INR 3102
Spring 2018
Prof. Nolan

REVIEW LINKS - Second Exam

The Weinberger Doctrine
National Interest 4 P's
National Security 5 Grand Strategies
Trade Politics
Gaddis - integration/fragmentation

The Weinberger Doctrine

In 1993, the professional concerns of the military led to the resurfacing of the Weinberger Doctrine. This was reinforced by events in 1993 in Somalia (where the objectives of U.S. troop involvement remained unclear) and by the fears of some that the United States would become involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzogovina.

The Weinberger Doctrine was established by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the Reagan administration in 1984 to spell out the conditions under which the U.S. ground combat troops should be committed. (Recall that in the earlier part of the 1980s U.S. marines were sent to Lebanon with tragic consequences and the U.S. invaded Grenada where it was criticized for its political and strategic overkill.)

The elements of the Weinberger Doctrine include the following:

1. No overseas commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be made unless a vital interest of the United States or a U.S. ally is threatened.

2. If U.S. forces are committed, there should be total support - that is, sufficient resources and manpower to complete the mission.

3. If committed, U.S. forces must be given clearly defined political and military objectives. The forces must be large enough to be able to achieve these objectives.

4. There must be a continual assessment between the commitment and capability of U.S. forces and the objectives. These must be adjusted if necessary.

5. Before U.S. forces are committed, there must be reasonable assurances that the American people and their elected representatives support such a commitment.

6. Commitment of U.S. forces to combat must be the last resort.

A careful review of these items can clearly reveal a post-Vietnam sensitivity on the part of the Department of Defense. The department was at least sensitive enough to articulate what are really conventional and logical bases of political and military procedure and commitment. Recall the terms that Gen. Colin Powell expressed to the President in the video on the use of U.S. forces to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

INR3102 handout (Foreign Policy Goals, Theories, Powers, and Participants)


     National Interest Goal         Corresponding International Relations Theory

            Power                         Realism

            Peace                         Liberal Internationalism

            Prosperity                    International Political Economy

            Principles                    Democratic Idealism


Power is the key requirement for the most basic foreign policy goal, self-defense and the preservation of independence and territory. Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests. Realism is the school of IR theory that most emphasizes the objective of power. States ultimately can rely only on themselves for security. It is a self-help system. Cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic of security competition.

The principle policies for achieving power-based foreign policy strategies are largely coercive ones... most basic of all is maintaining a strong defense and a credible deterrence.


In a certain sense, all four of the national interest objectives ultimately are about peace. But in this particular analytic category we have in mind theories of Liberal Internationalism and two types of foreign policy. Liberal internationalism views world politics as a "cultivable garden" in contrast to Realism's view of a global jungle. Although they stop short of world government, these theories emphasize both the possibility and the value of reducing the chances of war and of achieving common interests. Looking at peace as achievable but not automatic, theorists such as Robert Keohane stress the importance of creating international institutions as the basis of sustained cooperation. Anarchy cannot be eliminated totally, but it can be partially regulated. International institutions may be formal bodies like the UN, but they can also be informal, what are often called international regimes. Keohane defines international institutions both functionally and structurally, as the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement those rules.

The other type of foreign policy strategy that fits here is the "peace broker" role the United States has played in wars and conflicts to which it has not been a direct party. (Camp David Accords...Dayton Accords)


Foreign policies motivated by the pursuit of prosperity are those which place the economic national interest above other concerns. They seek gains for the American economy. Some involve policies that are specifically foreign economic ones, such as trade policy. Others involve general relations with countries whose significance to U.S. foreign policy is largely economic, as with an oil-rich country like Saudi Arabia. Most generally they involve efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of the international economy.

Theories that stress these kinds of interrelationships between political and economic factors are called theories of international political economy. With regard to U.S. foreign policy and its interests in prosperity, we can distinguish between two main types of theories, one offering a benign view and the other a critical view. The benign one emphasizes the pursuit through foreign policy of general economic benefits to the nation: a favorable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a healthy macroeconomy. The ultimate goal is collective prosperity, in which the interests served are those of the American people in general.

More critical theories, such as imperialism, see such policies as dominated by and serving the interests of the capitalist class and other elites, such as multinational corporations and major banks. The prosperity that is sought is more for the private benefit of special interests, and the ways in which it is sought are highly exploitative of other countries.


