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A Definition of Colonialism

by Ronald J. Horvath

The goal of the academy is the discovery of order. Order may be only a condition of men’s minds, but seek it we must. The imperative to discover order may stem from man’s instinct to survive: to know is to have power, to have power enhances chances of surviving. Furthermore, only order is knowable, chaos or the lack of order is not; therefore, we must assume that order exists. In seeking order, Western scholars in the tradition of categorical philosophy define, classify, and explain.

Definition, classification, and explanation (theory) are difficult to separate. To define is to classify. To say what X is, is to classify all things as being X or not-X. Classifications are typically more complex, contain more components, than definitions. Classifications tend to be more specific than definitions and, therefore, better handle details. But the processes and results of defining and classifying are fundamentally similar; both order reality.

In a pretheory stage we must rely on a fairly cumbersome search process. Hundreds, even thousands, of descriptive studies of a phenomenon, done largely without the benefit even of definition, provide an initial sorting process through which the number of potential variables is substantially reduced. Definition and classification constitute another reduction process, in which only a few, perhaps a dozen or so, variables are chosen as being significant. The metaphysical basis of the selection process is generally implicit; there are certain tacit rules that govern the research behavior of any period. The process of selection consists of collective decision-making by scholars concerned with a particular phenomenon. The model offered here is an attempt to start a systematic process of selection (reduction) and arrangement of variables relevant to the phenomenon of colonialism.

With the development of theory, judgments on the significance of variables are made relatively simple. Theory is a system of explanation or prediction. Most theory predicts a fairly narrow range of facts. The exceptions to this, such as general systems theory, are few; most explanation is middle- or low-level theory designed to predict a relatively narrow range of variables. Ultimately the facts that are significant are those determined by theory, i.e., those that theory predicts. Before theory, all facts may seem to have relatively equal significance. (Many of these ideas are in accord with those of Kuhn [1962: 15, 24, 41–47]; Cohen and Nagel [1934: Chap. 12] provide a longer treatment of the subject of definition and classification.)

Where do we stand in the study of colonialism? The literature on colonialism would appear to have no end; and understandably, for colonialism has been one of man’s major preoccupations. Although colonialism ranks with the most influential processes in human history, Western scholars have not really come to grips with the phenomenon. The academic establishment possesses no widely accepted theory of colonialism, nor does any substantial agreement exist upon what colonialism is (Strausz-Hupé and Hazard 1958: 470).

The changing morality of colonialism contributes to our lack of understanding. People feel strongly about colonialism—it has either been a dirty business engaged in by evil people or a praiseworthy endeavor undertaken by fine gentlemen for the noble purpose of saving the wretched, the savage, the unfortunate. We can hardly talk about colonialism without referring to the way people feel about it, because this feeling has given the word myriad connotations. But knowing how people feel about colonialism does not tell us what it is. China and the Soviet Union condemn America for being an imperialistic power, and yet from one point of view both countries have been and are themselves colonial and imperial powers. (For the moment, I shall make no distinction between colonialism and imperialism.) The history of Russia from the beginning of the Tsarist period to the present is a history of aggressive, exploitative colonialism and imperialism. Tibet in relation to China is a conquered colony with a repressive military government; and ever since pre-Han times, China has expanded by a cultural process no more nor less noble than colonialism and imperialism. America, too, has felt superior in a moral sense to Britain, with its empire; at the same time, however, the United States has dominated Middle American countries economically, politically, and in other ways, and has engaged in ruthless exterminative expansion as a part of its Manifest Destiny. Further, some Afro-Americans today cry that they are victims of imperialism. Finally, representatives of countries in the Third World seem to be able to agree upon little except perhaps the evils of colonialism—the colonial past and neocolonial present—while at the same time ruthless, exploitative, exterminative (to use some of

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The present paper, submitted in final form 12 x 70, was sent for comment to 50 scholars, of whom the following responded: Andre Gunders Frank, David Jacobson, Madeline Barbara León, Robert W. Shirley, Aidan Southall, J. E. Spencer, and Bronislaw Stefanowsky. Their comments are printed after the text and are followed by a reply from the author.

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the commonly employed adjectives) colonial policies are being employed by these very governments (e.g., the Republic of Sudan and Nigeria) within their own borders to suppress “minority” groups. The mind boggles!

Scholars have failed to provide us with definitions of colonialism, imperialism, and related terms for many reasons; four are identified here:

1. Insufficient cross-cultural perspective. To stereotype colonialism on the basis of one or two particular cases or to assume that colonialism is characteristic of a particular civilization (Western civilization) is simply to ignore the full range of reality to which human history testifies. Bocke (1953), for example, seems to have developed a theory of colonialism based on the Dutch experience in Indonesia alone; and Lenin (1939) restricts his focus to one phase of Western civilization, though he recognizes that the Romans, too, engaged in imperialism. Every major and minor civilization has sought to extend its borders and its influence. And colonialism is not to be equated only with the civilized (cultures having cities and literate populations); pre-civilized people, too, have colonized. At least that is an assumption made here.

2. Lack of theoretical perspective. (Two theories of imperialism can be noted: Schumpeter 1951:3–130 and Lenin 1939.) For those in the humanities who are dubious of the possibility of discovering general explanations, i.e., who embrace an idiosyncratic perspective, the lack of explanation may not appear relevant. Since a sizable portion of the literature on colonialism is found in the humanities, this point is especially important. The position taken in this paper is that the long-range test of the adequacy of a definition is that it should lead us to theory and that one step in our quest for theory is to have a way of ordering reality.

3. Lack of flexibility in definitions of colonialism. Definitions and classifications should accommodate new findings. Therefore, they must have sufficient flexibility to allow manipulation or articulation.

4. An ultraconservative attitude toward words and their meanings. Koebner (1949; Koebner and Schmidt 1964), for example, has shown how the concept of imperialism developed as relevant initially to British foreign policy only. Rather than ask how people have used a particular word, I shall attempt here to determine what the colonial phenomenon is. Many words depicting colonial-type relationships are so close in meaning that they may be regarded as synonyms, and the urge to discover the specific semantic content of each term only contributes to unnecessary confusion. “Neocolonialism” is a case in point. The first use of the word may have occurred in the 1950’s. Newly independent nations found themselves only partially independent, and a new term to be exploited for political purposes was needed. The events of the early 1960’s, especially in connection with the secession of the Katanga from the Congo plus the military activities of white men and Western nations in the Congo, provided the emotional ingredients for the birth of the term. But what is the difference between economic imperialism, semicolonialism, and neocolonialism? That these words exist is not a sufficient reason for scholars to define them discretely.

What follows is an attempt to define colonialism through the use of what I call definitional analysis. The definitions generated have cross-cultural applicability in the modern world as well as in history; they are flexible and permit further manipulation; and they make apparent the relationships between phenomena and processes that are too often treated as separate.

A DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF COLONIALISM

It seems generally, if not universally, agreed that colonialism is a form of domination—the control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or behavior of other individuals or groups. (Colonialism has also been seen as a form of exploitation, with emphasis on economic variables, as in the Marxist-Leninist literature, and as a culture-change process, as in anthropology; these various points of departure need not conflict, however, and the choice of domination as a focus here will not exclude the culture-change dimension of the phenomenon.) The idea of domination is closely related to the concept of power.¹

Widespread accord also exists that colonialism refers to group domination and not to social relations and processes among sets of individuals at the family or subclan level.² Two basic types of group domination can be distinguished: intergroup and intragroup domination. The criterion employed to differentiate the two is cultural homogeneity or heterogeneity.³ Intergroup domination refers to the domination process in a culturally heterogeneous society and intragroup domination to that in a culturally homogeneous society. In Britain, both inter- and intragroup domination can be found, more clearly so in the past than today. The domination of the English over the Welsh, Irish, and Scots was a clear example of intergroup domination. At the same time, within English society there exist clear

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¹ That the wellspring of colonialism and imperialism is the power-seekers’ behavior of others has been discussed by many sociologists (see Landers 1961, Kohn 1958, Maunier 1949:13–14), but definitions of power have either been too rigid as to be of limited utility or, where applicable generally, ambiguous (see Riker 1964 for a review and analysis of definitions of power from five disciplines). Intuitively, my conception of power seems most closely associated with that of Dahl (1957) and Cartwright (1959). My inclination is to develop another fictional creature like Economic Man, whom we may call Political Man, who lives only to seek power. Parsons (1963), in an attempt to view power as classical economists view money, starts in this direction.

² That colonialism refers to relations among groups is apparently so obvious as not to require comment or even mention by many sociologists. Eventually, what kind of group we are considering must be defined. Sociologists concerned with groups have focused upon culturally homogeneous populations, and their definitions reflect this. For example, Homans (1950:1) defines group as "a number of persons who communicate with one another often enough over a span of time, and who are few enough so that each person is able to communicate with all other people, not second-hand, through other people, but 'face to face.'" Homans states (p. 85) that the meaning of group depends on what persons are considered to be outsiders to the group.

³ Defining cultural homogeneity itself would appear to be no simple undertaking, if the discussion surrounding the concept of social and cultural pluralism is any indication (see Furnival 1948, Smith 1960, Kuper and Smith 1969, Despres 1968). The term “cultural heterogeneity,” as I use it here, would appear to include Smith’s concept of plural communities; the term “cultural homogeneity” includes both homogeneous societies and heterogeneous societies without plural enclaves and/or plural communities (Kuper and Smith 1969:35–36).
strata (groups) among which a hierarchal arrangement of power, wealth, and status exist, in other words, intragroup domination. Since intragroup domination is not considered a form of colonialism, it is with intergroup domination that we are concerned.

The important difference between colonialism and imperialism appears to be the presence or absence of significant numbers of permanent settlers in the colony from the colonizing power. (This distinction is in keeping with the thinking of others on the subject; see, e.g., Hobson 1902.) The domination of Latin America, North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Asian part of the Soviet Union by European powers all involved the migration of permanent settlers from the European country to the colonies. These places were colonized. Most of Africa and Asia, on the other hand, was imperialized—dominated but not settled—and the countries involved are noticeably different today, in part, because of the nature of the domination process. Therefore, colonialism refers to that form of intergroup domination in which settlers in significant numbers migrate permanently to the colony from the colonizing power. Imperialism is a form of intergroup domination wherein few, if any, permanent settlers from the imperial homeland migrate to the colony.

A graphic summary of the model as it is developed thus far is given in Figure 1.

We can digress briefly to show how this scheme might handle the phenomenon social class. The term "class" is often used, at least implicitly, to refer to the hierarchical arrangement of status, power, or wealth groups within a culturally homogeneous population. In the light of this, a consideration of colonialism is not a consideration of class. A definition of class could be generated by articulating the intragroup side of the model. For example, a stratified/nonstratified variable could be added as a start. Class, partially defined, is a stratified form of intragroup domination. Nonstratified group domination could be illustrated by power relations within clans or lineages, if the clans or lineages were large enough to qualify as groups. A full definition of class would require the addition of other variables.

Let us now turn to the problem of the types of relationships that colonial and imperial powers have had with the people they have dominated. Consider, for now, three basic relationships: (1) extermination, (2) assimilation, and (3) relative equilibrium, i.e., neither extermination nor assimilation. The logical types of colonialism and imperialism produced by the two major variables—settlers/no settlers and the relationships between the dominant people and the dominated—are shown in the matrix of Figure 2.

The matrix generates six logical types, three of colonialism and three of imperialism. Type 1 is colonization in which the dominant relationship between the colonizers and the colonized is extermination of the latter. In the extreme sense of the word, to exterminate is to root out totally or eradicate. History provides us with relatively few examples where total extermination of the inhabitants of geographic entities occurred—among them the European occupation of Tasmania and of some of the Caribbean islands—but extermination of the inhabitants of vast areas of America, Australia, Canada, and Tsarist and Communist Russia (Baczkowski 1958: n 6) can also be cited here.

Type 2 is colonization in which assimilation is the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized. Among the many examples of this type are Hispanicized Latin America and the Philippines (see Foster 1960, Reed 1967), the Arabicized and/or Islamicized Middle East, and the Sinicized East and Southeast Asia (see Wiens 1954). In each of these examples, and the many others that could be offered, the colonizers acted as a "donor" culture and the colonized people constituted a "host" culture, with a vast amount of cultural transfer going, as the name implies, from donor to host. (The concepts of donor and host were developed to facilitate understanding of the cultural processes operating in Mexico in the early colonial period [see Foster 1960: Chap. 2] but are equally applicable elsewhere. Toynbee [1963: 139–40], for example, discusses a somewhat similar process, though in different terms.)

Type 3 is colonization in which settlers neither exterminate nor assimilate the indigenes. Settlers and indigenes may live either side by side or apart, but in either case there is a lack of wholesale acculturation or eradication (this is not to imply that no culture change occurs). Among the former European colonies that exemplified this type are Algeria, Rhodesia, Kenya, South Africa, and Indonesia.

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4 Osowski (1966) shows that the term “class” only emerged with the decline of the estate system in Europe—which I suspect also signals the cultural homogenization of population at the national level. The development of strata within homogeneous populations seems to have required a new term.
1. Power
2. Group
3. Cultural homogeneity
4. Settlers
5. Relations
6. Stage of political development

Fig. 3. A generated model of colonialism. The variables (differentia, in Aristotelian terms) incorporated into the classification at each level are indicated at left. A, assimilation; C, colonialism; D, domination; Do, domestic; E, extermination; G, group; I, imperialism; In, international; Inter, intergroup; Intra, intragroup; N, neither; NG, nongroup.

Type 4 is imperialism with extermination. This may be primarily a logical type which rarely, if ever, has occurred in history—unless purely punitive military adventures (arising from a kind of “destroy the village in order to ‘save’ it” mentality; see Willhelm 1969 for a discussion of how well American experience exemplifies this type) are so considered. Purely logical types are highly likely when mechanical generation-schemes such as the matrix arrangement of variables are employed. The scheme itself is not judged by the number of empty cells, i.e., the number of purely logical types produced; rather, the number of such types reflects upon the productivity of the variables chosen.

