MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Pathmarks

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Our fruitful friendship, based in seminars on art history and philosophy, moves me to dedicate the book under way in the single question...
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION (1949)

[21] The treatise “On the Essence of Ground” was written in 1928 at the same time as the lecture “What Is Metaphysics?” The lecture ponders the nothing, while the treatise names the ontological difference.

The nothing is the “not” of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. The ontological difference is the “not” between beings and being. Yet just as being, as the “not” in relation to beings, is by no means a nothing in the sense of a nihil negativum, so too the difference, as the “not” between beings and being, is in no way merely the figment of a distinction made by our understanding (ens rationis).

That nihilative “not” of the nothing and this nihilative “not” of the difference are indeed not identical, yet they are the Same in the sense of belonging together in the essential prevailing of the being of beings. The two essays – which were intentionally kept separate – attempt to determine more closely this Same as what is worthy of thought, without being equal to this task.

What if those who reflect on such matters were to begin at last to enter thoughtfully into this same issue that has been waiting for two decades?

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b Third edition, 1949: Within this genitive.

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Aristotle sums up his analysis of the manifold meanings of the word ἀρχή in the following way: τάσις μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅλον ἢ ἕτον ἢ γίνεται ἢ γινόμεσθαι. Here the variations in what we are accustomed to call “ground” are identified: the ground of what-being, of that-being, and of being true. In addition, [22] however, there is the endeavor to grasp that wherein these “grounds” agree as such. Their κοινὸν [what they have in common] is τὸ πρῶτον ὅλον, the First, starting from which ... Besides this threefold articulation of the foremost “beginnings” we also find a fourfold division of διάτυπον (“cause”) into εἰσαγωγικὸν, τὸ τὰ ἐν ἄρχῃ τῶν μεταβολῶν and οὐ εἰσαγκα. This division has remained the predominant one in the subsequent history of “metaphysics” and “logic.” Although πάντα τὰ ἄρχα [all the causes] are recognized as ἀρχαί, the intrinsic connection between the divisions, and their principle in each case, remain obscure. And there must be some doubt as to whether the essence of ground can be found by way of characterizing what is “common” to the “kinds” of ground, even though there is an unmistakable orientation toward illuminating ground in general in an originary manner. Indeed, Aristotle was not content merely to list the “four causes” alongside one another, but was concerned with understanding their interconnection and the grounding of this fourfold division. This is shown both by his detailed analysis in Book II of the Physics and especially by the way in which the question of the “four causes” is discussed in terms of the “history of the problem” in Metaphysics Book I, chapters 3–7. Aristotle concludes this discussion by noting: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὥσπερ διαφέρει περὶ τῶν ἄρχων καὶ τῶν πατέρων καὶ τῶν μεταμφισάς ἡμῖν καὶ ὧσπερ πάντες, οὐ δύναμις οὕτως ἄρχειν ἀλλὰς ἀρχαίς, πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ότι γίνεται ἢ ἀρχή ἢ ὡς ὕπατος λοιπῶν ἢ τίμα τρόπου τοιοῦτον. [It appears, then, that all these thinkers, since they are unable to arrive at any other cause, testify that we have correctly classified the causes, or they are. In addition, it is clear to be sought thus, or they must be. We shall have to omit the history originating after Aristotle. With respect to this problem, however, we may recall a familiar with the problem of growing the principium rationis sufficienti Grunde]) was treated for the first time in Schopenhauer’s [23] in his Principles of Determination and Cause, philosophical Investigations Concerned Matters (1809). The very questionable as to whether the “principle of reason” and the “principle of reason” might give rise to the question of the “principle of reason” and the principle. If not, then the problem of transcendent identity which transcendence itself is comprehensible via the problem of transcendent identity. The exposition of the transcendent identity and designating the transcendent identity, the essence of ground without an endpoint. This domain is shown not at this time that transcendence itself is comprehensively via the problem that is a philosophizing one, i.e., necessarily always testify to that in its entire essence. According lated: 1. The [24] Problem of the Question concerning the Ground.
correctly classified the causes, both how many they are and of what kind they are. In addition, it is clear that in seeking the causes, either all must be sought thus, or they must be sought in one of these ways. Here we shall have to omit the history of the problem of ground both prior to and after Aristotle. With respect to the way we plan to approach the problem, however, we may recall the following. Through Leibniz we are familiar with the problem of ground in the form of the question concerning the primum rationis sufficientis. The "principle of reason" ["Satz vom Grunde"] was treated for the first time in a monograph by Christian A. Crusius in his Philosophical Dissertation concerning the Use and Limits of the Principle of Determinative and Commonly Sufficient Reason (1743), and finally by Schopenhauer [23] in his dissertation Concerning the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813). Yet if the problem of ground is in general bound up with the central questions of metaphysics, then it must also be at issue even where it is not dealt with explicitly in its familiar form. Thus Kant apparently showed little interest in the "principle of reason," even though he explicitly discusses it both at the beginning and toward the end of his philosophizing. And yet it stands at the center of his Critique of Pure Reason. Of no lesser significance for the problem are Schelling's Philosophical Investigations concerning the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters (1809). The very reference to Kant and Schelling makes it questionable as to whether the problem of ground is equivalent to that of the "principle of reason" and whether it is even raised at all in that principle. If not, then the problem of ground must first be awakened. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that a discussion of the "principle of reason" might give rise to such an awakening and provide an initial pointer. The exposition of the problem, however, is equivalent to attaining and designating the distinctive domain within which we may treat of the essence of ground without any claim to make visible that essence at a stroke. This domain is shown to be transcendence. This means at the same time that transcendence itself is first determined more originarily and more comprehensively via the problem of ground. Any illumination of essence that is a philosophizing one, i.e., an intrinsically finite endeavor, must also necessarily always testify to that nonessence that drives human knowledge in its entire essence. Accordingly, the structure of what follows is stipulated: I. The [24] Problem of Ground; II. Transcendence as the Domain of the Question concerning the Essence of Ground; III. On the Essence of Ground.
I. THE PROBLEM OF GROUNDa

The "principle of reason" as a "supreme principle" seems to preclude from the very outset anything like a problem of ground. Yet is the "principle of reason" an assertion about ground as such? As a supreme principle, does it reveal at all the essence of ground? The usual, abbreviated version of the principle states: *nihil est sine ratione*, nothing is without reason. Transcribing it positively, this states: *omne ens habet rationem*, every being has a reason. The principle makes an assertion about being; and does so with regard to something like "ground."c Yet what constitutes the essence of ground is not determined in this principle. It is presupposed for this principle as a self-evident "idea."b However, the "supreme" principle of reason makes use of the unclarified essence of ground in yet another way; for the specific character of principle belonging to this principle as a "grounding" principle, the character of principle belonging to *principium grande* (Leibniz) can after all be delimited originally only with regard to the essence of ground.

The "principle of reason" is thus worthy of question both in the way it is posed and in terms of the "content" it posits, if the essence of ground is indeed now able to become a problem over and above some indeterminate general "idea."d Even though the principle of reason sheds no immediate light on ground as such, it can nevertheless serve as a point of departure for characterizing the problem of ground. The principle is indeed subject to many kinds of interpretation and appraisal, quite irrespective of those points worthy of question that we have indicated. Yet for our present purposes it seems pertinent to adopt the principle signed to it by Leibniz. However, whether the *principium rationis* for Leibniz, or indeed both, one kind, or even the whole, of the "relation" between the two ideas takes place on the philosophical level. Therefore philosophically unfavored will be drawn from Leibniz in this case. It will be sufficient to cite Primae Veritates:13

Semper ignis praedicatur, seu conceptua natura veritatis in acts, ut etiam Aristoteles observaverit in principio praedicati in subjectum per analysin notionum ostendi

[Thus a predicate, or consequence, in this fact consists the universal nature of the assertion, as Aristotle has seen, and the predicate in the subject is explained; it is implicit and is revealed through demonstration is based.]

Hoc autem verum est in omni veritate aut contingente, et in demonstrandi ratione, seu nullum efficiunt esse absque inchoatione necessariarum et contingentarum liberarum necessitate tollitur.

[The above holds true for every necessary or contingent, as well as this wondrous secret goes unnoticed, or the essential distinction, which even removes the difficulty of]

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a First edition, 1929: The approach in terms of the truth of being is undertaken here still entirely within the framework of traditional metaphysics and in a straightforward retrieval corresponding to the truth of beings, the unconcealment of beings, and the unveiledness pertaining to beingness. Beingness as idee is itself unveiledness. Here one path toward overcoming "ontology" as such is broached (cf. Part III), but the overcoming is not accomplished or constructed in an originary manner from out of what has been attained.
b First edition, 1929: Wherever and whenever there are beings, there is ground; thus, there is grounding wherever there is being. What is the essence of being, such that grounding belongs to it; what does grounding mean here; how is this "belonging" to be understood, and how does it change in accordance with the particular way of being? (cf. Part III.) Where does the necessity lie for grounding? In abyss of and in non-ground. And where is this? In Da-sein.
c First edition, 1929: Here there lies a specific interpretation of being: (1) being asserted (being true); (2) being produced from (what something is made of, *physis*); (3) (1 and 2) presence – constant.
d First edition, 1929: This "idea" of ground is not only universally accepted in an indeterminate manner, but behind this indeterminacy there lies the determinacy of a quite limited provenance. *De non* – (omnis) – *τοιαύτης* παραφήναι – *να ουν* that which is most constant, present. Cf. the "origin" of the four causes.

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pertinent to adopt the principle in the version and role first explicitly assigned to it by Leibniz. However, precisely here there is dispute as to whether the *principium rationis* is a "logical" or a "metaphysical" principle for Leibniz, or indeed both. Of course so long as we admit that we really know nothing of either the concept of "logic" or that of "metaphysics," or indeed of the "relation" between them, these disputes in the historical interpretation of Leibniz remain without any secure guideline and are therefore philosophically unfruitful. In no case can they compromise what will be drawn from Leibniz in what follows concerning the *principium rationis*. It will be sufficient to quote one major section from the tractatus *Prima Veritates*:

Semper igitur praedicatum seu consequens inest subjecto seu antecedenti; et in hoc ipso consistit natura veritatis in universum seu contexto inter terminos enuntiationis, ut etiam Aristoteles observavit. Et in identicis quidem conexio illa atque comprehensio praedicati in subjecto est expressa, in reliquis omnibus implicata, ac per analysin notionum ostendenda, in qua demonstratio a priori sita est.

Thus a predicate, or consequent, is always present in a subject, or antecedent; and in this fact consists the universal nature of truth, or the connection between the terms of the assertion, as Aristotle has also observed. This connection and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is explicit in relations of identity. In all other relations it is implicit and is revealed through an analysis of notions, upon which a priori demonstration is based.

Hoc autem verum est in omni veritate affirmativa universalis aut singularis, necessaria aut contingente, et in denominatione tam intrinseca quam extrinseca. Et latet hie arcanum mirabile a quo natura contingentiae seu essentiale discriminem veritatum necessariarum et contingentium continetur et difficultas de fatali rerum etiam liberarum necessitate tollitur.

The above holds true for every affirmative truth, whether universal or singular, necessary or contingent, as well as for both intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. This wondrous secret goes unnoticed, this secret that reveals the nature of contingency, or the essential distinction between necessary and contingent truths, and which even removes the difficulty regarding the inevitable necessity of free beings.

Ex his propter nimiam facilitatem suam non satis consideratis multa consequuntur magni momenti. Statim enim hinc nascitur axioma receptum, nihil esse sine ratione, seu nescitur esse absque causa. Aliquando veritas daretur, quae non potest probari a priori, seu quae non resolvatur in identicas, quod est contra naturam veritatis, quae semper vel expresse vel implicite identica est.

