generally) rather than to television alone.

20. The frequent divergence of subjective and objective measures of campaign tone is noted by Sigelman and Kugler (2003). In Wave 1, Bush’s ads were judged (in the aggregate) to have been slightly more negative than positive, and MacKay’s ads slightly more positive than negative. In the third wave, each candidate’s ads were characterized as negative by roughly 60% of those offering an opinion.

21. The figures in Table 3 also show more information possessed by Democratic identifiers (issue awareness) and older voters (group support awareness). The impact of age is relative: Our sampling area and, consequently, our panel contain a large number of older voters, and so it is not young people in an absolute sense but rather those under age 50 who were most knowledgeable about the organizations supporting each candidate.

22. This would seem to support the idea that campaigns serve to widen the “awareness gap,” with the informationally rich becoming even richer due to increased communication flow (see Holbrook, 2002, for a review; see also Moore, 1987; Zaller, 1992; Price & Zaller, 1993; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Some studies, however, report that exposure to campaigns, or to the news media generally, has the potential to promote larger knowledge gains among the least informed (and/or the least engaged, least educated, and least socioeconomically well-off; see Alvarez, 1997; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Rhine, Bennett, & Flickinger, 2001; Holbrook, 2002; Norris & Sanders, 2003).

23. Slightly more than half of our respondents reported having seen or (less often) heard the debate. By a margin of about 2 to 1, they judged Jeb Bush to have been the winner. While the
null finding here is at odds with much prior research on the topic (e.g., Holbrook, 1999; Just, Crigler, & Wallach, 1990; Weaver & Drew, 1995; Drew & Weaver, 1998; Druckman, 2003), one limitation of most of these studies (an exception is Holbrook, 2002) is that the models tested failed to control for other sources of learning such as exposure to news media or TV ads.

References


