Albanian Migration into Greece: The Economic, Sociological, and Security Implications

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The spectacular opening ceremony of the twenty-eighth Olympiad in Athens captured the imagination of the world with its glitter, originality, and depth. One of its key attractions included turning the Olympic stadium into an instant lake and featured a diachronic stream of navigators sailing to and from mainland Greece and the numerous isles through the ages. Behind this phantasmagoric staging lay the rich history of an ancient civilization whose content was undoubtedly Hellenic in origin but universal in content and in feeling. The underlying theme was that the “soft underbelly” of Europe was and remains the crossroads of the world whose shores not only attracted entrepreneurs and adventurers from every corner of the known world but served as launching pad for numerous others who sailed and settled in distant parts of the world, carrying with them the universal and timeless values and precepts of Hellenic civilization.

The event captured the trajectory of Greece’s experience with migration, particularly in the past four to five centuries. For most of its history since achieving independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late 1820s, the country has been a source of migrant workers. It is only since the early 1990s that modern Greece became the recipient of immigration. This change from a country of emigration to a country of significant immigration followed developments in its economy. For a small country of less than 11 million people, unaccustomed to receiving large groups of immigrants, the experience has had (and continues to have) profound economic, social, and secu-
rity implications. In the following pages we profile the nature and extent of recent migration into Greece and analyze its economic, social, and national security implications. Besides drawing conclusions, in the final section we deal with how the Greek state has responded to the immigration problem. But a brief and cursory overview of Greek experience with population movements is a beneficial beginning.

**Emigration: Brief Background**

The small, rocky, and resource-poor country could barely feed its unskilled and uneducated population. Thousands of Greek men fled for Europe, Russia, and elsewhere in search of employment. Emigration to the United States came much later, with the first wave of destitute immigrants reaching the shores of the Americas in the 1890s. Greeks from Greece proper were also joined by thousands of their compatriots residing in “unredeemed” territories. From 1850 to 1908, for example, about eight hundred thousand able-bodied men and their dependents took the road to migration.

The Balkan War (1912–3), which resulted in more than doubling Greece’s territory, followed by the influx of better educated and more cosmopolitan Greeks from Asia Minor in the 1920s, lay the foundations of a gradual improvement in the country’s economic fortunes.¹ But the advent of World War II and the destructive civil war (1946–9) that followed leveled whatever progress had been made. Thousands of people were forced to emigrate, further swelling the ranks of Greek migrant workers abroad. Postwar Greece experienced three emigration/migration movements that flowed in and out of the country. From 1945 to 1973, nearly 1 million Greeks moved to the United States, Canada, Australia, West Germany, and other European and even Latin American countries. Greeks emigrated in order to escape unemployment, poverty, and political repression. In Russell King’s words, the Greek migrants “functioned in the same way as a ‘reserve army of labor’ for Northern Europe’s industries and labor needs in other low status employment sectors.”²

Following more than two decades of substantial economic growth, Greece’s economy began to show signs of strength. Foreign aid and the remittances of sailors and Greeks living abroad contributed to this economic upturn. As a result, the country experienced some repatriation in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1974 to 1985, for instance, approximately half of those that had emigrated in the previous decades returned. Labor saturation in West Germany and other Northern European countries was partially responsible for this development. But by the mid-1980s this trend came to a halt, as did the need to leave the country. Rosetos Fakiolas sums up the situation: “Both emigration from and return migration to Greece reached insignificant levels and net migration marked close to zero.”

From Sender to Recipient: The Albanian Avalanche

Greek economic fortunes began to show considerable improvement following the country’s accession to what is now called the European Union in the early 1980s. Massive aid in the form of infrastructure-building packages enabled the country’s economy to experience an economic boom from the late 1980s on. From the periphery of capitalism Greece moved a few yards closer to the center. The per capita gross national product doubled in less than a decade, from about six thousands dollars in the late 1980s to more than thirteen thousand in 2002. Education levels went up and so did urbanization, upward mobility, and expectations. Educated and urban Greeks refused to accept agricultural or other low-paying jobs, such as domestic servants or custodians. Worsening economic conditions and political instability in Africa and other parts of the developing world, and especially the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, signaled the beginning of change. For the first time in history, immigrants began coming to Greece “from African and Asian countries, and after 1989, from East European countries.” All of a sudden Greece changed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration.