Type 5 is imperialism with assimilation between the imperial power and the dominated people. It would appear that Lattimore’s (1955; see also Murphy 1961) concept of the satellite is similar to this type of imperialism, and therefore the satellites of the Soviet Union can be considered as examples.

Type 6 is imperialism with neither extermination nor assimilation. Here a great number of examples exist, including most of Europe-dominated Africa and Asia. One would suspect that this final type is by far the most frequent kind of imperialism because, when no permanent settlers are involved, assimilation and extermination are less likely to occur.

Thus far no mention has been made of the nature or the stage of development of the political units involved in colonial or imperial situations. Colonialism and imperialism have come to be regarded, all too commonly, as phenomena restricted to the relations between Western nations and peoples of the Third World. One implication of this view is that the stage of the political development of either the dominant state or the dominated people is relevant to the definition of colonialism. Another implication is that colonialism as a form of domination, or as a type of exploitation, or as a cultural process, is linked to the rise of the nation-state in Europe. I find this view of colonialism indefensible. Colonialism and imperialism were practiced, for example, by a wide variety of peoples at different stages of political development in Africa south of the Sahara before European contact. The Buganda are a case in point; prior to the British period, they actively engaged in imperialism, and after the arrival of the British a process of “sub-imperialism” was initiated (Roberts 1962). A good deal of what Smith (1969: n 9) calls “inter-ethnic accommodation” can also be considered as colonialism and imperialism in these terms. The city-states of the classic world provide another series of examples; and Luthy (1961: 485) goes so far as to assert, “It might be said that the history of colonization is the history of mankind itself.” At least since the rise of the nation-state in Europe, the political status of the people in question has been seen as relevant to the morality of domination. What is appropriate treatment for cultural minorities within the confines of a territorial state is not so for groups outside the borders of that state. (This assumption partially accounts for the inconsistencies in the use of the terms “colonialism” and “imperialism” mentioned in the introduction; Tibet, for example, belongs to China, according to the Chinese.) My own view is that domestic colonialism and imperialism are not fundamentally different, as forms of domination or exploitation or as cultural processes, from international colonialism and imperialism. What is the difference between the suppression of non-Muslim peoples in southern Sudan by northern Muslims and the imperializing of all Sudan by the British? Not much. Yet at this time it is useful to distinguish between domestic colonialism and international colonialism here, if for no other reason than to show their basic similarity. The domestic/international dichotomy will be the last major variable to be incorporated into the classification in this section. Twelve logical types result. Domestic imperialism is that form of intergroup domination that occurs within the confines of a recognized autonomous political unit (polity).7 Domestic colonialism differs from domestic imperialism only in that permanent settlers from the colonial power participate in the domination process. International imperialism and colonialism are distinguished by the control of one political unit over another.

Figure 3 summarizes the above classification.

FURTHER MANIPULATIONS

Unlike former attempts at defining colonialism, the system of definitional analysis offered above can accommodate new findings. That not all aspects of every term are contained within the definitions generated is not a shortcoming of the modeling procedure, nor necessarily of the model itself. Certain features have intentionally been left implicit for the sake of brevity. Necessarily, judgments have been made as to which variables were significant and which were not. But how significance is determined is unfortunately not simply answered before theory.

Once produced, definitions and classifications, like theory, are compared with reality. The question asked is: Do the definitions and classifications apply meaningfully to a particular cultural situation in a particular locale?

7 What constitutes “recognition” is difficult to pin down; I use the term here in the sense of an enduring consensus by the power groups, including nations and subnationalities, concerned with a particular situation.
If, through such comparison, the model is found to be unacceptable, two courses of action are possible: modification or rejection of the model. Modification is considered first.

A specialist on domestic imperialism in India might object to the lack of any linguistic consideration, e.g., the role of Hindi, in the definition. Another, concerned with 19th-century British imperialism, might ask: Where is any discussion of economic exploitation? If such specialists feel that the definitions are essentially correct and that only a few modifications are necessary to right the scheme, then two kinds of modifications can be made.

The first is to handle the feature concerned as another variable, perhaps appending it directly to the model already developed. If this feature, the seventh variable, were dichotomous, then 24 logical types would be generated at the seventh level. Alternatively, the new variable might justifiably be inserted at some higher level, making necessary a rearrangement of that part of the model that follows it. If the interests of the researcher were limited, only minor modifications would be sufficient. For example, a researcher might not be satisfied with the definition of Type 6 (imperialism with a relative equilibrium relationship) because it makes no distinction between what has been variously called economic imperialism, semicolonialism, and neo-colonialism and the politically more formal varieties of imperialism, e.g., the difference between Ghana just before and just after independence. To deal with this shortcoming, a dichotomous variable, formal/informal, might be inserted.

If we insert the dichotomy above the settler/no settler variable, two types of intergroup domination result: formal and informal intergroup domination. In turn, two types of colonialism and two types of imperialism would follow: (1) formal colonialism, (2) informal colonialism, (3) formal (direct) imperialism (administrative imperialism), and (4) informal imperialism. Formal colonialism has already been defined simply as colonialism; informal colonialism is that form of intergroup domination that results from the voluntary migration of permanent settlers from places other than the metropolis, for example, Asians to Africa, the Chinese to Southeast Asia, non-Anglo-Saxons to North America. (Not all migration of this kind results in domination, as is evident in the case of the Africans who were brought to the New World.) Some of these groups have been referred to as “strangers” (in the African literature) or as “pariah” peoples, and it is characteristic of them that they resist, or are not permitted, assimilation. According to Weber (1946), a pariah people does not possess territory. Administrative imperialism is that form of intergroup domination in which formal (direct) control over the affairs of the colony exists through a resident, imperial, administrative apparatus. Informal imperialism is synonymous with neocolonialism, semicolonialism, and economic imperialism and is a type of intergroup domination in which formal administrative controls are absent and power is channelled through a local elite. Under this definition, the satellites of the Soviet Union and British-dominated territories such as Northern Nigeria fall into the same class, to be differentiated later on the basis of the relationship variable. A further consequence of the decision to insert the formal/informal variable above that of settlers is that 12 types are generated at the level of the relationship distinctions and 24 types at the level of the political-stage dichotomy. Alternatively, the formal/informal distinction might be added as the fifth, sixth, or seventh variable, with differing consequences. The choice among alternatives is determined by the number of meaningless categories—categories that are paradoxical (conflict logically) or are unlikely to have occurred in history (or to occur in the future?)—created in each case.

A second approach to modification would be to decide that the feature in question is equivalent to the domination variable. Accordingly, the new feature would be added as another dimension coequal with domination. Such a decision could generate a new system that could also be interconnected with selected features of the model of colonialism presented here. The utility or power of any model is only partially defined in terms of the problems it has solved. Equally important, if not more so, is the promise of solutions to other problems. Therefore, inherent flexibility is an important source of strength, not weakness.

