The Guard and Reserve in America’s New Missions

by Frank G. Hoffman

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War is both an arbiter of military institutions and the strongest harbinger of change. More than three years into the war on terror, some of our crucial national security institutions have been found wanting. The U.S. national defense community continues to fundamentally underestimate the scale and persistence of the threat to the nation. Without a full grasp of the opponent and an overarching framework for meeting the threat, little progress can be made on reframing an outdated security architecture.

Despite 9/11, the Armed services have not examined obsolete assumptions about the way they are organized, nor admitted that the enemy and its entire way of war challenges our mindset and approach to security. As RAND security analyst Brian Jenkins has noted, “We have reconfigured our institutions to better address ‘the spaces in between,’ but we have been far more reluctant to tamper with the basic institutions themselves. We have not fundamentally changed our habits of thought.”

We currently face what the late Robert Strausz-Hupé called “The New Protracted Conflict.” As in the Cold War, this is a long-term ideological conflict that requires constant vigilance, continued mobilization, and considerable resources. As in the earlier conflict, democracy and freedom are imperiled, and one side in the conflict must be vanquished, since there is no accommodation to strike with evil. Today’s threat cannot be deterred or appeased. Unlike the enemies of the past, our new enemies play to their strengths, not ours. “The enemies of yesterday were static, homogeneous, rigid, hierarchical, and


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resistant to change,” notes Jenkins, while “the enemies of today are dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid, networked, and constantly evolving.”

This opponent will avoid fighting the American Way of War.

We have not fully acknowledged how the Cold War shaped our mindset and institutional frameworks, and how much adaptation is necessary. This has become a defining challenge for Americans, one that cannot be resolved with law enforcement or intelligence operations, or simply with clinical applications of military power. Immediately after 9/11, it was apparent that:

This war cannot be won by a few days of pinprick bombing, such as has characterized past U.S. strikes against terrorism, any more than Japan could have been defeated by the morale-boosting Doolittle bombing raid on Tokyo in the dark days after Pearl Harbor. It will require a long, persistent effort against an enemy waging a new kind of war.

The costs of waging this new kind of war will be higher if we do not make the necessary design changes. Strategy is not only about how many major theater wars or overlapping contingencies the nation should be prepared to fight, or how big the defense budget should be, but also about the organization of the institutions that make up the nation's security system. The design and internal processes of these various institutions are crucial to the preparation for and conduct of war, and should be thought through before the tocsin sounds. The clash of arms remains the ultimate validation of the soundness of both the design of this structure and our strategy.

The post-Cold War era has pulled up deep-rooted assumptions planted in the earlier fight against a monolithic, existential threat. Today's new age of vulnerability holds more than its share of tension and disruption, the result of the wide array of new missions, technologies, and adversaries to which America's military must adapt. It must carefully change its strategy, force structure, training, and manpower systems, and even the culture of institutions themselves.

The Guard and Reserve have met great challenges before, providing substantial elements to the American Expeditionary Force in Europe in World War I and sending divisions there a generation later for World War II. Many veterans of that war, who thought and hoped that they had already fulfilled the call to duty, were again taken from their homes to serve in Korea in the 1950s. Likewise, many Reservists who served in Desert Storm in 1991 find themselves once again pulled from their families for an extended tour of duty.

Jenkins, p. 17.


For a comprehensive history of the Guard, see Michael Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636–2000 (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2003).
three years of activations and deployments to fulfill homeland security tasks after 9/11, to support the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and then in Operation Iraqi Freedom have significantly strained both the active component and the Guard and Reserve.

Today's Army has over 330,000 soldiers deployed overseas, from the Balkans to the Gulf, Afghanistan, and Korea. Between 2003 and 2004, all 33 combat brigades of the active Army will have been deployed overseas at least once. Long-term deployments from home stations, a better measure of stress on units and families, are at an all-time high. The Guard and Reserves have made a huge contribution. Reserve contributions have reached record levels (see Figure 1), and are now more than five times the mean level of the Clinton era, when the Reserve Component was thought to be excessively engaged. More than 400,000 members of the Reserve Component have been activated for some period of active duty in support of homeland defense (Operation Noble Eagle), in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom), or in Iraq. As of November 3, 2004, almost 180,000 Reservists and Guardsmen were on active duty, including 153,488 from the Army Reserve or Army National Guard and 11,444 from the Marine Corps Reserve. They represent approximately 45 percent and 33 percent of the available personnel from those components. Reservists make up roughly 40 percent of the force in Iraq, and an even higher share of the Balkan contingent.⁶

