Presidential Campaigns and Elections: An Overview

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I. Introduction

“There is no excitement anywhere in the world, short of war, to match the excitement of the American presidential campaign.”

Indeed, for voters and political observers alike, the process leading up to that fateful Tuesday once every four years is the pinnacle of national political spectacle—“the Super Bowl, the World Series, and, some might say, center ring of American politics” all wrapped up in a single event. Americans have come to expect nothing less in the competition for the most coveted elective office in the nation. Underlying the jockeying, posturing, and debating that define the long campaign leading the victor to the White House is a core belief that presidential elections matter. As commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, and “chief legislator” the president’s decisions and stances fundamentally shape national and foreign policy and leave lasting imprints on history.

The stability of quadrennial elections provided for in the Constitution does not imply that presidential campaigns have remained static since the founding of the Republic in 1789. Significant technological and structural changes in the electoral process have altered campaigning strategies in the last 50 years. Presidential campaigns in the post-World War II period are best understood as combining essential republican features reflected in the Founder’s desire for indirect democracy with pressures for democratization and citizen participation. This evolution has produced a unique amalgam of features and a new set of challenges for presidential contenders in their bid for the Oval Office.

This chapter considers the basic characteristics and processes surrounding contemporary presidential campaigns. The first section examines the characteristics of presidential challengers. The second section surveys the complexities of the nominating system, from primary elections and caucuses to national party conventions. The third section offers an overview of general
campaign dynamics, followed by a brief discussion of identifiable patterns of voting behavior in presidential elections. The concluding sections assess the impact of campaigns on governance, with particular attention to the concept of presidential “mandates,” and examine calls for reforms aimed at redressing dysfunctions of the current system.

II. Candidate Characteristics

It is an axiom of American politics that in the contest for the White House, “many are called but few are chosen.” Of course, primary elections and caucuses (discussed below) are structured to eventually narrow the field down to a single nominee by the time the two parties hold their national conventions in summer of the election year. But even a year before the first primary or caucus there is typically an identifiable pool of candidates who emerge and begin to consider a run for the White House. This “invisible primary” constitutes efforts to gain name recognition, media attention, and the national spotlight well in advance of the first-in-the-nation New Hampshire primaries and Iowa caucuses.³

[Table 1]

At this early stage of the presidential campaign the parties may field a dozen or more hopefuls for the White House. Several factors may contribute to the magnitude of contestants who decide to get into the race. Table 1 accentuates several patterns. First, the “out party”—that is, the party that does not currently hold the White House—is much more likely to attract a sizeable number of candidates when the incumbent of the opposition party is seeking reelection. In 1972 and 1976, for example, a large number of Democrats lined up to challenge Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, respectively. Similarly, Democratic President Bill Clinton’s reelection bid in 1996 drew competition from no less than twelve Republican contenders, and ten Democrats stood ready to square off against George Bush a full year before the 2004 presidential
election. Second, the party faithful are less inclined to challenge an incumbent president seeking reelection. Neither Ronald Reagan (1984) nor George W. Bush (2004) faced an in-party challenge in their reelection bids. When serious challenges to incumbent presidents have occurred in either party—such as Senator Edward Kennedy’s effort to overtake Jimmy Carter for the Democratic nomination in 1980 or Ronald Reagan’s attempt to beat Gerald Ford for the 1976 Republican nomination—the sitting president has always prevailed.

Americans are prone to complain about their presidential candidate choices. But it is difficult to make the case that the vast majority of nominees are unqualified. The “job experience” of competitors in presidential campaigns has been both substantial and remarkably stable in the last half-century. As political scientists Thomas Cronin and Michael Genovese note, “About half have been lawyers and served in Congress. Most others have held state or community elective office.” There are occasionally celebrity, businessmen, and political activist candidates who vie for the Democratic and Republican Party nominations. A theme in modern presidential politics is to run against Washington as an “outsider,” even though candidates generally need to have “insider” experience to win the party nomination. The eventual nominees of both parties have had significant executive experience in either national or state government and/or legislative experience in Congress. In fact, between 1960 and 2000 Democratic nominees had an average of 15 years of combined executive, congressional, and/or gubernatorial experience. Republicans boasted a combined average of 17 years.

[Table 2]

The U.S. Senate, state governorships, and the vice-presidency are the most important launching pads for successful presidential contenders. Table 2 shows that the U.S. Senate is a major recruiting ground for presidential candidates. Congressional scholar Barry C. Burden
found that between 1960-96 over one-third of those contesting the presidency—and just less than a quarter of those who were nominated as their party’s standard-bearer in the general election—had Senate experience. These candidates include Republicans Barry Goldwater (1964) and Bob Dole (1996), and Democrats Al Gore (2000), Walter Mondale (1984), George McGovern (1972), and Lyndon Johnson (1964). Republican Gerald Ford is an anomalous case, as he served 24 years in the House of Representatives. Ford, of course, was elected to neither the presidency nor the vice-presidency.

The public often equates executive experience at the state level with that at the national level. State governorships are the second largest source of presidential candidates. Nearly a fifth of nominees in the thirty-six year period held governorships. States are often considered “laboratories of democracy” and savvy governors can gain substantial name recognition and media attention for innovative policies and leadership. As Governor of Arkansas for thirteen years, Democrat Bill Clinton earned the national spotlight as president of the National Governor’s Association prior to his bid for the White House in 1992. Republican Ronald Reagan served eight years as governor of the most populous state in the nation, California, and Democrats Michael Dukakis (MA) and Jimmy Carter (GA) served ten and four years, respectively, as governors of their home states. Republican George W. Bush was elected twice to the Texas governorship and touted his record of working in a bipartisan spirit with Democrats in the state legislature. Howard Dean, the early Democratic frontrunner for 2004, served as Vermont governor for over 11 years. One common link between all these candidates is the appeal to voters that their economic management and experience at the state level enabled them to apply expertise to national policies.
Vice-presidents form a small number of overall contenders but a higher percentage of eventual nominees. Most vice-presidential candidates also have had prior congressional experience. Table 2 shows that just less than a third of vice-presidential nominees, including Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and George H.W. Bush won the White House (Nixon failed in 1960, but prevailed upon his second try in 1968). Vice-presidential candidates often face the unique dilemma of needing to support, while simultaneously distinguish themselves from, their predecessors. The point is underscored by the conundrum of Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey (1968), who sought to distance himself from Lyndon Johnson’s unpopular policies in the Vietnam War without undermining Johnson’s authority. Similarly, Democrat Al Gore (2000) attempted to take credit for the successful economic policies of Clinton’s presidency while detaching himself from the scandals that clouded Clinton’s two terms. Even successful vice-presidential candidates are not immune from the quandary. Republican George H.W. Bush was victorious in 1988 following Ronald Reagan’s two terms—though his promise of a “kinder, gentler America” seemingly called into question the “Great Communicator’s” legacy and drew the ire of many conservative Republicans.

III. The Nominating System: From Primaries and Caucuses to the Convention

The complicated process that eventually yields the parties’ nominees is tedious, challenging, and costly for presidential aspirants. Unlike most parliamentary democracies such as Great Britain or Canada, there is no legally-sanctioned “campaign period” that guides the process for choosing the American national executive. Federalism plays a pivotal role. Constitutionally, it is the states—not the federal government—that determine how and when delegates to the national party conventions are chosen. The majority of states hold primary elections beginning in January of the presidential election year. Primary elections give voters an
opportunity to express their candidate preference. The tabulation of these preferences translates into a share of delegates for each candidate from the states to the national party convention. The party’s standard-bearer is ultimately chosen through a roll-call vote of those delegates. Other states hold *caucuses*, which are local or statewide meetings of party activists. Party members then cast votes for delegates of their preferred candidate to the state and national conventions. Thus, primary elections and caucuses have popular participatory components but retain an important element of indirect democracy.