5. King, 7.
A number of the newly arrived immigrants were people of Greek background from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. These were given Greek citizenship and were quickly absorbed into the work force. But the overwhelming number of migrant workers that flooded Greece are legal and illegal Albanians. The Athens daily *Kathimerini* reported on 24 January 2003 that over 65 percent of foreigners living in the country are of Albanian origin, and two out of three are male. Nearly half (49.2 percent) of them are high school graduates, 37.1 percent possess elementary education, and only 8.9 percent hold university diplomas. Geographic proximity, a porous border, and abhorrent economic and social conditions in Albania explain this phenomenon. Greece’s need for cheap labor as well as sentimental reasons also account for the large and growing presence of Albanians on Greek soil.

Although reliable statistics are hard to come by, the Athens daily, *Ta Nea*, citing “official” data, reports that in 2001 the number of “foreigners” had reached 797,930. The unofficial but widely held view is that the number is much higher. The increase has been staggering. In 1951 it stood at 30,571. In 1971 the number had gone up to 92,568. By 1991 it had increased by about 80,000, to more than 170,000. Ten years later the number of legal and illegal foreigners residing in Greece shot up fourfold. Another Athens daily, *To Ethnos*, estimates that as many as 300,000 of the Albanian immigrants are considered aliens by Greek government authorities. In a country of fewer than 11 million people, unaccustomed to foreigners, such a number is excessively high. It has helped push unemployment up among the locals, threatens to dilute the Greek identity and cultural homogeneity, and presents security risks.

**Economics: Incentives, Consequences, and Prospects**

Despite labor shortages in agriculture and other low-paying jobs, the Greek economy needs fewer than half of the immigrant workers who enter the

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10. Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 195.
country. What then explains this Albanian avalanche? Even though the Albanians are considered one of the oldest national groups in the Balkan Peninsula, they were the last group in the area to acquire national independence. It came in 1913, but more than half of those who consider themselves Albanians continued to live in adjacent territories outside the jurisdiction of the Tirana government. The situation remains largely unchanged. Poor and politically unstable, the country was occupied by the Italian and the German forces during World War II. Resistance to occupation paved the way for the communists under Enver Hoxha to take control of the country and establish a totalitarian dictatorship.

The regime, which survived the death of its founder in 1985, lasted until the early 1990s. Along with North Korea, Albania was one of the most closed, xenophobic regimes in the world. Travel was prohibited, and so was the ownership of private cars. Religion was not merely suppressed, it was declared illegal. Striving for self-sufficiency, Hoxha and his colleagues discouraged commerce, made it illegal for Albanians to possess foreign currency, and punished severely any would-be opposition. Forced labor camps became common, earning the country the dubious distinction as the “Gulag of the Balkans.” Albania’s was the last of the communist regimes to fall, and only when it fell did the world realize the magnitude of the morass it left behind. In 1992, a year or two after the end of communism, fewer than 5 percent of Albanians owned telephones, and the per capita income was a mere six hundred dollars.\(^1\) The situation has improved a bit, but Albania, along with Moldova, remain Europe’s poorest countries.

Under the circumstances it is easy to understand why Albanians sought to emigrate in droves. Geographic proximity through the porous border separating the two countries made Greece an attractive choice. Though political and social push factors are major considerations toward migration, Albanians migrate into Greece primarily because of economic reasons. Furthermore, a significant wage disparity between the sending and receiving countries triggers additional migration. In general, “the wages earned in Greece are about four-to-six times higher than those that might be earned at home in Albania.”\(^2\)

In order to obtain higher-paying jobs and superior living conditions, it seems only logical that ambitious and destitute Albanian civilians risk the opportunity cost of residing and working in their own country. Despite the negative outcomes of subsisting within a foreign country, remaining in poverty, and facing negative sentiment from Greek society, an Albanian cost-benefit analysis would favor migratory movement into Greece.