Even before being mobilized in support of the war on terror, the Reserves were being stretched thin by the responsibilities they acquired in the post–Cold War years. Evident at the beginning of the Bush administration but not addressed were strains on the Total Force stemming from peacekeeping missions under the Clinton administration as part of its "engagement and enlargement" strategy. These strains are now reflected in Guard retention rates. To the credit of the Reserve Component, it not only responded to the

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mobilization but also exceeded expectations in terms of its readiness and performance over a wide range of missions. However, some units were not mobilized smoothly, some have been called up for extended tours, some have not had the kind of training and equipment status they should have, and some have been on active duty for over two years. The cumulative impact of this unbalanced force structure and multiple and competing demands for homeland and overseas deployments has come close to breaking the Reserves' back.\(^7\)

States, employers, and families are paying for an unbalanced force structure and inadequate numbers. Isolated strains are beginning to show in the Reserves, including discipline problems in activated units in the continental United States, in units challenging their utilization and support in Iraq, and in the failure of Individual Ready Reserve members to report for involuntary mobilization. Generals have made a few complaints about the Guard's readiness. These initial fractures are evidence of the strains placed on the Guards recently, which will undoubtedly be felt for years to come, both in the loss of trained manpower and in the increased costs of accessing, training, and retaining future Reservists.

There have been repeated calls for increasing the size of the Army. Yes, a sound argument can be made that today's Army, both active and reserve, is simply too small to meet the demands of the current strategy.\(^8\) There is little doubt that we are overstretched the force, and that either strategy has to be tailored to available resources or the Pentagon has to authorize a larger Army. However, a sudden increase in size will not relieve our problems in the short term, and could only exacerbate future resource shortfalls for a post-Iraq Army.

**Barriers**

The U.S. government still lacks a grand strategy that identifies clear and achievable objectives, and the related ways and means, to guide the integrated application of all elements of U.S. power in pursuit of the nation's interests.\(^9\) It

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has also been slow to grasp the shift in the characteristics of modern war, continuing to prepare for the wars it wants to fight rather than those it will fight. It has been so engaged with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that it missed the broader Revolution in Strategic Affairs that globalization and other dynamics produced.10

U.S. military culture still builds capabilities around shibboleths like "fight and win the nation's wars." These conceptions are not rooted in strategy. They reflect an apolitical conception of war that is antithetical to the Clausewitzian framework, that war is always an extension of political objectives. The U.S. emphasis on the destruction rather than the reconstruction phase of war has led one defense scholar to characterize the American Way of War as a "Way of Battles."11 Before the Iraq insurgency, Washington had not yet accepted that the collapse of order following almost every conflict imposes responsibilities for stability that require consideration as part of the war itself.

America has tried so hard to redefine war on its own terms that it sometimes forgets that the opponent has a say, too. Despite nearly two hundred years' experience fighting small wars and unconventional conflicts, dating back to the Barbary Wars, the U.S. military remains reluctant to engage in these conflicts (for instance, in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia), which are not thought to play to its strengths. We prefer to "shock and awe" our opponents, and end up stunning them with our hubris.12

Our defense institutions have strenuously resisted transforming the Cold War security architecture into a more responsive and flexible structure, beginning this only with the National Defense Panel's Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (1997) and the Hart-Rudman National Security Commission's Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change (February 2001). The Pentagon is only now belatedly addressing the shift in our global force posture, which has tied up considerable manpower in locations of reduced strategic importance.

The cumulative effect of these factors has strained our armed forces to the edge. It will take years to rebuild the strength of the country's Total Force after recent years. Until a true grand strategy is formulated, and until a process by which national security priorities are delineated and forces allocated, we continue to take risks.

Four Visions

Considerable attention has been given to the strategy that should guide the use of our armed forces and shape their capabilities, and to the appropriate

11 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Mar. 2004).
roles and missions for the Reserves. Dominating the debate have been four schools, which may be termed Military Revolutionaries, Classical Republicans, Traditionalists, and Democratic Globalists.