Rejection of a definition or classification should come only when the researcher has found an alternate scheme that better defines or classifies the phenomenon under consideration. (This is not to imply that a counter instance cannot invalidate a particular classification, but only that definitions and classifications should allow for, and in fact anticipate, new cases.) Such a scheme would be one that is more general (applicable to a greater number of cases) and simpler (promoting at least as much understanding in more parsimonious terms). To reject a scheme without a replacement for it is not the way of normal science (Kuhn 1962:77, 79).

SOME IMPLICATIONS

The proposed definitional and classificatory scheme has implications that extend well beyond the limited objectives of this paper. The scheme suggests a methodology, only partially explicit, that shows promise of being capable of handling fairly complex social and cultural phenomena. Two qualities of the methodology are worthy of note.

The first, already discussed, is its capacity for modification and articulation. Existing methods also have such capability, but characteristically defining is done on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. Although qualifications—e.g., that a definition is tentative, needs to be tested, and the like—are typically made in connection with the definitional process, definitions are either accepted or not, as is, by scholars. One reason is that the methodology for elaboration, modification, or rearrangement of components is not made sufficiently explicit. The only constant in science is change. Definition, like theory, must anticipate change. The methodology offered here is a syntax for semantics. The graphic symbolic qualities of the scheme have merit in that they are more easily mastered than the symbology of logic or mathematics.

A second feature of the methodology is that it stresses the interrelatedness of the variables. To be a scientist in
Western civilization has been to analyze, to take apart, to see the whole from the point of view of its components in the tradition of categorical philosophy. In natural science this method has been productive; in the study of man, it has not. Independent entities are nonexistent in human relationships. All is one. A study of colonialism is a study of social structure; a study of social structure is the study of value systems; and so on. The methodology used in this paper identifies parts (variables) and shows their relationship to other parts. Parts compose wholes. Accordingly, analysis and synthesis, i.e., seeing parts from the point of view of the whole, merge. The way in which the proposed methodology handles the interrelations of different dimensions of cultural and social phenomena can be illustrated by an analysis of the term "caste."

The methodology makes it difficult to define phenomena in isolation. A consideration of colonialism as a form of domination relates to the phenomenon stratificational systems, i.e., class and caste. Of these, only caste is related to colonialism or imperialism as defined here. Caste is a form of social stratification wherein status, wealth, and power are hierarchically arranged according to ethnic considerations and where no upward mobility is theoretically possible. Caste is normally associated with India, but certain of its features are more widespread than is often appreciated. Caste is a form of domination. Groups or subgroups, in this case castes or subcastes, are clearly based on ethnic criteria. In modern India, one caste does not normally colonize another caste's territory, although the historical origin of the caste system appears to have been related to colonialism as the term has been defined in this paper. One caste neither exterminates nor assimilates other castes, but rather there is relative equilibrium among them. Finally, caste is not considered an international phenomenon, but something that occurs within some political unit. Therefore, caste is a type of social structural form that is a result of domestic imperialism with relative equilibrium existing among strata (groups) that are ethnically homogeneous.

Using this definition, we can find caste in America and South Africa as well. Afro-Americans and American Indians have had and still do have to some extent a castelike status. Those Indians who survived the extermination phase of American imperialism and colonialism were given a castelike status and placed on reservations (may we call them Indianians?). Blacks, too, especially in the American South and more clearly in the past, had a caste status. Although racial considerations did play a role in defining the status of blacks and Indians, more important perhaps were cultural considerations; for example, blacks could be exploited whereas Indians could not, and the latter were, therefore, viewed as pests to be exterminated.

Whereas the caste system in India is believed to be breaking down, the caste system in South Africa is in a dynamic process of emergence. The separate development of whites and blacks is well known, but less well known is the separation of white cultural groups: those of Dutch vs. British origin. The policy of apartheid requires that the various racial and cultural groups maintain and develop their separate life-styles and cultures by living in residentially segregated districts and coming together only for purposes of work; in some respects, this is how the caste system in traditional India functioned. True, there are many differences between the two; South Africa's caste operates within a market nexus rather than the redistributive nexus that characterized the traditional Indian economy (Polanyi, Arenberg, and Pearson 1957: Chaps. 11, 12). The point of this analysis of caste is that a process (imperialism) and a social form (caste) are tied together. The separation of the process and the social structural form promotes more confusion than it does understanding.

CONCLUSIONS: A GENERATED GLOSSARY

The purpose of this paper has been to define colonialism and some related phenomena. The following set of definitions was generated by the procedure employed:

1. Domination is the control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or the behavior of other individuals or groups.

2. Intergroup domination is the domination process in a culturally heterogeneous society, intragroup domination that in a culturally homogeneous society.

3. Colonialism is that form of intergroup domination in which settlers in significant number migrate permanently to the colony from the colonizing power.

4. Imperialism is a form of intergroup domination in which few, if any, permanent settlers from the imperial homeland migrate to the colony.

5. Class is a form of stratified intragroup domination.

6. Domestic imperialism is that form of intergroup domination which occurs within the confines of a recognized autonomous political unit (polity). (With international imperialism the dominating group often becomes synonymous with the dominant political unit, though a class analysis provides a more realistic understanding of the process involved.)

7. Administrative imperialism refers to that form of intergroup domination in which formal (direct) controls over the affairs of the colony exist through a resident imperial administrative apparatus.

8. Informal imperialism is synonymous with neo-colonialism, semicolonialism, and economic imperialism and is a type of intergroup domination in which formal administrative controls are absent and power is channelled through a local elite.

9. Domestic colonialism differs from domestic im-
perialism only in that it involves permanent settlers moving from the colonial power.

10. Informal colonialism refers to that form of intergroup domination that results from the voluntary migration of permanent settlers from places other than the metropolis.

11. Caste is a type of social structural form that is the result of domestic imperialism with relative equilibrium existing among strata (groups) that are ethnically heterogeneous.

The definitions provided here by definitional analysis do not deny the complexity of reality, but rather attempt to identify the major strands of the richly woven fabric that is human affairs.

Abstract

Colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism are terms that remain undefined despite the enormous literature devoted to the phenomena. Within the academy and without, a critical evaluation of colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism is going on—and definition is a prerequisite for critical evaluation. A model for generating definitions that are logically consistent is offered in this paper. The model first identifies the variables relevant to colonialism and imperialism and then hierarchically orders the variables, with definitions resulting at each level. A procedure by which the definitions may be modified by future research findings is offered. Finally, it is suggested that the relationship between social stratification systems and colonialism and imperialism may be defined through a further articulation of the model presented here.

Comments

by Andre Gunder Frank

Santiago, Chile. 30 iv 71

As Horvath quite rightly points out, "definition, classification, and explanation (theory) are difficult to separate." Thus, this "definition" of colonialism is really a theory of colonialism and an integral part of a theoretical methodology or ideological approach to society and its study—and to the preservation of its status quo. But this theory is not scientific by Horvath's or any other acceptable standard, which—as he also rightly observes—"in Western civilization has been to analyze, to take apart, to see the whole from the point of view of its components."

