REVIEW LINKS - Second Exam
The Weinberger Doctrine
National Interest 4 P's
National Security 5 Grand Strategies
Gaddis - integration/fragmentation
The Weinberger Doctrine
In 1993, the professional concerns of the military led to the resurfacing of the Weinberger Doctrine. This was reinforced by events in 1993 in Somalia (where the objectives of U.S. troop involvement remained unclear) and by the fears of some that the United States would become involved in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzogovina.
The Weinberger Doctrine was established by Secretary of Defense
Weinberger in the Reagan administration in 1984 to spell out the
under which the U.S. ground combat troops should be committed. (Recall
that in the earlier part of the 1980s U.S. marines were sent to Lebanon
with tragic consequences and the U.S. invaded Grenada where it was
for its political and strategic overkill.)
The elements of the Weinberger Doctrine include the following:
1. No overseas commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be made unless a vital interest of the United States or a U.S. ally is threatened.
2. If U.S. forces are committed, there should be total support - that is, sufficient resources and manpower to complete the mission.
3. If committed, U.S. forces must be given clearly defined political and military objectives. The forces must be large enough to be able to achieve these objectives.
4. There must be a continual assessment between the commitment and capability of U.S. forces and the objectives. These must be adjusted if necessary.
5. Before U.S. forces are committed, there must be reasonable assurances that the American people and their elected representatives support such a commitment.
6. Commitment of U.S. forces to combat must be the last resort.
A careful review of these items can clearly reveal a post-Vietnam
on the part of the Department of Defense. The department was at least
enough to articulate what are really conventional and logical bases of
political and military procedure and commitment. Recall the terms that
Gen. Colin Powell expressed to the President in the video on the use of
U.S. forces to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.
INR3102 handout (Foreign Policy Goals, Theories, Powers, and Participants)
CORE GOALS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
National Interest Goal Corresponding International Relations Theory
Peace Liberal Internationalism
Prosperity International Political Economy
Power is the key
for the most basic foreign policy goal, self-defense and the
of independence and territory. Power enables an actor to shape his
so as to reflect his interests. Realism is the school of IR theory that
most emphasizes the objective of power. States ultimately can rely only
on themselves for security. It is a self-help system. Cooperation among
states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the
logic of security competition.
The principle policies for
power-based foreign policy strategies are largely coercive ones... most
basic of all is maintaining a strong defense and a credible deterrence.
In a certain sense, all four of the national interest objectives ultimately are about peace. But in this particular analytic category we have in mind theories of Liberal Internationalism and two types of foreign policy. Liberal internationalism views world politics as a "cultivable garden" in contrast to Realism's view of a global jungle. Although they stop short of world government, these theories emphasize both the possibility and the value of reducing the chances of war and of achieving common interests. Looking at peace as achievable but not automatic, theorists such as Robert Keohane stress the importance of creating international institutions as the basis of sustained cooperation. Anarchy cannot be eliminated totally, but it can be partially regulated. International institutions may be formal bodies like the UN, but they can also be informal, what are often called international regimes. Keohane defines international institutions both functionally and structurally, as the rules that govern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement those rules.
The other type of foreign
strategy that fits here is the "peace broker" role the United States
played in wars and conflicts to which it has not been a direct party.
David Accords...Dayton Accords)
Foreign policies motivated by the pursuit of prosperity are those which place the economic national interest above other concerns. They seek gains for the American economy. Some involve policies that are specifically foreign economic ones, such as trade policy. Others involve general relations with countries whose significance to U.S. foreign policy is largely economic, as with an oil-rich country like Saudi Arabia. Most generally they involve efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of the international economy.
Theories that stress these kinds of interrelationships between political and economic factors are called theories of international political economy. With regard to U.S. foreign policy and its interests in prosperity, we can distinguish between two main types of theories, one offering a benign view and the other a critical view. The benign one emphasizes the pursuit through foreign policy of general economic benefits to the nation: a favorable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a healthy macroeconomy. The ultimate goal is collective prosperity, in which the interests served are those of the American people in general.