This *primary season* that begins in January of the presidential election year and ends with the parties’ summer conventions serves a vital purpose in presidential selection. At a fundamental level the nomination process provides a framework for legitimization of presidential candidates and facilitates mass electoral choice, which is the lifeblood of representative democracy. The system is aimed at winnowing the field of contenders, producing a candidate with the greatest level of consensus in each party, and giving voters the tools they need to make informed choices. The primary season furnishes contestants with a forum to debate current policy issues, critique one another as well as candidates or the incumbent from the other party, and make their stances known to the public while enabling the press and the public to scrutinize their platforms. The objective is to produce the most qualified candidate in each party for the nation’s highest office and close ranks by the end of the summer national convention, which signals the beginning of the general election campaign.9

*The Dynamics of the Nomination Process: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives*

Different types of processes have necessitated different campaign tactics to win the parties’ nominations. Primary elections grew out of Progressive era reforms of the early 1900s as a means to redress corrupt and authoritarian nineteenth-century practices at state and national
conventions. Presidential nominees were often “insiders” chosen by party elites with little popular participation, either in Congress or through caucuses (meetings of state party leaders). Wisconsin instituted the first presidential primary in 1905. By 1912 eleven other states had followed suit. But a majority of states did not begin to utilize primaries until the 1970s. Until that point, presidential candidates shied away from entering primaries and party leaders continued to exercise substantial control over the choice of the nominee at the national convention.11

[Figures 1a and 1b]

As Figures 1a and 1b show, the percentage of delegates chosen through presidential preference primaries grew rapidly through the 1970s. Sixty to 75 percent of delegates for the two parties’ conventions are now routinely chosen through popular means, and four of every five states now holds a primary election. The year 1968 proved to be a watershed in the development of presidential primaries. The raucous Democratic convention in Chicago, at which protestors clashed with police when anti-Vietnam War protestors could not gain access or influence over the convention proceedings, precipitated important reforms. The delegate selection reforms were so sweeping that most Democratic state parties abandoned the caucus in favor of presidential primaries. And the national party organization could enforce the new rules because it seats the state delegates at the national convention.

Following the 1968 convention, the Democrats constituted the McGovern-Fraser Commission, which was charged with developing rules to open up the delegate section process to as many voters as possible. The reforms set quotas for the number of delegates constituting minorities and women, as well as younger voters. The Republican Party established its own “Delegates and Organization Committee” that pursued similar modifications. The net effect of
this reformist impulse in both parties was to decisively end the era of *brokered conventions* by limiting the influence of party leaders and extending popular control over nominations through primaries.\textsuperscript{12} By 2004, only four states—Alaska, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah—did not have some form of a presidential preference primary.\textsuperscript{13}

The consequences of the proliferation of primaries for presidential contestants are manifold from a strategic perspective. Candidates must pay close attention to the electoral timetable. Advance planning is essential. Months before the primary season, they must “assemble a staff to help raise money, develop campaign strategy, hone a message, and identify a larger group of people willing to do the advance work necessary to organize states for the upcoming primaries and caucuses.”\textsuperscript{14} Such groundwork includes currying favor with the media, attempting to obtain positive press coverage, conducting polling on policy ideas, and networking with local and state party organizational leaders and activists.

Nowhere is the need for early planning more evident than in fundraising. Candidates able to bankroll large sums of money solidify their status as a serious challenger and can create an image as an early “frontrunner” by drawing media attention to substantial financial backing. Although a large campaign war chest does not guarantee success, “early money,” as political scientists Elaine Kamarck and Kenneth Goldstein contend, “does make candidates look like winners and may allow them to withstand initial setbacks once the nomination season begins.”\textsuperscript{15}

One important decision candidates must make is whether to accept federal matching contributions. Federal law provides that if candidates raise a total of $100,000 by collecting $5,000 in individual contributions of no more than $250 each in at least twenty states, they can receive matching federal funds. Matching contributions are provided by taxpayers who voluntarily check-off a box on their annual federal tax returns. The tradeoff is that if candidates
accept federal money, they face spending ceilings and must comply with federal reporting and auditing requirements. In 2004 candidates receiving federal matching funds must limit primary campaign spending to approximately $45 million and no more than $50,000 from personal funds. Spending caps for the general election are fixed at $74 million, excluding unregulated contributions (often referred to as soft money) such as those from state and party organizations and political action committees (PACs).¹⁶ (See also Anthony Corrado, “An Overview of Campaign Finance Law,” Chapter 6).

Many recent presidential candidates have decided to reject federal funding because they can raise far more for their campaign war chests through individual contributions—and accepting federal funds may place their campaigns at a disadvantage. In 2000 the George W. Bush campaign made a conscious decision to forego federal matching funds and concentrate instead on raising such “hard money” (individual contributions).¹⁷ Bob Dole’s experience in 1996 was not lost on the Bush campaign. Dole, the Republican nominee, had accepted federal matching contributions but had spent heavily in the primaries against wealthy businessman Steve Forbes. As a result Dole’s campaign approached spending limits well in advance of the general election. In the 2004 election cycle the early Democratic primary frontrunner, Howard Dean, similarly decided to decline federal matching funds, preferring to amass individual contributions he estimated would exceed federal limits, as did the Bush White House.

In tailoring their message to primary voters and caucus participants, candidates must be mindful of their audience. By their very nature, caucuses draw committed party activists who tend to be more ideological than general election voters. And though turnout for primary elections tends to be much lower than in the general election, those who do go to the polls tend to be more ideologically committed, “dyed-in-the-wool” party supporters.¹⁸ Thus, candidates in
both parties have incentives to try to mobilize the ideological extremes of the primary electorate. For Democrats, this may include party loyalists such as African-Americans and union members. For Republicans committed party supporters may span social conservatives to business leaders. The opening test of candidates’ appeals to core supporting groups comes in New Hampshire and Iowa.

**Iowa, New Hampshire, and “Frontloading”**

The first battleground for the presidential nomination in each party takes place in New Hampshire and Iowa. Presidential candidates ignore the New Hampshire primaries and the Iowa caucuses at their own risk and peril. These two states have the tradition of holding the first-in-the-nation tests for presidential aspirants. Iowa Democrats, who had rushed to implement the McGovern-Fraser Committee reforms four years ahead of schedule, held the state’s first caucuses in 1972. New Hampshire held its first primary contest in 1952 and has a state constitutional provision mandating that its primary come before all others in the Union.

The New Hampshire primary has taken on mythical qualities. Between 1952 and 1988 no candidate successfully won the White House without prevailing in the Granite State’s primary. Only in the last decade has New Hampshire’s crystal ball for the White House proven incorrect. In 1992 Bill Clinton lost the New Hampshire primary but won the Democratic nomination and later defeated incumbent President George H.W. Bush. In fact, the Clinton campaign attempted to spin the early defeat in New Hampshire into a victory, arguing that the “Comeback Kid” did better than expected against favorite-son Paul Tsongas, a veteran Senator from neighboring Massachusetts. In 2000 Republican John McCain ran a spirited, centrist campaign and outpaced George W. Bush by 18 points in New Hampshire. Bush, who was later victorious in a number of subsequent primaries and won the Republican nomination decisively,
dismissed the loss by contending that “New Hampshire has long been known as a bump in the road for front-runners.”

Do the New Hampshire primary and Iowa caucuses give the two states too much influence in the early race for party nominations? Critics allege that New Hampshire and Iowa are “politically, socially, and economically unrepresentative of the country and both political parties at large.” Both states are rural, have few minority voters, and are more conservative than larger, more populous states such as New York, California, Texas, and Florida. Moreover, the frenzied national media coverage that follows candidates to Iowa and New Hampshire is biased toward the horse race. The focus is less on candidates’ policy positions and much more on which candidate is the frontrunner and prognostications about who will come out ahead when the vote counting ends.

Regardless of the merit of these critiques, candidates spend much time visiting the two states, cultivating contact with party activists, and reaching out to voters months before any voting occurs. These early contests are bellwethers that place candidates under heightened public and media scrutiny. And winning the New Hampshire primary and/or the Iowa caucuses provides pivotal momentum to the victor that produces mutually reinforcing effects. Prevailing in the Iowa and New Hampshire contests buttresses the victor’s image as the frontrunner, attracts media attention, and facilitates fundraising for the next round of contests—which increasingly come earlier and earlier in winter and early spring of the general election year.