This fourth core goal involves the values, ideals, and beliefs that the United States has claimed to stand for in the world. As a more general theory this emphasis on principles is rooted in Democratic Idealism. Democratic idealists hold to two central tenets about foreign policy. One is that when tradeoffs have to be made, "right" is to be chosen over "might." This is said to be particularly true for the U.S. because of the ostensibly special role bestowed on it - to stand up for the principles on which it was founded and not to be just another player in global power politics.

The other key tenet of Democratic idealism is that in the long run "right" makes for "might", that in the end interests like peace and power are well served by principles. One of the strongest statements of this view is the democratic peace theory, which asserts that by promoting democracy we promote peace because democracies do not go to war against each other.


Core national International      Conception of the        Main types
interest goals relations theory       international system      of policies

   Power       Realism               Balance of power             Coercive

   Peace          Liberal               World Order                  Diplomatic

   Prosperity  International         Global Capitalism           Economic
                  Political Economy

   Principles    Democratic Idealism    Global Democracy            Political


                           Power Granted to:

               President            Congress

    War Power        Commander in chief of          Provide for the common defense;
                     Armed forces                   declare war

    Treaties         Negotiate treaties             Ratification of treaties, by
                                                    two-thirds majority (Senate)

    Appointments  Nominate high-level            Confirm president's
                     government officials           appointments (Senate)

    Foreign Commerce No explicit powers, but        Explicit power "to regulate
                     treaty negotiation             foreign commerce"
                     and appointment powers pertain

   General Powers    Executive power; veto          Legislative power; power of the
                                                    purse; oversight and investigation


- the departments and agencies with principle (overall) foreign affairs responsibilities (National Security Council, State Dept., Defense Dept.)

- those most involved in foreign economic policy (Commerce Dept., Treasury Dept., Agriculture Dept., Dept. of State Bureau of Econ. Affairs, USTR- U.S. Trade Representative, ITC - International Trade Commission)

- agencies that deal with political democratization and economic development (Agency for International Development, State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor)

- intelligence agencies (the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency),

- those agencies and offices that, while primarily focused on domestic policy, also have important foreign policy involvement: the EPA on global environmental issues, the Office of National Drug Control Policy on international narcotics policy, the Dept. of Labor on international policies regarding employment practices, etc.

INR 3102

Handout on National Security Policy - 5 Grand Strategies

Two most imminent questions about security policy are when should the U.S. be prepared to consider the use of force, and what kinds of military forces should the U.S. try to sustain?

In the first years of the Clinton administration five grand strategies were put forth in the public discourse.

Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, collective or cooperative security, containment, and primacy.

These may be arrayed along a continuum of alternatives, with isolation and primacy as the two bookends.

At the isolationist end of the spectrum, U.S. global ambitions are modest, action is infrequent, and forces are small. At the primacy end of the spectrum, ambitions are great, action is frequent, and military forces are large and technologically very advanced.

Distinguish between different grand strategies in 5 ways:

- major problem in international politics they identify

- their basic premises and assumptions

- their preferred political and military instruments

- basic questions on U.S. agenda (positions on nuclear proliferation, regional conflict, ethnic conflict, humanitarian intervention)

- the kind of military force they will require

Neo-isolationism ( or disengagement)

Fundamentally a realist view because it focuses on power. Nuclear weapons insure sovereignty; no one has power to threaten U.S. sovereignty. In post-Cold war, U.S. better placed to go it alone. National defense is the only vital interest. Economic well-being best left to private sector. Promotion of such values as democracy and human rights are poor guides to policy. Interventions are too costly. Can increase U.S. safety by staying out of conflicts. No NATO, and UN good just for talking or coordinating efforts at improving quality of life, not peacekeeping (could draw U.S. into conflicts). Most of the foreign policy issues facing the U.S. would disappear. Only in the area of humanitarian assistance does it seem plausible that neoisolationism would act abroad, but only as a clean up - disasters, even wars after they have sorted themselves out.

force structure small - est. 2% GDP - save money

Nuclear force to deter attacks (including nuclear attacks)

Intelligence to monitor development of weapons of mass destruction worldwide and forestall terrorist threats to US

Navy and special operations forces

less "pleasant" side of this policy - U.S. gone from world stage
invitation for competition abroad...regional hegemons more bold
arms races...war...weapons of mass destruction likely to be used
war likely to damage commerce and make trade unsafe in some parts of the world
increase in others' defense spending make U.S. economy more competitive