The methodological definition or definitional methodology under review, far from being holistic, is antiholistic, abstract logical (or more precisely definitional) typologic—hence "type 4... a logical type which rarely, if ever, has occurred in history"—, and in the worst tradition of Western scholarship it is antihistorical. Therefore, this methodology is quite at one with that of those scholars of whom Horvath rightly observes that although colonialism ranks with the most influential processes in human history, Western scholars have not really come to grips with the phenomenon.

Nor can they, with a method-ideology that pretends to analyze reality by forgetting its holism, disregarding its concreteness, and denying its history. Far from coming to grips with colonialism and other unpleasant aspects of social reality, this ideology can only obfuscate all that reality while giving the illusion of explaining its parts.

A result of this by scientific standards unacceptable methodology and an example of its resultant obfuscation is the "definition of colonialism" in terms of the presence of significant numbers of permanent settlers which claims to liken the domination of Latin America, North America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Asian part of the Soviet Union, which any child in the dominated real world would unmask as the emperor's ideological clothes. For a scientific treatment (whatever its shortcomings and one's reservations), the reader may compare this ideology with the holistic, concrete historical methodology of Ribeiro (1970), which leads to very different, scientifically much more acceptable, and certainly more realistic results.

The reasons why "scholars have failed" go far beyond the four (insufficient cross-cultural perspective, lack of theoretical perspective, lack of flexibility, and ultraconservative attitude toward words and their meanings) identified by Horvath. The real reasons are to be sought not so much in attitudes toward mere words or limited outward-directed perspective—which are only derivative reflections—as in these scholars' ultraconservative attitude and limited perspective in regard to their own society and to their own role as ideologists in and of that society. Similarly, the explanatory limitations of the cited incursion into the sociology of knowledge are a reflection also of this same attitude and perspective. It is this political attitude and perspective of these scholars which underlies the failure of "Western scholarship"—including that under review here—to come, or to be willing and able to come, to grips with colonialism, imperialism, and the political, economic, and sociocultural structure and process of the society that requires and generates them.

by David Jacobson

Waltham, Mass., U.S.A. 14 iv 71

Certain aspects of Horvath's paper obscure his attempt to introduce order into the study of "colonialism." Horvath claims that scholars "have failed to provide us with definitions of colonialism," although his argument is based on a critique of others' definitions of colonialism. Perhaps his point is that a useful, productive, or, in some other way, critical definition has not been offered, but such qualification raises the problem—which he explicitly avoids—of specifying a theoretical standard by which conceptual utility may be evaluated. Horvath further confuses the issue by asserting that he is not concerned with analyzing the uses (and meanings) of the concept of colonialism, but rather with "what the colonial phenomenon is." He constructs categories of attributes which he chooses to label as varieties of colonialism or imperialism, but their utility remains problematic until carefully and systematically applied to empirical cases. Definitions constitute one element essential for the discovery of order, but their utility is based upon, and measured in terms of, their implications for theoretically understanding, or explaining, relationships between (categories of) phenomena. The construction of a definition itself implies a theoretical framework, however implicit, the signifi-
cance of which is underestimated when definitions are analyzed in terms of a "pretheory stage." "Definitional analysis" may be useful for conceptual clarification, but Horvath's argument would be greatly strengthened if he were to make explicit the theoretical implications of his definition of colonialism.

by MADELINE BARBARA LÉON'S

Baltimore, Md., U.S.A. 4 v 71

I was encouraged to be sent a manuscript dealing with the phenomena of colonialism and imperialism destined for publication in CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY. Systematic attention to these subjects in anthropological journals is long overdue and very welcome. I should like to question, however, the utility of an exercise in definition divorced from explicit theory and to examine critically some of the implicit theoretical underpinnings of Horvath's definitional scheme.

I share Horvath's concern with the use of words. If the meanings of words are unclear, understanding is impaired. For example, I am not sure what he means in his use of the term "ethnic." Does he mean to imply racial distinctiveness or cultural distinctiveness or both? The term has been used all three ways, and its meaning here makes a difference to the understanding of his argument.

Despite this common concern, I must question the value of this contribution. I have certain minor quibbles over consistency, such as the discussion of Africans brought to the New World within a category of voluntary migrants. My fundamental quarrel, however, is with the author's assumption that definition "leads to" theory—that it is a way of ordering reality which is prior to theory. Although Horvath acknowledges the difficulty of separating definition and theory, he then proceeds to do so. I would suggest that it is not useful to separate definition from a theoretical context.

As Horvath indicates, the process of definition involves the selection of a few variables as "significant" while other variables are ignored as insignificant or less significant. This selection process must be justifiable, if it is not mystical or completely arbitrary, and the justification can only be on the theoretical grounds of utility in a system of explanation or prediction. Horvath claims that the basis for selection is metaphysical and implicit. I would translate this to mean that the theoretical basis of many definitions has been left implicit, in my view unfortunately so. His own definitional structure is loaded with implicit theory, which he chooses to call definitions of relationships, as in the abstract, or "implications." I propose here to examine some aspects of this implicit theory and to relate it to certain explicit theoretical debates within the discipline.

Horvath uses domination as his first significant variable. The term domination is taken to refer to power relations. Therefore a judgment is here being made that for the analysis of the phenomena at hand political relationships are more significant than, for example, economic or cultural relationships. The theoretical scheme within which this definition would be produced would be one which grants explanatory primacy to political processes. A theoretical scheme giving explanatory primacy to economic processes would find it less useful. The question of inevitable theoretical bias built into a definition is not one to be solved merely by rearranging or adding to the variables. Can variables be subtracted as well? That would amount to writing your own definitions to suit the problem, which is what is generally done.

If variables cannot be subtracted, Horvath is imposing his own basic set of distinctions where they may or may not be apt.

Horvath's first manipulation is to differentiate between intragroup domination and intergroup domination. We are subsequently told that the social structure expressed by the exercise of domination ("domination process") in a culturally homogeneous society is to be defined as class. Class refers to the hierarchical arrangement of status, power, or wealth groups in such a society. However, the implicit theory is not developed to tell us whether, or the extent to which, these groups coincide or to elucidate the relationship between political power, status, and wealth. (One of the problems of implicit theory is that the implications of theoretical assumptions are likely not to be pursued.) The exercise of domination within a culturally heterogeneous society produces a different kind of stratification, caste stratification, wherein status, wealth, and power are hierarchically arranged according to ethnic considerations and where no upward mobility is theoretically possible.

This analysis applies to all situations of internal colonialism, a category in which Horvath includes the United States, India, and South Africa. Questions of agreement with this specific categorization aside, we are here introduced to two different types of societies, homogeneous and heterogeneous, characterized by two different forms of stratification, class and caste.

I submit that this whole discussion retracts the same ground as the theoretical debate that has raged around Smith's (1965, 1969) view of socio-cultural pluralism, merely substituting the term caste for Smith's concept of plural section. The fact that Smith is explicitly theoretical and Horvath denies theoretical preconceptions does not change the situation substantially.