Other states have been jealous of the privileged and allegedly disproportionate role Iowa and New Hampshire have played in the presidential selection process at the beginning of the primary season. As a result, many have moved their primary or caucus dates up in the election season in order to maximize leverage over the choice of the nominee. This dynamic of
frontloading primaries on the electoral calendar produces the parties’ nominees much earlier in the general election year as leading candidates rack up the necessary delegates to prevail in the summer conventions.

States’ attempts to gain influence over nominations through the electoral calendar and compete with Iowa and New Hampshire have grown in the last several decades. In 1988 southern Democrats, disappointed by the liberal nominees George McGovern in 1972 and Walter Mondale in 1984, pressured their state legislatures to hold primaries on the same day in March, dubbed “Super Tuesday,” in order optimize regional clout. In 1996 the California legislature, malcontent that the presidential nominees in both parties were a foregone conclusion by the time voters in the Golden State were able to cast their ballots, moved the state’s presidential primary data from June to March. California’s decision had a ripple effect as other states jockeyed to position their primaries earlier in the season and carry substantive influence over the nominees. That year several Midwestern and New England states coordinated their primaries on the same day. In 2002 the Democratic Party hastened its 2004 primary schedule to concur with the Republican calendar. The goal was to avoid a detrimental month-long pause in election dates in 2000 that some contended had given more media attention to the George W. Bush campaign.

The compound effect of frontloading, as Figure 2 makes clear, is an extremely compressed campaign schedule. Figure 2 shows the growth of presidential primaries occurring before April 1 of the election year. In 1968 only one state—New Hampshire—held its primary by April 1. The percentage of states holding early primaries doubled between 1980 and 2000, and in 2004 nearly three-quarters of all primaries were held before April 1.

[Figure 2]
Frontloading raises a number of normative concerns. One is that the overwhelming number of early primaries depresses voter turnout in later contests. Another is that frontloading provides incentives to raise greater sums of money earlier in the process. This dynamic may give a distinct, strategic advantage to the frontrunner, who is better able to marshal the necessary resources to compete effectively in the contests that follow Iowa and New Hampshire. Finally, the compressed elections schedule may further incentives for media coverage focusing on the horse race rather than substantive aspects of primary contests.\textsuperscript{28}

Critics worry that the media may fail to adequately vet candidate qualifications and early “knockouts” may rob voters of choices. In the 2000 primary season, for example, Republican challenger John McCain and Democratic challenger Bill Bradley both quit their bid for the White House in March, five to six months before the party conventions. The dynamics of 2004 confirmed the degree to which even longstanding frontrunners can rapidly fall victim to defeat in the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary. For months former Vermont Governor Howard Dean led the Democratic pack yet Massachusetts Senator John Kerry’s earned a surprise victory in Iowa. After Dean’s controversial “rebel yell” to supporters in Iowa following his third-place showing, negative media coverage that raised questions about Dean’s stability arguably signaled the death knell to his campaign. Dean placed a distant second in New Hampshire, and obtained only single digits in the South Carolina primary, the next to follow the Granite State’s. Dean dropped out of the race just one month following the Iowa caucuses after failing to win a single state’s primary.

\textit{National Conventions: What Role?}

The frontloading of primary elections and party caucuses enables frontrunners to accumulate enough delegates to wrap up their nomination months before the parties hold their
national conventions in July or August of the election year. Since the significant reforms of the 1970s the choice of the presidential nominee has been a foregone conclusion—both parties’ nominees have been chosen on the first ballot of the delegates assembled at the convention. So what purpose do the Democratic and Republican national conventions fulfill?

Conventions serve several useful roles. First, the parties ratify their policy platforms at the national convention. When there are disagreements about the platforms, the convention provides a forum for the airing of issues, their resolution, and consensus-building.29

Second, it is at the convention proceedings that the parties formally nominate their candidates after a vote of the delegates. The delegates also formally select the vice-presidential running mate, though the presidential nominee, by tradition, makes the choice. Ticket “balancing” often occurs with the selection of the vice-presidential nominee. Such balancing reflects a conscious choice to insure regional or generational diversity, policy expertise, or some combination thereof.30 In 2000, for example, George W. Bush chose former Wyoming Representative Richard Cheney, who brought significant private and public sector experience to the Republican ticket. Cheney had served as chief-of-staff for President Gerald R. Ford, defense secretary under George H.W. Bush, and headed a Fortune 500 oil corporation. Similarly, Democratic nominee Al Gore chose fellow Connecticut Senator Joe Lieberman to provide regional balance to the campaign; Lieberman, a Jew, also brought religious diversity to the ticket by representing a core Democratic constituency.

Finally, the nominating convention marks the official kickoff of the general election campaign. The fanfare of conventions draws media attention that the parties attempt to utilize as free advertising. Though the parties cannot guarantee which parts of the convention the national or local television media will cover, the carefully scripted speeches by party notables and well-
planned festivities are aimed at providing a favorable public image and campaign boost to the presidential candidate. Nonetheless, the parties face a dwindling audience for televised coverage of the conventions. In 1996, for example, only about a sixth of all households watched either convention, and three fifths of respondents did not even know when the Republican convention was being held.

**IV. The Political Environment and Presidential Campaigns**

Following the primary season, nominees face a number of strategic considerations in their bid for the White House. First, they must settle quickly on a calculus to win the 270 votes required in the Electoral College. Their anticipated geographical distribution of support becomes paramount in this numbers game. Second, they must decide which groups they want to target as they attempt to construct broad, supporting coalitions in the electorate. They must simultaneously tailor their message to voters and fix the tenor of the campaign, carefully searching for the appropriate balance in criticizing their opponent and elaborating their own policy goals. In this process, challengers and incumbents seeking reelection face different constraints and opportunities.

**Mapping an Electoral College Strategy**

Americans do not vote for their preferred presidential candidate directly. When they enter their polling places on the first Tuesday following the first Monday in November every four years, they are actually casting their votes for a slate of electors in their state who have pledged support to one or another candidate. Winning the Presidency is not contingent upon winning the popular vote in the nation. Instead, a candidate needs a majority—270 of the 538 votes—in the Electoral College.
The composition of states’ votes in the Electoral College is straightforward. Each state has a number of electoral votes equal to its number of Senators (2) and members in the House of Representatives (the District of Columbia has 3 electoral votes). In all states but Maine and Nebraska, the “unit rule” applies. The candidate who receives a plurality of the statewide vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. Maine and Nebraska partition electoral votes according to candidate pluralities in congressional districts, with the two “at large” votes awarded to the candidate who wins a plurality of the statewide vote. Given the predominance of the winner-take-all system, the net effect of the Electoral College is that it typically exaggerates the victor’s margin compared to the national popular vote.

The selection of the president through the Electoral College method is best understood as a compromise among the Founders. They sought to strike a balance between those who favored Congress’ choosing the executive and those who feared that direct election could lead to demagogues capturing the White House. The result was a truly federal arrangement, for states are free to decide for themselves how electors are chosen and apportioned. Satisfying those with a Madisonian preference for legislative government—in the case that no candidate receives a majority in the Electoral College—it is the House of Representatives that decides the next President (and the Senate the Vice-President). Each state delegation in the House casts a single, unified vote among the top three contenders.

Many critics charge that the Electoral College is an archaic institution, which should be replaced by direct election of the president. Twice, in 1800 and 1824, a presidential election has been thrown to the House in the absence of an Electoral College majority. And three times (1876, 1888, and 2000) the winner of the Electoral College narrowly lost the popular vote. The calls for reform are examined in greater detail at the end of this chapter.
For the moment, the import of the Electoral College system is that it forces candidates to map a general election strategy that targets a set of states, not one that necessarily maximizes popular votes across the nation. In this sense, George Bush was correct in 2000 when, after prevailing in the Florida recount controversy but losing the popular vote nationally, he noted that had he sought to increase his popular vote tally he would have campaigned more extensively in his native Texas where his popularity as governor was strong.