From these things, which have not been adequately considered due to their great simplicity, there follow many other things of great importance. Indeed, from them there at once arises the familiar axiom: "Nothing is without reason," or "there is no effect without a cause." If the axiom did not hold, there might be a truth that could
not be proved a priori, i.e., which could not be resolved into relations of identity; and this is contrary to the nature of truth, which is always identical, whether explicitly or implicitly.]

Leibniz, in a manner typical for him, here provides, together with a characterization of the "first truths," a determination of what truth is in the first instance and in general, and does so with the intent of showing the "birth" of the principium rationis from the natura veritatis. And precisely in undertaking this he considers it necessary to point out that the apparent self-evidence of concepts such as "truth" and "identity" forestalls any clarification of them that would suffice to demonstrate the origin of the principium rationis and the other axioms. What is at issue in the present inquiry, however, is not the derivation of the principium rationis, but an analysis of the problem of ground. To what extent does this passage from Leibniz provide us with a guideline?

The principium rationis persists, because without its persistence there would be beings that would have to be without ground. For Leibniz this means: There would be true things that would resist being resolved into identities, there would be truths that would contravene the "nature" of truth in general. Since this is impossible, however, and truth persists, the principium rationis, since it springs from the essence of truth, also persists. The essence of truth, however, is to be found in the connexio (ο’ςότιά’ς) of subject and predicate. Leibniz thus conceives of truth from the outset explicitly, though not entirely legitimately, appealing to Aristotle – as truth of assertion (proposition). He determines the nexus as the "insess" of P in S, and the "in esse" as "idem esse." Identity as the essence of propositional truth here evidently does not mean the empty sameness of something with itself, but unity in the sense of the original unitary agreement of that which belongs together. [27] Truth thus means a unitary according [Einstimmigkeit], which for its part can be such only as an overarching accordance [Ubereinstimmung] with whatever is announced as unitary in the identity. In keeping with their nature, "truths" – true assertions – assume a relation to something on whose grounds they are able to be in accord. That linking which is a taking apart within every truth in each case always is what it is on the grounds of . . . , that is, as self-grounding." In its very essence, truth thus houses a relation to something like "ground." In that case, however, the problem of truth necessarily brings us into a "proximity" to the problem of ground. Therefore the more originally we master the essence of truth, the more pressing the problem of ground must become.

However, can anything more originary be brought to bear beyond the delimitation of the essence of truth as a characteristic of the assertion?
ON THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

Nothing less than the insight that this determination of the essence of truth—however it may be conceived in its details—is indeed an uncircumventable one, yet nevertheless derivative.4 The overarching accordance of the nexus with beings, and their consequent accord, do not as such primarily make beings accessible. Rather, beings, as the concern of any predicative determination, must already be manifest before such predications and for it. For it to be possible, predication must be able to take up residence in a making-manifest that is not predicative in character. Propositional truth is rooted in a more originary truth (unconcealment), in the pre-predicative manifestness of beings, which may be called ontic truth. In keeping with the different kinds and domains of beings, the character of their possible manifestness and of the accompanying ways of interpretively determining them changes. Thus, for example, the truth of what is present at hand (for example, material things) as discoveredness is specifically distinct from the truth of those beings that we ourselves are, from the disclosedness of existing Dasein.5 Yet however multifaceted the distinctions between these two kinds of ontic truth may be, it remains valid for all pre-predicative manifestness that making manifest never primarily has the character of a mere presenting (Vorstellen) (intuiting), not even in "aesthetic" contemplation. The characterization of pre-predicative truth as intuition readily suggests itself because ontic truth—supposedly truth proper—is in the first place defined as propositional truth, i.e., as a "connection of presentations." That which is more simple by contrast to truth thus defined is then taken to be a straightforward presenting, free of any such connection. Such presentation indeed has its own function in the task of objectifying beings, which are of course always already and necessarily manifest. Ontic manifestation, however, occurs in our finding ourselves [Sichbefinden],6 in accordance with our attunement and drives, in the midst of beings and in those ways of comporting ourselves toward beings in accordance with our striving and willing that are also grounded therein. Yet even such kinds of comportment, whether they are interpreted as pre-predicative or as predicative, would be incapable of making beings accessible in themselves if their making manifest were not always illuminated and guided in advance by an understanding of the being (the ontological constitution: what-being and how-being) of beings. Unveiledness of being first makes possible the manifestness of beings. This

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4 First edition, 1929. Note here the historical origin from φύσις: [the connection] vor -
c失 is essential.
5 First edition, 1929. Here with respect to the openness of that which is closed as the round-
ing (κόσμος, Parmenides) of Da-sein; clearing [Lichtung] of the Da, not in terms of
psychology; rather these abilities are first possible on the grounds of Da-sein.
unveiledness, as the truth concerning being, is termed ontological truth.4 Certainly, the terms "ontology" and "ontological" are ambivalent, indeed in such a way that the problem peculiar to any ontology is precisely concealed. Λόγος of the ὑπερ means: the addressing (λέγειν) of beings as beings, yet at the same time it signifies that with respect to which beings are addressed (λέγονταίν). Addressing something as something, however, does not yet necessarily entail comprehending in its essence whatever is thus addressed. The understanding [zug] of being (λόγος) in a quite broad sense5 that guides and illuminates in advance all comportment toward beings is neither a grasping of being as such, nor is it a conceptual comprehending of what is thus grasped (λόγος in its narrowest sense = "ontological" concept). We therefore call this understanding of being that has not yet been brought to a concept a pre-ontological understanding, or ontological in the broader sense. A conceptual comprehending of being presupposes that our understanding of being has developed itself, and that being as understood, projected in general, and somehow unveiled in such understanding, has expressly been made thematic and problematic. Between preontological understanding of being and the explicit problematic of conceptually comprehending being there are many different levels. One characteristic level, for example, is that projection of the ontological constitution of beings that simultaneously marks out a determinate field (nature, history) as a region for possible objectification through scientific knowledge. The prior determination of the being (what-being and how-being) of nature in general is anchored in the "fundamental concepts" (Grundbegriffe) of the relevant science. In such concepts, space, place, time, motion, mass, force, and velocity are delimited, for example, and yet the essence of time or motion does not become an explicit problem. The understanding of the being of a being that is present at hand is here brought to a concept, yet the conceptual determination of time and place, etc., the definitions, are, in their approach and range, governed solely by the fundamental manner of questioning directed toward beings in the relevant science. The fundamental concepts of contemporary

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4 First edition, 1929: Unclear! Ontological truth is unveiling of beingness via the categories — but beingness as such is already one particular truth of being, one way in which its essential prevailing is cleared. This distinction between "ontic and ontological truth" is only a doubling of unconcealment and initially remains enconced within the Platonic approach. Thus what has been said hitherto only points the direction of an overcoming, but no overcoming is accomplished or grounded in terms of its own proper ground.

5 First edition, 1929: Here the erroneous procedure of merely extending ontological-metaphysical thinking to the question concerning the truth of being.

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science neither contain the "proper" ontological concepts of the being of those beings concerned, nor can such concepts be attained merely through a "suitable" extension of these fundamental concepts. Rather, the originary ontological concepts must be attained prior to any scientific definition of fundamental concepts. For it is from those ontological concepts that it first becomes possible to assess the restrictive way – which in each case delimits from a particular perspective – in which the fundamental concepts of the sciences correlate with being, which can be grasped in these purely ontological concepts. The "fact" of the sciences, i.e., the factual subsistence of an understanding of being, which is necessarily contained in them as in all comportment toward beings, can neither be the authority that grounds their a priori, nor can it be the source for knowledge of that a priori. Rather, it can only be one possible occasion for pointing us toward the originary ontological constitution of, for example, history or nature. Such a pointer must itself remain subject to a constant critique that has already taken its guidelines from the fundamental problematic of all questioning concerning the being of beings.

The possible levels and variations of ontological truth in the broader sense at the same time betray the wealth of originary truth lying at the ground of all ontic truth. Unconcealment of being, however, is always truth of the being of beings, whether such beings are actual or not. Conversely, in the unconcealment of beings there already lies in each case an unconcealment of their being. Ontic and ontological truth each concern, in different ways, beings in their being, and being of beings. They belong essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the distinction between being and being (ontological difference). The essence of truth in general, which is thus necessarily forked in terms of the ontic and the ontological,

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*a* First edition, 1929: The ambiguous nature of this distinction: in terms of what has gone before, a step toward its overcoming, and yet a fateful link back to it that obstructs every path toward the originary "unity" and hence also to the truth of the distinction.

*b* First edition, 1929: On this, cf. the lecture course of summer semester 1927 "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology," §21, where the term is first conveyed publicly. The conclusion corresponds to the beginning where Kant's thesis concerning "being" (the "is"), namely, that it is not a real predicate, is discussed. The discussion occurs with the intent of first getting a view of the ontological difference as such, and of doing so in coming from ontology, ontology itself, however, being experienced in terms of fundamental ontology. This lecture course as a whole belongs to Being and Time, Part I, Division Three, "Time and Being."

*c* First edition, 1929: Here the essence of truth is conceived as "forked" in terms of the "distinction" as a fixed reference point, instead of the contrary approach of overcoming the "distinction" from out of the essence of the truth of being, or of first thinking the "distinction" as being itself and therein the being of being [das Seyende des Seyns] – no longer as the being of beings.
is possible only together with the irruption of this distinction. And if what is distinctive about Dasein indeed lies in the fact that in understanding being it comports itself toward beings, then that potential for distinguishing in which the ontological difference becomes factual must have sunk the roots of its own possibility in the ground of the essence of Dasein. By way of anticipation, we shall call this ground of the ontological difference the transcendence of Dasein.

If one characterizes all comportment toward beings as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the grounds of transcendence. Intentionality, however, is neither identical with transcendence, nor, conversely, does it itself make transcendence possible.\(^\text{18}\)

Our task hitherto has merely been to show, in a few essential steps, that the essence of truth must be sought more originarily than the traditional characterization of truth in the sense of a property of assertions would admit. Yet if the essence of ground has an intrinsic relation to the essence of truth, then the problem of ground too can be housed only where the essence of truth draws its inner possibility, namely, in the essence of transcendence. The question concerning the essence of ground becomes the problem of transcendence.

If this conjunction of truth, ground, and transcendence is originarily a unitary one, then a chain of corresponding problems must come to light wherever the question of “ground” – if only in the form of an explicit discussion of the principle of reason – is taken hold of in a more resolute fashion. The statement cited from Leibniz already betrays the relatedness between the problem of “ground” and that of being. \(\text{Verum esse quia idem esse.}\) For Leibniz, however, \(\text{verum esse} – \text{being true, at the same time means \text{being } “in truth” – esse pure and simple.}\) The idea of being in general is then interpreted by \(\text{esse qua idem esse.}\) What constitutes an \(\text{esse}\) as an \(\text{en}\) is “identity,” unity correctly understood that, as simple unity,originarily unifies and simultaneously individuates in such unifying. \[^{12}\] That unifying, however, that individuates originally (in advance) and simply, and which constitutes the essence of beings as such, is the essence of the “subjectivity” of the \(\text{subjectum (substantiality of substance)}\) understood monadologically. Leibniz’s derivation of the \(\text{principium rationis}\) from the essence of propositional truth tells us that it is grounded upon a quite specific idea of being in general, an idea in whose light alone that “deduction” becomes possible. We see the connection between “ground” and “being” above all in Kant’s metaphysics. It is certainly the case that one commonly finds a lack of any explicit treatment of the “principle of reason” in his

“critical” writings, unless one count as a substitute for this Kant did indeed consider the place in his \text{Critique of Pure Reason} (\text{Grundzüge}) of all synthetic \(\text{principle (Grundzüge)}\) of all synthetic what in general – within the secure inquiry – belongs to the being provides a definition concerning determines its intrinsic possibility “I think.”\(^\text{19}\) When Kant says a sufficient reason that it is “a natural be undertaken in metaphysics principle of all synthetic know essential connection between The question of the original reason formal logic and the legitimate can then first be derived from This brief exposition of the question from the essence of truth to the problem of ground and the ontological truth, i.e., ultimate comprehensive question conci
cendence is thus the domain with itself to be encountered. Our of several of its main traits.

