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General editors’ preface
Preface
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New elucidation
Physical monadology
Optimism
False subtlety
The only possible argument
Negative magnitudes
Inquiry
Announcement
Dreams
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Inaugural dissertation
Résumés of the works
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Directions in space
Inaugural dissertation

A NEW ELUCIDATION
PRINCIPLES OF METAPHYSICS
(1755)

Purpose of the undertaking
Section 1. Concerning the pri...
Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics (1766)

Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766)
Träume eines Geistersehers,
erläutert
durch
Träume der Metaphysik.

velut aegri somnia, vanae
Finguntur species.

Hor.
Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by
dreams of metaphysics

Velut aegri somnia, vanæ
Finguntur species
Horace"
Preamble, which promises very little for the
effectuation of the project

The realm of shades is the paradise of fantastical visionaries. Here they find a country without frontiers which they can cultivate at their pleasure. Hypochondriacal exhalations, old wives’ tales and monastery miracles do not leave them short of building materials. Philosophers prepare the ground plan which they then proceed to modify or reject, as is their wont. Holy Rome alone possesses lucrative provinces in that realm: the two tiaras of the invisible realm support the third fragile diadem of its terrestrial power. And the keys which unlock the two gates to the other world simultaneously and sympathetically unlock the coffers of this world. Such exploitation-rights to that spirit-realm, having been legitimised by considerations of state-interest, place themselves far beyond the reach of all the futile objections raised by pedantic scholars. The use or misuse of these rights has become a practice so venerable that it no longer needs to subject itself to the humiliation of such a demanding cross-examination. But why is it that the popular tales which find such widespread acceptance, or which are, at least, so weakly challenged, circulate with such futility and impunity, insinuating themselves even into scholarly theories, and that, in spite of the fact that they do not even enjoy the support of that most persuasive of proofs, the proof from advantage (argumentum ab utili)? What philosopher, torn between the assurances of a rational and firmly convinced eyewitness, on the one hand, and the inner resistance of an insuperable scepticism, on the other hand, has not, on some occasion or other, created the impression of the utmost imaginable foolishness? Is he completely to deny the truth of all such apparitions? What reasons can he adduce to refute them?

Is he to admit the probability of even only one of these stories? How important such an admission would be! And what astonishing implications would open up before one, if even only one such occurrence could be supposed to be proven! There is, I suppose, a third possibility left, namely,

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4 Schattenreich / (both the German Schatten and the English word ‘shade’ may mean both ‘shadow’ and ‘ghost’).
5 Schulweisen. 6 ungenutzt oder ungeahndet.
7 Geisterverscheinungen / (see Glossary for Erscheinung).
not to meddle with such prying or idle questions, but to concern oneself only with what is useful. But this suggestion, being reasonable, has always been rejected by the majority of thorough scholars.

To believe none of the many things which are recounted with some semblance of truth, and to do so without any reason, is as much a foolish prejudice as to believe anything which is spread by popular rumour, and to do so without examination. For this reason, the author of this essay, in attempting to avoid the former prejudice, allowed himself to be in part carried away by the latter. He confesses, with a certain humiliation, to having been naive enough to investigate the truth of some of the stories of the kind mentioned. He found what one usually finds when one has no business searching at all, exactly nothing! Now, I suppose that this in itself is already a sufficient reason for writing a book. But there was also another factor, which has already on a number of occasions forced books out of modest authors: the insistent importunity of friends, both known and unknown. Not only that, but the author went to the expense of purchasing a lengthy work, and what was worse, he put himself to the trouble of reading it, as well! Such effort was not to be wasted. Such are the origins of the present treatise. Given its subject-matter, it ought, so the author fondly hopes, to leave the reader completely satisfied: for the bulk of it he will not understand, parts of it he will not believe, and as for the rest – he will dismiss it with scornful laughter.

The first part,
The first part, which is dogmatic

FIRST CHAPTER: A TANGLED METAPHYSICAL KNOT, WHICH CAN BE EITHER UNTIED OR CUT AS ONE PLEASES

If one were to draw up a compendium of everything concerning spirits which is recited by schoolboys, related by the common people and demonstrated by philosophers, it would, it seems, constitute no small part of our knowledge. Notwithstanding, I would venture the following opinion. If it were to occur to someone to linger for a while over the question: What exactly is this thing which, under the name of spirit, people claim to understand so well, all the know-all would be put in a very embarrassing position. The methodical gossip of the universities is frequently nothing but an agreement to exploit the instability of the meaning of words with a view to evading questions which are difficult to answer. And the reason for this evasiveness is the fact that the easy and generally reasonable answer ‘I do not know’ is frowned upon in the academies. Certain modern philosophers, as they like to be called, have no difficulty in disposing of this question. Their answer runs: a spirit is a being endowed with reason. No miraculous powers are needed, therefore, to see spirits; for, whoever sees human beings sees beings endowed with reason. But, the argument continues, a being, which in man is endowed with reason, is only a part of man, and this part of man, the part which animates him, is a spirit. Very well, then, before you go on to prove that only a spirit-being can be endowed with reason, please make sure that I have first of all understood what sort of concept I am to form for myself of a spirit-being. The self-deception in this case, though plain enough to be seen with half-opened eyes, nonetheless has an origin which can easily be understood. For that about which one knows a great deal early on in life as a child – of that, one can be sure, one will certainly know nothing later on in life when one has reached maturity. And the man of thoroughness will in the end at best be the sophist of his youthful delusions.

I do not, therefore, know whether spirits exist or not. And, what is more, I do not even know what the word ‘spirit’ means. However, since I
have frequently used the word or heard others use it, it follows that something or other must be understood by the term, irrespective of whether this something be a figment of the imagination or something real. In order to disentangle this hidden meaning, I shall compare my ill-understood concept with all its different applications. By noticing with which cases my concept is compatible and with which it is inconsistent, I hope to unfold the concealed sense of the concept.

Take, for example, a cubic foot of space and suppose that there is something which fills this space, that is to say, that there is something which resists the attempt by any other thing to penetrate this space. No one would call the being which existed in space in this fashion a spirit-being. Such a being would obviously be called material, for it is extended, impenetrable and, like everything corporeal, capable of division and subject to the laws governing impact. Thus far we still find ourselves on the well-trodden path followed by other philosophers. But imagine a simple being and at the same time endow it with reason. Would that then fully correspond to the meaning of the word spirit? In order to discover the answer to this question, what I propose to do is this: while allowing that

If the concept of a spirit had been derived by abstraction from our own empirical concepts, the procedure for rendering the concept distinct would be easy: one would simply have to indicate the characteristic marks which are revealed by the senses as belonging to this type of being, and by means of which we distinguish such beings from material beings. However, people talk of spirits even when there is some doubt as to whether such beings exist at all. It follows that the concept of the spirit-nature cannot be treated as if it were a concept derived by abstraction from experience. But if you ask: How then has one arrived at this concept in the first place, granted that it has not been by a process of abstraction? my reply to this question is as follows: There are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure inferences made in the course of experience; these concepts then proceed to propagate themselves by attaching themselves to other concepts, without there being any awareness of the experience itself on which they were originally based or of the inference which formed the concept on the basis of that experience. Such concepts may be called surreptitious concepts. There is a great number of such concepts; some of them are nothing but delusions of the imagination, whereas others are true, even obscure inferences are not always erroneous. Linguistic usage and the association of an expression with various stories which always contain the same essential characteristics, furnish that expression with a determinate meaning. This meaning can subsequently be unfolded only if the hidden sense is drawn out of its obscurity by comparing it with all the different kinds of cases in which the expression is employed and which either agree with or contradict that meaning.

1 Um diese versteckte Bedeutung auzuwirbeln.
2 so habe ich meinen schlecht verstandenen Begriff an allerlei Falle der Anwendung.
3 dessen verborgernen Sinn zu entfalten. 4 abgesondert. 5 abstractirt. 6 durch Abstraction.
7 Viele Begriffe entspringen durch gemeine und dunkel Schlusse bei Gelegenheit der Erfahrungen und pflassen sich nacher auf andere fort ohne Bewusstsein der Erfahrung selbst oder des Schlusses, welchser den Begriff uber diezele errichtet hat.
8 verschlimmert. 9 ein Wahn der Einbildung. 10 dunkel. 11 einreie Hauptmerkmal.
12 welche (I.e., eine bestimmte Bedeutung) folglich nur dadurch kann entfaltet werden, dass man diesem versteckten Sinn durch eine Vergleichung mit allerlei Fallen der Anwendung, die mit ihm einstimmig sind, oder ihn widerstreiten, aus seiner Dunkelheit hervorzieht.
the aforementioned simple being possesses reason as an internal quality, I shall for the moment only regard it in its external relations. I now proceed to raise the following question: suppose that I wished to place this simple substance in that cubic foot of space which is full of matter: would it be necessary for a simple element of that matter to vacate its place so that the spirit could occupy it? Do you think that the question must be answered affirmatively? Very well! In that case, the space in question, if it were to admit a second spirit, would have to lose a second elementary particle. And if one were to continue with this process, the cubic foot of space would eventually be filled with spirits. And this cluster of spirits would offer resistance by means of impenetrability in exactly the same fashion as if the cubic foot of space were full of matter. And this cluster of spirits would be subject to the laws of impact just as much as matter itself. Now, although such substances were in themselves endowed with the power of reason, externally they would nonetheless be indistinguishable from the elements of matter, in the case of which one is also only acquainted with the powers of their external presence; as for what may belong to their inner properties - of that one has no knowledge whatever. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that simple substances, which are such that they could be compounded together to form a cluster, would not be called spirit-beings. You will, therefore, only be able to retain the concept of a spirit if you imagine beings which could be present in a space which was already occupied by matter; beings, therefore, which lack the quality of impenetrability, will never constitute a solid whole, no matter how many of them are united together. Simple beings of this kind are called immaterial beings, and if they are possessed of reason, they are called spirits. But simple substances, which yield an impenetrable and extended whole when they are compounded together, are called material entities, while the totality of such simple substances is called matter. Either the word 'spirit' is empty of all sense, or its meaning is the meaning we have specified.

To advance from the definition which explains what the concept of a spirit involves to the proposition that such natures are real, or, indeed, even merely possible, involves an unusually large step. The writings of philosophers contain some very sound and reliable proofs, establishing,

* It can easily be seen here that I am speaking only of spirits which belong to the universe as constituents of it; I am not speaking of the Infinite Spirit, who is its Creator and Sustainer. For the concept of the spirit-nature of the latter is easy, for it is merely negative and consists in denying that the properties of matter belong to it, for they are incompatible with an infinite and absolutely necessary substance. On the other hand, in the case of a spirit-substance, such as the human soul, which is supposed to exist in union with matter, the following difficulty arises: on the one hand, I am supposed to think such substances as existing in a reciprocal relation with physical beings so that they constitute wholes, while on the other hand I am supposed to think of the only kind of combination we know - that which occurs among material beings - as being cancelled.

1 Klumpe. 2 kennt. 3 die als Theile zum Weltganzen gehören.
for example, that everything which thinks must be simple, that every substance which thinks rationally is an entity of this kind, and that the indivisible 'I' cannot be distributed throughout a whole constituted by many things which are combined together. My soul will, therefore, be a simple substance. But this proof still leaves the question unresolved whether the soul is one of those substances which, when they are united together in space, form an extended and impenetrable whole, and is thus material, or whether it is immaterial and therefore a spirit, or, indeed, whether a being of the type which is called a spirit-being is even possible.

And in this connection, I find myself constrained to warn against precipitate judgements, which are the judgements which most easily insinuate themselves into the deepest and darkest questions. It is commonly the case, namely, that that which belongs to ordinary empirical concepts is usually regarded as if its possibility were also understood. On the other hand, it is, of course, impossible to form any concept of that which deviates from common empirical concepts and which no experience can explain, even analogically. And for that reason one tends to dismiss it at once as impossible. All matter offers a resistance in the space which it occupies; it is, for that reason, called impenetrable. That this occurs is something which experience teaches us; and it is by abstraction from this experience that the general concept of matter is generated within us. But, although the resistance which something exercises in the space which it occupies is thus recognised, it is not for that reason understood. For, like everything else which operates in opposition to an activity, this resistance is a true force. The direction of that force is opposed to the direction indicated by the extended lines of the approach. For this reason, this force is a force of repulsion, and it must be attributed to matter, and therefore to the elements of matter, as well. Now, every rational being will readily admit that the human understanding has reached its limit here. It is experience alone which enables us to perceive that those things which exist in the world, and which we call material, possess such a force; but experience does not even enable us to understand the possibility of such a force. Now, suppose that I posited the existence of substances which were of a different kind: they are present in space but they possess forces which differ from the motive force of which the effect is impenetrability. If I supposed that such substances existed, it would be altogether impossible for me to activity, unless it bore analogy with any fear that we shall be refuted, then being able to establish their possible existence. Such spirit-natures would be present in a way that they could always be present in such spirit-natures without filling the space, in other words, the presence of such spirit-natures would be able to say that the place of the spirit is 'occupied' but itself a space. For, it is impossible for us to imagine the filling of a space by means of an active force (of repulsion) of greater activity but not occupation. The filling of a sphere of such a subject. Admittedly, more distinct, but then that is never the case with bodies must of necessity be something which is a proportionate part of the space, as the parts of space at all, but limits of necessity, which is a proportionate part of the space, as the parts of space at all, but limits of necessity, which is a proportionate part of the space, as the parts of the no experience can explain, even analogically. And for that reason one tends to dismiss it at once as impossible. All matter offers a resistance in the space which it occupies; it is, for that reason, called impenetrable.

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\[\text{ermahnt. begriffen.}\]

\[\text{und da ihre Richtung derjenigen entgegen steht, worAnn die fortgezogene Linien der Annäherung sieben.}\]

\[\text{dass hier die menschliche Einsicht zu Ende sei.}\]

\[\text{die mit andern Kräften im Raume gegensätzlich sind, als mit ihrer treibenden Kraft.}\]
be altogether impossible for me to think of them *in concreto* as displaying activity, unless it bore analogy with my empirical representations. And, in so far as I have denied them the property of *filling* the space in which they operate, I would have deprived myself of a concept by means of which the things which present themselves to my senses are otherwise thinkable for me; and the inevitable result must, therefore, be a kind of unthinkability. But this cannot be regarded as a known impossibility for the simple reason that the opposite will, in respect of its possibility, likewise remain incomprehensible, even though its actuality presents itself to the senses.