Military Revolutionaries

The Military Revolutionaries embrace the application of information technology to American security matters. This school holds that technological advances have substantially altered the conduct of military operations, displacing mass and quantity with precision and quality. Its adherents point to new technologies that allow us to conduct operations more efficiently, with far fewer forces or platforms.\textsuperscript{13}

To achieve the potential of the RMA, force modernization investments are being shifted from active forces, especially ground forces, to space-based platforms, aviation-strike capabilities, and advanced sensors and information networks that link our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to precision-strike systems.

The Military Revolutionaries explicitly focus the active component of America’s ground forces on classic war-fighting missions, even though that role has diminished in view of the information and precision advantages the United States can bring to bear. They would make the Guard and Reserve the primary military instruments for peace operation capabilities—e.g., military police, civil affairs, medical personnel, water purification, and civil engineers. This bifurcation of war fighting and peacekeeping produces a force structure that is substantially smaller, with far fewer ground forces. This theory, central to the Secretary of Defense’s earlier conceptions, has taken a beating after the initial post–Operation Iraqi Freedom euphoria.

The Military Revolutionaries often misread broader trends in the security environment, narrowly focusing on the opportunities of the RMA and overlooking the ways new information technologies will also benefit opponents in asymmetric wars. They badly misinterpret America’s combat experiences in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The RMA proponent assumed that the United States would retain a significant advantage based on its dominance in information technology. But lowered entry barriers and globalization make it unlikely that we can retain a monopoly in this area. Moreover, as we have seen in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, today’s security challenges entail the restoration of societies wracked by tribal warfare and ethnic tensions that are not amenable to efficient solutions based on

modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and precision-strike aircraft.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Classical Republicans}

The Classical Republican follows in the tradition of the founding fathers—at least of Jefferson's ideal Republic. They seek to retain the duality inherent between active and reserve forces, but reverse the relationship and roles between the two. Building on an ideal of shared responsibility for the common defense that goes back to Greek antiquity, Classical Republicans emphasize civic virtue and citizen engagement in the life and business of the state. (This is the only one of the four schools that would be consistent with imposing a draft under certain circumstances.) Proponents of this school include former Senator Gary Hart, who contends that the nation should maintain voluntary national service options, or even a system of universal military training. As Senator Hart puts it:

Nothing is as central to the republic as its defense and security. Nothing would likely reawaken a dormant sense of patriotism in American young people than a universal national training requirement. Nothing would engage the American people in the conduct of their international relations more profoundly than having their sons and daughters more directly involved in the national defense.\textsuperscript{15}

The Classical Republicans argue that relying on the Reserve Component would enhance debate and commitment leading up to the decision to deploy. The idea that a civilian-based force structure would serve as a brake on an ambitious chief executive was incorporated into the post–Vietnam War Abrams doctrine of Gen. Creighton Abrams, which made the Reserves an indispensable part of large-scale war. Arguably, given our deployment history since 1989 (the year of Just Cause in Panama), this philosophy has not appreciably influenced presidential freedom of action. It may have influenced the conduct of operations in Somalia and Kosovo, but that only suggests that the doctrine influences the actual conduct and duration of conflicts, not the decision to intervene.\textsuperscript{16}


This school argues that our history, traditions, and political values support the continued primacy of a citizen army and a substantial militia. It holds that our strategic circumstances, defense budgets, and domestic security challenges require a transformation of strategy, force structure, and capabilities, including a focus on our reserves and citizen-soldiers. The resulting force structure augurs for a substantially smaller active force that is oriented to forward deployments and quick-response missions. The capacity to conduct high-intensity conventional operations would be built into a Total Force strength designed to provide tiered readiness. Total troop numbers would be reduced to about 700,000 full-time personnel, for an active Army of only 300,000 and a Marine Corps reduced by about 20 percent, with commensurate transfers to the Reserves. Resources for equipment and training would be reapportioned from the active side to the Reserve Component. In short, the bulk of the Total Force would be shifted to the Reserve and Guard versus a large, standing active force.