II. TRANSCENDENCE

A preliminary remark on terms “transcendence” and prepare this word refers. Transcendence accomplishes such surpassing (transcending). As an occurrence is. Formally speaking, surpassing “from” something “to” something toward which such surpassing ultimately, called the “transcendence that is surpassed in this surpassing” occurrence to which the other
"critical" writings, unless one allows the proof of the second analogy to count as a substitute for this almost incomprehensible shortcoming. Yet Kant did indeed consider the principle of reason, and did so at a distinctive place in his Critique of Pure Reason under the title of the "supreme grounding principle [Grundatz] of all synthetic judgments." This "principle" analyzes what in general - within the sphere, and at the level of Kant's ontological inquiry - belongs to the being of beings as accessible in experience. He provides a definition concerning the reality of transcendental truth; i.e., he determines its intrinsic possibility via the unity of time, imagination, and "I think." When Kant says concerning the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason that it is "a notable pointer to investigations that have yet to be undertaken in metaphysics," then this is also true of his own highest principle of all synthetic knowledge to the extent that the problem of the essential connection between being, truth, and ground is concealed therein.

The question of the original relationship between transcendental and formal logic and the legitimacy of such a distinction in general is one that can then first be derived from here. This brief exposition of the Leibnizian derivation of the principle of reason from the essence of truth was intended to clarify the connection between the problem of ground and the question concerning the inner possibility of ontological truth, i.e., ultimately the more originial and accordingly more comprehensive question concerning the essence of transcendence. Transcendence is thus the domain within which the problem of ground must allow itself to be encountered. Our task is to make visible this domain in terms of several of its main traits.

II. TRANSCENDENCE AS THE DOMAIN OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

A preliminary remark on terminology must guide our use of the word "transcendence" and prepare our definition of the phenomenon to which this word refers. Transcendence means surpassing [Überstieg]. That which accomplishes such surpassing and dwells in this surpassing is transcendent (transcending). As an occurrence, this surpassing pertains to something that is. Formally speaking, surpassing may be grasped as a "relation" that passes "from" something "to" something. To surpassing there thus belongs that toward which such surpassing occurs, that which is usually, though inaccurately, called the "transcendent." And finally, there is in each case something that is surpassed in this surpassing. These moments are taken from a "spatial" occurrence to which the expression "transcendence" initially refers.
Transcendence in the terminological sense to be clarified and demonstrated means something that properly pertains to human Dasein, and does so not merely as one kind of comportment among other possible kinds that are undertaken from time to time. Rather, it belongs to human Dasein as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior to all comportment. Certainly, human Dasein as existing "spatially" has the possibility, among others, of spatially "surpassing" a spatial boundary or gap. Transcendence, however, is that surpassing that makes possible such a thing as existence in general, thereby also making it possible to move "oneself" in space.

If one chooses the title of "subject" for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as "Dasein," then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity. The subject never exists beforehand as a "subject," in order then, if there are objects at hand, also to transcend. Rather, to be a subject means to be a being in and as transcendence. The problem of transcendence can never be worked out by seeking a decision as to whether or not transcendence might pertain to a subject; rather, an understanding of transcendence is already a decision about whether we are able to conceptualize such a thing as "subjectivity" at all, or merely import a truncated subject, as it were.

Certainly a characterization of transcendence as the fundamental structure of "subjectivity" initially accomplishes little with respect to our penetrating into this constitution of Dasein. On the contrary, because we have now specifically warded off in general any explicit, or usually inexplicit, approach via the concept of a subject, transcendence may also no longer be determined as a "subject-object relation." In that case, transcendent Dasein (already a tautological expression) surpasses neither a "boundary" placed before the subject, forcing it in advance to remain inside (immanence), nor a "gap" separating it from the object. Yet nor are objects - the beings that are objectified - that toward which a surpassing occurs. Ubtat is surpassed is precisely and solely beings themselves, indeed every being that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus including precisely that being as which "it itself" exists.

In this surpassing Dasein for the first time comes toward that being that it is, and comes toward it as it "itself." Transcendence constitutes [35] selfhood. Yet once again, it never in the first instance constitutes only selfhood; rather, the surpassing in each case intrinsically concerns also beings that Dasein "itself" is not. More precisely, in and through this surpassing it first becomes possible to discuss in what way a "self" is, and with respect to this must have been surpassings and embraced by them, and nature.

Whatever the beings that have been surpassed in any Dasein, they are beings, however they may be surpassed in advance as a whole as such, even though - for reasons that are otherwise grasped - other things which one attributes the "subjective," towards which one attributes the "subjective," towards which transcendence as "transcendental" means, however, for Kant came to recognize the intrinsic possibility of ontological transcendence at all. And it is for this reason of transcendence may be interpreted starting from being as a being "epistemological." Precisely Kant came to recognize the intrinsic possibility of ontological transcendence at all. And it is for this reason of transcendence may be interpreted starting from being as a being "epistemological." Precisely Kant came to recognize the intrinsic possibility of ontological transcendence at all. And it is for this reason of transcendence may be interpreted starting from being as a being "epistemological." Precisely Kant came to recognize the intrinsic possibility of ontological transcendence at all. And it is for this reason of transcendence may be interpreted starting from being as a being "epistemological." Precisely Kant came to recognize the intrinsic possibility of ontological transcendence at all. And it is for this reason of transcendence may be interpreted starting from being as a being "epistemological."
first becomes possible to distinguish among beings and to decide who and in what way a "self" is, and what is not a "self." Yet insofar—and only insofar—as Dasein exists as a self, it can comport "itself" toward beings, which prior to this must have been surpassed. Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them, Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature.

Whatever the beings that have on each particular occasion been surpassed in any Dasein, they are not simply a random aggregate; rather, beings, however they may be individually determined and structured, are surpassed in advance as a whole. This whole may remain unrecognized as such, even though—for reasons we shall not discuss now—it is always interpreted starting from beings and usually with respect to a prominent domain of beings, and is therefore at least familiar to us.

Surpassing occurs as a whole and never merely at certain times and not at other times. It does not, for instance, occur merely or in the first place as a theoretical grasping of objects. Rather, with the fact of Dasein, such surpassing is there.

Yet if beings are not that toward which this surpassing proceeds, how then must we determine, or indeed even search for, this "toward which"? We name world that toward which Dasein as such transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as being-in-the-world. World co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence; as belonging to this structure, the concept of world may be called transcendental. This term names all that belongs essentially to transcendence and bears its intrinsic possibility thanks to such transcendence. And it is for this reason that an elucidation and interpretation of transcendence may be called a "transcendental" exposition. What "transcendental" means, however, is not to be taken from a philosophy to which one attributes the "standpoint" [36] of the "transcendental" or even of being "epistemological." This does not preclude our observing that precisely Kant came to recognize the "transcendental" as a problem concerning the intrinsic possibility of ontology in general, even though the "transcendental" for him still retains an essentially "critical" significance. For Kant the transcendental has to do with the "possibility" of (that which makes possible) that knowledge that does not illegitimately "soar beyond" our experience, i.e., is not "transcendent," but is experience itself. The transcendental thus provides the restrictive, yet thereby simultaneously positive, delimitation (definition) of the essence of nontranscendent ontic knowledge—i.e., knowledge that is possible for human beings as such. A more radical and more universal conception of the essence of transcendence, however,
necessarily entails a more originary elaboration of the idea of ontology and thus of metaphysics.

The expression “being-in-the-world” that characterizes transcendence names a “state of affairs,” indeed one that is purportedly readily understood. Yet what the expression means depends on whether the concept of world is taken in a prephilosophical, ordinary sense, or in its transcendental significance. This can be elucidated by the discussion of a twofold signification of the talk of being-in-the-world.

Transcendence, conceived as being-in-the-world, is supposed to pertain to human Dasein. But this is in the end the emptiest and most trivial thing that can be said: Dasein, the human being that exists, crops up among other beings and can therefore be encountered as such. Transcendence then means: belonging among the other beings that are already present at hand, or among those beings that we can always multiply to the point where they become unsurveyable. World is then the term for everything that is, for totality as the unity that determines “everything” only in terms of its being taken together, and no further. If we take this concept of world as underlying the talk of being-in-the-world, then we must indeed ascribe “transcendence” to every being as present at hand. Beings that are present at hand, that is, that crop up before us among other beings, “are in the world.” If “transcendent” [37] means nothing more than “belonging among other beings,” then it is obviously impossible to attribute transcendence to human Dasein as the constitution distinctive of its essence. Then the statement: To the essence of human Dasein belongs being-in-the-world, is even obviously false. For it is not necessarily essential that a being such as human Dasein factically exist. It can also not be.

Yet if, on the other hand, being-in-the-world is attributed legitimately and exclusively to Dasein, indeed as its essential constitution, then this expression cannot have the aforementioned meaning. In which case world also signifies something other than the totality of those beings that are present at hand.

To attribute being-in-the-world to Dasein as its essential constitution means to state something about its essence (its ownmost, intrinsic possibility as Dasein). In so doing, we may precisely not regard as our decisive criterion whether Dasein factically exists or not in a particular case, or which Dasein does so. The talk of being-in-the-world is not an observation concerning the factual appearing of Dasein; it is not an ontic statement at all. It concerns an essential state of affairs that determines Dasein in general and thus has the character of an ontological thesis. It is therefore the case that Dasein is a being-in-the-world not because, or only because, it factically exists, but the converse: it can exist as a constituent of a world (the essential constitution lies in this world) which surpassing occurs.

The statement: Factual Dasein belongs to the essence of Dasein, betrays itself as a tautology, as well “alongside” other beings, that is transparent in varying ways.

With the characterization of the transcendence of Dasein in a hibitivite manner. To transcendence, which surpassing occurs. This is not understood as, and of how the transcendent, i.e., of how being-in-the-world — in a preparatory conceptuality (albeit always real) that is transparent in varying ways.

In order to orient us concerning world, we shall first provide a come to the fore in the history characterization necessarily has concerns the ordinary meaning, i.e., of how being-in-the-world of Dasein is to be considered only in the direction of, and problem of ground. To this end, the phenomenon of world, which is such.

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exists, but the converse: it can be as existing, i.e., as Dasein, only because its essential constitution lies in being-in-the-world.

The statement: Factual Dasein is in a world (appears among other beings), betrays itself as a tautology that tells us nothing. The assertion: It belongs to the essence of Dasein to be in the world (necessarily to appear as well "alongside" other beings), proves to be false. The thesis: To the essence of Dasein as such belongs being-in-the-world, contains the problem of transcendence.

This thesis is an originary and simple one. This does not entail that it is simple to unveil, even though we can in each case come to understand being-in-the-world — in a preparatory manner that must once again be completed conceptually (albeit always relatively) — only in a single projection, one that is transparent in varying degrees.

With the characterization of being-in-the-world that we have provided, the transcendence of Dasein has at first been determined only in a prohibitive manner. To transcendence there belongs world as that toward which surpassing occurs. The positive problem of what world is to be understood as, and of how the "relation" of Dasein to world is to be determined, i.e., of how being-in-the-world as the originary and unitary constitution of Dasein is to be comprehended conceptually, is to be discussed here only in the direction of, and within the limits demanded by, our guiding problem of ground. To this end we shall attempt an interpretation of the phenomenon of world, which is to serve the illumination of transcendence as such.