We may, accordingly, accept the possibility of immaterial beings without any fear that we shall be refuted, though there is no hope either of our ever being able to establish their possibility by means of rational argument.\textsuperscript{8} Such spirit-natures would be present in space, but present in space in such a way that they could always be penetrated by corporeal beings; for the presence of such spirit-natures would involve *being active in* but not *filling* space,\textsuperscript{2} in other words, the presence in space of such spirit-natures would not involve resistance, the ground of solidity. Now, if we accepted the existence of such a *simple* spirit-substance, then, in spite of its indivisibility, one would be able to say that the place of its immediate presence was not a point, but itself a space. For, to appeal to analogy for help: even the simple elements of bodies must of necessity each of them fill a little space in the body, which is a proportionate part of that body's whole extension, for points are not parts of space at all but limits of space. Since this filling of space occurs by means of an active force (of repulsion) and therefore only indicates a sphere of greater activity but not a multiplicity of the constituent parts of the operative subject,\textsuperscript{3} the filling of space does not contradict the simple nature of such a subject.\textsuperscript{8} Admittedly, this possibility cannot be rendered more distinct, but then that is never possible with the fundamental relations of causes and effects. In exactly the same way, there is at any rate no demonstrable contradiction confronting me, even though the thing itself remains unintelligible, if I assert that a spirit-substance, though simple, nonetheless occupies\textsuperscript{4} a space (that is to say, is capable of being immediately active in it) without *filling* it (that is to say, without offering any resistance in that space to material substances).\textsuperscript{9} Nor would such an immaterial substance have to be called extended, any more than the units\textsuperscript{10} of matter,\textsuperscript{10} for only that which occupies a space when it is separated from everything and exists for itself on its own is *extended*. But those substances which are elements of matter can only occupy a space in virtue of the external effect they produce on other substances. But when these substances exist separately for themselves, and
when no other things are thought of as existing in connection with them, and when there are not even to be found in them things which exist externally to each other, these substances contain no space. This applies to corporeal elements. It would also apply to spirit-natures. The limits of extension determine shape. Spirit-beings cannot, therefore, be thought of as having a shape. These are the reasons, which are difficult to understand, for the conjectured possibility of immaterial beings in the universe. If there is anyone who knows of an easier method for arriving at this knowledge, let him not refuse to enlighten one who is eager to learn, and who, in the course of his investigations, has often found himself confronted with Alpine peaks, where others only see before them an easy and comfortable pathway, along which they advance, or think they do.

Now, suppose that it has been proved that the human soul was a spirit (though it is apparent from what has been said above that no such thing has as yet been proved), the next question to which we might then proceed would perhaps be the following: where is the place of this human soul in the world of bodies? My answer would run like this: The body, the alterations of which are my alterations — this body is my body; and the place of that body is at the same time my place. If one pursued the question further and asked: Where then is your place (that of the soul) in this body? then I should suspect there was a catch in the question. For it is easy to see that the question already presupposes something with which we are not acquainted through experience, though it may perhaps be based on imaginary inferences. The question presupposes, namely, that my thinking 'I' is in a place which is distinct from the places of the other parts of that body which belongs to my self. But no one is immediately conscious of a particular place in his body; one is only immediately conscious of the space which one occupies relatively to the world around. I would therefore rely on ordinary experience and say, for the time being: Where I feel, it is there that I am. I am as immediately in my finger-tip as I am in my head. It is I myself whose heel hurts, and whose heart beats with emotion. And when my corn aches, I do not feel the painful impression in some nerve located in my brain; I feel it at the end of my toe. No experience teaches me to regard some parts of my sensation of myself as remote from me. Nor does any experience teach me to imprison my indivisible 'I' in a microscopically tiny region of the brain, either so as to operate from there the levers governing my body-machine, or so as myself to be affected in that region by the workings of that machinery. For that reason, I would insist on its strict refutation before I could be persuaded to dismiss as absurd what used to be said in this way: '… the body, and wholly in each of its parts.'

Examples of Injuries have been added without the injured person losing his life or so. According to the idea which is commonly extended and as diffused through in which it is pictured for children, the removal or displacement of a single atom of a person of his soul. The current opinion of which would seem to have originated chiefly from one has the distinct feeling that the nerves of one were correct, it would also prove that the soul in anxiety or joy, the sensation seems to have majority of them, manifest their chief force and essentially of the brain, the organs of these senses being also closest to these signs, which Descartes calls ideas mot producer a motion which is similar to the most reflection the tissue of the brain will, in particular, earlier impression, and, as a result, grow in emotion as well, one feels not only the exposure...
DREAMS

absurd what used to be said in the schools: 'My soul is wholly in my whole body, and wholly in each of its parts.' Sound common sense often apprehends a truth before it understands the reasons by means of which it can prove or explain that truth. Nor would I be entirely disconcerted by the objection which maintained that I was, in this way, thinking of the soul as extended and as diffused throughout the whole body, roughly in the way in which it is pictured for children in the orbis pictus. The reason why I should not be disconcerted is this: I would dispose of the objection with the following remark: immediate presence in the totality of a space only proves a sphere of external activity; it does not prove a multiplicity of internal parts, nor, therefore, any extension or shape. They only occur when a space is to be found in a being which is posited for itself on its own, that is to say, when there are parts existing externally to each other. Finally, either I should know this little concerning the spirit-property of my soul, or, if this were disallowed, I should be content to know nothing at all of the matter.

If the objection were raised that these ideas are incomprehensible, or – and this is taken to be the same thing by most people – that they are impossible, that would not disturb me either. I would take my place at the feet of these wise men in order to hear them speaking thus: The human soul has its seat in the brain, and its abode is an indescribably tiny place in it. It is here that the soul, like the spider sitting at the

* Examples of injuries have been adduced where a substantial part of the brain has been lost without the injured person losing his life or suffering any impairment to the power of thought. According to the idea which is commonly entertained and which I am reporting here, the removal or displacement of a single atom of the brain would suffice instantly to deprive a person of his soul. The current opinion of the soul which assigns it to a place in the brain, would seem to have originated chiefly from the fact that, when one engages in deep thought, one has the distinct feeling that the nerves of the brain are being strained. But if this conclusion were correct, it would also prove that the soul was situated in other places as well. For example, in anxiety or joy, the sensation seems to have its seat in the heart. Many emotions, indeed the majority of them, manifest their chief force in the diaphragm. Pity moves the intestines, and other instinct express their origin and their sensibility in other organs. The reason which has persuaded people to think that they feel the reflective soul particularly in the brain is, perhaps, this: all reflection requires the mediation of signs for the ideas which are to be awakened, if the ideas, accompanied and supported by the signs, are to attain the required degree of clarity. The signs of our representations, however, are primarily those which are received either through hearing or through sight: these two senses are activated by impressions in the brain, the organs of these senses being also closest to that part of the body. Now, if the excitation of these signs, which Descartes calls idear materiae, is really a stimulation of the nerves producing a motion which is similar to the motion produced by sensation, then it follows that in reflection the tissue of the brain will, in particular, be forced to vibrate in harmony with the earlier impression, and, as a result, to grow fatigued. For if thought is accompanied by emotion as well, one feels not only the exertions of the brain but also the assaults being

1 was die Schullehrer sagten. * ohne dass es dem Menschen . . . die Gedanken gekostet hat.

* affectioil.
centre of its web, receives sensations. The nerves of the brain strike or agitate the soul. The effect of this, however, is that a representation is formed, not indeed of this immediate impression, but of the impression made on quite remote parts of the body, albeit as an object existing outside the brain. From this seat in the brain, the soul also operates the ropes and levers of the whole machine, causing voluntary motions as it pleases. Propositions such as these admit only of a very superficial proof, or of no proof at all. And ultimately, since we are only inadequately acquainted with the nature of the soul, such propositions can only be refuted in a correspondingly weak fashion. I am not willing, therefore, to become involved in one of those scholarly wrangles in which it is commonly the case that both sides have the most to say precisely when their ignorance of the subject is the most complete. Since, therefore, according to the propositions recommended to me, my soul, in its manner of being present in space, would not differ from any element of matter, and since the power of the understanding is an inner property which I cannot perceive in these elements of matter, even if that same property were present in all of them, it follows that no valid reason can be adduced for supposing that my soul is not one of the substances which constitute matter, or for supposing that its particular manifestations should not originate exclusively from the place which it occupies in such an ingenious machine as the body of an animal, and in which the confluence of the nerves assures the inner capacity of thought and the power of will. But in that case one would no longer be able to recognise with certainty any distinctive characteristic mark of the soul, which distinguished it from the raw elementary matter of corporeal natures. And then the idea jokingly proposed by Leibniz that in drinking our coffee we may perhaps be swallowing atoms destined to become human souls would no longer be a laughing matter. But, in such a case, would not this thinking 'I' be subject to the common fate of material natures? Just as it had by chance been drawn from the chaos of all the elements in order to animate an animal machine, why should it not at some time in the future, when the contingent combination has been dissolved, return once more to that chaos of elements? It is sometimes necessary to alarm the thinker who has gone astray by drawing his attention to the consequences of his error, so that he pays more careful attention to the principles by means of which he has allowed himself to be led on, as in a dream.

I must confess that I am very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to place my own soul in the class of these beings. But in that case, how exists between a spirit and a body, that incomprehensibility, granted, actions are derived from the conception that they are always connected with striking a blow — conditions which should an immaterial substance of motion should collide with a spirit? Are the effects on another being, which do opposition to them by means of if them from also occupying the space spirit-being is present in the matter intimate fashion; and it seems not of elements and in virtue of which it rather to operate on the inner principle including even a simple element of inner activity as the ground of its property, spite of the fact that I cannot specify

* The reason which inclines me to this probably remain so, as well. It is a reason which of animals. The principle of life is to be found an immaterial nature. For all life is based up.

† Leibniz said that this inner ground of a power of representation. This thought, which laughter by later philosophers. They would considered the question whether a substance possible in the complete absence of any inner ing to rule out such an inner state, then it some other possible inner state as an artless dependent on representations. Anybody can representations is attributed even to the sin follow that matter itself has a faculty of be connected together into a whole, can after a

these beings.* But in that case, how mysterious is the community* which
exists between a spirit and a body: and yet at the same time, how natural is
that incomprehensibility, granted that the concepts we have of external
actions are derived from the concepts we have of matter, and granted also
that they are always connected with the conditions of exerting pressure or
striking a blow — conditions which are not fulfilled here? For how, after all,
should an immaterial substance obstruct matter,* so that matter in its mo-
tion should collide with a spirit? And how could corporeal things produce
effects on another being, which differed from them, and which offered no
opposition to them by means of impenetrability, or in any way prevented
them from also occupying the space in which it was present? It seems that a
spirit-being is present in the matter, with which it is combined, in the most
intimate fashion; and it seems not to act on those forces which inhere in the
elements and in virtue of which they are related to each other; it seems
rather to operate on the inner principles of their state.† For every substance,
including even a simple element of matter, must after all have some kind of
inner activity as the ground of its producing an external effect, and that in
spite of the fact that I cannot specify in what that inner activity consists.† On

* The reason which inclines me to this view is very obscure even to myself, and it will
probably remain so, as well. It is a reason which applies at the same time to the sentient
being of animals. The principle of life is to be found in something in the world which seems to be of
an immaterial nature. For all life is based upon the inner capacity to determine itself voluntarily.* On the other hand, the essential characteristic mark of matter consists in the filling of
space in virtue of a necessary force which is limited by an external force operating against it.
It follows from this, therefore, that the state of all that which is material is dependent and
constrained, whereas those natures which are supposed to be spontaneously active and to
contain within themselves the ground of life in virtue of their inner force — in short, those
natures whose own power of will is capable of spontaneously determining and modifying
itself — such natures can scarcely be of material nature. One cannot reasonably demand that
such an unfamiliar type of being, which is known in most cases only hypothetically, should be
understood conceptually in the divisions of its various species. As any rate, those immaterial
beings which contain the ground of animal life are different from those which comprise
reason in their spontaneous activity† and are called spirits.

† Leibniz said that this inner ground of all its external relations and their changes was a
power of representation. † This thought, which was not developed by Leibniz, was greeted with
laughter by later philosophers. They would, however, have been better advised to have first
considered the question whether a substance, such as a simple part of matter, would be possible in the complete absence of any inner state. And, if they had, perhaps, been unwilling
to rule out such an inner state, then it would have been incumbent on them to invent
some other possible inner state as an alternative to that of representations and the activities
dependent on representations. Anybody can see for himself that if a faculty of obscure
representations is attributed even to the simple, elementary particles of matter, it does not
follow that matter itself has a faculty of representation, for many substances of this kind,
connected together into a whole, can after all never constitute a unified thinking entity.

1 nach Willkür. ¼ abhängend und zwang. ½ selbst thätig. ¾ Selbstthätigkeit.
4 die Gemeinschaft. ½ mit den Bedingungen des Druckes oder Stosses.
† der Materie im Wege liegen. † auf das innere Principium ihres Zustandes.
â eine Vorstellungs Kraft.
the other hand, if one were to accept such principles, the soul would, even in these inner determinations, construed as effects, intuitively cognise the state of the universe, the cause of those determinations. But which necessity it is which causes a spirit and a body together to form a single being, and what grounds they are which, in the case of certain forms of destruction, then cancel this unity again — these questions, along with various others, far transcend my powers of understanding. I am not normally particularly bold in measuring the capacity of my understanding against the mysteries of nature. Nonetheless, I am sufficiently sure of myself not to fear any opponent, no matter how dreadful his weapons may be (assuming always, that is, that I also had some inclination to the dispute) so that I can in this case test argument against argument in refutation, for among men of learning such testing is really the art of demonstrating each other’s ignorance.1

SECOND CHAPTER: A FRAGMENT OF OCCULT PHILOSOPHY, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO REVEAL OUR COMMUNITY WITH THE SPIRIT-WORLD

The initiate has already accustomed the untutored understanding, which clings to the outer senses, to higher concepts of an abstract character. He is now able to see spirit-forms, stripped of their corporeal shell, in the half-light with which the dim torch of metaphysics reveals the realm of shades. Let us now, therefore, having completed our difficult preparation, embark on our perilous journey.