Horvath's implicit argument parallels that of Smith's exposition of the plural society rather closely. To oversimplify Smith's complex argument, the plural society is differentiated into segments which are institutionally distinct from one another. The society is maintained through the monopoly or control of the political institutions of the society by one of these sections, which constitutes a dominant minority. Smith rejects the applicability of class analysis to the plural society because, he contends, such analysis assumes an integrative and continuous status continuum which is not present in plural societies. Horvath's view of ethnic groups as hierarchically arranged castes emerges as a caricature of Smith.

There is a great deal of utility and enduring value in Smith's formulation, but one of its most questionable aspects is the dichotomy between class-stratified societies and plural societies, to the extent that they must be analyzed in different terms. I have taken issue with this contention (1970) along with other of Smith's critics (McKenzie 1966; Tuden and Plotinovic 1970). Yet it is precisely this dichotomy which Horvath perpetuates in his distinction between homogeneous class society and heterogeneous caste society.

It is the case, as Horvath points out, that many writers (particularly sociologists) have used the term class in the context of culturally homogeneous societies in which values are shared. In fact Smith's views may be better understood in terms of his own intellectual confrontation with the Parsonsian theory of action. But, as Horvath also states in another context, we need not be bound by the way in which words have been used by others.

I would contend that it is theoretically more useful to have the term class refer to the distribution of wealth, power, and status (each analytically separable) in any state-organized society, including those which are culturally and/or racially heterogeneous. Unless we can separate analytically the distribution of these scarce goods from race and ethnicity (cultural differences), we cannot see how they may vary independently or alter their relationships over time. According to Horvath's view of caste we must assume by definition that wealth, power, and status are differentially distributed among hierarchically ranked ethnic groups and that this relationship
is “theoretically” immutable because no mobility is possible. On the other hand, Horvath himself contends that the caste system in India is breaking down while a caste system is crystallizing in South Africa. When the relationships between power, wealth, status, and ethnicity do demonstrably change, we can, if unimpeded by Horvath’s definitions, ask the question why; if they do not change, we can ask why not. According to Horvath’s formal scheme, the first question would be impossible and the second meaningless.

by ROBERT W. SHIRLEY

Toronto, Canada. 30 rv 71

It is an extremely important topic that Horvath has examined here, and I for one am happy to see that social scientists in the United States are beginning to study a problem Latin American intellectuals have worked on for years, namely the patterns of domination by one people over another. I do think, however, that this paper would have been much more useful if it had appeared ten years ago. A generative, formal classification such as this offers a valuable take-off point for further research, but can never be seen as “complete.” Certainly the categories chosen for the definitions are very important ones, mainly demographic factors of settlement vs. nonsettlement and extermination or assimilation of the preexisting population. On the other hand, so much is coming to be known today about the process of social stratification and the ways in which inter- and intragroup domination is maintained (see, for example, Furtado 1963, 1970; Prado Junior 1967; Balandin 1970) that a paper such as this leaves one with the strong sense of the missing questions “How?” and “Why?”

A number of points in this paper disturb me. I feel that social science might currently be better served by a series of overlapping definitional frameworks than by one fixed form. As Simpson (1961:27-28) has pointed out, a classification only has usefulness with regard to a specific theoretical framework (in his case, biological evolution). The theory here is not clear, although it is apparently related to demography. The categories are not really watertight, but many times refer to complex continua. The meaning, for example, of assimilation vs. equilibrium is not fully clear to me: are or were black Africans assimilated in the United States? in Brazil? in the South African mines? The answer to all of these is yes—and no—depending upon the criteria and the domains discussed.

by AIDAN SOUTHALL

Madison, Wis., U.S.A. 7 rv 71

I have no criticism of the logic or coherence of Horvath’s classificatory scheme. There is no escape from the fact that some enjoy this sort of thing more than others. It is rather out of fashion with many anthropologists because they do not find it the most satisfactory road to illumination of the problems that interest them. I think it represents at least a necessary preliminary mental process, but fruitful analysis begins when one has passed beyond its confines. I doubt the desirability of spending time on such schemes except in immediate relation to the study of specific problems. Perhaps this is what Horvath is doing, but there is no indication of it. True, his scheme is flexible in the sense that further differentiations can be built into it, but this way lies the early danger of arriving at categories more numerous than cases.

Proof of these points is that the model immediately shows its weaknesses in relation to the examples so cursorily added. There is not much difference, we are told, between the suppression of non-Muslim peoples in southern Sudan by northern Muslims and the imperializing of all the Sudan by the British. The crucial point, which the model seems to have prevented Horvath from seeing, is that the one was largely the cause of the other. The British drew a hard and fast line between the north and the south which had not existed before. In the north they fostered Arabic and Islam, already dominant there, in the south English and Christianity, both new to the area. We may formulate a law, not suggested by Horvath’s model, stated oversimply for the sake of brevity, that when an imperial power confers formal political autonomy upon a country fundamentally split by a single overriding cleavage, the constitution cannot survive and there will be disorder and bloodshed until a solution is adopted which blurs the cleavage. This applies to northern and southern Sudan, to Buganda versus the rest of Uganda, and to Northern Nigeria versus the rest of Nigeria.

The caste example is equally infelicitous. Interpretation of Indian caste as historically related to colonialism has simply not been a fruitful idea. Classifying the South African and United States situations as caste along with India, as has often been done, obscures more than it clarifies. I agree that it is necessary to ask, as a preliminary question, what common elements are to be found in the Indian, South African, and American systems of inequality, but this does not solve the more important questions raised by Dumont (1966) or Leach (1960) with respect to Indian caste. The model is even irrelevant to Horvath’s own point that blacks could be exploited whereas Indians could not, and the latter were, therefore, viewed as pests to be exterminated.

The model does not distinguish ideology from action: it would classify Portugal’s imperialism as international, whereas to Portugal it is domestic.

I disagree profoundly with Horvath’s view that domestic and international imperialism and colonialism are not fundamentally different “as forms of
domination or exploitation or as cultural processes.” I think the situation of the Indians in North America and of the Kirghiz or Kazakh in the Soviet Union are equally odd in which the behavior of both differ fundamentally from the situation of Africans in the colonial territories of European powers. This is particularly so for two reasons. The formal distinction between domestic and international requires careful refinement. For example, the oppression of Black by White South Africans might be superficially classified according to the model as domestic colonialism, but it is in a more important sense international imperialism. Unilinear classifications are not good because the requirements depend upon the problem. Furthermore, Horvath slips rather obtrusively into his definition of domination as the control of territory and/or behavior, but he gives no consideration to the vast implications of the latter. The ubiquitous contemporary form of neo-colonialism, in which the behavior of formally independent governments is partly controlled by the trade networks and the diplomatic, economic aid, intelligence, military, and financial institutions of the wealthy industrial nations would presumably be classified by the model as international imperialism. Unfortunately this does not get us very far because it is so elementary. The model stops at the point where interest begins. This kind of formal, aloof, Aristotelian model-building, without problem orientation, also carries the great danger of ignoring or twisting problems of ambiguity, ambivalence, and intermediacy because they do not initially fit. For example, I have described Alur domination (Southall 1956) as a process which does not fit either the intergroup or intragroup categories of Horvath’s scheme, and many writers have referred to similar cases elsewhere.