Most Albanian migrants also tend to be more educated and better skilled than the average Albanian civilian. As a result, most Albanian immigrants into Greece suffer from relative deprivation, the concept that ambitious, educated individuals never receive opportunities to ameliorate their economic and social status due to an unyielding establishment of an entrenched upper class. Furthermore, educated Albanian groups “which were traditionally protected in Albania, such as students, now seem to live on the margins of Albanian society and fall victim to clandestine labor markets and even trafficking in their home country[;] as a consequence, they experience a loss of economic citizenship which is only compounded further if they migrate.”

Most Albanian immigrants and potential migrants are faced with limited choices and opportunities, which perpetuate a labor migration into Greece that “can be conceptualized as a movement of people who are part of a global ideological chain that consumes and is actively involved in seeking the new life-style that the market economy has created.” The majority of Albanian immigrants are categorized as self-selected migrants who are inclined to be more ambitious, entrepreneurial, and aggressive than individuals choosing to remain in their home country.

As Albanians migrate daily into Greece, the receiving country is inevitably provided with a high labor supply, especially in unskilled or low skilled labor. Nonetheless, Greek society matches the foreign labor supply with a soaring demand in unskilled labor. The high labor demand is due to supply and demand factors. Primarily, the supply of Greek unskilled labor “has decreased...
sharply because of rising educational achievements.”16 As a result, most Greeks desire an esteemed, high-skilled profession and would be dissatisfied with a low-skilled job paying minimal wages. Moreover, a large portion of the output in the Greek economy is “still produced in small family firms and households which apply labor-intensive production methods, use low- and middle-level technology, and utilize mostly indigenous resources.”17

In addition, capital owners and managers employed in high-technology sectors also “generate a demand for hotel, catering, entertainment, domestic, and other services, largely based on unskilled and low-skill labor.”18 Other factors fueling a high Greek labor demand include the increase of labor participation among women in high-skilled professions, an increasing number of Greek citizens over the age of seventy, limited participation of men in housework, and a rise of employment opportunities in agriculture, tourism, and construction. As described, Greek low-skilled labor is mainly characterized by temporal, seasonal, and low-paying work. Desperate for employment and economic vitality, Albanian immigrants are more than “willing to be geographically mobile and to be flexible with regard to working practices and wages.”19 Albanian migrants constitute a huge portion of the Greek labor force and are major contributors to the growing Greek economy.

Despite stringent Greek immigration policies, Greek employers alleviate high demand for unskilled workers by hiring most Albanians illegally. An extremely lucrative underground economy has developed in Greece. According to several estimates, the larger “underground economy accounts for over 30 percent of total economic activity, while 16 and 20 percent of the labor employed in the country is unregistered.”20 Greek employers benefit immensely from hiring undocumented Albanian migrants. In doing so, they avoid paying higher wages to native-Greek workers and evade paying social security taxes. Most unregistered Albanians find themselves working in such industries as construction and agriculture. By 1996, construction represented “just under 50 percent of legal employment of aliens, with an additional esti-

17. Ibid., 60.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 61.
20. Ibid.
mated comparable number in clandestine employment.”21 Other professions in the Greek underground economy include domestic services, tourism and catering, garment making, custodial, and street hawking.

Though the wages paid to Albanians in Greece are significantly higher than income they could earn at home, wages paid to Albanians by exploitative Greek employers remain low. Rosetos Fakiolas estimates that “the pay of legal immigrants is 15 to 20 percent lower than that paid to their Greek counterparts doing the same type of work.” This drives labor costs down by “25 to 45 percent, because employers do not pay insurance and other fringe benefits that they are required to provide for Greek employees.”22 As an abundant supply of labor further lowers wages, Albanian migrants muster a daily income that barely meets subsistence levels. In construction, the daily take-home pay is seven thousand to ten thousand drachmas (twenty-three to thirty-three dollars). The lowest daily income “quoted in immigrant interviews and in the reports to the Ministry of Labour was four thousand to five thousand drachmas plus one thousand to two thousand drachmas in kind (meals, shelter, and so forth) for agricultural work.”23 Albanians receive the lowest wages among all foreign workers in Greece. In fact, Albanian domestic workers “sometimes get only half the wage received by a Filipina doing the same job.”24 Furthermore, on occasion, Albanian workers receive no pay at all for their duties and “become victims of blackmail by employers who threaten to report them to the police.”25 Though migrants do become more selective as they learn to speak the Greek language and locate favorable labor opportunities, Albanians continue to be marginalized within the Greek labor force.

24. Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 179.
25. Ibid., 179.
Social Implications

The short- and long-term real and potential implications of the Albanian influx are profound. Ta Nea reports that one out of ten students attending elementary and secondary school are foreigners, more than 80 percent of them Albanian immigrants. The same source states that of one hundred thousand births per year in Greece, more than fifteen thousand of them involve documented and illegal immigrants, mostly Albanians. The majority of Albanians are concentrated in the greater Athens area and other urban centers. This is reflected in the student population; in some parts of the country “the presence of pupils of immigrant background, and whose native language is not Greek, approaches 35 percent.” In the 1996–7 school year, for instance, the number of such students increased to 67,200 from 47,700 in the previous period. These trends are likely to accelerate in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of immigrants are young (twenty-five to forty-four years of age), and the birthrate among Greeks has fallen dramatically to near zero growth rate. Citing United Nations population projections data, Katimerini and other newspapers (including Ta Nea) report that by 2015, about 25 percent of the population of Greece will be first- and second-generation “foreigners.” This means that out of an estimated population of 14.2 million, 3.5 million will be first- and second-generation immigrants. The newspaper asserts that, with the exception of Luxembourg, Greece has “the highest percentage (7.0 to 7.5 percent) of immigrant population, and the highest percentage of illegal immigrants” of any country in the EU. In a homogeneous and largely Christian Orthodox country like Greece, these developments raise serious concerns about the future social conditions. From their side, immigrant populations feel the unease as well.

Low wages paid to Albanian migrants force them to reside in ephemeral housing and squalid living conditions. Immigrants hired in the Greek rural sector wander nomadically across the country in search of available labor opportunities. These migrants are often paid partly in the form of accom-

modation and shelter that represents a “parallel relegation to the most marginal and rejected housing spaces in cities.” Similarly, Albanian migrants hired in the urban sector are also subjected to unstable housing security and reside in poor and dilapidated dwellings. Multiple city districts are home to Albanian immigrants who habitually change residencies because of capricious and arbitrary housing contracts and police suspicion. In Athens, 60 percent of Albanians have “experienced at least one change of address since their arrival, . . . and a third have lived at five or more addresses.” Nonetheless, large urban centers remain popular destinations of settlement among Albanian migrants. Athens houses the highest concentration of Albanian immigrants.

Athens attracts many Albanian migrants because the capital presents a wide range of employment opportunities, as well as a big-city atmosphere that promotes anonymity of life, which in turn lowers the chances of arrest and deportation. Many town squares within the city limits, including the center of downtown, are used by immigrants as places of meeting and socializing where information about employment opportunities is shared among individuals. Yet though the capital offers an array of activities for foreigners, the Athens conurbation provides only several derelict city districts that serve as available residencies for most Albanian migrants. The neighborhoods of the districts are characterized by squalor and corroded buildings. During the first stages of Albanian immigration into Athens, most migrants sheltered in old hotels, “in certain squares, in underground and railway stations, and in abandoned or semiderelict properties dotted around the city.”

As immigrants accumulated in the old, dilapidated Athenian city districts, Greek citizens began avoiding the areas and marked the neighborhoods as being infested with crime and poverty. Presently, central Athens incorporates “several districts with a relatively high degree of concentration of [Albanian] immigrants; these areas are also increasingly characterized by prostitution, drug-trafficking, criminality, degraded accommodation and poor-quality

29. Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 180.
31. Ibid., 215.
infrastructure. There has been a significant drop in land and dwelling prices in recent years and a growing degree of abandonment and de-gentrification in these districts.” 32 Thus, Albanian social exclusion, as well as negative Greek sentiment toward migrants, have erupted within Athens’ city limits.