Ibant obscuri sola sub noce per umbras,
Perque domos Ditis vacus et inania regna.
Virgil

When it is in a state of inertia and rest, dead matter, which fills the universe, is, according to its own proper nature, in a single self-same condition: it has solidity, extension and shape. Its manifestations, which are based upon all these grounds, permit a physical explanation which is also mathematical; this explanation, when the physical and the mathematical are combined, is called mechanical. On the other hand, there is a type of being which contains the ground of life in the universe. Such beings, therefore, of the kind which enlarge the mass of lifeless matter as constituents, or increase its extension. Nor are they affected by lifeless matter acting in accordance with the laws of contact and impact. They rather, by means of their inner activity, animate both themselves and also the dead stuff of nature. If one turns one’s attention to this type of being, one will find oneself persuaded, if not with the distinctness of a demonstration, then at least with the anticipation of a notability of immaterial beings. The principles which they operate are called pneuma and are the mediating causes of the beings called organic. Since these immaterial principles, and thus substances and laws that the conclusion which form beings, if they are directly united whole, which could be called the inert world, on what basis of probability of which are similar to each other in each other only as a result of the unity of things) of a different constitution,14 than the former.

This immaterial world may have its own right; the parts of that in reciprocal connection and communication of corporeal things; it is so gent and only belongs to some of where the relation is mediated by through the mediation of matter, thorough-going connection which matter; they would at all times receive, so that their relation to each other would only be contingent and would provision, whereas their relation to each other would be natural and indissoluble.

If, in this way, we combine all nature, construing them as the community with each other, while with matter, we shall thereby imagine world, an immeasurable but unkind natures, in virtue of which alone the world is animated. It will, perhaps, forever taint how far and to which members of degrees of life, which border on the end of things may be. Hylozoism17 invents every

1 um in diesem Falle mit ihm den Versuch der Gegenggründe im Widerlegen zu machen, der bei den Gelahrten eigentlich die Geschicklichkeit ist, einander das Nichtwissen zu demonstrieren.
least with the anticipation of a not untutored understanding* of the existence of immaterial beings. The particular causal laws in accordance with which they operate are called pneumatic* and, in so far as corporeal beings are the mediating causes** of their effects in the material world, they are called organic. Since these immaterial beings are spontaneously active principles, and thus substances and natures existing in their own right, it follows that the conclusion which first suggests itself is this: these immaterial beings, if they are directly united may perhaps together constitute a great whole, which could be called the immaterial world (mundus intelligibilis).17

For on what basis of probability could one wish to assert that such beings, which are similar to each other in nature, could stand in community* with each other only as a result of the mediation of other beings (corporeal things) of a different constitution, for this latter claim is even more mysterious than the former.

This immaterial world may therefore be regarded as a whole existing in its own right; the parts of that immaterial world stand in a relation of reciprocal connection and community* with each other, even without the mediation of corporeal things; it follows that this latter relation is contingent and only belongs to some of the parts. Indeed, even in those cases where the relation is mediated by corporeal things, there is nothing to prevent those very same immaterial beings, which act on each other through the mediation of matter, from also standing in a special and thorough-going connection which is independent of the mediation of matter; they would at all times reciprocally affect each other as immaterial beings, so that their relation to each other through the mediation of matter would only be contingent and would be based upon a special divine provision, whereas their relation to each other independently of matter would be natural and indissoluble.

If, in this way, we combine all the principles of life in the whole of nature, construing them as so many incorporeal substances standing in community with each other, while also construing them as in part united with matter, we shall thereby imagine a great totality of the immaterial world, an immeasurable but unknown hierarchy of beings and active natures, in virtue of which alone the dead stuff of the corporeal world is animated. It will, perhaps, forever be impossible to determine with certainty how far and to which members of nature life extends, or what those degrees of life, which border on the very edge of complete lifelessness, may be.* Hylozoism8 invests everything with life, while materialism, when

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* mit der Vorempfindung eines nicht ungeübten Verstandes.  
* pneumatic.  
* Mittelursachen.  
* selbsthätige Prinzipien.  
* Gemeinschaft.  
* von fremder Beschaffenheit.  
* in wechselseitiger Verknüpfung und Gemeinschaft.  
* Bis auf welche Glieder aber der Natur Leben ausgebreitet sei, und welche diejenigen Grade derselben seien, die zunächst an die völlige Leblosigkeit grenzen, ist vielleicht unmöglich jemals mit Sicherheit auszumachen.
carefully considered, deprives everything of life. Maupertuis ascribed the
lowest degree of life to the organic particles of nourishment consumed by
animals; other philosophers regard such particles as nothing but dead
masses, merely serving to magnify the power of the levers of animal
machines. The undisputed characteristic mark of life, belonging to that
which we perceive by means of our outer senses is, doubtless, free move-
ment, which shows us that it has originated from the power of the will.
However, the conclusion that, when this characteristic mark is not encoun-
tered, then every degree of life is also lacking, is not certain. Boerhaave
says somewhere: "The animal is a plant which has its root in its stomach
(inside itself). Someone else might, with equal propriety, play with these
concepts and say: the plant is an animal which has its stomach in its root
(outside itself). It is, therefore, possible for plants to lack the organs of
voluntary motion and, in lacking them, to lack the external characteristic
marks of life, which are certainly necessary to animals, for a being which
has the instruments of its nourishment within itself must be able to move
itself according to need. A being, on the other hand, which has the
instruments of its nourishment outside itself and sunk in the element
which supports it, is already adequately provided for by forces external to
itself. Even though such a being contains within itself a principle of inner
life, namely, vegetation, it does not need an organic arrangement to be
made for external voluntary activity. None of this is necessary for my
argument, for, apart from the fact that I should have very little to say in
favour of such conjectures, these conjectures, which are regarded as dusty
and outmoded whims, are also exposed to fashionable mockery. The
ancients, namely, thought that three different types of life could be as-
sumed to exist: vegetative, animal, and rational. When the ancients com-
bined the three immaterial principles of these three different types of life
in man, they may well have erred. But when they distributed these immate-
rial principles among the three different classes of creature which grow
and reproduce their kind, they were saying something which, although, of
course, probably not capable of proof, was not for that reason absurd.
This is particularly true in the case of the judgement of a person who
wished to consider the separate life of the amputated parts of some ani-
mals, that quality of irritability which has been so well attested but which
is also at the same time such an inexplicable property of the filaments of
animal bodies and of some plants, and finally the close kinship between
the polyps and other zoophytes with plants. Moreover, the appeal to
immaterial principles is the resort of lazy philosophy. For that reason,
the reasoning of this sort is to be avoided at all costs, if the causes of

\[ \text{IMMANUEL KANT} \]

phenomena in the world, which of mere matter and which are ur-
anity, are to be known in their full

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\[ \text{* todte Klumpen.} \] \[ \text{aus Willkür.} \] \[ \text{keine organische Einrichtung.} \] \[ \text{willkürlichen Tätigkeit.} \] \[ \text{* Ich verlange nichts von allem diesem auf Beweisgründe.} \] \[ \text{das Pflanzensartige, das Tierische. und das Vernünftige.} \] \[ \text{Irritabilität.} \]
DREAMS

phenomena in the world, which are based upon the laws of the motion of mere matter and which are uniquely and alone capable of intelligibility, are to be known in their full extent. Nonetheless, I am convinced that Stahl, who is disposed to explain animal processes in organic terms, was frequently closer to the truth than Hofmann or Boerhaave, to name but a few. These latter, ignoring immaterial forces, adhere to mechanical causes, and in so doing adopt a more philosophical method. This method, while sometimes failing of its mark, is generally successful. It is also this method alone which is of use in science. But as for the influence of incorporeal beings: it can at best be acknowledged to exist; the nature of its operation and the extent of its effects, however, will never be explained.

The immaterial world would thus, then, include, firstly, all created intelligences, some of them being united with matter so as to form a person, others not; the immaterial world would, in addition, include the sensible subjects in all animal species; finally it would include all the other principles of life wherever they may exist in nature, even though this life does not manifest itself by any of the external characteristic marks of voluntary motion. All these immaterial natures, whether they exercise an influence on the corporeal world or not, and all rational beings, of which the animal nature is an accidental state of their being, whether they exist here on earth or on other heavenly bodies, and whether they are now animating the raw stuff of matter, or will do so in the future, or have done so in the past—all these beings, I say, would, according to this account, stand in a community consonant with their nature. This community would not be based on the conditions which limit the relationship of bodies. It would be a community in which distance in space and separation in time, which constitute the great chasm in the visible world which cancels all community, would vanish. The human soul, already in this present life, would therefore have to be regarded as being simultaneously linked to two worlds. The human soul, in so far as it is connected with a body so as to constitute a personal unity, clearly senses only the material world. On the other hand, as a member of the spirit-world, the human soul would both receive and impart the pure influences of immaterial natures, so that, as soon as its connection with the material world had been dissolved, the community in which it at all times stands with spirit-natures would continue to exist on its own; and that community would perforce reveal itself to the consciousness of the human soul in the form of a clear intuition.

* When heaven is spoken of as the seat of the blessed, ordinary people tend to represent it as existing above, high up in the measureless spaces of the universe. What is forgotten, however, is the fact that our own earth, if viewed from those regions, would also appear to be one of the stars in the heavens, and that the inhabitants of other worlds could point to us with

* die empfindende Subjekte. 4 sich ihrem Bewusstsein zum klaren Anschauen eröffnen müsste.
The constant use of the careful language of reason is now actually becoming tiresome. Why should I not be permitted, as well, to speak in the academical tone? It is more decisive and it dispenses both the author and the reader from the duty of thinking, which must sooner or later lead both of them to a state of tiresome indecision. Accordingly, it is as good as proved, or it could easily be proved, if one were willing to take the time and trouble to go into the matter, or, better still, it will one day, I know not when or where, be proved that the human soul, even in this life, stands in that which has been prepared for our eventual reception there. A curious illusion has the effect, which is dependent on the corporeal world, cannot be communicated to the world; that, standing in a reciprocal relation with these natures, it both has what is forgotten is the fact that, no matter how high one's ascent, one must sink back down below oneself, for such an immaterial whole would have to be represented, not in terms of such relations.

As much justification and say: Behold! The dwelling place of eternal bliss, a heavenly home which has been prepared for our eventual reception there. A curious illusion has the effect, namely, that the high flight taken by hope is always connected with the concept of ascent: what is forgotten is the fact that, no matter how high one's ascent, one must sink back down again, if at any rate, one is to gain a secure foothold in another world. But, according to the ideas which we have introduced here, heaven would in fact be the spirit-world, or, if you like, the blessed part of that world. And this world would have to be sought neither above nor below oneself, for such an immaterial whole would have to be represented, not in terms of remoteness from or nearness to corporeal things, but in terms of the spiritual connections of its parts to each other. In any case, the members of that world are aware of themselves only in terms of such relations.

1. in ihrer eigentlichen Beschaffenheit. 2. auf die materielle Erfahrung. 3. künstliche. 4. einfliessen können.
DREAMS

them, for the materials of which the two types of ideas are constituted are different in kind.

It would be a fine thing if the systematic constitution of the spirit-world which we have presented here could be inferred, or even supposed as simply probable, not merely from the concept of the spirit-nature as such, which is far too hypothetical in character, but from some real generally accepted observation. Accordingly, if the reader will bear with me, I shall venture such an attempt here. It will, admittedly, take me some distance from my path; it will also be far enough removed from self-evidence. But, in spite of this, it seems to give rise to conjectures of a kind which are not disagreeable.

Among the forces which move the human heart, some of the most powerful seem to lie outside the heart. In other words, there are forces which do not seem to relate as mere means, for example, to the advancement of self-interest or the satisfaction of private need, as to an objective which lies within the person himself; they rather cause the tendencies of our impulses to shift the focal point of their union outside ourselves and to locate it in other rational beings. From this there arises a conflict between two forces, namely, the force of egoism, which relates everything to itself, and the force of altruism, by means of which the heart is driven or drawn out of itself towards others. I am not going to linger over the drive, which makes us so heavily and so universally dependent on the judgement of others, and causes us to regard the approval or applause of others as so necessary to perfecting our own good opinion of ourselves, though this tendency sometimes gives rise to a wrong-headed and misguided conception of honour. In spite of this, however, there may exist even in the least selfish and most sincere of temperaments a hidden tendency to compare that which one knows for oneself to be good or true with the judgement of others, with a view to bringing such opinions into harmony. Nonetheless, there may also exist a tendency to halt, so to speak, any human soul on the path of knowledge, if it appears to be pursuing a path different from the one we have chosen ourselves. All of this perhaps reveals that, when it

1 in ihrer eigentlichen Beschaffenheit. 2 auf die Eigenmächtigkeit.
3 dass die Tendenz unserer Regungen den Brennpunkt ihrer Vereinigung ausser uns in andere vernünftige Wesen versetzen.
4 Eigenheit. 5 der Gemeinnützigkeit.
6 zur Vollendung des unsrigen (sei. Urtheils) von uns selbst.
7 ein übelverstandener Ehrenwahn (the word übelverstanden is to be understood in the sense of 'wrongheaded'; under Ehrenwahn Grimm offers notio falsa honoris ['false conception of honour']).
8 dañenige, was man für sich selbst als gut oder wahr erkennt (the phrase is ambiguous: it is not grammatically clear whether für sich selbst attaches to erkennt [the view of C, G, and V] or to gut oder wahr [the view of Co and L]; the context rather supports the former view).
comes to our own judgements, we sense our dependency on the universal human understanding, this phenomenon being a means of conferring a kind of unity of reason on the totality of thinking beings.