In order to orient us concerning this transcendental phenomenon of world, we shall first provide a characterization of the chief meanings that come to the fore in the history of the concept of world, although our characterization necessarily has certain gaps. In the case of such elementary concepts, the ordinary meaning is usually not the originary and essential one. The latter is repeatedly covered over, and attains its conceptual articulation only rarely and with difficulty.

Something essential shows itself already in the decisive commencements of ancient philosophy. Κόσμος does not refer to this or that particular being, to those beings that press upon us and oppress us; yet nor does it refer to all these beings taken together. Rather, it means a "state of affairs," i.e., how beings, and indeed beings as a whole, are. Κόσμος οὐ̲σικός does not, therefore, designate this domain of beings as delimited from another, but this world of beings as distinct from another world of the same beings, the ἑα̲ν itself ἐκ τῆς χώσικος. The world as this "how as a whole" already underlies every possible fragmentation of beings; such fragmentation
I do not annihilate the world, but rather always requires it. Whatever is to tVI.

did not form the latter by first being stuck together, but is in advance governed through and through by the world. Heraclitus recognizes a further essential trait of xocrfloe;: 5 Ἡκτελετός ἐστι τοῖς ἐγρηγορηθέντωσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινόν κόσμον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιμασθέντων ἐκατον τίς ἔναν ἀποστρέφεσθαι. To those who are awake there belongs a single and therefore common world, whereas whoever is asleep turns toward a world of his own. Here we find the world being related to fundamental ways in which human Dasein factically exists. When awake, beings show themselves in a thoroughly concordant way that is accessible to everyone in an average manner. In sleep, the world of beings is individuated exclusively with respect to each particular Dasein.

Several points are already visible from these brief hints: (1) World refers to a "how" of being of beings, rather than to these beings themselves. (2) This "how" determines beings as a whole. In its grounds it is the possibility of every "how" in general as limit and measure. (3) This "how" as a whole is in a certain manner prior. (4) This prior "how" as a whole is itself relative to human Dasein. The world thus belongs precisely to human Dasein, even though it embraces in its whole all beings, including Dasein.

Certain though it is that this rather inexplicit and somewhat dawning understanding of xόσμος may be compressed into the above meanings, it is also incontestable that this word often merely names those beings themselves that are experienced in such a "how." It is no accident, however, that in connection with the new ontic understanding of existence that irrupted in Christianity the relation between xόσμος and human Dasein, and thereby the concept of world in general, became sharper and clearer. The relation is experienced in such an originary manner [40] that xόσμος now comes to be used directly as a term for a particular fundamental kind of human existence. Κόσμος ὁστός in Saint Paul (cf. I Corinthians and Galatians) means not only and not primarily the state of the "cosmic," but the state and situation of the human being, the kind of stance he takes toward the cosmos, his esteem for things. Κόσμος means being human in the manner of a way of thinking that has turned away from God (τῇ σοφίᾳ τοῦ κόσμου). Κόσμος ὁστός refers to human Dasein in a particular "historical" existence, distinguished from another one that has already dawned (αἰῶν ὁ μέλλων).

The Gospel according to Saint John employs the concept xόσμος unusually frequently – above all in relation to the Synoptics – and does so in a sense that is quite central. World designates the fundamental form of human Dasein removed from simple. Consequently, world together, without any distinction and the sinners, the Jews and the sinners, the Jews and the world was made by him. In this context, Augustine provides evidence that just are not called the world, s and the world was made by him. In this context, Augustine presents the two uses of mundus, "eu non cognoverunt," to imply a means as much as eu non cognoverunt, in mundo [dwelling in the world], which is equivalent to context, the excerpt reads:

Quod est, mundus factus est per ipsum alicuius. Mundus per ipsum factus est et mundus dicitur. Iterum alicuius mundus non cognoverunt Creatorum sui et mundum dicti sunt mundus. Amandi appellari meruerunt quod ille, ut domus, aut bonam e, et bonam domus, quo dicimus inabitantes malos, et bonam domus.
human Dasein removed from God, the character of being human pure and simple. Consequently, world is also a regional term for all human beings together, without any distinction between the wise and the foolish, the just and the sinners, the Jews and the Gentiles. The central meaning of this completely anthropological concept of world is expressed in the fact that it functions as the opposing concept to that of Jesus son of God, which filiation is conceived as life (~w~, truth (~A~Oev:.t), light (~pwc;). This coining of the meaning of ~xoall0C; that begins in the New Testament then appears unmistakably, for example, in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. According to Augustine, mundus on the one hand means the whole of created beings. But just as often mundus stands for mundi habitatores. This term again has the specifically existential sense of the dilectores mundi, impii, carnales [those who delight in the world, the impious, the carnal]. Mundus non dicuntur iusti, quia licet carne in eo habitent, corde cum deo sunt [The just are not called the world, since, though they may dwell in the world in flesh, in heart they are with God]. Augustine might well have drawn this concept of world (~w~) – which then helped to determine the history of the Western spirit – just as much from Saint Paul as from the Gospel of Saint John. The following excerpt from the Prologue to the Gospel according to Saint John may provide evidence for this: €v 1:0 ~xoall0C; ~v, xat 0 ~xoall0C; lh' aU1:0U €y€vew' xat 0 ~xoall0<::; alhov oUx hvw [He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not] (John 1:10). In this context, Augustine provides an interpretation of mundus in which he shows the rdJO uses of mundus, in "mundus per ipsum factus est" and "mundus cum non cognovit," to imply a twofold usage. In its first meaning mundus means as much as ens creatum. In the second, mundus means habitare corde in mundo [dwelling in the world in heart] as amore mundum [loving the world], which is equivalent to non cognoscere Deum [not knowing God]. In context, the excerpt reads:


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inhabitant amando mundum. Qui sunt? Qui diligent mundum, ipsi enim corde
habitant in mundo. Nunc qui non diligent mundum, carne versantur in mundo, sed
corde inhabitant coelum. 18

[What does it mean to say: "The world was made by him"? Heaven and Earth,
sea, and all things which are in them are called the world. Yet in another sense,
those who delight in the world are called the world. The world was made by
him, and the world knew him not." But did the heavens not know their creator,
did the angels not know their creator, did the stars not know their creator, whom
even the devils acknowledged? Everywhere, all things bore witness to him. Who did
not know him? Those who, because they love the world, are called the world. For,
when we love a place, we dwell there in heart. And, if we love the place where we
live, we deserve to be called what it is called. When we say this house is bad or that
house is good, we do not find fault with the walls of the house we call bad, nor do
we praise the walls of the house we call good. Rather, what we mean by "bad house"
is "bad inhabitants" and, by "good house," "good inhabitants." In the same way, by
"world" we mean those who dwell in the world by virtue of loving the world. Who
are they? Those who delight in the world, since these same dwell in the world
in their hearts. For those who do not delight in the world are engaged in the world in
their flesh, but in their hearts they dwell in heaven.]

Accordingly, world means: beings as a whole, namely, as the decisive "how"
in accordance with which human Dasein assumes a stance and maintains
itself in relation to beings. Thomas Aquinas [42] likewise on occasion uses
mundus as synonymous with universum [universe], universitas creaturarum
[the whole world of creatures], but also as meaning saeculum [worldly way
of thinking], quod mundi nomine amatores mundi significantur. Mundanus
(saecularis) is the opposing concept to spiritualis. 

Without going into detail about the concept of world in Leibniz, let
us mention the determination of world in Scholastic metaphysics. Baum­
garten's definition is: mundus (universum, universitas creaturarum)
[the whole world of creatures], but also as meaning saeculum [worldly way
of thinking], quod mundi nomine amatores mundi significantur. Mundanus
(saecularis) is the opposing concept to spiritualis. 

Already in the "Dissertation on the Concept of World" in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
as a whole, 14 then the problem regarding to a transformation in the
concept of world in the philosophy of Kant. In this respect, how
a pointer, albeit a rather con­
ceptual" meaning of "world" in Kant emerges once more, although

In §2 he characterizes
the concept of world in the sense), i.e., the
parts, quae hic (44) sumuntur
sense), i.e., the
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the essence of, an
in general) and to "theoretical
regional term for the highest
beings.

If the concept of world thus
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Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
as a whole, the major problem in the Critique
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of what is understood by
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"nisi parte quae nisc toto quod non est pars, i.e.,
of substances, analysis ends on
simple; so synthesis ends only
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parts, quae hic (44) sumuntur
sense), i.e., the, parts, which a
quae consistit in substantiarum
association whatsoever." Finally, world is also distinguished from any comprehensive concept of creatures "that is only a part of another such concept with which it stands in real association."31

The essential determinations belonging to such a world may be derived from a twofold source. What must be present in any world is on the one hand "whatever follows from the general essence of things." In addition, everything that "in the positing of certain creatures may be recognized as necessary from the essential properties of God."33 Within metaphysics as a whole, the "doctrine of world" is therefore subordinate to ontology (the doctrine of the essence of, and most universal distinctions between things in general) and to "theoretical natural theology." World is accordingly the regional term for the highest unity of association in the totality of created beings.

If the concept of world thus functions as a fundamental concept of metaphysics (of rational cosmology as a discipline of metaphysica specialis), and if Kant's Critique of Pure Reason presents a laying of the ground for metaphysics as a whole,34 then the problem of the concept of world must, corresponding to a transformation in the idea of metaphysics, attain an altered form in Kant. In this respect, however, it is all the more necessary to provide a pointer, albeit a rather concise one, since in addition to the "cosmological" meaning of "world" in Kant's anthropology, the existentiell meaning emerges once more, although without its specifically Christian hue.

Already in the "Dissertation of 1770," where the introductory characterization of the concept mundus in part still transpires entirely within the orbit of the traditional ontic metaphysics,35 Kant touches on a difficulty in the concept of world that later becomes sharpened and expanded into a major problem in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant begins his discussion of the concept of world in the "Dissertation" by giving a formal determination of what is understood by "world": world as a "terminus" is essentially related to "synthesis": In composito substantiali, quemadmodum Analysis non terminatur nisi parte quae non est totum, h.e. Simplici, ita synthesis non nisi toto quod non est pars, i.e. Mundo. [Just as, in dealing with a complex of substances, analysis ends only with a part that is not a whole, i.e., with the simple; so synthesis ends only with a whole that is not a part, i.e., with the world.] In §2 he characterizes those "moments" that are essential for a definition of the concept of world: (1) Materia (in sensu transcendentali) h.e. partes, quae hic [44] sumunt esse substantiae. [Matter (in a transcendental sense), i.e., the parts, which are here assumed to be substances.] (2) Forma, quae consistit in substantiarum coordinaciones, non subordinaciones. [Form,
which consists in the *coordination*, not in the subordination, of substances.]

(3) *Universitas*, quae est omnitudo compartium *absoluta*. [Entirety, which is the absolute totality of conjoined parts.] In relation to this third moment, Kant notes: *Totalitas hae absoluta, quamquam conceptus quotidiani et facile olivii speciem praec se ferat, praesertim cum negative emuentur, sicuti fit in definitione, tamen penitum perpecsa crucem figere philosopho videtur.* [This absolute totality appears to be an ordinary, easily understandable concept, especially when it is negatively expressed as in our original definition. But, when more closely considered, it is seen to confront the philosopher with a crucial problem (cross).]