Table 4 shows that following the 2000 Census a candidate can obtain a majority in the Electoral College with only eleven states. Five of those states—California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina—have experienced heavy population growth in the last two decades, bolstering their importance in candidate strategy. California is the richest electoral prize with 55 electoral votes, followed by Texas (34), New York (31), and Florida (27). If a candidate feels he is likely to lose one or more of these populous states, he must devise a compensatory strategy by attempting to prevail in another set of states with fewer electoral votes each. Thus, forecasting Electoral College votes becomes a paramount enterprise for the nominees’ campaigns.

Nominees can draw upon past history as a guide to their Electoral College strategy. Table 5 presents basic geographic electoral trends in the last decade. The first part of the table shows those states that are the most solidly Democratic. The distribution of states backing the Democratic candidate in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections is concentrated on the west coast (California, Oregon, Washington), the upper mid-west (Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois), and the east coast (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania). Together, the states that
supported Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996, and Al Gore in 2000 total 260 electoral votes following
the 2000 Census. The second part of Table 5 shows that Republican strength is, by contrast,
concentrated in Texas, the Rocky Mountain west (Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming), parts of the mid-
west (North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Indiana), and much of the south (Virginia,
North and South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi). The states voting in favor of the

As William Mayer et al. explain, “Presidential campaigns have a clear tendency to
concentrate their resources on a relatively small number of competitive states—states that both
candidates have some legitimate prospect of carrying—while ignoring states that appear solidly
to favor one camp or the other.”

The rest of Table 5 shows those “swing states” that play a
pivotal role in handing the presidency to the nominee of one or the other party. These states
have alternated support for the parties’ nominees in the last decade. Candidates must pay
particularly close attention to court voters in these states in order to secure an Electoral College
victory. Of the states which have thrown support behind Republican candidates in two of the
three elections from 1992-2000, Florida is the largest prize with 27 electoral votes. Conversely,
those states that supported Clinton in 1992 and 1996 all went for Bush in 2000. Of these nine
states, Ohio was the most important with 20 electoral votes at present.

**Secular Realignment, Electoral Coalitions, and Incumbent/Challenger Strategies**

Table 5 implicitly conveys the importance of the geographic realignment of the national
electorate for the parties’ nominees. While Pacific Coast states have become more Democratic
in recent presidential elections, southern states began a much longer-term transition toward
support of the Republican Party nearly half a century ago. The breakup of the once “solid”
Democratic south can be traced to Strom Thurmond’s “states’ rights” Dixiecrat campaign in
1948. Lyndon Johnson’s failure to carry five states in the South in 1964 in light of his strong support of civil rights facilitated George Wallace’s successful independent campaign in the deep south and Nixon’s victories in the “outer South” and border states in 1968, fueling a critical transition. Finally, in-migration to the sun-belt states of the South and social and religious conservatives’ increasing support of Republicans fueled the party’s breakthrough in 1994. Southerners’ support of GOP congressional candidates gave control of the House of Representatives to the Republicans after a 40 year hiatus. In the intervening period southerners had often “split” their vote between Republican presidential candidates and Democratic congressional candidates with seniority in Congress—a key factor in Republicans’ ability to capture the White House, but not a majority in Congress.

If current trends continue in the new century, the secular geographic realignment presages closer presidential races in the Electoral College, as evidenced by Florida’s determinant role in 2000. With a large number of states solidly Democratic or Republican, a smaller number of states may ultimately hold sway over the outcome. Increasingly competitive elections oblige nominees to craft their appeals to targeted groups in the electorate. The first objective is to “encourage a high turnout and loyal voting among their party’s usual voting coalition.” For Republicans, supporters may include social conservatives, wealthy voters, Protestants and Whites. For Democrats, core supporters tend to comprise lower-income voters, African-Americans and other minorities, educators, and Jews. The second objective is to broaden their supporting coalitions as widely as possible. For most presidential campaigns this strategy entails fine-tuning their policy positions towards the center of the electorate without alienating the most loyal primary voters who enabled them to capture their party’s nomination. Political scientists often speak of “coalitions in the electorate” that nominees constructed to win the Oval Office.
Examples include Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “New Deal coalition” in 1932 that included blacks, southerners, business interests, and Catholics, and the “Reagan coalition” of 1980 that comprised middle-class voters, disaffected Democrats, and social conservatives.

Incumbent presidents seeking reelection and challengers face different constraints and opportunities in the general campaign. “Americans,” the veteran political scholar Stephen Hess maintains, “do not need a presidential campaign to judge the qualities of an incumbent. Voters know what a president has done, and what the president’s party has done.” The domestic economy and foreign policy issues figure most prominently in voters’ retrospective evaluations of sitting presidents. Presidents can take credit for successes in both domains, but they cannot escape blame for failures.

Economic and foreign policy issues have cut both ways for incumbent presidents. Robust economic growth and successful handling of foreign policy crises in the Suez and China propelled Dwight Eisenhower to a landslide reelection victory in 1956 on the theme of “peace and prosperity.” Ronald Reagan’s reelection in 1984 hinged on economic prosperity, captured by television ads portraying “it’s morning again in America.” Similarly, Bill Clinton crafted his successful reelection campaign in 1996 by attributing strong economic growth to his administration’s policies that would enable him to build “a bridge to the twenty-first century.”

Other incumbent presidents have fared less well. The domestic backlash against the unpopular war in Vietnam shaped Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to seek reelection in 1968. High unemployment and spiraling inflation, combined with the image of a weak president vis-à-vis the Iranian hostage crisis, thwarted Jimmy Carter’s reelection bid in 1980. In that election, challenger Ronald Reagan asked voters “Are you better off now than you were four years ago?” A majority answered “no.” And in 1992 George Bush’s high popularity following victory in the
Persian Gulf War was precipitously eclipsed by a downward turn in the economy that ultimately cost him reelection. Bush was hammered both by Democratic nominee Bill Clinton and millionaire Reform Party candidate Ross Perot for the stagnating economy.

“A challenger’s campaign,” political scientists John Jackson and William Crotty point out, “needs to stress change as a basic them.” Challenges for the White House have no record in the White House on which to run; they can only make promises. Although former governors and members of Congress can tout their prior policy records at the state level or in the national legislature, all such challengers are nevertheless asking voters to prospectively judge their future agenda. It is little wonder, then, that challengers go out of their way to highlight the theme of change in their campaigns. In 1976 the Carter campaign’s slogan was “A leader, for a change”; in 1984, Walter Mondale ran against Ronald Reagan by suggesting “America needs a change”; and in 1992 Bill Clinton’s campaign slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!” aimed to portray incumbent George Bush as out of touch with voters and convey that Clinton would make economic growth a priority. Clinton simultaneously told voters “Don’t stop thinking about tomorrow” as he detailed plans to launch an unprecedented, if eventually unsuccessful, overhaul of the national health care system.

In each election since 1960 when incumbent presidents have served out two terms or have chosen not to seek reelection (Johnson, 1968) the incumbent vice-president has won the party’s nomination (Nixon, 1960; Humphrey, 1968; G.H.W. Bush, 1988; Gore 2000). Vice-presidential candidates confront special challenges. They must stress continuity with the past administration’s successful policies while carving out their own vision of the future. In his unsuccessful run for the White House in 1960, for example, Richard Nixon accentuated the economic and civil rights policies of the Eisenhower administration. Hubert Humphrey
promised to further the Johnson Administration’s progress on the domestic front (the “Great Society”). Similarly, George H.W. Bush emphasized his role in Reagan’s economic and defense policies and pledged to “stay the course.” By most accounts, however, the 1988 campaign was one of the most negative in the past half-century. The Bush campaign’s steadfastly harsh portrayals of Michael Dukakis as “soft” on crime and defense, exemplified by television advertisements criticizing the Massachusetts governor’s furlough program and questioning his ability to act as commander-in-chief, infuriated Democrats. The Dukakis campaign responded with a series of ads reproving Bush’s plans for tax cuts that would putatively benefit only the “top 1% of taxpayers.”