According to the Classical Republicans, such a reliance on the Reserve Component has served the nation well in the past, by linking the military and the dangers it faces to the nation at large. “The specific purpose and intent of a citizen army is to engage the American people in the policy decision at the point a military operation takes on a semipermanent character.” The disadvantages of this approach are the adverse effect it would have on deterrence, the reduction in forward presence, and the increased reaction time required in crises. Nor does it address the potential for an inordinately high operations tempo if the world remains as chaotic as it is today. Finally, it ignores the reality that there are a finite number of people who want to serve in the military on a part-time basis, and that this model may not be sustainable going forward. This model would seem more appropriate for an earlier, more stable security environment, based in a secure Fortress America capable of mobilizing for the occasional tyrant and addressing the Barbary pirates. It may not be an effective structure for today’s global insurgency.

Traditionalists

The Traditionalist wants to stay the course, maintaining that the current National Guard structure is an appropriate reflection of the Guard’s ethos and contribution to the nation’s security. This view focuses on the Guard’s traditional role since World War II and its vital contribution to the Cold War. In essence, this vision of the Guard’s role remains unchanged after 9/11 and would retain a heavy force structure of eight National Guard Divisions configured for conventional combat in Europe. In strategic terms, Traditionalists argue that the National Guard should focus its structure, equipment, and training solely on war fighting and its role as a strategic reserve. They do not

accept domestic security roles as a raison d'être or a mission for which the Guard should specifically structure itself. Traditionalists admit that the Guards must respond to their respective governors' calls for assistance in response to natural emergencies and domestic crises, but they do not want to create any specific capabilities for this role. They accept "dual missioning" of the Reserve Component for both war-fighting and homeland security functions, but not true dual capability or dual readiness. This both contravenes the National Guard's role under Title 32 of the U.S. Code and blithely assumes that capabilities designed for distinctively different roles will be acceptable in both.

This is the school of thought that pushed back and actively opposed the Hart-Rudman Commission's recommendation that the Guard accept homeland security as a primary mission per the militia clauses of the Constitution. Even after 9/11, leading Guard officials opposed the employment of Guard assets for domestic security tasks, arguing that the Guard could not recruit for this a mission that could be perceived as less prestigious, that federal resources would not be forthcoming for non-military or non-Defense Department missions, and that the long-term health of the Reserve Component would deteriorate. This school continues to contend that training and equipping Guard assets for domestic security missions along the borders or near critical elements of the nation's infrastructure is a misapplication of resources.

The Traditionalist school accepts the current employment of the Reserve as an integral component of the Total Army, with its emphasis on combat service support skills. This implicitly accepts the conclusion that the Reserves have a greater tie to the active force and that the Reserves are a more interdependent part of the Total Force, with a potentially higher reliance, leading to a higher probability of activation and employment for both major conflicts and today's complex contingencies.

The Traditionalist fails to appreciate the competition for increasingly scarce defense resources in today's radically different security situation. It is much harder to think of funding the Guard to conduct future missions in Bosnia or Korea at this time when Boston and Kansas may be at risk. Today's asymmetric threats make distinctions in mission priorities between frontline forces for the Fulda Gap and domestic roles to protect Main Street, USA somewhat antiquated. There is no distinct front overseas anymore, and many strategic and institutional boundaries are either blurred or blown away.

The Traditionalist does not accept the conclusion that the end of the Cold War sharply diminished the utility of the Guard as a war-fighting force. The coming cash crunch in the Defense Department will only hasten the search for creative solutions. Despite massive defense increases, a substantial modernization and maintenance bill is building steam. A few years ago, after the Clinton-era procurement holiday, the "coming train wreck" was a popular refrain. That is now sharply accelerated by the high pace of operations since

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18 Author interviews with Congressional leaders and Adjutants General, 2001.
the war on terror was initiated. Weapons, ammunition, trucks, and airplanes are being used up at rates greater than programmed, and they may have to be repaired or replaced far earlier than now planned. While Defense spending was substantially increased of late, the funding will be entirely consumed by operational demands and sharply increasing personnel costs. This will force defense planners to seek greater efficiencies. Paraphrasing General Eric K. Shinseki, the former Army Chief of Staff, if the Guard does not like change in the form of homeland security tasks, it is going “to like irrelevance even less.”