Due to a perceived cultural identity threat among Greeks, Albanian immigrants suffer from stigmatization. In all forms and expressions, Greek citizens have developed a perception of the migrants that promotes a national identity that “is about ‘Us and Them’; it creates boundaries which distinguish the in-group, the national community, from those outside, the foreigners.” 33 Many Greek civilians believe that Albanian migrants impinge on the Greek social fabric and Hellenic identity. Since the Greek national community “is primarily ‘imagined,’ its reality lies in its members’ perceptions of the vitality of their culture and their common belonging. Immigrants who do not share the cultural and identity codes of the nation pose a threat to it.” 34 Albanian migrants are looked down upon and heavily scrutinized. Even an ethnic Greek-Albanian woman residing in Athens described Albanian immigrants as “‘uncivilized, barbarians[,] they steal, lie, and cheat.” 35 Despite the fact that these negative sentiments are not shared by the majority of the Greeks, nevertheless the criminal behavior on the part of a minority of Albanian migrants has fueled this type of social attitude.

In order to endure marginalization from Greek civilians, Albanian immigrants have formed social networks. The building and reinforcement of networks “are crucial for the individual’s survival as an illegal immigrant.” 36 Social bonding and extended family structures provide Albanian migrants with a sense of community, an increase of social capital, alleviation from economic and health problems, and easier access to employment. Furthermore, social networks serve as strong protection from the police. Despite residing in areas of high criminality, “residential groupings of immigrants offer security and respond more successfully in cases of emergency.” 37 Social

32. Ibid., 209.
33. Anna Triandafyllidou, “Racists? Us? Are You Joking? The Discourse of Social Exclusion of Immigrants in Greece and Italy,” in Eldorado or Fortress? 188.
34. Ibid., 189.
35. Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 179.
36. Iosifides and King, 218.
37. Ibid.
networks allow Albanians to escape the reality of negative Greek sentiment and mistreatment.

Though social networking enables migrants to temporarily lessen the perils of racism and discrimination, it reinforces marginalization. Social exclusion is fostered not only by differences in Greek and Albanian residencies but “also in the destruction of Albanians’ ability to establish and maintain networks of consumption and ethnic communication.”38 As a result, Albanian immigrants have failed to assimilate into Greek society. The growing Greek perception of Albanians as criminals has sparked police raids on the migrants’ places of residence and accommodation, especially in Athens. The Athens police have recently started a campaign to criminalize Albanians’ rights to private home ownership. Furthermore, deportations of illegal Albanian migrants have risen annually. The removal of Albanian immigrants can also be seen as part of a wider strategy to regenerate the center of Athens. The view of migrants as polluters of the city reflects the new stratification politics of urban centers, in which the migrant is swept under the carpet in an attempt to create a city without any visible signs of migrant presence.39

**Security Concerns**

In traditional Cold War thinking, security was perceived and defined strictly in terms of national sovereignty and focused “on material capabilities and the use and control of military forces by states.”40 The end of the Cold War and the advent of terrorism have changed our perceptions of national security. Terrorist threats, the illicit activities of drug cartels, illegal immigration, crime, human trafficking, and prostitution constitute a greater threat to the security of many states today than invasion by a neighboring hostile state. Among other things, such developments challenge the state’s capacity to protect its borders, control domestic violence, and collect and distribute resources. In addition, concerns about national identity in the wake of glo-

38. Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 178.
39. Ibid., 178.
balization are also cited as security threats. Ole Waever, Paul Roe, Barry Buzan, and others refer to this as *societal security*. In Waever’s mind, societal security is concerned about threats to a society’s identity (if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society. Societal security, he asserts, “is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms.”\(^{41}\) Roe concurs, stating that a society feels insecure when its “ability to reproduce its traditions and way of life” is threatened.\(^{42}\)

The Greek landscape exemplifies many of these security concerns. The country’s border patrol and other law enforcement authorities concede the difficulties they encounter in keeping illegal aliens from entering the country. The same officials doubt the reliability of official data. The country’s topography, corruption, and lack of adequate resources and clever tactics of smugglers—not to mention the sheer number, desperation, and persistence of would-be undocumented immigrants—are some of the major interdiction impediments. But the number of successes tells a great deal about the magnitude of the problem. For example, citing official sources, *Kathimerini* notes that from early 2000 to the end of 2002, the coast guard and other interdiction authorities reported “736 illegal entry incidents, apprehended 114,454 illegal entrants and 344 smugglers, and confiscated 216 boats and other smuggling vehicles.”\(^{43}\)