Although the Bush-Dukakis campaign may have been notable for the intensity with which both camps leveled negative charges and personal attacks at one another, the basic themes form a leitmotiv in presidential contests in the post-War period. Democrats often paint their Republican opponents as catering to wealthy voters and business interests. In 1956, for example, Democratic standard-bearer Adlai criticized Eisenhower’s tax cuts, which he contended aided the well-to-do and left the middle-class behind. Similarly, in the 2000 campaign Al Gore charged that George W. Bush’s tax cut plans would benefit only the wealthiest taxpayers and corporations. Republicans, on the other hand, have frequently accused their Democratic challengers of a laxity on national defense and poor economic management. In 1964 Barry Goldwater charged Lyndon Johnson with “weak and vacillating leadership” on foreign affairs, in 1972 Richard Nixon criticized George McGovern’s defense cut plans as potentially ruinous to the military, and in 1996 Bob Dole accused Bill Clinton of allowing the nation’s military to fall into disarray.
While many Americans view negative campaigning and personal character attacks as distasteful, it should be noted that such tactics are as old as the Republic itself. The extreme enmity between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in 1796 and 1800, in which even the virtue of the candidates’ wives was trampled under foot, is a case in point. Why then does negative campaigning persist? The answer is simple: *It is highly effective.* Negative portrayals of opponents have considerable influence in shaping undecided voters’ views, reinforcing party loyalists’ voting intentions, and they have substantial “staying power.” In the television era of “sound bites” and 30 second spot ads, candidates find it much easier to paint a negative image of their opponent than elaborate the details of their policy positions.

**V. Presidential Voting**

A comprehensive analysis of presidential voting patterns is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. However, well-established models of presidential voting emphasize basic factors that shape the contours of turnout and voter choice—particularly the impact of socio-economic status, age, race, religion, and gender. These factors merit a brief discussion, as presidential campaigns must pay close attention to the locus of their potential support.

**Determinants of Turnout**

Turnout in American presidential elections usually exceeds off-year congressional elections by some 10 to 20 percent. Still, voters who go to the polls every four years to elect the president represent, on average, only about *half* of the eligible electorate. Even in 2000—the closest presidential election in the last several decades—only 51 percent of eligible voters nationally cast ballots.
There is a certain historical irony to the lack of voter participation in the United States. The franchise has been extended to heretofore excluded groups, including women (Nineteenth Amendment), African Americans (Voting Rights Act of 1965), and 18-year-olds (Twenty-Sixth Amendment), yet fewer Americans exercise that right in the aggregate. Which factors account for this “vanishing electorate”? Structural barriers to voting, such as voter registration requirements that vary widely in the states, may be one reason for low turnout—despite efforts to make registration easier with the 1993 “motor voter” law that enables citizens to register to vote at state motor vehicle offices. In addition, other western, industrialized nations have adopted compulsory voting requirements and often make election day a paid holiday—factors that increase turnout significantly. Elections in the United States are held on weekdays, which may complicate some voters’ ability to get to the polls.

Sociological models of voting emphasize a number of interrelated factors that affect turnout in American presidential elections. Such factors are borne out in statistics compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau for the 2000 presidential election. One of the most important factors is age. A basic feature of presidential elections is that older Americans go to the polls in far greater numbers than younger Americans. The Census Bureau reports that in 2000 only 32 percent of eligible voters 18-24 years of age cast votes, while 74 percent of Americans age 65-74 turned out. “Demobilization” among younger voters may stem from a variety of sources, such as alienation from political parties or dissatisfaction with candidate choices. Older Americans, particularly retirees, may have more free time to go to the polls. But they also may feel a greater stake in the outcomes of presidential elections vis-à-vis programs that directly affect them, including Social Security and Medicare. Because older Americans represent a highly mobilized
voting group, it is little wonder that presidential candidates pay close attention to such issues in their campaigns.

The combined impact of education and income on voter turnout accentuates the importance of social class in voting participation. Well-educated, upper-income voters are typically the targets of campaign appeals dealing with tax, health, and social policy. Social groups with the lowest voter turnout include the unemployed, less educated Americans, and minorities. By contrast, the most mobilized voters include employed, college-educated, white Americans. In 2000, only 27 percent of eligible voters with less than a ninth-grade education went to the polls, while just less than half of high-school graduates cast ballots. By contrast, 70 to 75 percent of voters with a bachelor’s or advanced degree turned out for the 2000 presidential election. Similarly, less than a third of eligible voters whose income fell below the poverty line (approximately $8,900, depending on family size) voted in the 2000 presidential election. Nearly two-thirds to three-quarters of voters with incomes above $50,000 took part.

Race and ethnicity also substantively impact voter turnout. Nationally, Hispanics have the lowest voter turnout among ethnic groups. In the 2000 election just a little more than a quarter of eligible Hispanics went to the polls. By contrast, 60 percent of eligible white voters cast ballots. Participation among blacks remains lower overall compared to whites. However, the long-term impact of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for African-American turnout cannot be underestimated. Some 25 million new African American voters were registered by 1968, enabling that community to surmount barriers to voting that many states had implemented dating to Reconstruction. There is some evidence that mobilization among blacks is approaching parity for whites. In the 2000 presidential election, overall turnout stood among African-Americans stood at 54 percent—just six points lower compared to whites.
Voter Choices

Party registration and loyalty is the most telling indicator of how individuals are likely to vote in presidential elections. Typically 70 to 90 percent of registered Democrats vote for the Democratic standard-bearer, and the same dynamic holds for Republicans. Presidential candidates on both sides of the political spectrum attempt to curry favor both with the shrinking number of “swing voters” who frequently alter their support between candidates of the two parties and voters who consider themselves independents.

Still, many of the factors that affect turnout in presidential elections also condition voter choice. Race, religion, and economic status are particularly noteworthy factors. Blacks are the most loyal supporters of Democratic candidates. In the 2000 election 90 percent of blacks voted for Al Gore—6 and 7 percent more than voted for Bill Clinton in 1996 and 1992, respectively. The conservative views of many Republicans concerning affirmative action and economic policies has alienated all but a tiny minority of African-American voters. Hispanics also form a core Democratic group, though not as uniformly as blacks. Republican candidates culled approximately a quarter of the Hispanic vote between 1992 and 2000, and George W. Bush, as governor of Texas, sought to make in-roads with the significant number of Latino voters in his home state and elsewhere in the nation.

Individuals’ religious affiliation also conditions party identification and voting. White protestants, particularly southern evangelicals, tend to form a bedrock of Republican support. Over 60 percent of white protestants backed George W. Bush in 2000. By contrast, Jews, who tend to be more liberal on social issues, overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates. In 2000 Al Gore marshaled the support of nearly 80 percent of Jewish voters. Finally, Catholics are somewhat more supportive of Democratic candidates overall, but show evidence of more
significant cleavages in recent elections. Forty-nine percent of Catholics supported Al Gore in 2000, compared to 47 percent for George W. Bush. Issues concerning social policy, and abortion in particular, tend to split Catholics.

Not surprisingly, income has a strong impact on presidential voting. The Republican candidates’ leitmotivs of tax cuts, smaller government, and regulatory reform tend to resonate most with upper-income voters. From 1992-2000 voters with incomes exceeding $50,000 consistently backed Republican candidates more than their Democratic rivals. By contrast, Democratic candidates’ greater emphasis on government services and social programs more consistently resound with moderate-to-low income voters under the $30,000 threshold.\textsuperscript{50}

The impact of gender on presidential voting has recently received a growing amount of interest by scholars and elections observers. Many analysts speak of a contemporary gender gap in presidential contests. Increasingly, men appear to support Republican candidates more than Democratic candidates, while the inverse is true for women. The two most recent elections in 1996 and 2000 evidenced the largest gender gaps in recent times—11 and 10 percent, respectively. In 1996 Bill Clinton won the support of 54 percent of women voters compared to only 43 percent of men. According to some analysts, women’s stronger support of Clinton facilitated his victory over Bob Dole.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, in 2000 George W. Bush garnered the support of 53 percent of men and only 43 percent of women.