I shall, however, pass over this otherwise not insubstantial observation, and concentrate for the time being on another which is more illuminating and more important for our purpose. When we relate external things to our need, we cannot do so without at the same time feeling ourselves bound and limited by a certain sensation; this sensation draws our attention to the fact that an alien will, so to speak, is operative within ourselves, and that our own inclination needs external assent as its condition. A secret power forces us to direct our will towards the well-being of others or regulate it in accordance with the will of another; though this often happens contrary to our will and in strong opposition to our selfish inclination. The focal point at which the lines which indicate the direction of our drives converge, is therefore not merely to be found within us; there are, in addition, other forces which move us and which are to be found in the will of others outside ourselves. This is the source from which the moral impulses take their rise. These impulses often incline us to act against the dictates of self-interest. I refer to the strong law of obligation and the weaker law of benevolence. Each of these laws extorts from us many a sacrifice, and although self-interested inclinations from time to time overrule them both, these two laws, nonetheless, never fail to assert their reality within human nature. As a result, we recognise that, in our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the rule of the general will. It is this rule which confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity and invests it with a systematic constitution, drawn up in accordance with purely spiritual laws. We sense within ourselves a constraining of our will to harmonise with the general will. To call this sensed constraining 'moral feeling', is to speak of it merely as a manifestation of that which takes place within us, without establishing its causes. Thus it was that Newton called the certain law governing the tendencies inherent in all particles of matter to draw closer to each other the gravitation of matter, not wishing to entangle his mathematical demonstrations in possible vexatious philosophical disputes concerning the cause of those tendencies. Nonetheless, he did not hesitate to treat gravitation as a genuine effect produced by the universal activity of matter operating on itself; for this reason he also gave it the name 'attraction'. Are we, then, to suppose that it would not in the same way be possible to represent the phenomenon of the moral impulses in thinking natures, who are reciprocally related to each other, as the effect of a general spirit-natures exercise an influence on morality, in the immediate community, these same things would happen contrary to our moral sense. The focal point at which the lines which indicate the direction of our drives converge, is therefore not merely to be found within us; there are, in addition, other forces which move us and which are to be found in the will of others outside ourselves. This is the source from which the moral impulses take their rise. These impulses often incline us to act against the dictates of self-interest. I refer to the strong law of obligation and the weaker law of benevolence. Each of these laws extorts from us many a sacrifice, and although self-interested inclinations from time to time overrule them both, these two laws, nonetheless, never fail to assert their reality within human nature. As a result, we recognise that, in our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the rule of the general will. It is this rule which confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity and invests it with a systematic constitution, drawn up in accordance with purely spiritual laws. We sense within ourselves a constraining of our will to harmonise with the general will. To call this sensed constraining 'moral feeling', is to speak of it merely as a manifestation of that which takes place within us, without establishing its causes. Thus it was that Newton called the certain law governing the tendencies inherent in all particles of matter to draw closer to each other the gravitation of matter, not wishing to entangle his mathematical demonstrations in possible vexatious philosophical disputes concerning the cause of those tendencies. Nonetheless, he did not hesitate to treat gravitation as a genuine effect produced by the universal activity of matter operating on itself; for this reason he also gave it the name 'attraction'. Are we, then, to suppose that it would not in the same way be possible to represent the phenomenon of the moral impulses in thinking natures, who are reciprocally related to each other, as the effect of a general spirit-natures exercise an influence on morality, in the immediate community, these same things would happen contrary to our moral sense.

1 wenn man diesen Gedanken so viel Scheinbarkeit und Plausibilität zu geben vermöchte, so könnte man es auch natürliche Weise nur in der ganzen Moralität adäquate Wirkung haben, ohne dass diese sich selbständig habe.

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each other, as the effect of a genuinely active force, in virtue of which spirit-natures exercise an influence on each other? If the phenomenon of the moral impulses were represented in this way, the moral feeling would be this *sensed dependency* of the private will on the general will: it would be an effect produced by a natural and universal reciprocal interaction. And it would be in virtue of this reciprocity that the immaterial world would attain its moral unity, and that as a result of having formed itself into a system of spiritual perfection, in accordance with the laws governing the cohesive unity peculiar to it. If one concedes to these thoughts enough plausibility to justify the effort of measuring them against their consequences, one may perhaps find oneself, because of their charm, being imperceptibly prejudiced in their favour. For in this case, the anomalies seem to vanish which are normally so embarrassingly conspicuous in the contradiction between the moral and the physical circumstances of man here on earth. All the morality of actions, while never having its full effect in the corporeal life of man according to the order of nature, may well do so in the spirit-world, according to pneumatic laws. True intentions, the clandestine motives of numerous endeavours which have been frustrated by powerlessness, self-conquest, even sometimes the covert malice of seemingly good actions—all these, in respect of physical success in the corporeal world, are for the most part lost. In the immaterial world, however, these same things would have to be regarded as fruitful grounds.

And, in respect of the immaterial world, in accordance with pneumatic laws, and in virtue of the connection between the private and the general will, in other words, in virtue of the connection between the unity and the whole of the spirit-world, these same things will either exercise an effect which is consonant with the moral quality of the free will, or themselves also be reciprocally affected by such an effect. For since the moral character of the deed concerns the inner state of the spirit, it follows that it can only naturally produce an effect, which is consonant with the whole of morality, in the immediate community of spirits. As a result, it would now happen that man’s soul would already in this life and according to its moral state have to occupy its place among the spirit-substances of the universe, just as, in accordance with the laws of motion, the various types of matter in space adopt an order, consonant with their corporeal powers.
relatively to each other. If, then, the community of the soul with the corporeal world is eventually dissolved by death, life in the other world would simply be a natural continuation of the connection in which the soul had already existed during this present life. And all the consequences of the morality practised here would re-appear there in the effects, which a being, standing in an indissoluble community with the entire spirit-world, would already have exercised earlier in that world in accordance with pneumatic laws. The present and the future would, therefore, be of one piece, so to speak, and constitute a continuous whole, even according to the order of nature. This latter circumstance is of particular importance. For, in a speculation which is based simply on principles of reason, the necessity of having to resort to an extraordinary Divine Will in order to resolve a difficulty arising from the imperfect harmony between morality and its consequences in the world, amounts to a serious difficulty. And the reason is this: no matter how probable our judgement, based on our concepts of the Divine Wisdom, concerning that will may be, a strong suspicion will always remain that the feeble concepts of our understanding may perhaps have been applied to the Supreme Being in a fashion which is very much mistaken. For man's obligation is simply to judge the Divine Will by appeal either to the harmoniousness which he really perceives in the world, or to the harmoniousness which, using the rule of analogy, he may suppose the world to have. He is not, however, entitled to imagine new and arbitrary arrangements in the present or the future world, employing some scheme originated by his own wisdom, which he then promptly converts into a rule for the Divine Will.

We shall now steer our reflection back on to the path we were following before, and proceed on our way towards the objective which we have set ourselves. If the spirit-world and the participation of our souls in it is as universal and commonplace phenomenon. The rarity of the phenomena is almost more extraordinary than their possibility. However, this difficulty

* The reciprocal effects which take their origin from the ground of morality and which human beings and the members of the spirit-world exercise upon each other in accordance with the laws of pneumatic influence—these reciprocal effects might be construed in the following terms: there naturally arises from these reciprocal effects a closer community between a good or a bad soul, on the one hand, and a good or a bad spirit, respectively, on the other; as a result, the former associate themselves with that part of the spirit-republic which is consonant with their moral constitution, participating in all the effects which may, in accordance with the order of nature, arise therefrom.

1 ein stetiges Ganzes.

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can fairly easily be remedied; and, indeed, it has already been in part
overcome. For the representation which the human soul, using an immate­
rial intuition, has of itself as a spirit, in so far as it regards itself as
standing in relation to beings of a similar nature, is quite different from
the representations it has when the soul's consciousness represents itself
as a human being by means of an image drawn from the impression made
on the organs of the body and which can only be represented in relation
to material things. Accordingly, while it is true that there is one single
subject which is simultaneously a member of the visible and the invisible
world, it is nonetheless not one and the same person, for the representa­
tions of the one world are not, on account of their different constitution,
the accompanying ideas of the representations belonging to the other
world. And hence what I think as spirit is not remembered by me as
human being; and, conversely, my state as a human being does not enter
at all into the representation of myself as a spirit. Furthermore, no matter
how clear and intuitive the representations of the spirit-world may be*
this would still not suffice to make me as a human being conscious of
them; for in so far as even the representation of oneself (that is to say, of
the soul) as a spirit has been acquired by means of inferences, it is not in the
case of any human being an intuitive empirical concept.

* This may be explained by means of a certain dual personality which belongs to the soul
even with respect to this life. Certain philosophers, with not the slightest qualm that anyone
might object, think that they can appeal to the state of deep sleep to prove the reality of
obscure representations, when in fact all that can be said with certainty in this matter is that
we do not, when we are awake, remember any of the representations which we may perhaps
have had in deep sleep. And all that follows from this is that these representations are not
clearly represented when we wake up; what does not follow is that these representations at
the time when we were sleeping were obscure. 1 I suspect on the contrary, that these
representations may be clearer and more extensive than even the clearest of the representa­
tions we have when we are awake. For that is what is to be expected of a being, as active as
the soul, when the external senses are in a state of perfect rest. But since the body of the
person is not sensed at the time, the accompanying idea of the body is lacking on awakening;
and it is this idea which can assist in bringing to consciousness the fact that the previous state
of the thoughts belongs to one and the same person. The actions of some sleep-walkers, who
on occasion display greater understanding in this state than usual while remembering noth­
ing about it when they wake, nonetheless confirm the possibility of what I suspect is the case
with deep sleep. Dreams, on the other hand, is that to say, the representations which the
sleeper has and which he remembers when he wakes, are not relevant here. For when a
person dreams, he is not completely asleep; to a certain degree he has clear sensations, and
weaves the actions of his spirit into the impressions of the external senses. Hence it is that
he subsequently remembers them in part; and hence it is that he also finds in them nothing
but wild and extravagant chimaeras as must happen, since the ideas of the imagination and
those of external sensation have been jumbled together with each other.

1 durch ein immaterielles Anschauen. * aus dem Eindrucke körperlicher Organen.
* dunkel Vorstellungen. + Geisteshandlung. . wilde abgeschmackte Chimären.
5 Ideen der Phantasie.
This heterogeneity between spirit-representations and those which belong to the bodily life of man need not, however, be regarded as an impediment serious enough to prevent all possibility of our becoming aware, from time to time, even during this present life, of the influences which emanate from the spirit-world. For these influences can enter the personal consciousness of man, not, it is true, directly, but, nonetheless, in such a fashion that they, in accordance with the law of association of ideas, excite those images which are related to them, and awaken representations which bear an analogy with our senses. They are not, it is true, the spirit-concept itself, but they are symbols of it. For after all, it is always exactly the same substance which belongs to and is a member of both this world and the other world. The two kinds of representation belong to the same subject and they are linked with each other. The possibility of this being the case can, to a certain extent, be rendered intelligible if we consider the way in which the higher concepts of reason, which are fairly close to the spirit-concepts, normally assume, so to speak, a corporeal cloak in order to present themselves in a clear light. It is for this reason that the moral characteristics of the Divinity are represented under the representations of anger, jealousy, compassion, revenge, and so forth. It is for this reason, too, that poets personify the virtues, vices and other qualities of the kind, albeit in such a fashion that the true idea of the understanding shines through. Thus, the geometer represents time by a line, although space and time only agree in their relations; "Ungleichartigkeit."

It is thus not improbable that spirit-sensations may enter consciousness, if they arouse images in our imagination which are akin to

\footnote{Ungleichartigkeit. \  nach dem Gesetz der vergeschossenen Begriffe. analoge Vorstellungen unserer Sinne / C & V: rappresentazioni analoghe \ (V: analogiche) dei nostri sensi / Co & L: des représentations analogiques de nos sens / G: analogous ideas of our senses \ M: analogous representations of our senses \ S: nei nostri rappresentazioni analoghe. \ geistiger Begriff.}

or other qualities of human nature / M: and other natural properties / S: o altre qualità naturali \ \ (None of the translators has recognised that the phrase \ der Natur \ is being used in a colloquial sense and has the force of \ dieser Natur \ [often employed, as here, to complete a list] and ought thus to be translated by 'of the kind' or 'such as have just been mentioned'. Serious philosophical problems would be raised by attributing to Kant the view that virtue and vice were natural qualities.alone senses the difficulty, for he translates \ der Natur \ by 'of human nature'.\)

\footnote{Phantasien. \ Erscheinungen. \ Bilder der Apparenz / Apparenz is not listed in Grimm's dictionary, invented by Kant, presumably as a synonym.

\* Bild der Phantasie. \ Schein der Empfindungen. \ oder auch mancherlei sonst eingeschichtene Wahrheit. \ Hirngespinst der Einbildung. \ groben Blend}

them. In this way, ideas which a serious influence would clothe themselves human being normally uses: the clothed in the image of a human immaterial world would be cloth which normally delight our senses.

Phenomena\* of this type cannot be observed; they can only occur with people an exceptionally high degree of skill, the imagination, according to the mathematicians are commonly disinclined to admit the existence of Leibnizian monads is probably because they cannot avoid representing them as tiny little lumps. It is thus not improbable that spirit-sensations may enter consciousness, if they arouse images in our imagination which are akin to

\footnote{Phantasien. \ Erscheinungen. \ Bilder der Apparenz / Apparenz is not listed in Grimm's dictionary, invented by Kant, presumably as a synonym. \ Bild der Phantasie. \ Schein der Empfindungen. \ oder auch mancherlei sonst eingeschichtene Wahrheit. \ Hirngespinst der Einbildung. \ groben Blend}
them. In this way, ideas which are communicated by means of spirit-influence would clothe themselves in the signs of that language, which the human being normally uses: the sensed presence of a spirit would be clothed in the image of a human figure; the order and beauty of the immaterial world would be clothed in the images of our imagination which normally delight our senses in life, and so forth.

Phenomena of this type cannot, however, be something common and usual; they can only occur with persons whose organs are endowed with an exceptionally high degree of sensitivity for intensifying the images of the imagination, according to the inner state of the soul, and by means of harmonious movement, and do so to a greater degree than usually happens, or, indeed, ought to happen with people of sound constitution. Such out of the ordinary persons would, at certain moments, be assailed by the vision of certain objects as external to them, which they would take for the presence of spirit-natures presenting themselves to their corporeal senses, though the occurrence is in such a case only an illusion of the imagination, but of such a kind that the cause of the illusion is a genuine spirit-influence. That spirit-influence cannot be felt immediately; it can only reveal itself to consciousness by means of the images of the imagination which are akin to it, and which assume the semblance of sensations.

The concepts which we have acquired by learning, and many erroneous opinions, indeed, which have insinuated themselves into the mind in some other way, will have played a role in a case such as this, where delusion and truth are mingled together, and where a real spirit-sensation, although providing the basis of the experience, has nonetheless been transformed into a phantom of sensible things. But it will also be admitted that the capacity thus to develop the impressions emanating from the spirit-world so that they can be clearly intuited in this life can scarcely be of much use, for, in a case like this, the spirit-impression is of necessity so intimately interwoven with the illusion of the imagination, that it cannot be possible to distinguish the element of truth in such an experience from the crude illusions which surround it. Moreover, such a state would indicate a genuine malady, for it presupposes a modification in the balance of the nerves which are set in unnatural motion even by the merely

* By this I do not mean the organs of outer sensation but rather the sensorium of the soul, as it is called; that is to say, that part of the brain, of which the movement usually accompanies the many different images and representations of the thinking soul, as the philosophers maintain.

...
Finally, it would not be at all surprising if the spirit-seer were at the same time a fantastical visionary, at least in respect of the images accompanying these apparitions of his. It would not be surprising, for representations well up and burst forth which are by nature alien and incompatible with the representations which human beings have in the bodily state; they introduce ill-assorted images into outer sensation, so that wild chimaeras and wondrous caricatures are hatched out, and, passing before the mind in a long train, they dupe the deluded senses, even though the original representation may have been based upon a true spirit-influence.