Selective Engagement

Motivated by both power and peace. Mainly concerned with peace among the great powers. Great power conflicts are much more dangerous to U.S. than other conflicts. Russia, the EU, China and Japan matter most. Purpose of U.S. engagement would be to affect directly the propensity of these powers to go to war with one another. Threaten war to prevent war (realist). This is where the U.S. has been drawn in the past. Why not collective security?...not possible to get collective will, so credibility of collective response is doubtful, deterrence therefore not likely. Proliferation is a great worry. Regional conflicts matter only as they affect great power competition, same with ethnic conflicts. Humanitarian assistance subject to domestic political process (public opinion?)

force structure

strong nuclear deterrent
force capabilities for one major engagement and support for ally in another ...emphasis on mobile naval and air forces and reserves


where is the principle behind strategy?...realism win public support? U.S. prestige served? Credibility at risk? What guides determination of minor issues affects on great powers? Responsible selective engagement would require considerable case by case analysis and public debate.

Collective Security

Only one informed by liberalism rather than realism (peace not power). Is important not to confuse means with ends. Peace is effectively indivisible and U.S. has national interest in world peace. Conditions have never been better for such a policy. interdependencies are a factor...technologies are available both to deter and defeat bad guys. Cooperation among great powers more likely (democracies). Because publics in democracies are casualty sensitive, decisive military superiority is a necessity for repeated action to enforce te peace. Strategy depends on an organization to coordinate collective action. Credibility not yet built up, likely to involve UN and U.S. in a number of wars over years to build up deterrent. Proliferation is a key issue. The more nukes are around the more difficult for multilateral agencies to act against aggression. War to prevent nuclear powers?

Regional aggressions get most attention; ethnic conflicts a real problem.

force structure

Small force only possible if others cooperate to the maximum extent. It is not subtle diplomacy of the U.S. which proves critical, but rather its military reputation which depends on large, diverse, technologically sophisticated and lushly supplied military forces capable of decisive operations...not necessarily a cost saver


Seeks to prevent wars among the great powers by opposing the rise of specific candidate hegemons. Fear of a reascendent Russia and an up and coming China. NATO expansion solves many of the traditional security problems of European great powers after the Cold War (Germany - Russia). Addresses possible Russian threat but also keeps U.S. in Europe and forestalls possibility of German adventuresome policy in the east (talks of vacuums etc...realist) China likewise watched. Its rapid economic growth, improving military, stridency on Taiwan have led to suggestion a maintenance of U.S. diplomatic and military presence in the region.

Force structure

Moderate levels of force until Russian economy recovers and China's military gets the advantages of China's economic growth


Power is the key to peace. Balance of power is insufficient. Only a preponderance of power ensures peace. Both world order and national security require that the U.S. maintain primacy. Greatest threat is rise of a peer competitor on the order of the former USSR. China most likely peer rising. Economic growth and recent pursuit of power projection capabilities. 1992 Defense Planning Guide (DPG)insisted that U.S. remain sole superpower. Others can rest on U.S. provided stability. U.S. benevolent hegemon with others interests in mind? Persuade other challengers by promoting norms...democracy, international law, market economics. Does not place greatest emphasis on military means...problem not lack of resources, but lack of public will/support (NSC-68 similarity?) Shares isolationism's skepticism of international organizations...facade of multilateralism useful though for diplomatic cover. Proliferation and major power conflict matter most.

Force structure - Bush
Bush's Cold War force adequate


great powers will rise...preventing them will sap U.S. strength
risk of overreach?...too costly?...too open ended?

INR 3102

Key Areas of U.S. Trade Policy

POLICY AREA                                                             KEY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES

Negotiating Trade Agreements                                                 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
                                                                                               Commerce Department
                                                                                               State Dept. Undersec. For Econ. Affairs
                                                                                               Agriculture Department
                                                                                               Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Export Promotion                                                                   U.S. Export-Import Bank
                                                                                              Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC)
                                                                                              Trade and Development Agency (TDA)
                                                                                              State Department
                                                                                              Agriculture Department

Administrative Trade Remedies  (Import regulation)                U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
                                                                                              Commerce Department
                                                                                              Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
                                                                                               Labor Department

(Economic issues and foreign policy priorities of the American public? Recall the data reviewed on public opinion and foreign policy...self-interested issues with rising support and non-self regarding issues falling)