This “cross” weighs upon Kant in the next decade, for in the *Critique of Pure Reason* precisely this “universitas mundi” becomes a problem, and indeed in several respects. What must be clarified is: (1) *To what does the totality represented under the title “world” relate, and to what alone can it relate?* (2) *What is accordingly represented in the concept of world?* (3) *What character does this representing of such totality have; i.e., what is the conceptual structure of the concept of world as such?* Kant’s answers to these questions, which he himself does not pose explicitly in this manner, bring about a complete change in the problem of world. Kant’s concept of world indeed continues to relate the totality represented in it to finite things that are present at hand. However, this relation to finitude – a relation essential to the content of the concept of world – receives a new sense. The finitude of things present at hand is not determined by way of an ontic demonstration of their having been created by God, but is interpreted with regard to the fact that these things exist for a finite knowing, and with regard to the extent to which they are possible objects for such knowing, i.e., for a knowing that must first of all let them be given to it as things that are already present at hand. Kant names these beings themselves, which with respect to their accessibility are referred to a receptive apprehending (finite intuition), “appearances,” i.e., “things in their appearance.” *The same beings*, understood, however, as possible “objects” of an absolute, i.e., creative intuition, he calls “things in themselves.” The unity of the connection of appearances, i.e., the constitution of the being of those beings accessible in finite knowledge, is determined by ontological principles of ground, i.e., the system of synthetic knowledge a priori. The substantive content represented a priori in these “synthetic” principles, their “reality” in the old meaning – precisely retained by Kant – of substantiveness, may be presented free of experience and by way of intuition from out of the objects, i.e., from out of that which is necessarily intuited a priori along with such objects, namely, the pure intuition of “time.” The reality of the synthetic principles is objective; it can be understood as the unity of appearances, because it is at all times incomplete. If this unity of the concept of world is complete, then the representative content (reality) in principle can be nothing that can be intuited. So the extent that this represents a necessary a priori, even though it is a concept of *reality*. Representations of the certain completeness that no finite reason has only a system of empirically possible unity appears, “By a system, however, I understand an idea. The latter is reason’s *united unity and wholeness* represent an idea,”9 it can never relate to a higher unity, it therefore only “understanding. These ideas, having been given to us by the nature of reason, the entire employment of our time, [46],”10 they spring not from the relation to something given, but from the understanding. Kant thus calls the “reflective” concepts of the reason as the realization and refinement of the conditions, and the totality of conditions, and at all times unconditioned, a finite reason is none other than a concept of a given and conditioned. And so the totality of conditions, and at all times unconditioned, are explained by the concept of the understanding for the synthesis of the conditions.

As representations of the reflective ideas are necessary representations to something other than a concrete representation of an object, and to the object in turn absolute (things in themselves), we may assign the three discip
ON THE ESSENCE OF GROUND

principles is objective; it can be presented from the objects. And yet the
unity of appearances, because it is necessarily referred to a factically conting­
ent being-given, is at all times conditioned and in principle fundamentally
incomplete. If this unity of a manifold of appearances is represented as
complete, then the representation of a comprehensive concept arises whose
content (reality) in principle cannot be projected in an image, i.e., in some­
thing that can be intuited. Such a representation is "transcendent." Yet to
the extent that this representation of a completeness is nevertheless nec­
essary a priori, even though it is transcendent it does have transcendental
reality. Representations of this kind Kant calls "ideas." They "contain a
certain completeness that no possible empirical knowledge can attain, and
here reason has only a systematic unity in mind, which it tries to make our
empirically possible unity approach, without it ever being fully attained."16
"By a system, however, I understand the unity of manifold knowledge under
an idea. The latter is reason's concept of the form of a whole."37 Because the
unity and wholeness represented in the ideas "can never be projected in an
image,"17 it can never relate immediately to anything intuitable either. As
a higher unity, it therefore only ever concerns the unity of synthesis of the
understanding. These ideas, however, "are not arbitrarily dreamt up, but
given to us by the nature of reason itself, and therefore necessarily relate to
the entire employment of our understanding."18 As pure concepts of reason
[46], they spring not from the reflection of the understanding, which still
relates to something given, but rather from the pure procedure of reason as
inferential. Kant thus calls the ideas "inferred" concepts, as distinct from
the "reflective" concepts of the understanding.40 In its inferential activity,
reason is concerned with attaining something unconditioned in relation to
the conditions. The ideas as reason's pure concepts of totality are therefore
representations of the unconditioned. "Thus the transcendental concept of
reason is none other than a concept of the totality of conditions for something
given and conditioned. And since the unconditioned alone makes possible
the totality of conditions, and conversely, the totality of conditions is itself
at all times unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be ex­
plained by the concept of the unconditioned insofar as it contains a ground
for the synthesis of the conditioned."41

As representations of the unconditioned totality of a realm of beings,
ideas are necessary representations. And insofar as a threefold relation of
representations to something is possible, namely, to the subject and to the
object, and to the object in two ways, one finite (appearances) and the other
absolute (things in themselves), there arise three classes of ideas, to which
we may assign the three disciplines of traditional metaphysica specialis. The
concept of world is accordingly that idea in which the absolute totality of those objects accessible in finite knowledge is represented a priori. This means as much as "the sum-total [Inbegriff] of all appearances," or "sum-total of all objects of possible experience." Yet since those beings accessible to finite knowledge may be viewed ontologically with respect to both their what-being (essentia) and their "existence" (existentia) - or in Kant's formulation of this distinction, in accordance with which he also divides the categories and principles of the transcendental analytic, "mathematically" and "dynamically" - there thus results a division of the concepts of world into mathematical and dynamic. The mathematical concepts of world are the concepts of world "in their more restricted meaning," as distinguished from the dynamical concepts, which he also calls "transcendental concepts of nature." Yet Kant considers it "quite fitting" to call these ideas "as a whole" concepts of world, "because by world we understand the sum-total of all appearances, and our ideas too are directed only toward the unconditioned in appearances; in part also because the word world, understood transcendentally, means the absolute totality of the sum-total of existing things, and we are directing our attention solely to the completeness of synthesis (albeit really only in regression to the conditions)."

[48] Not only the connection between Kant's concept of world and that of traditional metaphysics comes to light in this remark, but with equal clarity the transformation accomplished in the Critique of Pure Reason, i.e., the more originary ontological interpretation of the concept of world. This interpretation, by way of a concise response to our three questions above, may be characterized as follows: (1) The concept of world is not an enigmatic association of things in themselves, but a transcendental (ontological) concept of the sum-total of things as appearances. (2) In the concept of world we are not presented with a "coordination" of substances, but precisely with a subordination, namely, the "increasing series" of conditions of synthesis, up to the unconditioned. (3) The concept of world is not a "rational" representation whose conceptuality is undetermined; rather, it is determined as an idea, i.e., as a pure synthetic concept of reason, and is distinguished from concepts of the understanding.

The character of universitas (totality) that was earlier attributed to it is thus now removed from the concept mundus and reserved for a still higher class of transcendental ideas that the concept of world itself points toward, and that Kant calls the "transcendental ideal."
At this point we must forgo an interpretation of this highest point of Kantian speculative metaphysics. Only one thing needs to be mentioned so as to let the essential character of the concept of world, namely, finitude, emerge more clearly.

As an idea the concept of world is the representation of an unconditioned totality. And yet it does not represent that which is altogether and "properly" unconditioned, insofar as the totality thought in this concept remains related to appearances, to the possible object of finite knowledge. World as an idea is indeed transcendent, it surpasses appearances, and in such a way that as their totality it precisely relates back to them. But transcendence in the Kantian sense of surpassing experience is ambivalent. On the one hand, it can mean: within experience, exceeding that which is given within it as such, namely, the manifold of appearances. This is the case for the representation "world." But transcendence also means: stepping out of experience as finite knowledge altogether and representing the possible whole of all things as the "object" of an intuitus originarius. In such transcendence there arises the transcendental ideal, compared to which world constitutes a restriction and becomes a term for finite, human knowledge in its totality. The concept of world stands, as it were, between the "possibility of experience" and the "transcendental ideal," and thus in its core means the totality of the finitude that is human in essence.

From here, an insight opens up into a possible second, specifically existentiell meaning that, in addition to the "cosmological" one, pertains to the concept of world in Kant.

"The most important object in the world, to which man can apply all progress in culture, is man, because he is his own ultimate end. - To recognize him, therefore, in accordance with his species as an earthly being endowed with reason, especially deserves to be called worldly knowledge, even though he comprises only one part of the creatures of this earth." Knowledge of man, and indeed precisely with respect "to what he makes, or can and ought to make of himself as a freely acting being," i.e., precisely not knowledge of man in a "physiological" respect, is here termed knowledge of the world. Knowledge of the world is synonymous with pragmatic anthropology (knowledge of the human being). "Such an anthropology, considered . . . as worldly knowledge, is then not yet properly called pragmatic when it contains an extensive knowledge of matters in the world, e.g., of animals, plants, and minerals in various lands and climates, but when it contains knowledge of man as citizen of the world."
cosmos as a species of living being, becomes especially clear from the turns of phrase that Kant has recourse to in clarifying this existentiell concept of world: "knowing the world" and "having class [world]." Although they both refer to the existence of human beings, the two expressions each mean something different, "for the first (the human being who knows the world) merely understands the game as a spectator, whereas the second has played along with it." Here world is the term for the "game" of everyday Dasein, for the latter itself.

Commensurate with this, Kant distinguishes "worldly erudition" from "private erudition." "The first refers to the skillfulness of one human being in exercising influence upon others, in order to use them for his own ends." Furthermore: "A history is composed in a pragmatic manner whenever it makes one erudite, i.e., instructs the world as to how it may procure its advantage better or at least just as well as the previous world." From this "worldly knowledge" in the sense of "life-experience" and understanding of existence Kant distinguishes "Scholastic knowledge." Along the guideline of this distinction he then develops the concept of philosophy in accordance with its "Scholastic concept" and its "worldly concept." Philosophy in the Scholastic sense remains an affair of the mere "artificer of reason." Philosophy in accordance with its worldly concept is the concern of the "teacher in the ideal," i.e., of the one [51] who aims for the "divine human being in us." "The concept of world here means that concept which concerns what is necessarily of interest to everyone." In this whole context world is the designation for human Dasein in the core of its essence. This concept of world corresponds entirely to the existentiell concept of Augustine, except that the specifically Christian evaluation of "worldly" existence, of the amatores mundi, is omitted and world has the positive significance of the "participators" in the game of life.

This existentiell meaning of the concept of world cited from Kant prefigures the more recent appearance of the expression "Weltanschauung." Yet expressions like "man of the world" and "the aristocratic world" show a similar meaning of the concept of world. Here again "world" is not a mere regional title used to designate the human community as distinct from the totality of natural things; rather, world refers precisely to human beings in their relations to beings as a whole; town houses and mews, for example, also belong to the "aristocratic world."

It is therefore equally erroneous to appeal to the expression world either as a designation for the totality of natural things (the natural concept of world), or as a term for the community of human beings (the personal concept of world). Rather, more or less clearly highlighted in the fact that it is directed to Dasein [in its relation to being]. The development of the term meaning according to which it is used and in such a way that their relation is an indeterminate manner. With the concept of Dasein as such, a structuring of the employment of the concept of world in the expression "worldly knowledge" was intended to indicate – it attempts to raise to a level of the phenomenon of Dasein that is ontologically grasped in its uniqueness.

Human Dasein – a being that comporting itself toward being are always manifest as a whole be expressly conceptualized; the expanse of this whole is characterized without the whole of those beings or indeed "completely" invest layers. Yet the understanding in each case reaches ahead of the whole world. The task now is to make it possible for us to shed light upon the phenomenon of world. The following questions: (1) What we have described? (2) To what kind make it possible for us to list the world, i.e., to shed light upon the phenomenon of world? (transcendence)?