Democratic Globalism

Democratic Globalists seek perpetual primacy for the United States. This school is based on the idea that America must preserve and extend its global leadership by focusing on its military power and by making U.S. power so overwhelming that competitors will simply not choose to compete with America in any domain. To this school, the greatest threat to U.S. primacy is inadequate defense spending. To them, insufficient funding for modernization and force structure in the 1990s imperiled the extension of the Pax Americana. To this school, the strategic framework for maintaining primacy is centered on four core missions: (1) defending the American homeland; (2) fighting and decisively winning, by having sufficient forces to engage and win multiple, simultaneous major theater wars without unacceptably high risks; (3) achieving system stability, expanding forces to meet the realities of a messy world and long-term independent constabulary operations; and (4) transforming the U.S. military to exploit the RMA.

To date, the Globalists have been succeeding in restoring U.S. military spending from just under 3 percent GDP to 4 percent (a level we currently approach) or more. This school would also restore the strength of the active military from today’s 1.36 million service people to 1.6 million, bringing it back to the levels envisioned by the Bush Sr. administration in its proposed Base Force. This proposal distinguishes the Globalists from the Military Revolutionaries. Both schools seek to leverage the RMA, but the Revolutionaries would use force structure reductions to pay for this new investment. The Globalist finds more utility in land power, large active forces, and forces uniquely qualified to conduct stability operations. Globalists would maintain our forward-deployed and -based forces in Southeast Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Taiwan Straits, but reposition them to reflect changes in strategic realities.

Globalists would increase the Army’s end-strength by 50,000 (to 525,000) in order to increase staffing in over-deployed areas, particularly

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overstrained Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. Similarly, they would increase the Marine Corps' active-duty personnel to 200,000, even though selected combat capabilities such as armor would be reduced. The Globalists do not consider how this increase would consume the majority of the increase in the Pentagon's budget.

Despite its ambitious strategic agenda of preserving and extending American influence, this school reduces the strength of the Army National Guard and Reserve. The rationale is to focus these on true national emergencies, not routine missions. Yet, while making constabulary functions an explicit core mission of the Reserves, the Globalists do not support the Guard or Reserve's employment in this task. Similarly, even though this school says that defending the homeland is the number-one mission, it also argues that "reshaping the Guard for homeland security is unwise."21

The downsides to this approach include the potential for imperial overstretch, which some conservatives worry could dilute rather than extend the Pax America. Despite a well-reasoned attempt to argue for additional resources and forces, this approach struggles to match ends to means. It sharply underestimates the troops necessary to achieve its stated policy objective and also dramatically overestimates public support for its aims. Its emphasis on conventional military power to underscore U.S. preeminence, when other instruments of national power are seriously strained and just as relevant, is troubling. It does appropriately identify a valid justification for additional troop strength and appropriate applications of technology, including missile defense, and was remarkably prescient about adapting our global presence posture. Significantly, however, it misses the real challenges to the homeland.

The strategic emphasis and respective force structure and budget resources for each of the four schools are presented in Table 1 below.

Proposal

Any proposal to adapt the Reserve Component is bound to contain some points of disagreement and a measurable element of resistance from many quarters, but a few propositions can be agreed upon. First, the Reserve Component is critical for its ties to Main Street, USA. One does not have to accept the viability of the Abrams doctrine to recognize the importance of domestic political support. Any alteration to Reserve Component roles and missions must be tied to an appreciation of all dimensions of strategy, not just the military or technological aspects. Overlooking the social dimension of strategy is something once cited as a cause for America's failure in Vietnam,


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<th>Table 1. Four Alternative Schools for Reserve Roles and Missions</th>
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and something of which we should remain mindful. In this respect, the Classical Republicans have a point.

Second, the concrete and cost-effective contributions that the Reserve system makes to our national security have to be recognized. The performance of the Guard and Reserves in the past three years more than demonstrates the efficient stewardship of its leadership over the past decade and its utility in strategy and operations. In an era where “transformation” is the code word for adapting in the face of new circumstances, we cannot overlook today’s Total Force effectiveness as one of this country’s most significant transformations.