As presidential scholar Gerald M. Pomper notes, issue foci by presidential candidates may explain, in part, the existence of the gender gap. Gore’s emphasis on health care and education may have appealed more to women, who tend to be the primary care-givers of children. By contrast, men, as primary income earners in family settings, may have preferred Bush’s accent on taxes and the economy.\textsuperscript{52} The 2004 election may provide further insight into
the gender gap as discussion has shifted from Democratic-leaning “soccer moms” to Republican-leaning “NASCAR dads” who may form a pivotal swing vote bloc.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{VI. The Mandate Controversy}

Do presidential campaigns bestow “mandates” on elected presidents to carry out policy reforms and their preferred agenda? Presidents routinely claim to have mandates—regardless of whether they have prevailed over their opponent by large or narrow margins or whether voter turnout is comparatively high or low. One the one hand, some scholars question the concept of mandates from a normative perspective on the constitutional co-equality of the Presidency and Congress. On the other hand, there is little consensus on the empirical conditions that might confer a mandate on an elected president.

Robert Dahl, one of the foremost theorists of American politics, opposes the concept of mandates on a number of grounds. Dahl’s central objection is that mandates presuppose a type of \textit{institutional partisanship}—that “when conflicts over policy arise between the president and Congress, the president’s policies ought to prevail.”\textsuperscript{54} Such a notion assumes that Congress and its 535 elected members should subordinate themselves to the executive and disregard the legislature’s constitutional status as a co-equal branch of government. Dahl disputes claims that presidential elections convey information about voter preferences for the president’s program worthy of elevating the Presidency over Congress. Citing interview data from two landslide election victories in the last half century—Democrat Lyndon Johnson in 1964 and Republican Richard Nixon in 1972—Dahl provides evidence that no more than a fifth of all voters actually cited Johnson’s or Nixon’s policy program in their vote choice. Dahl concludes that presidents refer to mandates for politically self-serving ends. “No elected leader,” he admonishes, “including the president, is uniquely privileged to say what an election means—nor to claim that
the election has conferred on the president a mandate to enact the particular policies the president supports.”

Yet pundits, political scientists—and most particularly, presidents themselves—do attempt to surmise the significance of presidential elections and national electoral trends connected to them. In 1960 John F. Kennedy prevailed over rival Richard Nixon by one of the most narrow margins in modern electoral history—just 119,000 votes. But Kennedy implicitly rejected the idea that the election failed to produce a mandate. “There may be difficulties with Congress,” Kennedy is reputed to have said, “but a margin of only one vote would still be a mandate.”

Kennedy molded much of his real or perceived mandate in his inspiring, inaugural speech with the refrain “ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country.” Similarly, George W. Bush—who lost the popular vote to Al Gore in 2000 by over 500,000 votes but prevailed in the Electoral College following the recount controversy in Florida—dismissed the notion that he had no mandate. While some observers contended Bush’s only mandate could be to govern “from the center,” the president set his administration’s policies on a decidedly conservative path in domestic and foreign affairs.

Aggregate empirical evidence on mandates, and the conditions that might allow presidents to claim a mandate, are open to interpretation. Table 6 assesses a number of indicators for first-term presidents. Higher voter turnout should indicate greater voter interest in the presidential campaign and bolster the victor’s claims to a mandate. Although the winner-take-all nature of the Electoral College inflates the victor’s margin in that body, the president’s popular vote is pivotal in such claims. Further, the level of presidential “coattails”—the number of seats the president’s party gains in the House of Representatives—can buttress assertions of a mandate and reflect the president’s popularity in members’ districts, which can translate into
bargaining leverage for the president. Elections to the House are used as a bellwether because all 435 seats are up for election every two years. Presidents can more credibly claim a mandate when their party controls both chambers of Congress (unified government) rather than when control of the Presidency and Congress is split (divided government). The president’s initial popularity following the first poll of his presidency can also reinforce claims to a mandate if he is riding high in the court of public opinion. Finally, although most presidents suffer the phenomenon of “mid-term loss”—that is, a seat loss for their party in the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections—the magnitude of the seat loss, or a surprise gain, can signal the degree of unhappiness with, or continued voter support of, the president’s agenda.

The overall evidence for presidential mandates presented in Table 6 is decidedly mixed. On the basis of the data, two campaigns represent particularly strong cases. First, Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 victory over Republican standard-bearer Barry Goldwater stands out. With strong voter turnout, Johnson culled over 61 percent of the popular vote—a figure higher than for all other post-War presidents. He brought 37 Democrats to Congress on his coattails, most of whom shared enthusiasm for his “Great Society” agenda. With his initial public approval at 75 percent, Johnson had a surfeit of public good will, though that reservoir would dry up by the mid-term elections of 1966 and the backlash against the Vietnam War. Second, Dwight Eisenhower’s landslide victory in 1952 with 55 percent of the popular vote swept enough Republicans onto Capitol Hill that the GOP captured majorities in the House and Senate. Eisenhower also garnered strong public support as he took office, with 68 percent of the public approving of his job as chief executive. However, Eisenhower may not have used perceptions of
a mandate to his benefit. He did not have much of a legislative agenda and did not even put forth one to Congress until his second year in office when urged to do so by his staff.  

The case of Ronald Reagan is rather complex. Reagan’s landslide victory in the Electoral College in 1980 was tempered by a popular majority barely over 50 percent. Moreover, while Reagan’s victory helped give Republicans a majority in the Senate, his coattails of 34 seats in the House were not long enough to prevent Democrats from retaining control of that chamber—as they would for the entirety of his two terms. But Reagan was highly popular in a number of Democrats’ districts, particularly in the South, and his electoral popularity gave him strong leverage in his first two years to accomplish much of his agenda. Still, the gains the GOP made in the House in 1980 were erased two years later as voters registered their dissatisfaction with a recessionary economy.

Other cases for a mandate are less compelling. Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Clinton, and Bush (2000) marshaled only a plurality—not a majority—of the popular vote behind their campaigns, and Carter won a very close race against Republican incumbent Gerald Ford. Save for 1960, voter turnout was well below 60 percent. Except for Carter, none of these presidents’ first poll placed him above 58 percent. Moreover, coattails for these presidents were minimal or “negative.” Kennedy (1960), Bush (1988), Clinton, and Bush (2000) saw their party’s seats in the House actually diminish with their election victory, complicating efforts to posit a mandate. For all first-term presidents but George W. Bush, the erosion of party strength in Congress was compounded in the mid-term elections.

Beyond these objective data, a persuasive case for a mandate may depend significantly on the nature of issues that infuse the presidential campaign. Political scientist Patricia Heidotting Conley has argued that there are actually several different categories of mandates.  

Non-policy
focused campaigns that center more on candidate qualities and personalities, particularly with narrow electoral margins, may produce a victory without a mandate. The Kennedy-Nixon (1960), Carter-Ford (1976), and Bush-Dukakis (1988) contests would seem to conform to this scenario quite well. Popular mandates are most likely to follow issue-based campaigns, a large victory margin or at least a majority of the popular vote, and strong coattails in Congress. Eisenhower’s promise in 1952 to “go to Korea,” Lyndon Johnson’s tireless campaign for the “Great Society,” and Ronald Reagan’s sharp critiques of Jimmy Carter on taxes and foreign policy, followed by their electoral victories, approximate the best examples of presidents who were credibly able to argue that the outcomes had conferred more than a modicum of popular support for their agendas. Finally, the intermediate category of bargained mandates may comprise those presidents who win by narrow margins, have variable coattails, but run an issue-oriented campaign. Along with his plurality popular-vote victories, President Clinton’s focus in 1992 on the economy and health care, and later in 1996 on moderating the Republican congressional majority’s domestic policies, gave him some—if not always a lot—of leverage over the definition of the national agenda.

Mandates are clearly in the eye of the beholder. Andrew Jackson was the first president to claim a popular mandate a century and a half ago. Modern presidents have carried on the tradition, in large measure because persuasively laying claim to a mandate may be a vital mechanism for gaining influence in Congress and surmounting the obstacles of the constitutional separation of powers.