The Congressional Vote on NAFTA, 1993

House of Representatives        YEA         NAY

        Democrats                             102             157

        Republicans                           132               43

                TOTAL                         234            200


          Democrats                             27                 28

          Republicans                            34                10

            TOTAL                               61                 38

Major U.S. Trade Partners      1980         1999

                        Western Europe             23.9%         21.7%

                        Asia-Pacific                    21.4            21.2
                                (Japan)                  (11.0)         (10.9)
                               (China)                    ----              (7.0)

                        Canada                           16.5            20.5

                         Latin America                 15.5            17.7
                                  (Mexico)                (5.9)          (11.0)

                         Other                                9.5            13.5

                         Africa                                6.0             1.3

                         Middle East                       5.7             3.0

U.S. Trade Balance in the 1990s (in millions of dollars)

                        Imports                         Exports                     Trade Balance

1990                495,311                         393,592                       -101,718

1991                487,129                         421,730                         -65,718

1992                532,498                         448,157                         -84,341

1993                 714,990                        642,953                         -72,037

1994                  802,682                        698,301                      -104,381

1995                  891,593                        786,529                      -105,064

1996                  959,349                        850,775                      -108,574

1997                1,047,799                       937,593                       -110,207

1998                1,100,314                       931,026                       -169,288

2000                1,445,438                    1,070,054                       -375,384
2001                1,365,399                    1,007,580                       -357,819
2002                1,392,145                       974,107                       -418,038
2003                1,517,281                    1,022,561                       -494,814
2004                1,769,031                    1,151,448                       -617,583

2005                1,671,400                        904,300                       -767,000

With China

1999                     81,788                    13,111                              -68,677
2002                   125,192                    22,127                            -103,065

2005                    243,5000                  41,800                           -201,700

With Mexico

1999                     94,628                    78,772                              -15,581
2002                   134,615                    97,470                              -37,145

2005                    170,200                 120,000                              -50,200

With Canada

1999                   173,256                  156,603                              -16,653
2002                   209,087                  160,922                              -48,165
 2005                  287,900                  211,300                              -76,600

INR 3102 

Notes on John Lewis Gaddis "Toward the Post-Cold War World"
Foreign Affairs 10 (1991)

In looking at the dilemmas of defining U.S. national interests and purposes in the post-Cold War, Gaddis travels into the unknown (and perhaps confusing) world of ideas. He tries to gather his conceptions of what U.S. policy makers face now that the bipolar certitudes of the Cold War are gone. The topics of some recent and upcoming lectures dealt with issues of national interests, national purpose and decision making. The introduction of Gaddis is offered to assist the students in thinking critically about these kinds of post-Cold War policy problems. SO, look at the ideas he discusses, try to make some logical implications about how Gaddis' ideas and the issues of politics in the foreign policy decision making process (from the external, societal, governmental, etc...) we are studying are interconnected.

Gaddis uses the imagery of cartography to discuss how to understand the unfamiliar environment after the Cold War. The geopolitical map of the Cold War centered around the division between forces of democracy and those of totalitarianism (see Truman Doctrine). It was a simplification that everyone could understand. In the aftermath of the Cold War a new map that simplifies international environment centers around a new form of competition that is just as pervasive as the rivalry between democracy and totalitarianism. It is the contest between forces of integration and fragmentation in the contemporary international environment. Integration involves breaking down barriers that have historically separated nations and peoples in such diverse areas as politics, economics, religion, technology, and culture. Fragmentation forces are resurrecting old barriers between nations and peoples - and creating new ones - at the same time old ones are being torn down. Nationalism, protectionism, racism, and such domestic problems as drugs, the breakdown of education, and the emergence of a permanent social and economic underclass are viewed as elements of the disintegrationist forces facing policy makers.
 The dilemma facing policy makers is inherent in the tension between the forces of fragmentation and integration. While integration tends to satisfy material needs, fragmentation is often required to gratify intangible desires. The U.S. must try to balance these opposing processes as it tried to balance the power arrangements in the Cold War system. Either process carried to the extreme is a threat. According to Gaddis "a fully integrated world would be one in which individual countries would lose control of their borders and would be dependent upon others for critical resources, capital, and markets." A loss of sovereignty would result. A fragmented international system would look like anarchy to the extreme. As Gaddis asserts, "The world would be reduced to a gaggle of quarreling principalities, with war or the threat of war as the only means of settling disputes among them." Gaddis' prescription for balancing the processes includes addressing the remnants of the old rivalry (Eastern Europe et al.,) to adjust and integrate with new economic and security structures, finding appropriate limits to interdependence, and regaining solvency in and discipline in defining U.S. interests.