Third, we must acknowledge some uncertainties. When resources are tight, and when a great premium is being paid for hedging against the uncertain, the existence of ready Reserve elements for low-probability but high-consequence events appears prudent. Taking a historical perspective gives a sense of the contingencies and the occasional sudden shifts and discontinuities we should expect. It also warns against extrapolating from recent experiences and projecting the future as a linear extension of yesterday.

"Traditional" warfighting. As Michael Vlahos writes, “the technology dimension of military transformation has served to turn Old War into High Ritual. Only Americans want to practice it, and they do it to make it always unappetizing for others. But to keep things this way, the U.S. military must

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23 The other two, both legislated by Congress over the doubts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were the All Volunteer Force policy and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols).

forever worship at Old War's altar." Paradoxically, our very supremacy at old war teaches our adversaries to adopt variations of new war. We will need extensive capacity to conduct "old war" from here on out, and rotational requirements could necessitate tapping into the Reserve Component during periods of great and unanticipated emergency. We must also prepare our Reserve Component to deal with nontraditional forms of conflict.

However, we no longer have the luxury of mobilizing and then training our Reserve Component, but instead must be prepared to train them for specific missions in advance, in order to be able to rapidly mobilize and deploy ready units as required by circumstances. This augurs for higher levels of readiness, requiring more focused preparations and organizational alignments to provide first-class training during peacetime. In this regard, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, has appropriately called for a change in our approach to preparing the Reserve. In the past, the process was thought of as "Alert, Mobilize, Train, and Deploy." General Schoomaker's vision of a "Train, Alert, and Deploy" process is more apt for our future needs.

Maintaining a war-fighting role for the Reserve Component both has historical validity and helps us to hedge against uncertainty and future instability either at home or abroad. Consistent with formal assessments of the Guard's composition, it should be sized to provide an efficient strategic reserve and structured to provide a total of five Division equivalents, including a balanced set of focused-maneuver brigades (5 heavy/5 medium/5 light), with their associated support elements. These forces would be trained and prepared primarily but not exclusively for a war fighting role.

Stability and Support Operations. The nature and frequency of stability operations and constabulary missions is going to require organizations that are principally organized, trained, and equipped for those endeavors. Among the greatest threats this country faces, after rogue nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran, are the many failed or failing states that cannot fulfill their security or public service functions. These are potential breeding grounds for terrorists and have enormous humanitarian and spillover costs, as the case of Sudan demonstrates. Our role in the world makes these missions our responsibility, and therefore it is imperative that our military be able to continue to provide forces to help stabilize and secure such states.

We also must prepare for the inevitable "savage wars of peace," including specialized forces capable of conducting preemptive stability inter-
ventions or following up after conventional forces have swept through an
area. This is not a "lesser included task" for a semi-military entity. The best
peacekeeper is a very credible combat soldier. However, this warrior must be
organized, trained, and equipped to fulfill his mission, as well as educated in
the necessary mindset to excel in what are frequently stressful contexts.

The requirement for participation in international stability and support
operations is another reality of today's complex security tapestry. It is essential
to expand our understanding of what winning a war and producing a better
peace entails, as well as the costs of failing to follow through on military
success. "The characteristics of the U.S. style of warfare—speed, jointness,
knowledge, and precision—are better suited for strike operations than for
translating such operations into strategic successes." This suggests a division
comprising three to four Stability Enhancement Brigades, built into the Army
Reserve, which already possess much of the required skill sets and expertise.
This is also an area in which the Reserves can build upon their ongoing work
with U.S. coalition partners in Europe.

Homeland Security. The most prominent change in our security envir-
onment is the rise of terrorism. The last Quadrennial Defense Review, largely
completed by September 2001, emphasized "the unique operational demands
associated with defense of the United States and restoring the defense of the
United States as the Department's mission." Yet it is still unclear what role the
Department of Defense is taking with respect to homeland security, and more
specifically what role the Guard is to play. The primary transformation directive
in the Pentagon, the Transformation Planning Guidance, does not adequately
address homeland security. Northern Command remains a Potemkin village,
with no forces or real resources. The Army's new vision gives short shrift to
this aspect, as well.