World as a wholeness "is" gives itself the signification of existence in whatever way. That Dasein "its" world then means: In this Dasein gives rise to itself [in this way] with having to be. In the being of Dasein is such a way is a surpassing in the direction that world shows itself to be that
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concept of world). Rather, what is metaphysically essential in the more or less clearly highlighted meaning of ἐν μέρος, mundus, world, lies in the fact that it is directed toward an interpretation of human existence (Dasein) in its relation to beings as a whole. Yet for reasons that we cannot discuss here, the development of the concept of world first encounters that meaning according to which it characterizes the “how” of beings as a whole, and in such a way that their relation to Dasein is at first understood only in an indeterminate manner. World belongs to a relational structure distinctive of Dasein as such, a structure that we called being-in-the-world. This employment of the concept of world – as our historiographical references were intended to indicate – is so far from being arbitrary that it precisely attempts to raise to a level of explicitness and to sharpen into a problem a phenomenon of Dasein that is constantly already familiar to us, yet not ontologically grasped in its unity.

Human Dasein – a being that finds itself situated in the midst of beings, comporting itself toward beings – in so doing exists in such a way that beings are always manifest as a whole. Here it is not necessary that this wholeness be expressly conceptualized; its belonging to Dasein can be veiled, the expanse of this whole is changeable. This wholeness is understood without the whole of those beings that are manifest being explicitly grasped or indeed “completely” investigated in their specific connections, domains, and layers. Yet the understanding of this wholeness, an understanding that in each case reaches ahead and embraces it, is a surpassing in the direction of world. The task now is to attempt a more concrete interpretation of the phenomenon of world. This may unfold through our response to the following questions: (1) What is the fundamental character of the wholeness we have described? (2) To what extent does this characterization of world make it possible for us to illuminate the essence of Dasein’s relation to world, i.e., to shed light upon the intrinsic possibility of being-in-the-world (transcendence)?

World as a wholeness “is” not a being, but that from out of which Dasein gives itself the signification of whatever beings it is able to comport itself toward in whatever way. That Dasein gives “itself” such signification from out of “its” world then means: In this coming toward itself from out of the world Dasein gives rise to itself [zeitigt sich] as a self, i.e., as a being entrusted with having to be. In the being of this being what is at issue is its potentiality for being. Dasein is in such a way that it exists for the sake of itself. If, however, it is a surpassing in the direction of world that first gives rise to selfhood, then world shows itself to be that for the sake of which Dasein exists. World
has the fundamental character of the "for the sake of . . .," and indeed in
the originary sense that it first provides the intrinsic possibility for every
factically self-determining "for your sake," "for his sake," "for the sake of
that," etc. Yet that for the sake of which Dasein exists is itself. To selfhood
there belongs world; world is essentially related to Dasein.

Before we attempt to inquire into the essence of this relation and thus
to interpret being-in-the-world starting from the "for the sake of" as the
primary character of world, we need to ward off several misinterpretations
that may suggest themselves with regard to what has been said.

The statement: *Dasein exists for the sake of itself,* does not contain the
positing of an egoistic or ontic end for some blind narcissism on the part
of the factical human being in each case. It cannot, therefore, be "refuted,"
for instance, by pointing out that many human beings sacrifice them­
selves for others and that in general human beings do not merely exist alone
on their own, but in community. The statement in question contains nei­
ther a solipsistic isolation of Dasein nor an egoistic intensification thereof.
By contrast, it presumably gives the condition of possibility of the human
being's being able to comport "himself" either "egoistically" or "altruisti­
cally." Only because Dasein as such is determined by selfhood can an I-self
comport itself toward a you-self. Selfhood is the presupposition for the
possibility of being an "I," the latter only ever being disclosed in the "you."
Never, however, is selfhood relative to a "you," but rather - because it first
makes all this possible - is neutral with respect to being an "I" and being
a "you," and above all with respect to such things as "sexuality." All state­
ments of essence in an ontological analytic of the Dasein in the human
being take this being from the outset in such neutrality.

How then is Dasein's relation to world to be determined? Since world
is not a being, and supposedly belongs to Dasein, this relation is evidently
not to be thought as a relation between Dasein as one being and world as
another. Yet if this is the case, does not world then get taken into Dasein
(the subject) and declared as something purely "subjective"? Yet the task
is to gain, through an illumination of transcendence, one possibility for
determining what is meant by "subject" and "subjective." In the end, the
concept of world must be conceived in such a way that world is indeed
subjective, i.e., belongs to Dasein, but precisely on this account does not
fall, as a being, into the inner sphere of a "subjective" subject. For the same
reason, however, world is not merely objective either, if "objective" means:
belonging among beings as objects.

As the respective wholeness of that for the sake of which Dasein exists
in each case, world is brought before Dasein through Dasein itself. This

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a First edition, 1929: But Dasein and
Time, Part II. Dasein belongs to beyJ
essence of the "occurrence" - temporl
name for the truth of being.

b First edition, 1929: Yet here the el
"distinguishing" and transcendence.
ing - the latter is the carrying throul
of the quite other commencement;
phenomenological-existential and tran
the latter? Comes into its own in the
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bringing world before itself is the originary projection of the possibilities of Dasein, insofar as, in the midst of beings, it is to be able to comport itself toward such beings. Yet just as it does not explicitly grasp that which has been projected, this projection of world also always casts the projected world over beings. This prior casting-over (Überwurf) first makes it possible for beings as such to manifest themselves. This occurrence of a projective casting-over, in which the being of Dasein is temporalized, is being-in-the-world. "Dasein transcends" means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, "forming" [bildend] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a paradigmatic form [Vor-bild] for all manifest beings, among which each respective Dasein itself belongs.

Beings, such as nature in the broadest sense, could in no way become manifest unless they found occasion to enter into a world. This is why we speak of their possible and occasional entry into world. Entry into world is not some process that transpires in those beings that enter it, but is something that "happens" with beings. And such occurrence is the existing of Dasein, which as existing transcends. Only if, amid beings in their totality, beings come to be "more in being" in the manner of the temporalizing of Dasein are there the hours and days of beings' entry into world. And only if this primordial history, namely, transcendence, occurs, i.e., only if beings having the character of being-in-the-world irrupt into beings, is there the possibility of beings manifesting themselves.\(^\text{61}\)\(^\text{b}\)

Our elucidation of transcendence thus far already lets us understand that, if it is indeed in transcendence alone that beings can come to light as beings, transcendence comprises an exceptional domain for the elaboration of all questions that concern beings as such, i.e., in their being. Before we dissect our guiding problem of ground within the domain of transcendence, and thereby sharpen the problem of transcendence in one particular respect, we should become better acquainted with the transcendence of Dasein via a further historical recollection.

\(^{a}\) First edition, 1929: But Dasein and beyng itself? Not yet thought, not until Being and Time, Part II. Dasein belongs to beyng itself as the simple onefold of beings and being; the essence of the "occurrence"—temporalizing of Temporality [Temporaliität] as a preliminary name for the truth of beyng.

\(^{b}\) First edition, 1929: Yet here the erroneous determination of the relationship between "distinguishing" and transcendence. Transcendence prevails in essence in the distinguishing—the latter is the carrying through [Austrag] of the distinction. Here the preparation of the quite other commencement; everything still mixed and confused, converted into phenomenological-existential and transcendental "research"; occurrence not as "leap," and the latter? Comes into its own in the event of appropriation.
Transcendence is specifically expressed in Plato's εξέχεινα. Yet may we interpret the ἀγαθόν as the transcendence of Dasein? Even a fleeting glance at the context in which Plato discusses the question of the ἀγαθόν must dispel such doubts. The problem of the ἀγαθόν is merely the culmination of the central and concrete question concerning the chief and fundamental possibility of the existence of Dasein in the polis. Even though the task of an ontological projection of Dasein upon its fundamental metaphysical constitution is not explicitly posed or even developed, the threefold characterization of the ἀγαθόν undertaken with constant reference to the "sun" impels us toward the question of the possibility of truth, understanding, and being — i.e., taking these phenomena together, toward the question concerning the originary and unitary ground of possibility of the truth of our understanding of being. Such understanding, however — as an unveiling projecting of being — is the primordial activity of human existence, in which all existing in the midst of beings must be rooted. For the ἀγαθόν is that Εύς (sovereign power) that is sovereign with respect to the possibility (in the sense of the enabling) of truth, understanding, and even being, and indeed of all three together in their unity.

It is not by accident that the ἀγαθόν is indeterminate with respect to its content, so that all definitions and interpretations in this respect must fail. Rationalistic explanations fall short, as does the "irrationalist" recourse that takes flight in the "mystery." The illumination of the ἀγαθόν, in keeping with the pointer that Plato himself provides, must stick to the task of interpreting the essence of the connection between truth, understanding, and being. Inquiry back into the intrinsic possibility of this connection sees itself "compelled" to accomplish explicitly the surpassing that occurs necessarily in every Dasein as such, yet mostly in a concealed manner. The essence of the ἀγαθόν lies in its sovereignty over itself as Εύς — as the "for the sake of . . . ," it is the source of possibility as such. And because the possible indeed lies higher than the actual, Εύς ἀγαθόν Εύς, the essential source of possibility, is even μεγάλος τιμητήρ.94

Certainly the relation of the "for the sake of" to Dasein becomes problematic precisely here. Yet this problem does not come to light. Rather, according to the doctrine that has become traditional, the ideas remain in a έπερισφάνος τόπος; the task is merely to secure them as the most objective of objects, as that which is in beings, without the "for the sake of" showing itself as the primary character of world so that the originary content

of the εξέχεινα might come to

Indeed there later awakens that Plato’s "recollective" "dialogue ideas as innate to the "subject." The history of the problem of already comes to light, yet at a two poles of possible interpretation grounded and determined. The objects and at the same time an exceptional domain of ever-n一大早 phenomenon of world, of typical comportment toward intuitus, as an apprehending the "transcendental ideal" goes to

In this fleeting recollection problem of transcendence transcendence cannot be unitive, but solely through an ontological subject, an interpretation actively opposes "subjectivism "objectivism."66

III. ON THE

[59] Our discussion of the "principle or reason or ground to the domain by way of an analysis of the conground from out of the transcendenent: To what extent does there lie something like ground in gene as the respective whole of its "being that is equioriginarily beg

4 Second edition, 1931: No! Dasein not at all comprehended, and not experienced. εξέχεινa not transcendence either, but ἀγαθόν as αἰτία.