We need no longer be at a loss to furnish seeming explanations of the ghost stories which philosophers so often encounter, or of all the different kinds of spirit-influences which are periodically the subject of discussion.

Departed souls and pure spirits can never, it is true, be present to our outer senses, nor can they in any fashion whatever stand in community with matter, though they may indeed act upon the spirit of man, who belongs, with them, to one great republic. And they can exercise this influence in such a way that the representations, which they awaken in him, clothe themselves, according to the law of his imagination, in images which are akin to them, and create the vision of objects corresponding to them, so that they present the appearance of existing externally to him. This deception can affect any of the senses. And no matter how much the deception is intermingled with absurd figments of the imagination, one need not let this prevent one from supposing that there are underlying spirit-influences at work here. I should be insulting the reader's perspicacity, if I were to devote further time to discussing the application of this type of explanation. For metaphysical hypotheses have about them such an uncommon degree of flexibility that one would have to be very clumsy not to be able to adapt this present hypothesis to any story whatever, and to do so even before investigating its veracity — something which is in many cases impossible and in many more highly discourteous.

However, if one draws up a balance of the advantages and disadvantages which could accrue to someone who was to a certain extent organised not only for the visible world but also for the invisible (assuming that there ever was such a person), such a balance would seem to be a gift like that with which Juno honoured Tiresias: she first made him blind, so that she could grant him the gift of prophecy. For to judge from the above propositions, intuitive knowledge of the other world can only ever be attained here by forfeiting something of that understanding which one needs for this present world. Nor do I know whether certain philosophers, even, who with such application and absorption train their metaphysical

Aristotle somewhere says: When we dream each has a world of his own, perhaps, to reverse the final clause he have each of them their own world dreaming. On this basis, if we consider their various imaginary worlds each the exclusion of the others — if we dwell in the world known as The together by Wolff from a small quantum experience and a larger quantity of what cannot be thought — if we consider with their contradictory visions, dreaming their dreams. For if they completely, that is to say, if they see view which does not exclude agreement of human beings, then none of them the light of their proofs, appear at all. And the philosophers will all in same time, such as the mathematicians important event must now be signs and portents which made their horizon of the sciences.

There is a certain affinity between theers of sense. The latter commonly have dealings with spirits. And the n
telescopes on those remote regions and find themselves able to report wonders from those distant places, ought to be wholly released from this hard condition. At least I do not begrudge them any of their discoveries. My only concern is that someone of sound understanding but little tact may give them to understand what Tycho de Brahe’s coachman said in reply to him when the former claimed to be able to travel the shortest route at night-time by means of the stars: My dear master, you may have a thorough understanding of the heavens, but here on earth you are a fool.28

Third Chapter: Anti-Cabbala — A Fragment of Ordinary Philosophy, the Purpose of Which Is to Cancel Community with the Spirit-World

Aristotle somewhere says: When we are awake we share a common world, but when we dream each has a world of his own.30 It seems to me that one ought, perhaps, to reverse the final clause and be able to say: if different people have each of them their own world, then we may suppose that they are dreaming. On this basis, if we consider those who build castles in the sky in their various imaginary worlds, each happily inhabiting his own world to the exclusion of the others — if we consider, for example, the person who dwells in the world known as The Order of Things, a world tinkered together by Wolff from a small quantity of building-material derived from experience and a larger quantity of surreptitious concepts,31 or the person who inhabits the world which was conjured out of nothing by Crusius employing the magical power of a few formulae concerning what can and what cannot be thought32 — if we consider these people, we shall be patient with their contradictory visions, until these gentlemen have finished dreaming their dreams. For if they should eventually, God willing, awake completely, that is to say, if they should eventually open their eyes to a view which does not exclude agreement with the understanding of other human beings, then none of them would see anything which did not, in the light of their proofs, appear obvious and certain to everybody else as well. And the philosophers will all inhabit a common world together at the same time, such as the mathematicians have long possessed. And this important event must now be imminent, if we are able to believe certain signs and portents which made their appearance some while ago above the horizon of the sciences.

There is a certain affinity between the dreamers of reason and the dreamers of sense.3 The latter commonly include those who from time to time have dealings with spirits. And the reason for including the latter is exactly

3 die Luftbaumeister der mancherlei Gedankenwelten.
4 gezimmert.
5 In gewisser Verwandtschaft mit den Träumern der Vernunft stehen die Träumer der Empfindung.
the same as that for including the former: they see something which no other normal person sees; they have their own community with beings which reveal themselves to no one else, no matter how good his senses may be. Assuming that the apparitions are nothing but figments of the imagination, the designation 'reveries' is appropriate in so far as both types of image are, in spite of the fact that they delude the senses by presenting themselves as genuine objects, hatched out by the dreamer himself. However, if one were to imagine that the two deceptions were sufficiently similar in the manner of their origin to justify our regarding the source of the one as sufficient to explain the other, one would be seriously mistaken. If someone, while fully awake, should be so absorbed by the fictions and chimaeras hatched out by his ever fertile imagination as to take little notice of the sense-impressions which were of the greatest importance to him at the time, we should be justified in calling him a waking dreamer. For the impressions of the senses only need to lose a little more of their strength and our waking dreamer will sleep, and what were chimaeras before will be genuine dreams. The reason why those chimaeras were not already dreams during wakefulness is this: he represents them at the time as being in himself, whereas other objects, which he senses, he represents as outside himself. As a consequence, he counts the former as the products of his own activity, while he regards the latter as something which he receives from outside and by which he is affected. For in this case, everything depends on the relation in which the objects are thought as standing relatively to himself as a human being, and, thus, relatively to his body. Hence, the images in question may very well occupy him greatly while he is awake, but, no matter how clear the images may be, they will not deceive him. For although, in this case, he also has a representation of himself and of his body in his brain, and although he relates his fantastical images to that representation, nonetheless, the real sensation of his body creates, by means of the outer senses, a contrast or distinction with respect to those chimaeras. As a result, he is able to regard his fantastical images as hatched out by himself and the real sensation as an impression of the senses. If now he should fall asleep, the representation which the senses give him of his body is extinguished, and all that remains are the representations he has created himself. In contrast to these representations, the other chimaeras are thought of as standing in an external relationship. And furthermore, as long as sleep continues, these representations must deceive the dreamer, for there is no sensation which allows him, by comparing the two, to distinguish the original image from the phantom, in other words, the outer from the inner.

Spirit-seers, therefore, differ entirely from waking-dreamers, and they differ not merely in degree but in kind. For spirit-seers, when they are sufficiently awake and often when their degree of vividness, refer certain other things which they really perceive here is simply how it happens that the imagination and locate it outside the body, of which also they are aware be the great distinctness of these the cause of this phenomenon, for the figment of the imagination is question which I wish to have answer grave such an image, which it oug within itself, into quite a different external to itself among the objects tion which the soul has. Nor shall an answer which addsuces other cases this kind of deception, and which one For whether the victim of the deception what one wishes to know is not what other circumstances, but rather how

However, in using our outer sense the clari ty with which the objects as these objects in our sensations. They the same exactitude in all cases; the condition of the sensation, and if it able to represent things as external a highly probable that our soul, in its of sensation, locating it at the point caused by the object and which inconverge, when they are extended. indicate the direction in which the them backwards, the point at which point. This point, which is called the to the effects produced, the point of tion entertained, however, it is the point in the direction in which the sens

* Blendwerk ihrer Einbildung. * ein Betrage
* Hierbei wird es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass un
Vorstellung versetze, wo die verschiedene Richtu
Richtungslinien) fortgezogen werden, zusammen
* Daher sieht man einen strahlenden Punkt a
Richtung des Einfalls der Lichtstrahlen zurückge
* Sehpunkt / (Grimm defines Sehpunkt as 'the
one's attention'. Grimm quotes the present
Kant's usage [based as it is on a geometrical

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fully awake and often when their other sensations possess the highest
degree of vividness, refer certain objects to external positions among
the other things which they really perceive around them. And the question
here is simply how it happens that they transpose the illusion of their
imagination* and locate it outside themselves, and do so in relation to their
body, of which also they are aware by means of the outer senses. It cannot
be the great distinctness of these figments of their imagination which is
the cause of this phenomenon, for what counts here is the place to which
the figment of the imagination is transposed as an object. Hence, the
question which I wish to have answered is this: How does the soul trans­
pose such an image, which it ought, after all, to represent as contained
within itself, into quite a different relation, locating it, namely, in a place
external to itself among the objects which present themselves to the sensa­
tion which the soul has. Nor shall I allow myself to be fobbed off with an
answer which adduces other cases which have some kind of similarity with
this kind of deception, and which occur, for example, in the state of fever.
For whether the victim of the delusion' be in a state of health or illness,
what one wishes to know is not whether such deceptions also occur in
other circumstances, but rather how the deception is possible.

However, in using our outer senses, what we find is that, in addition to
the clarity with which the objects are represented, we include the place of
these objects in our sensations. This may not always, perhaps, occur with
the same exactitude* in all cases; nonetheless, it constitutes a necessary
condition of the sensation, and if it were not satisfied it would be impos­
sible to represent things as external to themselves. This being the case, it is
highly probable that our soul, in its representation, transposes the object
of sensation, locating it at the point at which the various lines, which are
caused by the object and which indicate the direction of the impression,
converge, when they are extended.* Hence, if one takes the lines, which
indicate the direction in which the light-rays enter the eye, and extend
them backwards, the point at which they intersect is seen as a radiant
point.* This point, which is called the optical point', is, it is true, in respect
to the effects produced, the point of divergence. In respect of the representa­
tion entertained, however, it is the point of convergence of the lines indicat­
ing the direction in which the sensation is transmitted when it makes an

* Blendwerk ihrer Einbildung. 1 des Betrogenen. 2 Richtigkeit.
1 Hierbei wird es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass unsere Seele das empfundene Object dahin in ihrer
Vorstellung versetze, wo die verschiedene Richtungslinien des Eindrucks, die (i.e., die verschiedene
Richtungslinien) dasselbe (i.e., das empfundene Object) gemacht hat, wenn sie (i.e., die verschiedene
Richtungslinien) fortgezogen werden, zusammensetzen.
* Daher sieht man einen strahlenden Punkt an demjenigen Orte, wo die von dem Auge in der
Richtung des Einfalls der Lichtstrahlen zurückgezogene Linien sich schneiden.
* Sehpunkt / (Grimm defines Sehpunkt as 'the point at which one looks, at which one directs
one's attention'. Grimm quotes the present sentence from Kant and seems to suggest that
Kant's usage [based as it is on a geometrical definition] is very slightly deviant.)
imaginarium is located outside the thinking subject, and the image which is the product of the mere imagination, is represented as an object present to the outer senses. The dismay which is felt at the supposed appearance of something which, according to the natural order of things, ought not to be present, will, even if such a phantom of the imagination were only weak to begin with, soon excite the attention, and confer upon the apparent sensation a vividness so great as not to permit the deluded person any doubt as to the veracity of his experience. This deception can affect any outer sense, for each of them yields copied images in the imagination, and the displacement of the nerve-tissue can cause the focus imaginarius to be displaced and located at the point from which the sensible impression produced by a corporeal body, which was actually present, would come. It will not, therefore, be surprising if the fantastical visionary should think he very distinctly sees or hears many things which no one else perceives. And likewise it would not be surprising if these figments of his imagination should appear to him and suddenly disappear: nor would it be surprising if they were to deceive one sense, for example, the sense of touch, and yet be imperceptible to all the other senses, for example, the sense of touch, and thus appear to lack solidity. Ordinary ghost stories tend so markedly to display such characteristics as strongly to warrant the suspicion that they may well have arisen from a source such as I have described. And thus, even the popular concept of spirit-beings, which we extracted above from ordinary linguistic usage, is very much in accordance with this type of delusion. Nor is this concept untrue to its origin, for the essential characteristic mark of this concept is supposed to be constituted by the property of being present in space but not impenetrable.

One might adduce as an example displaying a remote similarity to the case under consideration, the state of someone drunk who, in his drunken condition, sees double with both eyes. The cause of the double vision is the fact that the dilation of the blood vessels creates an impediment to directing the axes of the eyes in such a way that their lines, when extended, intersect at the point at which the object is to be found. In exactly the same way, the distortion of the vascular tissue of the brain, which may perhaps be merely temporary, and which may, as long as it lasts, only affect some of the nerves, may have the effect, even when we are awake, of making certain images of the imagination appear outside ourselves even when we are awake. This deception may be compared with an experience which is very common. When one is emerging from sleep and one finds oneself in a state of relaxation which is not far removed from slumber itself, and if, with drowsy half-opened eyes, one looks at the various threads of the bedcover or of the curtains surrounding the bed, or at the tiny marks on the wall close-by, it is easy to turn them into the forms of human faces, and such like. The deception ceases once we exert our will and concentrate our attention. In this case, the displacement of the focus imaginarius of the images of the imagination is to a certain extent subject to the power of the will, whereas in the case of derangement it cannot be prevented by any power of the will.

It is also highly probable that we are awake, of making certain images of the imagination appear outside ourselves even when we are awake. This deception may be compared with an experience which is very common. When one is emerging from sleep and one finds oneself in a state of relaxation which is not far removed from slumber itself, and if, with drowsy half-opened eyes, one looks at the various threads of the bedcover or of the curtains surrounding the bed, or at the tiny marks on the wall close-by, it is easy to turn them into the forms of human faces, and such like. The deception ceases once we exert our will and concentrate our attention. In this case, the displacement of the focus imaginarius of the images of the imagination is to a certain extent subject to the power of the will, whereas in the case of derangement it cannot be prevented by any power of the will.

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Die gemeine Geistererzählungen lassen so sehr auf dergleichen Bestimmungen hinaus.
It is also highly probable that the concepts of spirit-forms, inculcated into us by education, provide the sick mind with materials for its delusive imaginings, and that a brain which was free from all such prejudices, even if it were affected by some disturbance, would not so easily hatch out such images. Furthermore, it can also be seen from this that, since the malady of the fantastical visionary does not really affect the understanding but rather involves the deception of the senses, the wretched victim cannot banish his illusions by means of subtle reasoning. He cannot do so because, true or illusory, the impression of the senses itself precedes all judgement of the understanding and possesses an immediate certainty, which is far stronger than all other persuasion.