VII. Reforming Presidential Campaigns & Elections

Presidential campaigns have been an integral part of the evolution of the American democracy and are fundamental in shaping national governance. As this chapter has
emphasized, the history of presidential campaigns and elections has been one of increasing pressures for mass participation in the choice of chief executives. What is perhaps most striking is that this challenge has been met thus far in the Republic’s history without altering the basic form of the Constitution.

Still, critics suggest the nation may be at a crossroads and that more drastic reforms may now be required to redress inherent dysfunctions of the presidential selection process. The United States has one of the poorest voter turnout rates for western industrialized countries—some 10 to 30 percent lower for comparable elections in Canada, France, or the United Kingdom. And other important calls for reform concern primary elections and the Electoral College. The potential advantages and shortcomings of such reforms must be weighed carefully and objectively.

_Dysfunctions of the Nominating Process and Possible Remedies_

There is no shortage of critiques of the presidential primary process. Detractors contend that divisive primaries can breed in-fighting and place a party’s eventual nominee in a particularly difficult situation in the general election. Many scholars lament that the growth of primaries has precipitated the weakening of state party organizations and party leaders’ influence, enabling outsider and comparatively unknown candidates to win nominations, often with disastrous results (e.g., McGovern in 1972 and Dukakis in 1988). And the net impact of the frontloading of elections, combined with fundraising prerequisites and media coverage dynamics, has reinforced candidate-centered—not party-centered—campaigns from the early primaries through the general election.  

The proliferation of primaries following the reforms of the 1970s has spawned an important debate about whether divisive intra-party primaries wind up damaging a party’s
eventual nominee in the general election. The hypothesis is that candidates’ personal attacks on one another and the exposure of internal strife over policy questions can spur “fratricide.” Factionalism, while a part of the winnowing process, may give rise to negative media coverage on candidate controversies, provide fodder for the other party’s campaign, and permanently damage candidates’ chances by driving disgusted voters away from the polls. Recently, colorful and memorable disputes between primary contenders have included Republican George H.W. Bush’s charge in 1980 that Ronald Reagan’s agenda amounted to “voodoo economics,” the protracted dispute between Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter and Senator Ted Kennedy in 1980, and Republican Bob Dole’s warning to rival George H.W. Bush in 1988 to “stop lying about my record.” Moreover, contenders may be required to spend large sums of money to ward off challengers before the general election campaign, depriving the eventual nominee of vital resources. The example of Republican Bob Dole’s primary contests against Pat Buchanan and Steve Forbes in 1996, noted earlier, is a case in point. Finally, in-fighting may irreparably harm the parties’ ability to arrive at consensus when the convention meets, as some groups who supported losing contestants may feel slighted and be unwilling to support the eventual nominee.65

It seems unlikely that the parties are likely to do away with primaries and restore party leaders to an exalted position in nominee selection. Such a move could remedy the problem of divisive primaries, but is contrary to the general thrust toward greater inclusion and popular participation in the presidential selection process. It may also be the case that scholars have overestimated the relative effects of divisive primary campaigns. Recent evidence suggests that “out-groups” whose candidate lost in a divisive primary campaign do return to the party fold by the general election. Their concern shifts from their preferred candidate’s agenda in the
nomination process to which party will ultimately control the White House. Moreover, by another line of reasoning, the competitive nomination process is a healthy one for it encourages candidates to reach out to and mobilize new constituencies during the primary process. Another positive effect of a tough primary campaign is to adequately prepare the eventual nominee to do battle with his opponent in the general campaign.

Several proposed reforms target the recent phenomenon of states’ frontloading the electoral calendar as a means of improving the quality of the early presidential campaign process. The objective is to shorten the campaign season with the intent of garnering voters’ sustained interest and nullifying states’ timing advantage through early primaries. One idea is to institute “time zone” primaries. Political scientist James Lengle suggests a system in which “primaries and caucuses would be grouped by time zone and scheduled one month apart, on the first four Tuesdays of March through June.” The proposal would displace the allegedly disproportionate importance of Iowa and New Hampshire in the primary process, encourage candidates to launch broader appeals, and equalize the weight of more and less populous states in nominee selection. Other proposals suggest a set of staggered regional primaries, or a blanket national primary held on the same day, to accomplish the same goal.

The operationalization of such reforms would depend on states’ willingness to agree on a date for a set of regional primaries or a national primary. Otherwise, codifying such reforms would require a constitutional amendment. As noted earlier, southern, New England, and midwestern state legislatures have agreed at various times to hold regional primaries—so such an “informal” reform is not without precedent. Yet states are scarcely homogeneous. Population centers and ethnic, social, and occupational diversity vary greatly, complicating efforts to classify states neatly into specific regions. In addition, it is dubious that Iowa and New
Hampshire would willingly forego the media attention and tourist dollars spent by candidates and reporters given their first-in-the-nation tradition. And there are no current constitutional proposals mandating regional or national primaries pending in the U.S. Congress.

**The Electoral College: An Antiquated Institution?**

The issue of reforming the Electoral College was thrown into the spotlight anew following the contentious presidential balloting in Florida in 2000. Perhaps what was most surprising in 2000 was not the closeness of the popular vote between George W. Bush and Al Gore, or even Bush’s loss of the popular vote to Gore, but the extremely narrow margin for the victor in the Electoral College. The outcome hinged on a single state, and Bush ultimately prevailed in the Electoral College by only 2 votes.

Critics contend that the 2000 outcome is evidence that the Electoral College is anachronistic. The central concern is that the system undermines popular sovereignty in presidential selection. Apart from the possibility that a candidate who loses the popular vote can win the Electoral College, detractors point to the nefarious prospects of the “faithless elector” problem. Hypothetically, an elector, although pledged to a particular candidate, could decide to throw her support to another candidate. What if such support were enough to alter the outcome in a close Electoral College race? Although such a scenario has not occurred, some electors have made the theoretical point by purposefully reneging on their vow to a particular candidate. In 2000 Barbara Simmons, a Democratic elector from the District of Columbia who was pledged for Al Gore, left her ballot blank to protest the District’s lack of voting representation in Congress. And in 1988 Margaret Leach, a Democratic elector from West Virginia, switched her vote to support vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen for president instead of Michael Dukakis in order to draw attention to the faithless elector question.
Other critics are uncomfortable with the possibility that a presidential election can be thrown to the House of Representatives if no candidate receives a majority in the Electoral College. This scenario *has* occurred twice in the nation’s history—once in 1800, and again in 1824. The “wheeling and dealing” in Congress that awarded the White House to John Quincy Adams in 1824 was broadly viewed as illegitimate and cast a pall over his troubled presidency. In more recent times the concern is that given the “unit rule” in 48 states (winner-take-all systems), a regional or third party candidate could draw enough Electoral College support to rob one of the two major party candidates of a majority and leave the House to decide the victor.

On the other hand, some critics of the Electoral College support its demise precisely *because* the institution discriminates against third-party presidential candidacies. George Wallace, who ran a spirited independent campaign in 1968 on segregation and “law and order,” won 13.6 percent of the popular vote. Because his support was regionally concentrated in the deep south, he won 46 Electoral College votes. He was the last third party candidate to earn any Electoral College votes. In 1992 and 1996 Ross Perot garnered 18.9 percent and 8.4 percent of the popular vote, respectively, but gained *no Electoral College votes* because his support was geographically diffuse. Such Electoral College dynamics may lead some supporters to believe that supporting even a serious third party challenger results in a “wasted vote.”