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of the ἔκτασις might come to the fore as the transcendence of Dasein. Indeed there later awakens the converse tendency, already prefigured in Plato’s "recollective" "dialogue of the soul with itself," to conceive of the ideas as innate to the "subject." Both attempts testify that the world is both held before Dasein (beyond it), and yet also forms itself within Dasein. The history of the problem of the ideas shows how transcendence always already comes to light, yet at the same time oscillates to and fro between two poles of possible interpretation, poles that are themselves inadequately grounded and determined. The ideas count as more objective than the objects and at the same time as more subjective than the subject. Just as an exceptional domain of everlasting beings takes the place of the unrecognized phenomenon of world, so too the relation to world in the sense of a particular comportment toward this being comes to be interpreted as intuitus, as an apprehending that is no longer mediated, as "reason." The "transcendental ideal" goes together with the intuitus originarius. In this fleeting recollection of the still concealed history of the original problem of transcendence we must have the growing insight that transcendence cannot be unveiled or grasped by a flight into the objective, but solely through an ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject, an interpretation that must constantly be renewed and that actively opposes "subjectivism" in the same way that it refuses to follow "objectivism."\footnote{First edition, 1929: In keeping with the essence of ground, bring to the fore the originary fathoming of ground [Ergriinden]. Fathoming of ground prior to all grounding of something. Fathoming of ground in philosophy and art, but not in religion. In III, an approach to the destructuring of, i.e., of the ontological difference; ontic-ontological truth. In III the step into a realm that compels the destruction of what has gone before and makes a complete overturning necessary. In III the essence of willing as Dasein, superseding and overcoming of all capacities.}

III. ON THE ESSENCE OF GROUND\footnote{Our discussion of the “principle of reason” referred the problem of reason or ground to the domain of transcendence (I). Transcendence has, by way of an analysis of the concept of world, been determined as the being-in-the-world of Dasein (II). The task now is to illuminate the essence of ground from out of the transcendence of Dasein. To what extent does there lie in transcendence the intrinsic possibility of something like ground in general? World gives itself to Dasein in each case as the respective whole of its "for the sake of itself," i.e., for the sake of a being that is equioriginarily being alongside . . . what is present at hand, being . . .}
with ... the Dasein of others, and being toward ... itself. Dasein is able to be in relation to itself as itself in this manner only if it surpasses "itself" in this "for the sake of" [Umwillen]. This surpassing that occurs "for the sake of" does so only in a "will" ["Wollen"] that as such projects itself upon possibilities of itself. This will that essentially casts the "for the sake of itself" over and thereby before Dasein cannot therefore be a particular willing, an "act of will" as distinct from other forms of comportment (such as representing, judging, or enjoyment). All forms of comportment are rooted in transcendence. The "will" in question, however, must first "form" the "for-the-sake-of" itself as and in a surpassing. Yet whatever, in accordance with its essence, casts something like the "for the sake of" projectively before it, rather than simply producing it as an occasional and additional accomplishment, is that which we call freedom. Surpassing in the direction of world is freedom itself. Accordingly, transcendence does not merely come upon the "for the sake of" as anything like a value or end that would be present at hand in itself, rather, freedom holds the "for the sake of" toward itself, and does so as freedom. In this transcending that holds the "for the sake of" toward itself there occurs the Dasein in human beings, such that in the essence of their existence they can be obligated to themselves, i.e., be free selves. In this, however, freedom simultaneously unveils itself as making possible something like the "for the sake of" projectively before it, rather than simply producing it as an occasional and additional accomplishment, is that which we call freedom. Freedom alone can let a world prevail and let it world for Dasein. World never is, but worlds.

In this interpretation of freedom arrived at in terms of transcendence there ultimately lies a more originary characterization of the essence of freedom than that which determines it as spontaneity, i.e., as a kind of causality. The beginning of something by itself provides only the negative characterization of freedom according to which there is no determinative cause lying further back. This characterization, however, overlooks above all the fact that it speaks in an ontologically undifferentiated manner of "beginnings" and "occurrences," without explicitly characterizing what it means to be a cause in terms of the specific manner of being pertaining to the being that is in this way, namely, Dasein. Accordingly, if spontaneity ("beginning by oneself") is to be capable of serving as an essential characterization of the "subject," then two things are first required: (1) Selfhood must be clarified ontologically for any possible appropriate conception of what is meant by this "by oneself"; (2) precisely the same clarification of selfhood must provide us in advance with an indication of the way in which

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6 First edition, 1929. The reverse: Dasein withstands the prevailing [Wahren], or better the essential unfolding [Wesen], of truth and thus grounds the possibility of being human as being human in Dasein!

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8 First edition, 1929. Places into the...
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In order to determine the kind of movement that pertains to "beginning," the selfhood of that self that already lies at the grounds of all spontaneity, however, lies in transcendence. Letting world prevail in projectively casting it over us is freedom. Only because transcendence consists in freedom can freedom make itself known as a distinctive kind of causality in existing Dasein. Yet the interpretation of freedom as "causality" above all already moves within a particular understanding of ground. Freedom as transcendence, however, is not only a unique "kind" of ground, but the origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom for ground.

We shall name the originary relation of freedom to ground a grounding (Gründen). In grounding, freedom gives and takes ground. This grounding that is rooted in transcendence is, however, strewn into manifold ways. There are three such ways: (1) grounding as establishing (Stiften); (2) grounding as taking up a basis (Bodennehmen); (3) grounding as the grounding of something (Begründen). If these ways of grounding belong to transcendence, then the expressions "establishing" and "taking a basis" evidently cannot have an ordinary, ontic meaning, but must have a transcendental meaning. Yet to what extent is Dasein's transcending a grounding in the said ways?

As the "first" of these ways we deliberately cite "establishing," though not because the others derive from it. Nor is it that manner of grounding initially familiar to us, or that we come to know first. And yet precisely this manner of grounding has a priority, one that shows itself in the fact that the illumination of transcendence provided above was unable to avoid it. This "first" form of grounding is nothing other than the projection of the "for the sake of". If such freely letting world prevail was determined as transcendence, and if the other ways of grounding also necessarily belong to the projection of world as grounding, then this implies that neither transcendence nor freedom has as yet been fully determined. It indeed always pertains to Dasein's projection of world that in and through its surpassing Dasein comes back to beings as such. The "for the sake of" that is projectively cast before us points back to the entirety of those beings that can be unveiled within this horizon of world. To such beings, in whatever levels of prominence or degrees of explicitness, there also always belong in each case both beings as Dasein and beings that do not have the character of Dasein. Yet in the projection of world, such beings are not yet manifest in themselves. Indeed, they would have to remain concealed, were it not for the fact that Dasein in its projecting is, as projecting, also already in the midst of such beings. Yet this

^ First edition, 1929: Places into the ground-less (abyss of ground), non-ground.

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"in the midst of . . ." refers neither to a cropping up among other beings, nor even to a specific self-directedness toward this particular being in comporting oneself toward it. Rather, this being in the midst of . . . belongs to transcendence. That which surpasses, in passing over and beyond and thus elevating itself, must find itself [sich befinden] as such among beings. As finding itself, Dasein is absorbed by beings in such a way that, in its belonging to beings, it is thoroughly attuned by them. Transcendence means projection of world (62) in such a way that those beings that are surpassed also already pervade and assume that which projects. With this absorption by beings that belongs to transcendence, Dasein has taken up a basis within beings, gained "ground." This "second" form of grounding does not arise after the "first," but is "simultaneous" with it. This does not mean that the two are present at hand within the same "now"; rather, projection of world and absorption by beings, as ways of grounding, belong in each case to a single temporality insofar as they co-constitute its temporalizing. Yet just as the future precedes "in" time, yet temporizes only insofar as having-been and present also — as intrinsic to time — temporalize in the specific unity of time, so too those ways of grounding that spring from transcendence display this connection. Such correspondence is to be found, however, because transcendence is rooted in the essence of time, i.e., in its ecstatic-horizonal constitution.67

Dasein would be unable to be pervasively attuned by beings as the being that it is,68 and thus would be unable, for example, to be embraced, captivated, or permeated by them; it would be altogether deprived of any leeway for this, were it not for the fact that an irruption of world, and be it only a glimmer of world, accompanies such being absorbed by beings. In this, the world that is unveiled may be scarcely or not at all transparent conceptually; world may even be interpreted as one particular being among others; any explicit knowledge of Dasein's transcending may be absent; the freedom of Dasein that brings along with it the projection of world may be barely awake — and yet only as being-in-the-world is Dasein absorbed by beings. Dasein grounds (establishes) world only as grounding itself in the midst of beings.

This grounding that establishes, as the projection of possibilities of itself,69 entails, however, that in this process Dasein in each case [63] exceeds itself. In accordance with its essence, the projection of possibilities is in each case richer than the possession of them by the one projecting. The ready possession of possibilities belongs to Dasein, however, because, as projective, it finds itself in the midst of beings. Certain other possibilities are thereby already withdrawn from Dasein, and indeed merely through its own facticity. Yet precisely this withdrawal of certain possibilities pertaining to
its potentiality for being-in-the-world – a withdrawal entailed in its being absorbed by beings – first brings those possibilities of world-projection that can "actually" be seized upon toward Dasein as its world. Such withdrawal lends precisely the binding character of what remains projected before us the power to prevail within the realm of Dasein's existence. Corresponding to these two ways of grounding, transcendence at once exceeds and withdraws. The fact that the ever-excessive projection of world attains its power and becomes our possession only in such withdrawal is at the same time a transcendental testimony to the finitude of Dasein's freedom. And does not the finite essence of freedom in general thereby announce itself?

For the interpretation of the manifold grounding of freedom, what is essential initially is to see the unity of the two ways of grounding we have so far discussed, the unity that comes to light in the way in which excess and withdrawal become transcendently attuned to one another.

Yet Dasein is a being that not only finds itself in the midst of beings, but also comport itself toward beings and thus also toward itself. Such comportment toward beings is at first and for the most part even equated with transcendence. If this is indeed a failure to recognize the essence of transcendence, then the transcendental possibility of intentional comportment must become a problem. And if intentionality is indeed distinctive of the constitution of Dasein's existence, then an illumination of transcendence cannot pass it over.

The projection of world indeed makes possible – although we cannot show this here – a prior understanding of the being of beings, [64] yet it is not itself a relation of Dasein to beings. And our being absorbed, which lets Dasein find itself in the midst of beings and pervasively attuned by them (though never without the unveiling of world), is likewise not a comportment toward beings. Yet presumably both – in their unity as characterized – make intentionality possible transcendentally, and in such a way that, as ways of grounding, they co-temporalize a third manner of grounding: grounding as the grounding of something. In this form of grounding, the transcendence of Dasein assumes the role of making possible the manifestation of beings in themselves, the possibility of ontic truth.

"The grounding of something" should here be taken not in the restricted and derivative sense of proving ontic or theoretical propositions, but in a fundamentally originary meaning. According to this meaning, grounding something means making possible the why-question in general. To make visible the originarily grounding character proper to the grounding of something means, therefore, to illuminate the transcendental origin of the "why" as such. We are not therefore seeking, for instance, something that occasions
the factual irruption of the why-question in Dasein, but are inquiring concerning the transcendental possibility of the "why" in general. For this reason, we must interrogate transcendence itself insofar as we have determined it via the two ways of grounding discussed thus far. Grounding as establishing sets forth possibilities of existence in its projection of world. Existing always means: comporting oneself toward beings — toward those not having the character of Dasein, and toward oneself and those like oneself — in finding oneself in the midst of beings, and doing so in such a way that in this comportment in which one finds oneself, the potentiality for being of Dasein itself is at stake. In the projection of world an excess of possibility is given with respect to which, in our being pervaded by those (actual) beings that press around us as we find ourselves, the "why" springs forth. Yet because the first two ways of grounding belong together in transcendence, the springing forth of the "why" is transcendently necessary. The "why" even becomes manifold at its very origin. Its [65] fundamental forms are: Why in this way and not otherwise? Why this and not that? Why something at all and not nothing? In this "why," in whatever manner it is expressed, there also lies already a preunderstanding, albeit a preconceptual one, of what-being, how-being, and being (nothing) in general. This understanding of being first makes possible the "why." This means, however, that it already contains the ultimate and primordial originary answer to all questioning. As altogether the most antecedent answer, our understanding of being provides the ultimate and primary grounding of things. In such understanding of being, transcendence as such grounds things. Because being and the constitution of being are unveiled therein, the transcendental grounding of something may be called ontological truth.

Such grounding of things lies "at the ground" of all comportment toward beings, and in such a way only that in the illumination granted by our understanding of being can beings manifest themselves (i.e., as the beings they are and in the way they are). Yet because such grounding of something prevails transcendentally from the outset throughout all becoming-manifest of beings (ontic truth), all ontic discovery and disclosing must in its way be a "grounding of something"; i.e., it must account for itself. In such accounting, what occurs is the referral to a being that then makes itself known, for example, as "cause" or as the "motivational grounds" (motive) for an already manifest nexus of beings. This referral is in each case demanded by the what-being and how-being of the relevant beings and by the manner of way in which the transcendence of Dasein, as the development of an understanding and because this way of grounding is always unveiled in transcendence, cast "grounds" aside, and cover them over. As a consequence, and thus also of accounting for Dasein how far to extend such understanding to attain an author of the transcendental possibility of the "why" is always unveiled in transcendence explicitely unveils itself as such. Thus it is a remain concealed as such and be freed.