The bucolic and tranquil Greece of previous decades has changed dramatically. Crime has increased dramatically, as has the use of illegal substances. The country has become a critical link in human trafficking and sexual exploitation of young women from former Eastern bloc counties. Although in most cases the ringmasters of these despicable acts are Greeks, the majority of the footwork is done by Albanians. Police in Athens and provincial towns have reported numerous incidents of Albanians involved in thefts, break-ins, beatings, and killings of business proprietors and homeowners. The elderly living in remote parts of the countryside tend to be a special target. Indicative of this state of affairs is the decay of Athens’ Omonia Square. Once


\(^{42}\) Ibid., 142.

a favored meeting place of promenading Athenians and their families, the square is now referred to as “new Tirana” and has been turned into a polyglot Mecca of illicit drugs, prostitution, and other forms of crime.

Finally, the issue of identity loss is high on the agenda of Greece’s powerful Orthodox Church and other conservative elements. The church believes that the country’s most salient security issue is loss of identity, which is severe enough to threaten the nation’s very survival. The root of the problem, as they see it, is the de-Christianization of the society in the face of the avalanche of foreign and mainly non-Christian elements. The head of the church, Archbishop Christodoulos, holds politicians responsible for the country’s social ills. The outspoken and highly verbose prelate derides politicians as “Euroligourides” (Eurocravers) and laments their servility and inferiority complex toward foreigners. Led by the archbishop, the church has successfully resisted plans to build a mosque and a Muslim cultural center on the outskirts of Athens. Although the church avoids naming the Albanians, it is nevertheless clear that they are viewed as the main culprits.

State Response and Concluding Remarks

Owing to its lack of experience with immigration, the Greek state was caught unprepared to deal with the phenomenon. The fact that citizenship in Greece is based on ethnic and not civic considerations further complicates the state’s response. Eventually, the government passed laws aiming to restrict immigration and set working-permit conditions. The first law on immigration was passed in 1994, and “its main objective has been to prevent the entry of undocumented immigrants and to facilitate the expulsion of those already present by simplifying expulsion procedures.”44 In 1997, a new law was adopted outlining the conditions and requirements for the issuing of working permits. The 1997 law provides for two types of permits. The White Card, is a six-month, renewable working permit, and it is issued to those who can demonstrate that they have “a potential work contact with a specific employer.”45 The Green Card is a five-year renewable permit given to a foreign worker who

44. Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 196.
45. Ibid.
can prove that “he/she has been in Greece for five years and has the necessary means to sustain himself/herself.”\textsuperscript{46} Although the law protects family members from expulsion, it does not recognize any political or other rights of foreign workers and makes no provisions for citizenship. After fifteen years of residence (excluding years of study) and ten years of social insurance contributions, a permit of indefinite duration can be granted. By opting for a policy of “ethnic preferences,” the Greek state has put citizenship beyond the reach of Albanian and other migrant workers.\textsuperscript{47} These indicate that the state “is still unclear how it wishes to deal with immigration.”\textsuperscript{48}

Despite their rough exterior, the legal provisions restricting immigration are not consistently enforced. Owing to increased unemployment among the young, who nevertheless refused to accept low-paying and prestige-lacking jobs, the state is under pressure from various social groups, including the powerful Orthodox Church, to restrict and/or expel migrant laborers. At the same time, state authorities succumb to pressure from employers who have come to depend on cheap Albanian labor. The porous Greek-Albanian frontier and lax enforcement of laws makes it possible for those expelled to return in a few days and for new migrants to join them. Gabriella Lazaridis and Iordanis Psimmenos capture the essence of this bifurcated state behavior as follows: “The migrant is transformed into ‘an experimental agent’ who, unable to control his/her economic environment, becomes part of a globalized unification process ‘free’ of community union or skill constraints. In other words, migration is the political experience of both the shrinking social rights and of the modification of labor into a power container that functions according to world market necessities.”\textsuperscript{49}

The Albanian migrant workers in Greece are there to stay, and the Greek state needs to confront the issue sooner rather than later. The nation’s political, entrepreneurial, religious, and intellectual elites need to come up with ways that would allow the immigrants to incorporate themselves into Greek society without causing major interruptions. The challenge is greater than staging a successful Olympiad.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 197.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 203.
\textsuperscript{49} Lazaridis and Psimmenos, 173.