More critical theories,
as imperialism, see such policies as dominated by and serving the
of the capitalist class and other elites, such as multinational
and major banks. The prosperity that is sought is more for the private
benefit of special interests, and the ways in which it is sought are
exploitative of other countries.
This fourth core goal
the values, ideals, and beliefs that the United States has claimed to
for in the world. As a more general theory this emphasis on principles
is rooted in Democratic Idealism. Democratic idealists hold to two
tenets about foreign policy. One is that when tradeoffs have to be
"right" is to be chosen over "might." This is said to be particularly
for the U.S. because of the ostensibly special role bestowed on it - to
stand up for the principles on which it was founded and not to be just
another player in global power politics.
The other key tenet of
idealism is that in the long run "right" makes for "might", that in the
end interests like peace and power are well served by principles. One
the strongest statements of this view is the democratic peace theory,
asserts that by promoting democracy we promote peace because
do not go to war against each other.
A FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY TYPOLOGY
Core national International
Conception of the Main
interest goals relations theory international system of policies
Power Realism Balance of power Coercive
Democratic Idealism Global
PRINCIPAL FOREIGN POLICY PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Power Granted to:
Commander in chief
Provide for the common defense;
Armed forces declare war
Ratification of treaties, by
two-thirds majority (Senate)
government officials appointments (Senate)
Commerce No explicit powers,
Explicit power "to regulate
treaty negotiation foreign commerce"
and appointment powers pertain
Legislative power; power of the
purse; oversight and investigation
FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
- the departments and agencies with principle (overall) foreign affairs responsibilities (National Security Council, State Dept., Defense Dept.)
- those most involved in foreign economic policy (Commerce Dept., Treasury Dept., Agriculture Dept., Dept. of State Bureau of Econ. Affairs, USTR- U.S. Trade Representative, ITC - International Trade Commission)
- agencies that deal with political democratization and economic development (Agency for International Development, State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor)
- intelligence agencies (the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency),
- those agencies and
that, while primarily focused on domestic policy, also have
policy involvement: the EPA on
issues, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
on international narcotics policy, the Dept. of Labor
on international policies regarding employment practices, etc.
Handout on National Security Policy - 5 Grand Strategies
Two most imminent questions about security policy are when should the U.S. be prepared to consider the use of force, and what kinds of military forces should the U.S. try to sustain?
In the first years of the Clinton administration five grand strategies were put forth in the public discourse.
Neo-isolationism, selective engagement, collective or cooperative security, containment, and primacy.
These may be arrayed along a continuum of alternatives, with isolation and primacy as the two bookends.
At the isolationist end of the spectrum, U.S. global ambitions are modest, action is infrequent, and forces are small. At the primacy end of the spectrum, ambitions are great, action is frequent, and military forces are large and technologically very advanced.
Distinguish between different grand strategies in 5 ways:
- major problem in international politics they identify
- their basic premises and assumptions
- their preferred political and military instruments
- basic questions on U.S. agenda (positions on nuclear proliferation, regional conflict, ethnic conflict, humanitarian intervention)
- the kind of military
they will require
Neo-isolationism ( or disengagement)
Fundamentally a realist
because it focuses on power. Nuclear weapons insure sovereignty; no one
has power to threaten U.S. sovereignty. In post-Cold war, U.S. better
to go it alone. National defense is the only vital interest.