Yet even then it is unveiled, because the first two ways of grounding, cast "grounds" aside, and cover them over. As a consequence, and thus also of accounting for Dasein how far to extend such understanding to attain an author of the transcendental possibility of the "why" is always unveiled in transcendence explicitely unveils itself as such. Thus it is a remain concealed as such and be freed. Yet even then it is unveiled, because the first two ways of grounding, cast "grounds" aside, and cover them over. As a consequence, and thus also of accounting for Dasein how far to extend such understanding to attain an author of the transcendental possibility of the "why" is always unveiled in transcendence explicitely unveils itself as such. Thus it is a remain concealed as such and be freed.
beings and by the manner of unveiling (truth) belonging to them. Because the transcendence of Dasein, as projectively finding itself, and as forming the development of an understanding of being, is a grounding of things; and because this way of grounding is equioriginary with the first two ways within the unity of transcendence, i.e., springs forth from the finite freedom of Dasein; for this reason Dasein can, in its factual accounting and justifications, cast "grounds" aside, suppress any demand for them, pervert them, and cover them over. As a consequence of this origin of grounding things and thus also of accounting for them, it is in each case left to the freedom in Dasein how far to extend such grounding and whether indeed it understands how to attain an authentic grounding of things, i.e., an unveiling of the transcendental possibility of such grounding. Even though being is always unveiled in transcendence, this does not require any conceptual ontological grasp. Thus it is altogether possible for transcendence to remain concealed as such and be familiar only in an "indirect" interpretation. Yet even then it is unveiled, because it lets there be precisely beings that have irrupted with the fundamental constitution of being-in-the-world, and in this the self-unveiling of transcendence makes itself known. Transcendence explicitly unveils itself as the origin of grounding, however, when such grounding is brought to spring forth in its threefold character. In accordance with this, ground means: possibility, basis, account. Strewn in this threefold manner, the grounding that is transcendence first brings about in an originarily unifying manner that whole within which a Dasein must be able to exist in each case. Freedom in this threefold manner is freedom for ground. The occurrence of transcendence as grounding is the forming of a leeway into which there can irrupt the factual self-maintaining of factual Dasein in each case in the midst of beings as a whole. Are we then restricting to three the four grounds discovered by the tradition, or are these three ways of grounding equivalent to the three kinds of προς τον θεόν in Aristotle? The comparison cannot be made in such a superficial manner; for what is peculiar to the first discovery of the "four grounds" is that it does not yet distinguish in principle between transcendental grounds and specifically ontic causes. The transcendental grounds appear merely as the "more universal" in relation to the ontic. The originary character of the transcendental grounds and their specific character of ground remain covered over beneath the formal characterization of "first" and "highest" beginnings. And for this reason they also lack unity. Such unity can consist only in the equioriginary character of the transcendental origin of the threefold grounding. The essence "of" ground cannot even be sought, let alone found, by asking after a universal genus that is supposed
to result by way of [67] an "abstraction." The essence of ground is the transcendental springing forth of grounding, strewn threefold into projection of world, absorption within beings, and ontological grounding of beings.

And it is for this reason alone that even the earliest questioning concerning the essence of ground shows itself to be entwined with the task of shedding light upon the essence of being and truth. Yet may we not still inquire as to why these three determinative components of transcendence that belong together may be designated by the same term "grounding"? Is it simply a matter of a contrived similarity based on wordplay? Or are the three ways of grounding after all identical in one respect, although in a different way in each case? We must indeed respond in the affirmative to this question. At the "level" of our present appraisal, however, we cannot undertake to illuminate the meaning of that particular respect in which these three inseparable ways of grounding correspond to one another in a unitary and yet strewn manner. By way of indication it must suffice to point out that establishing, taking up a basis, and legitimation each in their own way spring forth from a care for steadfastness and subsistence, a care that in turn is itself possible only as temporality.

Deliberately turning away from this domain of the problem, and instead looking back to the point of departure of our investigation, we shall now discuss briefly whether anything, and if so, what, has been attained with regard to the problem of the "principle of reason" through our attempt at shedding light upon the "essence" of ground. The principle means: every being has its reason [ground]. The exposition we have given first of all illuminates why this is so. Because being, as understood in advance, "intrinsic" grounds things in an originary manner, every being as a being in its own way announces "grounds," whether these are specifically grasped and determined in an appropriate way or not. Because "ground" is a transcendental characteristic of the essence of being in general, the principle of reason [ground] is valid for beings. Ground, however, belongs to the essence of being because being (not beings) is given only in transcendence as a grounding that finds itself in a projecting of world. Furthermore, it has become clear with respect to the principle of reason [ground] that the "birthplace" of this principle lies neither in the essence of proposition nor in propositional truth, but in ontological truth, i.e., in transcendence itself. Freedom is the origin of the principle of reason [ground]; for in freedom, in the unity of excess and withdrawal, the grounding of things that develops and forms itself as ontological truth is grounded.

8 First edition, 1929: And the latter in time as Temporality [Temporalität].

Coming from this origin we find not only extrinsic possibility, but we also come upon hitherto unmentioned concerns that is, however, suppressed in the context. In Leibniz, the expression to an apparently insignificant point in time may be schematically brought together to exist quid aliud; ratio est cur potius quam aliud existit quid aliud existit quid nihil existit quid aliud existit quid aliud existit quid aliud...; a reason is why another way; a reason is why anything is; a reason is why anything is. "why" is expressed as "cur potius quam existit quid aliud..." the first problem is not that of questions, in each case posed facts be decided. Rather, what need the principle ["why"] could associate itself with.

Every accounting for things requires, because as a manner of intent, respect to their possibility it is always (ontological) grounding of some grounding always necessarily properly, where the character of possibility of beings to be unveiled is constituting itself, in grounding for Dasein, rooted in Dasein's for Dasein's freedom (ontological) grounding of self and self, in the [69] "potius quam" freedom of reason. But once again, the transcendental connections between "...why" clarify the idea of being in general, something and nothingness).

In its traditional form and not stuck in a trivialized form that annulate everything that has the character of declaring this principle to be a contradiction, or even deriving it but is equivalent to cutting off a serve, moreover, that even the parts are not only also transcendental, but
Coming from this origin we not only understand this principle in its intrinsic possibility, but we also gain an eye for something noteworthy and hitherto unelucidated concerning the way it has been conceived, something that is, however, suppressed in the way the principle is ordinarily formulated. In Leibniz we indeed find the principle coined in ways that lend expression to an apparently insignificant moment of its content. These may be schematically brought together as follows: ratio est cur hoc potius existit quam alid; ratio est cur sic potius existit quam aliter; ratio est cur aliquid potius existit quam nihil. [A reason is why this exists rather than something else; a reason is why something exists in this way rather than in another way; a reason is why anything exists rather than nothing.] The "cur" ["why"] is expressed as "cur potius quam" ["why rather than"]. Here again the first problem is not that of the ways and means by which these questions, in each case posed factically in ontic ways of comportment, are to be decided. Rather, what needs to be clarified is why it is that the "cur" ["why"] could associate itself with the "potius quam" ["rather than"] at all.

Every accounting for things must move within a sphere of what is possible, because as a manner of intentional comportment toward beings with respect to their possibility it is already compliant with the explicit or implicit (ontological) grounding of something. In accordance with its essence, such grounding always necessarily provides a given range of what is possible – here the character of possibility changes according to how the being of those beings to be unveiled is constituted – and it does so because being (the constitution of being), in grounding something, is, as transcendentally binding for Dasein, rooted in Dasein's freedom. The reflection of this origin of the essence of ground in the grounding that pertains to finite freedom shows itself in the [69] "potius quam" found in these formulations of the principle of reason. But once again, shedding light upon the concrete, transcendental connections between "ground" and the "rather than" presses us to clarify the idea of being in general (what-being and how-being, something, nothing and nothingness).

In its traditional form and role, the principle of reason has remained stuck in a trivialized form that necessarily entails that we first of all illuminate everything that has the character of a "grounding principle." For even declaring this principle to be a "grounding principle" and, for instance, placing it together with the principle of identity and principle of noncontradiction, or even deriving it from these, does not lead us into the origin, but is equivalent to cutting off all further questioning. Here we should observe, moreover, that even the principles of identity and noncontradiction are not only also transcendental, but point back to something more originary
that does not have the character of a proposition, but rather belongs to the occurrence of transcendence as such (temporality).

Thus the principle of reason too lets its non-essence interfere with the essence of ground, and in the sanctioned form of a grounding principle suppresses a problematic that would first open up this very principle. Yet this "non-essence" cannot simply be attributed to the supposed "superficiality" of individual philosophers, and nor can it therefore be overcome by supposedly more radical "progress." Ground has its non-essence because it springs from finite freedom. This freedom is itself unable to withdraw from whatever springs forth from it in this way. The ground that springs forth in transcending folds back upon freedom itself, and freedom as origin itself becomes "ground." Freedom is the ground of ground. Yet not simply in the sense of a formal, endless "iteration." Freedom’s being a ground does not—as we are always tempted to think—have the character of one of the ways of grounding, but determines itself as the grounding unity of the transcendental strewal of grounding. As this ground, however, freedom is the abyss of ground [Ab-grund] in Dasein. Not that our individual, [70] free comportment is groundless; rather, in its essence as transcendence, freedom places Dasein, as potentiality for being, in possibilities that gape open before its finite choice, i.e., within its destiny.

Yet in its world-projective surpassing of beings, Dasein must surpass itself so as to be able to first of all understand itself as an abyss of ground from out of this elevation. And the character of this abyssal ground of Dasein is in turn nothing that lends itself to a dialectic, or to psychological dissection. The irruption of this abyssal ground in transcendence as grounding is rather the primordial movement that freedom accomplishes with us ourselves and thereby "gives us to understand," i.e., proffers as the originary content of world, that this content, the more originally it is grounded, concerns all the more directly the heart of Dasein, its selfhood in action. Accordingly, the non-essence of ground is “overcome” only in factical existing, but never eliminated.

If, however, transcendence in the sense of freedom for ground is understood in the first and last instance as an abyss of ground, then the essence of what was called Dasein’s absorption in and by beings also thereby becomes sharper. Dasein—a finding itself in the midst of beings and pervasively attuned by them—is, as free potentiality for being, thrown among beings. The fact that it has the possibility of being a self, and has this

6 First edition, 1929: Still the futile attempt to think Dasein while shielding the truth of being in its turning.
factically in keeping with its freedom in each case; the fact that transcendence temporalizes itself as a primordial occurrence, does not stand in the power of this freedom itself. Yet such impotence (thrownness) is not first the result of beings forcing themselves upon Dasein, but rather determines Dasein’s being as such. All projection of world is therefore thrown. Clarifying the essence of finitude in Dasein from out of the constitution of its being must precede all “self-evident” assumptions concerning the finite “nature” of the human being, all description of properties that first ensue from finitude, and above all any overhasty “explanation” of the ontic provenance of such properties.

[71] The essence of the finitude of Dasein is, however, unveiled in transcendence as freedom for ground. 

And so the human being, existing as a transcendence that exceeds in the direction of possibilities, is a creature of distance. Only through originary distances that he forms for himself in his transcendence with respect to all beings does a true nearness to things begin to arise in him. And only being able to listen into the distance awakens Dasein as a self to the response of the other Dasein in whose company [Mitsein] it can surrender its I-ness so as to attain itself as an authentic self.

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a First edition, 1929: The leap [Sprung] into the origin [Ursprung]! (Da-sein) origin – freedom – temporality, finitude of Dasein not identical with the finitude of the human being, to be grasped otherwise: character of origin!

b First edition, 1929: But freedom has nothing in common with grounding or with ground, just as little as with cause [Ursache] or causation [Ver-ursachen] or any kind of “substance” or “making” [“sachen” und “machen”].