The result of these observations involves the following embarrassing difficulty: the deep speculations of the previous chapter are rendered wholly superfluous, and the reader, no matter how ready he may be to give some support to the plans which exist only in idea, will nonetheless prefer the concept which enables him to resolve the difficulties with greater ease and speed, and which can expect more general support. For, apart from the fact that it seems more consonant with a rational mode of thought to draw the grounds of one’s explanation from the material with which experience furnishes us rather than to lose oneself in the dizzy concepts of a reason which is half-engaged in creating fictions and half-engaged in drawing inferences, this approach also furnishes some occasion for mockery, as well; and mockery, whether it be justified or not, is a more powerful instrument than any other for checking futile enquiries. For to wish to offer, in a serious fashion, interpretations of the figments of the imagination of fantastical visionaries instantly arouses grave doubts; and philosophy, which allows itself to be caught in such low company, falls under suspicion. It is true that I have not, in what I have said above, disputed the madness of such apparitions. On the contrary, although I have not made madness the cause of the imagined spirit-community, I have connected the two by supposing madness to be a natural effect of such a community. But what foolishness is there, after all, which could not be made to harmonise with a fathomless philosophy? I do not, therefore, blame the reader at all if, instead of regarding the spirit-seers as semi-citizens of the other world, he simply dismisses them without further ado as candidates for the asylum, thus saving himself the trouble of any further enquiry. But if this is the footing on which everything is to be taken, then the method of treating such adepts of the spirit-realm will also have to be very different from that suggested by the ideas elaborated above. And whereas it was once found necessary in the past on occasion to burn some of them, it will
now suffice simply to purge them. Nor would it be necessary, if this was how things stood, to range so far afield, and, with the help of metaphysics, to seek out mysteries in the fevered brains of deluded enthusiasts. The sharp-sighted Hudibras would have been able to solve the riddle on his own, for his opinion was: *if a hypochondriacal wind should rage in the guts, what matters is the direction it takes: if downwards, then the result is a f--; if upwards, an apparition or an heavenly inspiration.*

FOURTH CHAPTER: THEORETICAL CONCLUSION
ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PART

Scales, intended by civil law to be a standard of measure in trade, may be shown to be inaccurate if the wares and the weights are made to change pans. The bias of the scales of understanding is revealed by exactly the same stratagem, and in philosophical judgements, too, it would not be possible, unless one adopted this stratagem, to arrive at a unanimous result by comparing the different weighings. I have purified my soul of prejudices; I have eradicated every blind attachment which may have insinuated itself into my soul in a surreptitious manner with a view to securing an entry for a great deal of bogus knowledge. Now, whether or not it confirms or cancels my previous judgements, whether it determines me or leaves me undecided, nothing is important or venerable for me except that which, having followed the path of honesty, occupies its place in a tranquil mind open to any argument. Whenever I encounter something which instructs me, I appropriate it. The judgement of the opponent who refutes my arguments becomes my own judgement, once I have put it on the scales and weighed it first of all against the scale of self-love, and then, having transferred it to that scale, against my own alleged reasons, and found it to be of superior quality. I formerly used to regard the human understanding in general merely from the point of view of my own understanding. Now I put myself in the position of someone else's reason, which is independent of myself and external to me, and regard my judgements, along with their most secret causes, from the point of view of other people. The comparison of the two observations yields, it is true, pronounced parallaxes, but it is also the only method for preventing optical deception, and the only means of placing the concepts in the true positions which they occupy relatively to the cognitive faculty of human nature. It will be objected that this is very solemn language for a subject as indifferent as the one we are discussing, and more an idle distraction than a serious argument mistaken. And although opinions in what concerns a trifle, or in small matters may serve as experiments, I do not find that there is anything in which no examined inclinations, which had deprived it of its reality whether for or against. But the scales, cause speculations, which rise on the other side. This is the only method for preventing optical deception, and one's own invention, belief in the ghost-stories, which And even the initial delusions, part of spirits or about the influence of the spirits relating to the supposed connection with us, only have a scale-pan of hope; on the other hand, such things seem to answer to the question we are to suppose, would remain undecided whether for or against. But the scales, cause speculations, which rise on the other side. This is the only method for preventing optical deception and one's own invention, belief in the ghost-stories, which And even the initial delusions, part of spirits or about the influence of the spirits relating to the supposed connection with us, only have a scale-pan of hope; on the other hand, such things seem to answer to the question we are to suppose, would remain undecided whether for or against. But the scales, cause speculations, which rise on the other side. This is the only method for preventing optical deception and one's own invention, belief in the ghost-stories, which And even the initial delusions, part of spirits or about the influence of the spirits relating to the supposed connection with us, only have a scale-pan of hope; on the other hand, such things seem to answer to the question we are to suppose, would remain undecided whether for or against. But the scales, cause speculations, which rise on the other side. This is the only method for preventing optical deception and one's own invention, belief in the ghost-stories, which And even the initial delusions, part of spirits or about the influence of the spirits relating to the supposed connection with us, only have a scale-pan of hope; on the other hand, such things seem to answer to the question we are to suppose, would remain undecided whether for or against. But the scales, cause speculations, which rise on the other side. This is the only method for preventing optical deception and one's own invention, belief in the ghost-stories, which
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indifferent as the one we are discussing and which deserves to be called more an idle distraction than a serious occupation. Nor is such a judgment mistaken. And although one does not need to make massive preparations in what concerns a trifle, one may, nonetheless, indeed make such preparations if such a trifle presents itself. A care greater than necessary in small matters may serve as an example in great matters. With one exception, I do not find that there are any attachments in my mind, nor do I find that any unexamined inclination has insinuated itself into my mind, which had deprived it of its readiness to be guided by any kind of reason, whether for or against. But the scales of the understanding are not, after all, wholly impartial. One of the arms, which bears the inscription: *Hope for the future*, has a mechanical advantage; and that advantage has the effect that even weak reasons, when placed on the appropriate side of the scales, cause speculations, which are in themselves of greater weight, to rise on the other side. This is the only defect, and it is one which I cannot easily eliminate. Indeed, it is a defect which I cannot even wish to eliminate. Now, I admit that all the stories concerning the apparition of departed souls or about the influences exercised by spirits, and all the theories relating to the supposed nature of spirit-beings and of their connection with us, only have a significant weight when placed in the scale-pan of hope; on the other hand, when placed in the scale-pan of speculation, such things seem to weigh no more than empty air. If the answer to the question we are considering did not harmonise with an inclination which was already pronounced, what rational being, I do you suppose, would remain undecided as to which of the following possibilities was the greater: that a type of being exists which has nothing in common with anything which the senses teach him, or that certain experiences, not uncommon in a number of cases, are to be attributed to self-deception and one's own invention?

Indeed, it is this which seems in general to be the chief cause for the belief in the ghost-stories, which meet with such universal acceptance. And even the initial delusions, produced by the alleged apparitions of those who have died, are probably the result of the fond hope that one will oneself somehow survive death. For often, in the shades of the night, the senses have been deceived by illusions, and ambiguous forms have been converted into phantoms' harmonising with the opinions one held beforehand. And on this foundation, philosophers finally formed the rational ideas of spirits, which they then incorporated into the body of their teaching. On examination, my own pretentious theory of the community of spirits will be found to follow exactly the same direction as that adopted by popular inclination. For the propositions concur only in yielding a

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concept which explains how the human spirit leaves this world;* in other words, our state after death. But I make no mention of how it comes into the world, that is to say, no mention of generation and reproduction. Indeed, I make no mention even of how it is present in the world, that is to say, how an immaterial nature can exist in a body and how it can exercise an influence by means of the body. And there is a very good reason for all this, and it is as follows: I am completely ignorant about all these matters. And as a consequence, I might, I suppose, have been content to remain just as ignorant about the future state, as well, but for the fact that the bias of a favourite opinion served to recommend the reasons which presented themselves, feeble as they are.

It is exactly the same ignorance which prevents my venturing wholly to deny all truth to the many different ghost-stories which are recounted, albeit with a reservation which is at once commonplace but also strange: I am sceptical about each one of them individually, but I ascribe some credence to all of them taken together. The reader is free to judge for himself. But for my part, the arguments adduced in the second chapter are sufficiently powerful to inspire me with seriousness and indecision when I listen to the many strange tales of this type. However, since there is never any lack of justifying reasons, if one's mind is already made up beforehand, I do not propose to incommode the reader by further extending my defence of this way of thinking.

Since I now find myself at the conclusion of the theory of spirits, I venture to add one more remark: this reflection, if properly used by the reader, will bring the whole of our philosophical understanding of such beings to completion.* From now on it will be possible, perhaps, to have all sorts of opinions about but no longer knowledge of such beings.* This claim may sound somewhat immodest. For certainly there is in nature no object known to the senses of which it can be said that one has ever exhausted it either by observation or by reason, not even if it were a droplet of water, or a grain of sand, or something even simpler – so measureless is the complexity of that which nature, in its incomprehensibility, has made of it, in order to an understanding as limited as ours. But I shall now put to one side, a whole matter of spirits, an extension which differs so much from anything else that it is impossible that such a theory can be completed, albeit without securely establishing the limits of our ignorance. We find that the various different approaches, where one tries to govern them, constitute the principles of the theory of death, which we know. But the principle of this life, which is that of the soul, we do not know but only suppose, not only that the entire range of our sensations, but also of our thoughts, is comprehensible. One has to make do with a philosophy of this sort, which differs so much from anything else, that any possibility of such negations is based on a fiction, in which one never seeks its refuge. On this basis all the various different approaches, which is supposed to exist; as such a theory, I call it, it is necessary in order to be able to invest the modest profit of one's thought in the objects which are beyond one's power, one must cut the coat of one's projects to the measure of one's energy to cover the entire range of our sensations.

* Among the ancient Egyptians the symbol of the soul was the butterfly; the Greek word for the soul had exactly the same meaning. It is easy to see that the hope, which makes of death nothing but a transformation, has generated this idea and its symbols. But this does nothing to destroy our confidence that the concepts which have sprung from this source are correct. Our inner sentiment and the judgements which are made by what is analogous to reason, and which are based on that inner sentiment, lead, provided they are neither of them corrupted, precisely where reason would lead, if it were more enlightened and more extensive.

1 Unsere innere Empfindung und die darauf gegründete Urtheile des Vernunftähnlichen / (the clause is obscure and ambiguous: it is unclear whether des Vernunftähnlichen is to be construed as an instrumental genitive [the view of C, V, and the present translator] or as an objective genitive [the view of Co, L, and St]).

2 Mannigfaltigkeit. * philosophischen Lehr. 3 den Zuschnitt der Entwürfe den Kräften an.
plexity of that which nature, in the least of its parts, presents for analysis to an understanding as limited as that of man. But the situation is quite different when it comes to the philosophical theory of spirit-beings. The theory can be completed, albeit in the negative sense of the term, by securely establishing the limits of our understanding and by convincing us that the various different appearances of life in nature, and the laws governing them, constitute the whole of that which it is granted us to know. But the principle of this life, in other words, the spirit-nature which we do not know but only suppose, can never be positively thought, for, in the entire range of our sensations, there are no data for such positive thought. One has to make do with negations if one is to think something which differs so much from anything of a sensible character. But even the possibility of such negations is based neither on experience, nor on inferences, but on a fiction, in which reason, stripped of all assistance whatever, seeks its refuge. On this basis, the pneumatology of man can be called a theory of his necessary ignorance in respect of a type of being which is supposed to exist; as such it is quite adequate to its task.

I shall now put to one side, as something settled and completed, the whole matter of spirits, an extensive branch of metaphysics. It will from now on be of no concern to me. In thus reducing the scope of my enquiry and ridding myself of a number of completely futile investigations, I hope to be able to invest the modest abilities of my understanding in a more profitable fashion in the objects which are left. The wish to extend the tiny measure of one's energy to cover all kinds of windy projects is in most cases a futile wish. In this, as in other cases, prudence demands that one cut the coat of one's projects to the cloth of one's powers. If great things are beyond one's power, one must rest satisfied with what is moderate. 

\* Mannigfaltigkeit. \* philosophischen Lehrbegriff. \* die Grenzen unserer Einsicht. \* geringe. 
\* den Zuschnitt der Entwürfe den Kräften angemessen zu machen. \* das Mittelmäßige.
The second part, which is historical

FIRST CHAPTER: A STORY, THE TRUTH OF WHICH IS RECOMMENDED TO THE READER'S OWN FREE EXAMINATION

Sit mihi fas audita loqui – Virgil

The arrogance of philosophy causes it to be exposed to all kinds of futile question. And philosophy often finds itself seriously embarrassed when it is confronted by certain stories: it is unable either to doubt some of them with impunity or to believe others without being mocked. In the case of the stories which circulate concerning spirits, the two problems to a certain extent arise together, the former in listening to someone solemnly recount such stories, the latter in recounting them to others. And it is, indeed, the case that there is no reproach more bitter to the philosopher than that of credulity and being duped by popular error. Those who know how to create the impression of cleverness at no great expense pour their scornful laughter on anything which, because it is unintelligible both to the ignorant and to the wise, reduces them both to more or less the same level. It is, therefore, not surprising that phenomena of this kind, which are so frequently alleged to occur, should find wide acceptance, though publicly they are either denied or, indeed, hushed up. One can be sure, therefore, that no academy of sciences will ever make this material the subject of a prize question, not because the members of such academies are wholly free from the tendency to subscribe to the opinion in question, but because the rule of prudence rightly excludes indiscriminately throwing up both by prying inquisitiveness and by idle curiosity. And thus it is that stories of this kind are probably only ever believed secretly, whereas publicly they are dismissed with contempt by the incredulity which is currently in fashion.

However, it seems to me that this whole question is neither sufficiently important nor sufficiently prepared for us to be able to arrive at any decision in the matter. For this reason, I have no hesitation in introducing at this juncture a report of the kind mentioned and presenting it in a completely impartial spirit to the reader.

In Stockholm there dwells a comfortable means and independent of the more he has, as he himself tells us in the closest contact with spirits is obtaining information from them in giving them information about volumes devoted to his discovery in order to supervise their publication in deluding and charlatanry. The arch-spirit-seer of all spirit-visionaries, whether one relies on his own acquaintances or on his own writings, not deter those who are otherwise influenced from supposing that these fantasies. However, the credentials of the world consist in the proofs of furnishing by means of certain special secret knowledge, in dismissing Swedenberg with extraordinary power of the man, finds some credence with the man.