well-being best left to private sector. Promotion of such values as
and human rights are poor guides to policy. Interventions are too
Can increase U.S. safety by staying out of conflicts. No NATO, and UN
just for talking or coordinating efforts at improving quality of life,
not peacekeeping (could draw U.S. into conflicts). Most of the foreign
policy issues facing the U.S. would disappear. Only in the area of
assistance does it seem plausible that neoisolationism would act
but only as a clean up - disasters, even wars after they have sorted
force structure small - est. 2% GDP - save money
Nuclear force to deter attacks (including nuclear attacks)
Intelligence to monitor development of weapons of mass destruction worldwide and forestall terrorist threats to US
Navy and special operations
less "pleasant" side of
policy - U.S. gone from world stage
invitation for competition abroad...regional hegemons more bold
arms races...war...weapons of mass destruction likely to be used
war likely to damage commerce and make trade unsafe in some parts of the world
increase in others' defense spending make U.S. economy more competitive
Motivated by both power and
Mainly concerned with peace among the great powers. Great power
are much more dangerous to U.S. than other conflicts. Russia, the EU,
and Japan matter most. Purpose of U.S. engagement would be to affect
the propensity of these powers to go to war with one another. Threaten
war to prevent war (realist). This is where the U.S. has been drawn in
the past. Why not collective security?...not possible to get collective
will, so credibility of collective response is doubtful, deterrence
not likely. Proliferation is a great worry. Regional conflicts matter
as they affect great power competition, same with ethnic conflicts.
assistance subject to domestic political process (public opinion?)
strong nuclear deterrent
force capabilities for one major engagement and support for ally in another ...emphasis on mobile naval and air forces and reserves
where is the principle
strategy?...realism win public support? U.S. prestige served?
at risk? What guides determination of minor issues affects on great
Responsible selective engagement would require considerable case by
analysis and public debate.
Only one informed by liberalism rather than realism (peace not power). Is important not to confuse means with ends. Peace is effectively indivisible and U.S. has national interest in world peace. Conditions have never been better for such a policy. interdependencies are a factor...technologies are available both to deter and defeat bad guys. Cooperation among great powers more likely (democracies). Because publics in democracies are casualty sensitive, decisive military superiority is a necessity for repeated action to enforce te peace. Strategy depends on an organization to coordinate collective action. Credibility not yet built up, likely to involve UN and U.S. in a number of wars over years to build up deterrent. Proliferation is a key issue. The more nukes are around the more difficult for multilateral agencies to act against aggression. War to prevent nuclear powers?
Regional aggressions get
attention; ethnic conflicts a real problem.
Small force only possible
others cooperate to the maximum extent. It is not subtle diplomacy of
U.S. which proves critical, but rather its military reputation which
on large, diverse, technologically sophisticated and lushly supplied
forces capable of decisive operations...not necessarily a cost saver
Seeks to prevent wars among
great powers by opposing the rise of specific candidate hegemons. Fear
of a reascendent Russia and an up and coming China. NATO expansion
many of the traditional security problems of European great powers
the Cold War (Germany - Russia). Addresses possible Russian threat but
also keeps U.S. in Europe and forestalls possibility of German
policy in the east (talks of vacuums etc...realist) China likewise
Its rapid economic growth, improving military, stridency on Taiwan have
led to suggestion a maintenance of U.S. diplomatic and military
in the region.
Moderate levels of force
Russian economy recovers and China's military gets the advantages of
Power is the key to peace.
of power is insufficient. Only a preponderance of power ensures peace.
Both world order and national security require that the U.S. maintain
Greatest threat is rise of a peer competitor on the order of the former
USSR. China most likely peer rising. Economic growth and recent pursuit
of power projection capabilities. 1992 Defense Planning Guide
that U.S. remain sole superpower. Others can rest on U.S. provided
U.S. benevolent hegemon with others interests in mind? Persuade other
by promoting norms...democracy, international law, market economics.
not place greatest emphasis on military means...problem not lack of
but lack of public will/support (NSC-68 similarity?) Shares
skepticism of international organizations...facade of multilateralism
though for diplomatic cover. Proliferation and major power conflict
Force structure - Bush
Bush's Cold War force adequate
great powers will
them will sap U.S. strength
risk of overreach?...too costly?...too open ended?