We were unprepared in 2001, and despite progress, we remain
unprepared today for major events that would overwhelm any state or local
capacity. The scale and nature of future possible scenarios is numbing, and
they may not be contained to New York and Washington. We are obligated

30 Echevarria, Toward An American Way of War, p. 16.
31 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Recon-
struction (National War College: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004); Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, Needed: A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction
to think bigger and beyond today's organizational stovepipes and outdated conceptual blinders. As Stephen Duncan has noted, “the traditional line between military and civilian functions is, like the line between foreign and domestic threats, becoming less distinguishable.” The situation is ripe for Reserve participation and substantive involvement of the National Guard. This was controversial when it was proposed by the Hart-Rudman Commission in 2001, although now numerous other studies and institutes have echoed its findings. Of recent note, the September 2004 Transforming the Reserve Component for the 21st Century conference recommended that “the primary but not exclusive mission of the National Guard is homeland defense.”

The Guard’s “deep knowledge of emergency response systems, crisis management needs and law enforcement concerns make it ideally suited” for an increased role in homeland security. The Guard’s organization at the state, rather than federal, level makes it uniquely positioned—geographically, politically, and capability wise—to contribute to this extension of our defenses within our territory. Unfortunately, it may already be forward-deployed near domestic battlefields of the future.

To fulfill this vital role, a total of three Division equivalents would be allocated to primarily homeland security missions. This Homeland Security Corps would comprise twelve Security Enhancement Brigades (SEBS). One brigade would be assigned to each of the ten Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency national regions. One additional Brigade would be earmarked for potential foreign deployments or as a reinforcing brigade for special events (Olympics, political conventions, major sporting events, Inaugural parades, etc). This brigade would annually work with DHS’s regional director for training and exercises. The twelfth brigade would be designated for future national missile defense assignments.

The Homeland Security Corps could be regionally organized under Title 32 authority with agreements of the supported governors. Alternatively, the SEBS could be allocated to Northern Command for employment as federalized forces in an emergency. These brigades would be recruited from and

35 Transforming the Reserve Component was sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army, the Center for American Progress, and the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. The conference report is available at www.americanprogress.org. See also Jack Spencer and Larry M. Wortzel, “The Role of the National Guard in Homeland Security,” Backgrounder 1532, Heritage Foundation, Apr. 8, 2002; and Lynn E. Davis, et al., Army Forces for Homeland Security (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2004).
expected to serve within very short notice for service in their region and within the country as their primary mission.

The SEB brigade headquarters organization would include a substantial command-and-control capability that would be interoperable with state and local emergency management systems. Each SEB would comprise (1) a military police or security battalion, (2) a chemical biological incident response battalion, home for the current Civil Support Teams; (3) a combat support battalion with engineering, logistics, and transportation assets; and (4) a medical support company. Homeland security would be the primary, but not exclusive, mission of these Brigades. This realignment would materially contribute to patching up today's major gaps and closing the current rhetoric/resource gap.\(^3^7\) It would also dispel the dual-mission myth that currently undercuts readiness for the Guard's war fighting and domestic security roles. High levels of readiness—in terms of structure, training and equipment—for specific missions, will be the hallmark of our Reserve Component into the next era. While the Guard may be dual- or multi-mission capable as a whole, it must field capable units for specific missions. Dual-missioning should be replaced with emphasizing mission-capable units. The Pentagon's Homeland Defense Strategy acknowledges specific weakness in overall capacity for consequence-management and emphasizes that the country will expand its reliance on the Reserve and Guard, but maintains that we will continue to rely upon dual-capable forces for both consequence-management and other forms of civil support.

**Conclusion**

As General John McAuley Palmer so aptly noted many years ago, "sound military institutions are organic growths and not structures. A sound national defense is not like a tower of brick and stone that can be built de novo on the surface of the ground. It is, rather, like a living tree with roots deep in the political tradition and history of a nation."\(^3^8\) Our national defense is not a permanent structure. It can adapt, consistent with sound policy and direction from our nation's political leadership. The Reserve Component is, as Palmer defined it, "rather like a living tree with roots deep in the political tradition and history of a nation." Although its roots may run deep, it can still be toppled by strong winds. To preclude this, it is time for renewed attention to the role of our Reserve and Guard to meet the demands of our times.


\(^{38}\) Quoted in Michael Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, p. 369.