Towards the end of the year Schwedenberg appeared with the princess from a certain princess. He was to have made it almost impossible such a case. The occasion of the general circulation, concerning asking him a number of questions regarding more of his imaginations than to obtaining general success, in dismissing Swedenberg, which had a bearing on his confidence Schwedenberg appeared with the princess, on her own admission, declared the answer to be true, etc. have been imparted to him by any the report made by an ambassador the time, and sent to another for story coincides exactly with what concerning the matter.
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completely impartial spirit to the reader’s judgement, whether favourable or unfavourable.

In Stockholm there dwells a certain Schwedenberg, a gentleman of comfortable means and independent position. For the last twenty years or more he has, as he himself tells us, devoted himself exclusively to cultivating the closest contact with spirits and with the souls of the dead, to obtaining information from them about the other world, and, in exchange, to giving them information about this present world, to composing hefty volumes devoted to his discoveries, and periodically travelling to London in order to supervise their publication. He is not exactly reticent about his secrets, speaking freely with everyone about them; he seems to be completely convinced of the truth of his claims, giving no impression of deliberate fraud or charlatanry. If one is to believe the man himself, he is the arch-spirit-seer of all spirit-seers, just as he is the arch-visionary of all visionaries, whether one relies on the descriptions furnished by his acquaintances or on his own writings. Nonetheless, this circumstance cannot deter those who are otherwise favourably disposed towards spirit-influences from supposing that there is still something true behind such fantasies. However, the credentials of all plenipotentiaries from the other world consist in the proofs of their extraordinary calling, which they furnish by means of certain specimens in the present world. That being the case, I must, selecting from what is circulated as an attestation of the extraordinary power of the man in question, at least mention that which finds some credence with the majority of people.

Towards the end of the year 1761, Schwedenberg received a summons from a certain princess. Her great understanding and insight ought to have made it almost impossible that she should have been deceived in such a case. The occasion of the summons was the rumour, which was in general circulation, concerning the alleged visions of this man. After asking him a number of questions, more with a view to mocking his imaginings than to obtaining genuine news of the other world, the princess, in dismissing Schwedenberg, entrusted him with a secret mission, which had a bearing on his community with spirits. Some days later Schwedenberg appeared with the answer, which was such as to fill the princess, on her own admission, with the greatest astonishment, for she declared the answer to be true, even though it was not one which could have been imparted to him by any living person. This story is taken from the report made by an ambassador to the court there, who was present at the time, and sent to another foreign ambassador in Copenhagen. The story coincides exactly with what a special enquiry was able to establish concerning the matter.

\[1\] *der in seine Geistergemeinschaft einschlug.*

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The following stories have no other guarantee than that of common hearsay; the proof provided by such a source is very dubious. Madame Marteville, the widow of a Dutch envoy to the Swedish court, received instructions from the relatives of a goldsmith demanding that she settle an outstanding account relating to a silver tea-service which had been made for her. The lady, who was familiar with her late husband’s punctiliousness in financial matters, was convinced that the debt must already have been settled during his life-time; but she found no proof of such a settlement among his posthumous papers. Women are particularly prone to lend credence to stories of prophecy, interpretations of dreams, and all kinds of other wondrous things. She accordingly revealed her affair to Schwedenberg, with the request that—assuming that what was said of him was true and that he was in contact with the spirits of the dead—he obtain information from her late husband in the other world concerning the circumstances surrounding the above-mentioned request for payment. Schwedenberg promised to do so. A few days later, he visited the lady’s home again, informing her that he had obtained the information she wanted; he informed her that the missing receipts were to be found in a secret compartment in a cabinet, which he pointed out to her and which she thought had been completely emptied. On the basis of this description, a search was instantly undertaken, and, in addition to finding her late husband’s secret Dutch correspondence, they also discovered the missing receipts. In this way, all the claims which had been raised against her were rendered completely void.

The third story is such that it must be possible to furnish a complete proof of its truth or falsity. It was, if I am rightly informed, towards the end of the year 1759, when Schwedenberg, returning from England, disembarked one afternoon at Gothenburg. That same evening he joined a company of people at the invitation of a local merchant. After he had spent some while there, he reported to the company, with every sign of consternation, that at that very moment a dreadful conflagration was raging in Stockholm in the Südernälm. After a few hours had passed, in the course of which he periodically withdrew to be on his own, he informed the assembled company that the fire had been brought under control, at the same time describing the extent to which the fire had spread. That very evening, this wondrous news was noised abroad and by the next morning it had spread to every part of the town. But it was only after the lapse of two days that the report of the fire eventually reached Gothenburg from Stockholm—a report which coincided completely, it was said, with Schwedenberg’s visions.

The reader will probably ask what on earth could have induced me to engage in such a despicable business as that of spreading fairy-tales abroad, which every rational being would hesitate to listen to with patience—and, indeed, not merely disseminating them but actually making them the subject of philosophy, with which we have story from the cloud-cuckoo-land, proper about having them made? And, anyway, why should it be misled by credulous trust in the to be deceived by an incautious

The frontiers between folly and that one can scarcely proceed for ally making a little sally into the sometimes allows itself, notwithstanding, to be persuaded into making which are solemnly made with seem to be a remnant of the ancient no longer really appearances therefore often turns into folly, regarded as a natural legacy of story with which I have concern to analyze that dubious mixture of amounts to establish the proportion in which I have concern to that the criticism should observe itself protected from mockery by the fact what you would wish to call it, I in a numerous company. And that, some feasibility against the accusation the case and will, I suppose, considerable absides have found acceptance in no other reason than that the Among such absides are to be water-divining, premonitions, promaent women, the influence exercise animals and plants. Was it not, indeed, thoroughly avenged themselves on the latter tended to treat them for hearsay children and women even intelligent men to take a commons the fact that any sensible person any African predators prowling any example of the human understanding
ing them the subject of philosophical investigations. However, since the philosophy, with which we have prefaced the work, was no less a fairy-story from the cloud-cuckoo-land of metaphysics, I can see nothing improper about having them make their appearance on the stage together. And, anyway, why should it be more respectable to allow oneself to be misled by credulous trust in the sophistries of reason than to allow oneself to be deceived by an incautious belief in delusory stories?

The frontiers between folly and understanding are so poorly marked that one can scarcely proceed for long in the one region without occasionally making a little sally into the other. As for the ingenuousness which sometimes allows itself, notwithstanding the opposition of the understanding, to be persuaded into making some concessions to many assertions which are solemnly made with self-assurance, such ingenuousness seems to be a remnant of the ancient ancestral loyalty, which is, it must be conceded, no longer really appropriate to our present state, and which therefore often turns into folly. But for that very reason, it is not to be regarded as a natural legacy of stupidity. Hence, in the case of the strange story with which I have concerned myself, I leave it to the reader to analyze that dubious mixture of reason and credulity into its elements, and to establish the proportion in which the two ingredients are present in my own mode of thought. For in the case of such a criticism, all that matters is that the criticism should observe the proprieties. I am thus sufficiently protected from mockery by the fact that, in committing this folly, if that is what you would wish to call it, I nonetheless find myself in a learned and numerous company. And that, so Fontenelle thought, is already a sufficient guarantee against the accusation of imprudence. For it has always been the case and will, I suppose, continue to be so in the future, that certain absurdities have found acceptance even among rational people, and that for no other reason than that they are the object of general discussion. Among such absurdities are to be found, to name but a few, faith-healing, water-divining, premonitions, the operation of the imagination of pregnant women, the influence exercised by the phases of the moon on animals and plants. Was it not, indeed, recently that common country folk thoroughly avenged themselves on the learned for the mockery with which the latter tended to treat them for their credulity? For by a great deal of hearsay children and women eventually induced a substantial number of intelligent men to take a common wolf for a hyaena, and that in spite of the fact that any sensible person could see that there are not likely to be any African predators prowling around the forests of France. The infirmity of the human understanding combined with man's curiosity is respon-

1 ein Märchen... aus dem Schlafenlande der Metaphysik. 1 Scheingründe der Vernunft.
2 ein Rest der alten Stammehrlichkeit. 1 ein natürliches Erbsstück der Dummheit.
3 Anständigkeit. * Sympathie.

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sible for his initially snatching up truth and delusion indiscriminately. But gradually he refines his concepts; a few of them survive the process, and the rest are thrown away as rubbish.

If there is anyone to whom these tales about spirits should appear to be a matter of importance, that person can always - assuming, that is, that he has the money to do so and nothing better to do - venture on a journey of enquiry, to investigate these stories more closely, just as Artemidorus 2 travelled around Asia Minor, benefiting oneiromancy in the process. Furthermore, posterity, with a similar turn of thought, will be full of gratitude to him for having prevented the eventual emergence of a second Philostratus, who, after the lapse of many years, would have turned our Schwedenberg into a new Apollonius of Tyana, when after such a lapse of time, hearsay would have ripened into formal proof, and the interrogation of eyewitnesses - a troublesome business, which is, however, extremely necessary - would then have become an impossibility.

SECOND CHAPTER: ECSTATIC JOURNEY OF AN ENTHUSIAST 9 THROUGH THE SPIRIT-WORLD

Somnia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas,
Nocturnos lemures, portentque Thessala - Horace 55

I cannot blame the cautious reader at all, if, in the course of this book, he has begun to feel reservations about the method which the author has thought proper to follow. For by placing the dogmatic part of the work before the historical part, and thus reasons before experience, I must have created the suspicion that I was proceeding in a cunning fashion. For, although I might perhaps already have had the story in my mind, I nonetheless proceeded as if I knew nothing apart from the pure, abstract observations, my purpose being to end by surprising the completely unsuspecting reader with a welcome confirmation derived from experience. And, indeed, this is a stratagem which philosophers have very successfully deployed on a number of occasions. For it is not to be forgotten, that all knowledge has two ends by which it can be caught; an a priori end, and one which is a posteriori. Various modern students of nature, it is true, have declared that one must start with the a posteriori end; they think that the eel of science can be caught by the tail, their view being that, if enough empirical cognitions are acquired, they can then gradually ascend to higher general concepts. Whether or not this is a prudent procedure, it is far from being sufficiently learned or philosophical, for this manner of proceeding soon leads to a Why? to which no answer can be given. And this is about as creditable to a person, who, when requested by a client, requested the creditor to call again. For difficulty, men of penetrating understanding, namely, from the approach involves a new difficulty; and, I know not where; the approach involves a new difficulty. Indeed, it would be a matter of importance, if one could travel around Asia Minor and benefit oneiromancy, and then proceed to call this second Philostratus, who, after the lapse of many years, would have turned our Schwedenberg into a new Apollonius of Tyana, when after such a lapse of time, hearsay would have ripened into formal proof, and the interrogation of eyewitnesses - a troublesome business, which is, however, extremely necessary - would then have become an impossibility.

1 der Fortgang der Gründe nicht auf die Erzählung / (Erzählung: not in the sense of report).
2 in: Übersichtlich / C: all: infinitiv / Co & L: infinitive; I: infinity / S & V: infinitive; all suppose that Übersichtlich is a slip of the pen.
3 a playful tone of this work makes it quite possible that the reader with Übersichtlich in a context where in the geraden Linie der Schlaufe / · dadurch dass sie nach dem Ziele gewisser Eintritt / · ob er wohl unvermerkt durch ausgestochene Schlitze / · sinusreichen Lehrart.
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dreams is about as creditable to a philosopher as it would be to a merchant who, when requested by a client to settle a bill of exchange, politely requested the creditor to call again some other time. Thus, to avoid this difficulty, men of penetrating understanding have started from the opposite extremity, namely, from the pinnacle of metaphysics. But this approach involves a new difficulty: one starts, I know not whence, and arrives, I know not where; the advance of the arguments refuses to correspond to experience. Indeed, it looks as if the atoms of Epicurus, having spent an eternity in a state of continuous fall, are more likely to form a world as a result of their accidental collision with each other than the most general and most abstract concepts are to explain it. The philosopher, therefore, clearly recognised that his rational arguments, on the one hand, and experience or factual description, on the other hand, would probably, like two parallel lines, continue to run side by side to the unthinkable, without ever meeting. Our philosopher thus reached an agreement with his fellow philosophers, as if they had come to a formal understanding with each other on the matter. Their agreement was this: each would adopt his own starting point in his own fashion; after that, rather than follow the straight line of reasoning, they would rather impart to their arguments an imperceptible clinamen by stealthily squinting at the target of certain experiences or testimonies; they would thus steer reason in such a fashion that it would be bound to arrive at precisely that point which would surprise the unsuspecting student; they would prove, namely, what they all along knew was going to be proved. Our philosophers then proceeded to call this path the a priori path, even though that path had already been covertly laid down by means of markers planted in the direction of the a posteriori point. The adept who knew what was going on, would naturally be obliged not to betray his master. Adopting this ingenious method, various men of merit have even suddenly come upon mysteries of religion on the bare path of reason. Their procedure is exactly like that of the romantic author: he makes his heroine flee to distant countries so that, by means of an happy adventure, she may acci-

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Footnotes:
1. der Fortgang der Gründe nicht auf die Erfahrung treffen will. * Vernunftgründe.
2. Ins Unendliche / C: all'infinito / Co & L: indéfiniment / G: into infinity / M: right into the realm of the unthinkable / S & V: indefinitamente / (C, Co, L, G, V, & S, following Hartenstein, all suppose that Unendliche is a slip of the pen for Unendlichkeit; the mocking, sarcastic, and playful tone of this work makes it quite possible that Kant actually intended to surprise the reader with Unendlichkeit in a context where Unendlichkeit would have been expected).
3. ins Unendliche / C: all'infinito / Co & L: indéfiniment / G: into infinity / M: right into the realm of the unthinkable / S & V: indefinitamente / (C, Co, L, G, V, & S, following Hartenstein, all suppose that Unendliche is a slip of the pen for Unendlichkeit; the mocking, sarcastic, and playful tone of this work makes it quite possible that Kant actually intended to surprise the reader with Unendlichkeit in a context where Unendlichkeit would have been expected).
4. in der geraden Linie der Schlussfolge. * mit einem unmerklichen Clinamen der Beweisgründe.
5. dadurch dass sie nach dem Ziele gewisser Erfahrungen oder Zeugnisse verstohlen hinschielten.
6. ob er wohl unvermerkt durch ausgesteckte Stäbe nach dem Punkte a posteriori gezogen war.
7. sinnreichen Lehrlaut.