Key Areas of U.S. Trade Policy
KEY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
State Dept. Undersec. For Econ. Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
U.S. Export-Import Bank
Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC)
Trade and Development Agency (TDA)
Administrative Trade Remedies (Import
U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
(Economic issues and foreign policy priorities of the American
Recall the data reviewed on public opinion and foreign
issues with rising support and non-self regarding issues falling)
The Congressional Vote on NAFTA, 1993
House of Representatives YEA NAY
Democrats 102 157
Republicans 132 43
Democrats 27 28
Republicans 34 10
Major U.S. Trade Partners 1980 1999
Western Europe 23.9% 21.7%
(Japan) (11.0) (10.9)
(China) ---- (7.0)
Canada 16.5 20.5
(Mexico) (5.9) (11.0)
Other 9.5 13.5
Africa 6.0 1.3
U.S. Trade Balance in the 1990s (in millions of
Imports Exports Trade Balance
1990 495,311 393,592 -101,718
1991 487,129 421,730 -65,718
1992 532,498 448,157 -84,341
1993 714,990 642,953 -72,037
1994 802,682 698,301 -104,381
1995 891,593 786,529 -105,064
1996 959,349 850,775 -108,574
1997 1,047,799 937,593 -110,207
2001 1,365,399 1,007,580 -357,819
2002 1,392,145 974,107 -418,038
2003 1,517,281 1,022,561 -494,814
2004 1,769,031 1,151,448 -617,583
2005 1,671,400 904,300 -767,000
2002 125,192 22,127 -103,065
2005 243,5000 41,800 -201,700
2002 134,615 97,470 -37,145
2005 170,200 120,000 -50,200
2002 209,087 160,922 -48,165
2005 287,900 211,300 -76,600
Notes on John Lewis Gaddis "Toward the Post-Cold War World"
Foreign Affairs 10 (1991)
In looking at the dilemmas of defining U.S. national interests and purposes in the post-Cold War, Gaddis travels into the unknown (and perhaps confusing) world of ideas. He tries to gather his conceptions of what U.S. policy makers face now that the bipolar certitudes of the Cold War are gone. The topics of some recent and upcoming lectures dealt with issues of national interests, national purpose and decision making. The introduction of Gaddis is offered to assist the students in thinking critically about these kinds of post-Cold War policy problems. SO, look at the ideas he discusses, try to make some logical implications about how Gaddis' ideas and the issues of politics in the foreign policy decision making process (from the external, societal, governmental, etc...) we are studying are interconnected.
Gaddis uses the imagery of cartography to discuss how to understand
the unfamiliar environment after the Cold War. The geopolitical map of
the Cold War centered around the division between forces of democracy
those of totalitarianism (see Truman Doctrine). It was a simplification
that everyone could understand. In the aftermath of the Cold War a new
map that simplifies international environment centers around a new form
of competition that is just as pervasive as the rivalry between
and totalitarianism. It is the contest between forces of integration
fragmentation in the contemporary international environment.
involves breaking down barriers that have historically separated
and peoples in such diverse areas as politics, economics, religion,
and culture. Fragmentation forces are resurrecting old barriers between
nations and peoples - and creating new ones - at the same time old ones
are being torn down. Nationalism, protectionism, racism, and such
problems as drugs, the breakdown of education, and the emergence of a
social and economic underclass are viewed as elements of the
forces facing policy makers.
The dilemma facing policy makers is inherent in the tension between the forces of fragmentation and integration. While integration tends to satisfy material needs, fragmentation is often required to gratify intangible desires. The U.S. must try to balance these opposing processes as it tried to balance the power arrangements in the Cold War system. Either process carried to the extreme is a threat. According to Gaddis "a fully integrated world would be one in which individual countries would lose control of their borders and would be dependent upon others for critical resources, capital, and markets." A loss of sovereignty would result. A fragmented international system would look like anarchy to the extreme. As Gaddis asserts, "The world would be reduced to a gaggle of quarreling principalities, with war or the threat of war as the only means of settling disputes among them." Gaddis' prescription for balancing the processes includes addressing the remnants of the old rivalry (Eastern Europe et al.,) to adjust and integrate with new economic and security structures, finding appropriate limits to interdependence, and regaining solvency in and discipline in defining U.S. interests.