The most radical proposal to reform the Electoral College is to abolish it through a constitutional amendment that would institute direct election of the president. The simplest plan would hand the presidency to the candidate with the most votes. Other plans would resemble the French two-ballot system for direct election of the president by prescribing a minimum threshold for victory (either a plurality or a majority) and then requiring a runoff between the top two candidates if no contestant attained the minimum.
Other proposals aim to make the Electoral College outcome roughly proportionate with the popular vote and target the faithless elector problem. These “mend it, don’t end it” proposals suggest variants of the systems in place in Maine and Nebraska in which electoral votes are apportioned according to the candidate who prevails in each congressional district, with the two “at large” electoral votes determined by the candidate who receives a plurality in the statewide vote. Other plans would simply apportion Electoral College votes according to the popular vote in each state. In either plan, removing the faithless elector problem could be achieved by automatically awarding electoral votes to the candidates.

Scholars and the general public are divided on Electoral College reform, and the 2000 election controversy did not result in a real or perceived constitutional crisis that might have otherwise precipitated serious calls for the institution’s abolition. Following the 2000 election fracas in Florida, polls suggested Americans favored eliminating the Electoral College by a 60-40 margin. Yet that figure was actually less compared to surveys conducted in previous decades dating to the 1960s. And post-2000 election polls showed that by broad margins Americans believed Bush’s accession to the presidency, and the Supreme Court’s intervention in the Florida recounts, were legitimate.

Still, proponents of Electoral College reform or abolition point to a number of advantages. Direct election, proportional schemes, or district plans would insure that presidents would carry the popular vote. Such reforms might also spur increased voter turnout by encouraging third party candidates. Larger metropolitan areas would garner greater political clout compared to the current system. And such reforms are in keeping with the historical drive toward democratization of presidential selection.
Concerns over direct election, however, are numerous. Some worry that direct election would destabilize the federal system by encouraging the proliferation of minor parties. Candidates might choose to launch regional, rather than national, appeals and move the nation towards unnecessary sectional conflicts. Further, candidates might have incentives to campaign primarily in the most populous states at the expense of small states and ignore issues of importance to minority voters. Finally, the financial and human costs of imposing a uniform, national voting system could also be quite significant.

Whatever the merits of arguments for and against Electoral College reform, constitutional amendments have repeatedly failed to find support in Congress. Americans have amended the Constitution only 27 times in over two centuries. Given this reticence to alter the basic structure of the Constitution, substantive changes to the apportioning of electoral votes may be most likely to emanate from the states and come in piecemeal fashion. The Maine and Nebraska district plans are among the most feasible options for reform, major constitutional change notwithstanding.

* * *

“Every vital question of state,” Alexander Hamilton forecast in the Constitutional debates at the Founding, “will be merged in the question, ‘Who will be the next president?'” Hamilton’s wisdom echoes still today. Though not without controversy, complexity, and some level of dysfunction, presidential campaigns are dynamic and central to the American democracy. Their evolution at the dawn of the nation’s third century will depend on the character, determination, and democratic spirit of the candidates who run for the nation’s highest office—and the expectations and evaluations of voters who engage and select them.
For Further Reading

Books


Paul D. Shumaker and Burdett A. Loomis (eds.), *Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond* (New York: Chatham House, 2002).


Websites

*Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.*
<http://www.uselectionatlas.org/>

<http://www.fec.gov/elections.html>

*Gender Gap.* “Elections – Who’s Running?”
<http://www.gendergap.com/elections.htm>

*National Archives and Records Administration.* “Electoral College Calculator.”
<http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/electoral_college/calculator.html>

*Project Vote Smart.*
<http://www.vote-smart.org>

*United States Bureau of the Census.* Voting and Registration Statistics.
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting.html>
### Table 1
Number of Presidential Candidates, 1960-2004

<table>
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<th>Republicans</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Open*</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Open*</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Open*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Republican Incumbent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:**

<sup>a</sup> includes Senator Robert Smith (R-NH) who first ran as a Republican and then changed to Independent.

<sup>b</sup> includes the Democratic candidates who had announced by September 2003 (Wesley Clark, Howard Dean, John Edwards, Richard Gephardt, Bob Graham, John Kerry, Dennis Kucinich, Joe Lieberman, Carol Moseley-Braun, and Al Sharpton).

* In all open presidential races between 1960-2004, the incumbent vice president has won his party’s nomination. Only George H.W. Bush (1988) was successful in his bid for the White House. Richard Nixon (1960), Hubert Humphrey (1968) and Al Gore (2000) were defeated.
Table 2
Presidential Candidate Backgrounds, 1960-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last Office Held</th>
<th>Contenders (%)</th>
<th>Nominees (%)</th>
<th>Winners (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist/Celebrity</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1a
Number of Democratic Presidential Primaries
and Percentage of Delegates Selected Through Primaries, 1968-2000

Figure 1b
Number of Republican Presidential Primaries
and Percentage of Delegates Selected Through Primaries, 1968-2000

Source: Adapted by author from CQ Press, Selecting the President from 1789-2000
Figure 2
The “Frontloaded” Presidential Primary Season, Selected Years:
Percent of Primaries Held Before April 1

### States’ Electoral Votes by Magnitude 1981-2010
(ranked by current magnitude after 2000 Census)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>54</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>New Jersey</td>
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<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>271</td>
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<table>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>Massachusetts</td>
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<td>Kentucky</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>Connecticut</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Maine</td>
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<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.C.</td>
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<td>Montana</td>
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<td>North Dakota</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States shown in bold have consistently increased Electoral College votes across the last two decades.
Table 5
States Won by Democratic and Republican Candidates, 1992, 1996, and 2000

*States Carried by Bill Clinton (1992, 1996) and Al Gore (2000)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>DC</td>
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<td>Michigan</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>Alaska</td>
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<td>Mississippi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Swing States – Favoring Republicans*


*Swing States – Favoring Democrats*

Table 6
First Term Presidents and the Question of Mandates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
<th>Popular Vote (%)</th>
<th>Electoral College (%)</th>
<th>Coattails (House)</th>
<th>First Poll (%)</th>
<th>Unified/Divided Government</th>
<th>Mid-Term Election (House)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>+37</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>-47</td>
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<td>Nixon</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>55.9</td>
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<td>Carter</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>Reagan</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>+34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>-52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Unified*</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Republicans controlled both the House and Senate following the 2000 elections; however, Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords’ decision to leave the Republican Party gave Senate Democrats the de facto majority.
Notes


5 Figures were calculated by author from data reported by Robert E. DiClerico, “In Defense of the Presidential Nominating Process,” in Choosing Our Choices: Debating the Presidential Nominating Process, edited by Robert E. DiClerico and James W. Davis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 69; data were updated by author for the 2000 election, and the averages included “accrued” years of experience by incumbent presidents seeking reelection.


8 Richard Nixon served 6 years in Congress, Hubert Humphrey 16 years, Walter Mondale 13 years, and George H.W. Bush 5 years.


11 Candidates typically only contested primary elections to demonstrate their electability where doubts existed. For example, John F. Kennedy entered the West Virginia primary to prove his ability to attract votes nationally and dispel arguments that his catholic religious affiliation would doom him to defeat. West Virginia had very few catholic voters, and Kennedy’s overwhelming victory boosted his eventual nomination. See Robert Dallek’s account in Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-63 (Boston: Little, Brown, 2003).


13 <http://www.vote-smart.org/election_president_state_primary_dates.php>, accessed 09/10/03.


26 Polsby and Wildavsky, Presidential Elections, p. 117.


30 Pika, Maltese, and Thomas, The Politics of the Presidency, p. 49.

31 Polsby and Wildavsky, Presidential Elections, p. 140.


For a state-by-state ranking and averages, see <http://www.democracy-nc.org/improving/voterturnout.pdf>.


The exception is Cuban-Americans in south Florida. In addition, unlike Hispanics in other parts of the country, Cuban-Americans tend to vote Republican—especially older voters. See Richard S. Conley, *Florida 2002 Elections Update* (Boston: Pearson), Chapter 1.


55 Ibid., p. 69.


70 For a list of other “faithless electors,” see <http://www.cnn.com/interactive/allpolitics/0012/electors/content.k.html>


75 For an overview, see Karlyn Bowman of the American Enterprise Institute, “Vote of Confidence,” *The Public Perspective* (March/April 2002); available at <http://www.aeipoliticalcorner.org/KB%20Articles/kb02marchapril.pdf>.