Of course reality must be ordered to be intellectually understood, but this kind of model provides only an initial approach, which has to be abandoned because adding to it all the further differentiations which progressively become necessary leads to uneconomic absurdities. When deeper levels of analysis are reached, the models used (implicitly or explicitly) have to be focussed directly upon the context and problem under study. It is only through the understanding of the inter-relationship of variables, in that context and with respect to that problem, has been achieved that they can fruitfully be related to more comprehensive models.

by J. E. Spencer
Los Angeles, Calif., U.S.A. 26 iv 71

The issue of colonialism, with which Horvath is concerned, cannot be dismissed as much ado about nothing, but the difficulty is that seldom will anyone agree that a given case fits the simplistic set of definitions when the criteria for deciding a case are subjectively stated. And in this sort of problem there is not just an Academy, but as many as there are colonizers/imperializers, and each academy will see its own case through its own perspective with its own perception. This becomes quite clearly a case of the West trying to impose a simple universal definition of morality in aggression upon all the practitioners thereof.

For the academy of the West, the definitions are intellectually sound but impractical in the sense that they are not clear and objective measures by which all users must come to the same result. For example, how many are “settlers in significant number,” on the basis of which we are to decide whether the case is one of colonialism or imperialism? Although the Philippines did become Hispanicized to a remarkable degree, there were never 10,000 Spaniards and part-Spaniards in the islands at any one time, but there were many times that number of Chinese and part-Chinese resident there in late Spanish times. France set out to “colonize” her new holding in Indochina, but there were never 50,000 French and part-French there, and there were over ten times that many Chinese. At most there were just under 300,000 Dutch and part-Dutch in Indonesia, but over a million Chinese. It is very unlikely that Horvath and I could agree very easily on most of the cases, since there is such a large grey zone in almost every case.

I would object to having to force every case into the simple pattern of the model. Although Philippine Hispanicization looks like a simple case of international assimilative colonialism in one view, there is a fair case to be made for domestic colonialism in another view, in that Filipinos took over and utilized the Spanish-introduced political institutions to strengthen their own in order to maintain control of the evolving political state, while Chinese residents converted themselves into Philippinized citizens of that same political state to secure a degree of economic control. Where am I now? And that Horvath provides for further manipulation of the model to take care of some problems is well and good on the one hand, but fraught with semantic danger on the other. For all that, it is a fact that I want to wait a time to see what greater clarity he can bring to this knotty kind of issue before I start labeling things with terms out of the model.

by Bronislaw Stefanizyn
Pittsburgh, Pa., U.S.A. 19 iv 71

I find the attempt to arrive at a definition of colonialism useful. However, social and cultural anthropologists seem to have been able to do without this term. They see colonialism as but one of many forms of culture contact, particularly when they are dealing with directed culture change. Moreover, the anthropologist concentrates primarily on the effects of culture contact, whereas the historian and the political scientist, each faithful to the principles of his discipline, dwell more on the particular event of colonialization and therefore find it difficult to proceed from the particular event to a generalization. The bibliography accompanying the present article seems to reflect this situation; most of the references cited come from historical, economic, sociological, and political science sources, hardly any from anthropologists. Ex ore tuo indicio te.

Reply
by Ronald J. Horvath

This paper arose out of my interest in urbanization in the Third World. What impressed me initially was that the origins, processes, and patterns of urbanization in Africa in no important way matched the expectations generated by the classic models and theories of urbanization. I decided to investigate the hypothesis that these differences were due to colonialism. But what is colonialism? Naively, I thought that I could go to the library for a couple of weeks and come up with a satisfactory answer. A year later, it seemed that there were as many definitions as studies—and, worse yet, that many studies were conducted without the aid of definition, much less theory. To compound the confusion, many scholars were doing studies of colonial relationships under other labels. The discrepancy between what scholars defined colonialism to be and the situations they identified as colonial ones stood out; the former tended to be vastly wider than the latter. I concluded that Western scholars had failed to come to grips with colonialism and imperialism. Of the many problems that must be dealt with in order to do so, my paper focuses upon only one: the need to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the various terms relating to colonialism. It does not
include a theory of colonialism; it does not deal with the politics or the morality of colonialism. It does not even finish the task it has set out to accomplish.

Spencer, for example, correctly points out that the criteria for applying these definitions are not adequately spelled out. Further specification is in order, but more empirical work and/or the development of theoretical propositions should precede such specification. What a significant number of settlers is will depend upon what kind of answer is sought or is required by the theoretical propositions. An empirical solution based upon purely demographic data might examine the range of settlers involved in a variety of colonies. If the number needed to control an area were the criterion, other problems would emerge; for what Cortez could do in Mexico in 1519 with a handful of Spaniards isn’t possible in Vietnam in the 1960’s with half a million Americans. But why would Spencer wait for me to make such specifications? Can cultural geographers be content with their scant treatment of colonialism or with the ethnocentric manner in which many have approached it (e.g., documentation of what we “discovered” them)?

I am quite sympathetic with those who would prefer a well-articulated, explicit theory to a definition of colonialism (Jacobson, Léons). So would I. The how and why of colonialism and imperialism (Shirley) would be included in such a theory as postulates. These objections are not invalid; they just seem premature. We do not as yet possess a means by which empirical regularities relating to colonialism can be systematically identified or even compared in a purely descriptive manner, and this is a minimum though not sufficient condition for theory construction. Definition and classification typically precede theory construction; we may recall important precedents from the history of science. The principles of taxonomy in biology evolved prior to Darwin. The how and why did change because of Darwin—species were no longer seen as immutable—but the taxonomy survived. The periodic tables in chemistry represent another example of a classificatory system that has survived many shifts in theory. I would not argue that definition and classification must precede theory construction, but merely that they generally do, and that useful definitions and classifications can survive changes in the explanations (theories) of given phenomena. Léons points out that there is implicit theory in the definitions; but “theory” here should read “theories,” and these implicit theories are conceivably as different as the theory that God created all life in its present form in a matter of days and the theory of evolution proposed by Darwin (both of which, at different times, were considered to be consistent with the same classificatory system). Southall says that classification “is rather out of fashion with many anthropologists” and suggests that classifications are to be used only initially and then “abandoned.” I would argue that classifications cease to be important as a research focus only when one of them has come to be widely agreed upon, and even then classification is not abandoned, but built upon.

The research I have done for this article has convinced me that colonialism is a universal phenomenon; all civilizations have engaged in it, and it is likely that many precivilized folk have also. In order to define the phenomenon in a fashion that will lead to theory, we need to know what the various types of colonial relationships have in common. Focus on differences alone has often led to the conclusion that all relationships are unique. The doctrine of uniqueness and theory-building are antithetical. I began, then, by asking what all types of colonialism have in common, with the object of considering differences afterwards. When we know what colonialism is, we can begin to distinguish subtypes of colonialism, e.g., the domestic vs. international varieties (Southall).

Having tailored this emperor’s clothes with no deception intended, I can only ask Frank if it is not his ideological position that prevents him from seeing the simple garment involved. His criticism focuses upon the variable that distinguishes colonialism from imperialism on the basis of the presence or absence of settlers. Ribeiro, whose scheme he prefers, makes this same distinction, though he calls it immigrant vs. trading colonialization and adds slavish colonialization. A more important difference between Ribeiro’s treatment and mine is that he relates levels of technology and his “civilizational processes” to his scheme. I hope that Frank is not trying to suggest that either he or Ribeiro is free of ideology, for I am dubious of the possibility of a useful value- or ideology-free social science. Rather, I shall assume that he objects to placing the various examples cited in one class because he sees the differences which stem from his ideological position as being more important than their similarities. Were I to insert my own ideology into the scheme, it would be at the domination level, as a series of explicit assumptions (on the if side of an if . . . , then . . . construction) relating to the source(s) of domination. These assumptions or theoretical postulates would specify the important differences among types of domination. But first we must have answers to questions such as: Is domination part of our biological inheritance, as Ardrey would lead us to believe? Do the forms of domination vary significantly with changes in levels of technology, e.g., preindustrial, industrial? Or are the differences associated with various kinds of institutions, e.g., feudalism, capitalism? The assumptions one makes about the sources of domination can logically lead one to place the cases cited into very different categories; but these differences are not dealt with in this paper. A serious and prolonged discussion of the nature of domination and its relationship to the kinds of variables that anthropologists and other social scientists have been interested in (or should be interested in) is certainly called for.

Léons claims that Smith’s work on pluralism is explicitly theoretical; my view is that it is primarily definitional, with only a weak commitment to theory. The last word I have seen from Smith (1969a:415) on the matter is:

There does not now exist any agreed or systematic body of concepts and analytic propositions which could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the plural society.

The most generous interpretation of the theoretical basis of Smith’s, and I might add Kuper’s, work is that (1) if a plural society exists, then domination necessarily occurs, and (2) if a homogeneous or heterogeneous society exists, then consensus occurs. Here we see the ideological basis of liberal democracy in the form of theoretical propositions. Smith’s (1969a:449) observations on the desirability of universal incorporation (universalism, in Parsons’ sociology) add further support to this interpretation. Events in America during the past several years place serious strain on the credibility of the distinction these propositions make. The Pentagon Papers make even C. Wright Mills’ view of a power elite look conservative. This relatively minor difference of interpretation aside, two important differences between my formulation and Smith’s must be pointed out. First is the reversal of the tendency to dissociate pluralism from colonialism; my view is more in line with Furnivall’s original view of pluralism, though I have attempted substantially to generalize his conception. Second is the way in which my scheme makes clear the interrelationships among variables and generates definitions. By contrast, try to subject Smith’s formulation to definitional analysis; I have, and have despairs.

Léons expresses concern about the judgments involved in the selection of

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variables. After reviewing the literature on colonialism, I tentatively classified all the works into three groups in terms of whether they viewed colonialism as a form of domination, a form of exploitation, or a cultural process. This paper attempts to tie the first and third views together; colonialism as a form of exploitation is left untreated. I have since incorporated the economic dimension, at least partially, into the model [Hethmon n.d.).

She is right in pointing out that Americans of African origin were not voluntary migrants and should not be placed in the category of informal colonists.

Of all the comments, I am least in sympathy with the notion that the discipline which defines its domain as the study of man can do without the terms colonialism and imperialism (Stefaniszyn). The bibliographic materials cited reflect my belief that important problems cannot be solved within the confines of traditional disciplines. Professional chauvinism and the argots it generates are serious barriers to understanding the condition of man, let alone attempting to change that condition. Why call colonialism “culture contact” or “historical incorporation” if you mean colonialism? Yet this is not denying that what Stefaniszyn is saying is generally true—“Social and cultural anthropologists have been able to live without this term”—but can this be justified in the future?

This article was written in 1968, which seems like ten years ago from the point of view of the raising of my consciousness on the subject (Shirley), and if I were to write it again today I suspect it would be different. The reduction of ambiguity through the building of a formal scheme, though absolutely essential to the enterprise we call science, seems less important for a concept like colonialism than understanding the “political attitude and perspective” (Frank) that underlie the failure of scholars to come to grips with the phenomenon. I now agree with Frank’s criticism of the reason I gave for this failure and accept his explanation as more fundamental. To get the academy to confront its own politics will not be an easy task, especially if we continue to allow another to live with the illusion that we can be objective scholars in the social sciences.

The task of bringing our ideology and values out into the open so that they may be scrutinized and demystified will also require definitional analysis in order to minimize the ambiguity of the critical terms we use. Definitional analysis, then, should be regarded as a tool needed for the demanding task of understanding the condition of man and for the even more demanding task of participating in the changing of that condition.

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Prizes

The Chicago Folklore Prize is supported by an endowment established by the International Folklore Association and is awarded annually by the University of Chicago for an important contribution to the field of folklore. Students, candidates for higher degrees, and established scholars may compete for the prize. The contribution may be a monograph, thesis, an annotated and interpreted collection of materials, or, in exceptional cases, a textbook. No restrictions are placed on the contestant’s choice of topic or selection of material: the term “folklore” is here used in its broadest sense (e.g., American, European folklore, etc.; anthropological, literary, religious folklore, etc.). Entries are welcomed from any country in the world.

Material which has appeared in print may be submitted within one year from the time of publication. If the contestant wishes to have his entry returned, it should be accompanied by the return postage. The successful contestant will be asked to donate his entry, if it is already printed, to the University of Chicago; if the award goes to an entry submitted in typewritten form, the author is requested to send a copy to the University of Chicago if it later appears in published form.

The prize provides a cash award of about $75.00. If the entries merit special consideration and funds are available, more than one prize may be awarded; on the other hand, the judges may recommend that no award be made in a given year.

For 1971, three prizes were awarded. First prize went to Venetia Newall (London, England) for her book An Egg at Easter. Second prizes were awarded to Paulo de Carvalho-Neto (Los Angeles, Calif., U.S.A.) for his book The Concept of Folklore and to Gertrude Prokosch Kurath with Antonio Garcia for their book Music and Dance of the Tetza Pueblos.

Former prize-winners will not, normally, be eligible to win the prize a second time; however, those who have received an “honorable mention” will continue to be eligible to win a prize. Entries must be submitted before April 1, 1972 to the Chairman of the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures, University of Chicago, 1050 E. 59th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A.

The Human Relations Area Files will present a prize of $250 for the best social science student paper in cross-cultural research. Authors must be currently enrolled at a degree-granting institution or have been awarded a degree during 1971. Papers may be either substantive or methodological. Use of the Human Relations Area Files is not mandatory. All papers will be considered for publication in Behavior Science Notes at the discretion of the editors and should be of suitable length for publication (up to 50 manuscript pages). If accepted for publication, papers will appear in English. Any manuscript not written in English should be accompanied by an English summary. Each entry should include a brief statement about the author and a 50–75-word abstract. HRAF assumes no responsibility for manuscripts submitted. Papers will be judged by an independent panel of experts, whose decision shall be final. Deadline for submission of entries is March 31, 1972. Entries or requests for further information should be addressed to the Editor, Behavior Science Notes.