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dentally meet her admirer: *et fugit ad salices et se cupit ante videri* (Virgil). With such illustrious predecessors, therefore, I should not have had any reason to be ashamed if I had also employed the same stratagems to help my enquiry on its way to the desired conclusion. But I would earnestly implore the reader not to believe any such thing of me. And, anyway, of what use would this method be to me now, since it is impossible for me to deceive anyone now that I have let the secret out of the bag? Not only that, but I find myself in the following unfortunate predicament: the testimony, upon which I have stumbled, and which bears such an uncommon likeness to the philosophical figment of my imagination, looks so desperately deformed and foolish, that I must suppose that the reader will be much more likely to regard my arguments as preposterous because of their affinity with such testimonies than he will be to regard these testimonies as reasonable because of my arguments. I accordingly declare, without beating about the bush, that, as far as such seductive comparisons are concerned, I have no sense of humour. I declare, without further ado, either that one must suppose that there is more cleverness and truth in Schwedenberg’s writings than first appearances would suggest, or that, if there is any agreement between him and my system, it is a matter of pure chance. It would be as it sometimes is with frenzied poets when, so it is believed or so at least they claim, they predict the future: their prophecies now and again correspond to what actually happens.

I now arrive at the purpose of this work, namely, the writings of my hero. If many writers, who are now forgotten or whose name will one day fall into oblivion, have the substantial merit of not having been miserly in the expenditure of their understanding in the composition of their hefty works, then Schwedenberg doubtless deserves the greatest honour of all. For certainly, his flask in the lunar world is full to the brim; it is surpassed by none of the moon-flasks which Aristotel saw there and which were filled with the reason which was lacking down here, and which their possessors would one day have to seek out again. For Schwedenberg’s lengthy work is completely empty and contains not a single drop of reason. Nonetheless, there prevails in that work such a wondrous harmony with what the most subtle ruminations of reason can produce on a like topic, that the reader will pardon me if I should find here the same curious phenomenon in the play of the imagination which so many other collectors have found in the play of nature. I am thinking, for example, of the way in which they discover the Holy Family in the irregular patterns of marble, or monks, baptismal fonts and organs in stalactites and stalagmites, or even the discovery by the mocking Lison on a frozen window-pane of the triple crown and the number of the beast—none of them things which anyone already filled with them before.

The great work of our Author is full of nonsense. He presents it to the title *Arcana coelestia*. In it his vision of the meaning of the first two books of Revelation is applied to the whole of the Spiritual Treatises are of any concern to me. All accounts of them are to be found in the *Theologische Bibliothek*. It is only when his own eyes are supposed to have seen them, which we are chiefly concerned with, that the chapters of his book started the adventure on which we are to embark. As for the empty-headed sophists who mistake the delusion of the senses in general for the deception of reason, they are perversely ruminative reason may prefer. It would be as reasonable because of my arguments! I accordingly declare, without further ado, that, as far as such seductive comparisons are concerned, I have no sense of humour. I declare, without further ado, either that one must suppose that there is more cleverness and truth in Schwedenberg’s writings than first appearances would suggest, or that, if there is any agreement between him and my system, it is a matter of pure chance. It would be as it sometimes is with frenzied poets when, so it is believed or so at least they claim, they predict the future: their prophecies now and again correspond to what actually happens.

I now arrive at the purpose of this work, namely, the writings of my hero. If many writers, who are now forgotten or whose name will one day fall into oblivion, have the substantial merit of not having been miserly in the expenditure of their understanding in the composition of their hefty works, then Schwedenberg doubtless deserves the greatest honour of all. For certainly, his flask in the lunar world is full to the brim; it is surpassed by none of the moon-flasks which Aristotel saw there and which were filled with the reason which was lacking down here, and which their possessors would one day have to seek out again. For Schwedenberg’s lengthy work is completely empty and contains not a single drop of reason. Nonetheless, there prevails in that work such a wondrous harmony with what the most subtle ruminations of reason can produce on a like topic, that the reader will pardon me if I should find here the same curious phenomenon in the play of the imagination which so many other collectors have found in the play of nature. I am thinking, for example, of the way in which they discover the Holy Family in the irregular patterns of marble, or monks, baptismal fonts and organs in stalactites and stalagmites, or even the discovery by the mocking Lison on a frozen window-pane of the triple crown and the number of the beast—none of them things which anyone already filled with them before.

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none of them things which anyone else would see unless their heads were already filled with them beforehand.

The great work of our Author consists of eight quarto volumes stuffed full of nonsense. He presents it to the world as a new revelation under the title *Arcana coelestia*. In it his visions are employed to discover the secret meaning of the first two books of Moses; and a similar method of exegesis is applied to the whole of the Scriptures. None of these visionary interpretations are of any concern to me here. For those interested, however, accounts of them are to be found in the first volume of Dr Ernesti's *Theologische Bibliothek*. It is only the *audita et visa*, in other words, only what his own eyes are supposed to have seen and his own ears to have heard, which we are chiefly concerned to extract from the appendices attached to the chapters of his book. For it is these which constitute the foundation of all the other daydreams, and which have also pretty well started the adventure on which we have embarked above in the airship of metaphysics. The style of the author is dull. The stories he tells and the arrangement they receive seem, in truth, to have arisen from fanatical intuition. There is little reason to suspect that the speculative fantasies of a perversely ruminative reason may have induced him to invent these stories or to use them for purposes of deception. To that extent, therefore, they have some importance and really do deserve to be presented in a small anthology, and possibly more so than many of the playthings invented by the empty-headed sophists who swell our journals, for the systematic delusion of the senses in general is a much more remarkable phenomenon than the deception of reason; the causes of which are well enough known. The deception of reason could to a large extent be prevented by subjecting the powers of the mind to control by the will, and by exercising rather more restraint over an idle inquisitiveness. The deception of the senses, on the other hand, concerns the ultimate foundation of all our judgments, and if that foundation were defective, there is little that the rules of logic could do to remedy the situation! In the case of the author we are discussing, I accordingly separate sensory delusion from the delusions of his reason. I shall ignore the misguided sophistries which result from his going beyond his visions, just as, in other connections, one often has to separate a philosopher's observations from his sophistries. Even illusory experiences are generally more instructive than the illusory arguments of reason. Thus, while depriving the reader of some of the moments which he would perhaps otherwise have devoted, with not much greater benefit,
to the reading of thorough books devoted to this subject, I have at the same
time taken account of the delicacy of his taste, for, by omitting many wild
chimaeras, I have distilled the quintessence of the book into a few drops.
And in doing this, I promise myself as much gratitude from the reader as a
certain patient thought he owed his physicians for only having made him
eat the bark of the quinquina, when they could have easily made him eat
the whole tree.

Schwedenberg divides his visions into three types. The first type in-
volved being liberated from the body. This state is an intermediate state
between sleeping and waking; in this state he saw, heard and, indeed, felt
spirits. This only happened to him three or four times. The second type of
vision involved being carried off by the spirit. In this state he was, let us
say, walking along a road without losing his way; at the same time, he was
in entirely different places in the spirit, clearly seeing dwelling places,
people, forests, and so forth, and doing so for a period of several hours,
until he suddenly became conscious of himself again in his real place.
This happened to him two or three times. The third type of vision is the
usual one and one which he experienced daily in a state of complete
wakefulness. It is from this type of vision that the stories he recounts are
chiefly taken.

According to Schwedenberg, everybody stands in an equally intimate
relation with the spirit-world, though they have no awareness of doing so.
The difference between himself and other people consists simply in the
fact that his inmost being was opened up, a gift of which he always speaks
with veneration (Datum mihi est ex divina Domini misericordia).\(^{64}\) It is clear
from the context that this gift is supposed to consist in becoming con-
scious of the obscure representations which the soul receives in virtue of
its constant connection with the spirit-world. Hence it is that he distin-
guishes between the outer and inner memory in man. A person has outer
memory as someone belonging to the visible world, whereas a person has
inner memory in virtue of the connection with the spirit-world. This is
also the foundation of the distinction between the outer and the inner
man. Schwedenberg's own superiority consists in the fact that, already in
this life, he sees himself as a person who belongs to the community of
spirits and that he is recognised by them as someone belonging to that
community. It is also in this inner memory that everything, which has
vanished from outer memory, is conserved, none of a person's representa-
tions ever getting lost. After death, the memory of everything which had
ever entered his soul and which had so far remained concealed from him,
goes to make up the complete book of his life.

The presence of spirits affects only a person's inner sense, it is true.
But this causes them to appear to him as existing outside himself, and,
indeed, as existing in human form.

\(^{*}\) Erscheinungen. \(^{*}\) dass sein Innerses aufgethan ist. \(^{*}\) dunkelen Vorstellungen.
indeed, as existing in human form. The spirit-language is an immediate
communication of ideas, but that language is at all times combined with
the appearance of the language which the person concerned normally
speaks, and it is represented as being external to him. One spirit reads the
representations which are to be found clearly contained in the memory of
another spirit. In this way, the spirits see in Schwedenberg the representa-
tions which he has of this world, and they do so with such clear intuition
that they are themselves deceived, frequently imagining that they are
seeing these things immediately, though, in fact, that is impossible, for no
pure spirit has the least sensation\textsuperscript{v} of the corporeal world. But neither can
they have any representation of the corporeal world simply in virtue of
their community with the souls of other living people, for the inmost being
of such people\textsuperscript{v} is not opened up; in other words, their inner sense
contains nothing but obscure representations. Hence, Schwedenberg is
the very oracle of the spirits, who are as curious to contemplate the
present state of the world in him, as he is to contemplate the wonders of
the spirit-world in their memory, as in a mirror. Although these spirits,
likewise, stand in the closest connection with all the other souls of living
people and act upon them or are themselves acted upon by them, they
nonetheless have as little knowledge of this as do human beings, for their
inner sense,\textsuperscript{t} which belongs to their spirit-personality, is completely ob-
scure.\textsuperscript{v} The spirits, therefore, suppose that the effect produced in them, as
a result of the influence of human souls, is something which is thought by
them alone, just as human beings, in this life, also suppose that all their
thoughts and all the operations of their willing\textsuperscript{w} arise only from within
themselves, even though, as a matter of fact, they are often transmitted to
them from the invisible world. Nonetheless, each human soul, already in
this life, has its place in the spirit-world, and belongs to a certain society
which is at all times consonant with the soul's inner state of truth and
goodness, that is to say, consonant with the inner state of its understand-
ing and will. However, the positions\textsuperscript{v} of the spirits, relative to each other,
have nothing in common with the space of the corporeal world. Hence, in
what concerns their spirit-positions,\textsuperscript{v} the soul of someone in India may
often be the closest neighbour of the soul of someone in Europe. On the
other hand, those who, from the corporeal point of view, live in the same
house, may, from the point of view of their spirit-relations referred to
above, exist at quite some distance from each other. If a person should
die, the soul of that person does not change its position; it becomes aware
of itself\textsuperscript{v} as occupying the position it already occupied relative to other
spirits in this life. Furthermore, although the relation of spirits to each
other does not constitute a true space, nonetheless, that relation does
\textsuperscript{v} mindeste Empfindung. \textsuperscript{t} ihr Inneres. \textsuperscript{u} innerer Sinn. \textsuperscript{w} ganz dunkel.
\textsuperscript{v} Willensregungen. \textsuperscript{v} Stellen. \textsuperscript{v} geistige Lagen. \textsuperscript{v} empfindet sich.
present the appearance of true space to them. Their connections with
each other are represented under the concomitant condition of nearness;
while their differences are represented as distances, just as the spirits
themselves are not really extended, though they do present the appear-
ances of human forms to each other. In this imagined space there is to be
found a thoroughly going community of spirit-natures. Schwedenberg con-
verses with the souls of the departed whenever he pleases, and he reads in
their memory (in their faculty of representation) the state in which they
contemplate themselves, seeing it as clearly as if he were looking at it with
bodily eyes. Furthermore, the enormous distance between the rational
inhabitants of the world is to be regarded, from the point of view of the
spirit-universe, as nothing: it is as easy for him to converse with an
inhabitant of the planet Saturn, as it is with the soul of a human being who
has died. Everything depends on the relation of their inner state and on
the connection which they have with each other, according to their agree-
ment in the true and the good. More distant spirits can, however, easily
enter into communion with each other through the mediation of other
spirits. For this reason, too, a human being does not need to have actually
lived on the other heavenly bodies to be able one day to know them with
all their wonders. His soul reads in the memory of other citizens of the
universe after they have died the representations which they have of their
life and their dwelling place, and he sees the objects contained therein as
clearly as if he saw them by means of an immediate intuition.

A central concept in Schwedenberg's fantasies is this: corporeal beings
have no substance of their own; they only exist in virtue of the spirit-
world, though each body subsists not in virtue of one spirit alone but in
virtue of all spirits together. For this reason, cognition of material things
has a double significance: it has an external sense which consists in the
relation of matter to itself; and it has an internal sense, in so far as material
things, construed as effects, designate the forces of the spirit-world,
which are the causes of those material things. Thus the human body
involves the parts being related to each other in accordance with the laws
which govern matter. But in so far as the human body is maintained by the
spirit which dwells within it, its various members and their functions have
a value which is indicative of the powers of the soul; and it is in virtue of
the operation of these powers that the various members come to acquire
their form, activity and permanency. This inner sense is unknown to man,
and it is this inner sense which Schwedenberg, whose inmost being was

opened up, wished to make known to other things in the visible world
when they are construed: it has an importance; they have another
significance when they are construed as symbols, and that significance is of
the new interpretations which the inner sense, namely, the
symbolische Beziehung, the kernel of their value,
and the actual sensation of such objects from this that Schwedenberg is
of this world that it subsists in regard it simply as a coherent
holding in the spirit-world.) His
environment regions, the dwelling-spaces, which he saw with his own eyes
that, having on many occasions had died, he almost always found
could scarcely be persuaded they
were surrounded by a world similar to this, or that he had not
thought of the new interpretations which
was stated that the region in the spirit-world. He
had found that the region in
the actual sensation of such objects
from this that Schwedenberg is
of this world that it subsists in
and not in virtue of one spirit alone but in virtue of all spirits
spiritual beings.

I have already indicated that

4 Apparenz desselben. 1 unter der begleitenden Bedingung der Näheheit. 1 als Weiten.
2 die Apparenz. 2 (Vorstellungs Kraft). 2 in Gemeinschaft kommen.
3 durch ein unmittelbares Anschaun.
4 Daher hat die Erkenntnis der materiellen Dinge zweierlei Bedeutung: einen äusserlichen Sinn in
Verhältniss der Materie aufeinander und einen inneren, in so fern sie als Wirkungen die Kräfte der
Geisterwelt bezeichnen, die ihre Ursachen sind.

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opened up, wished to make known to man. The same thing holds of all the other things in the visible world; they have, as we have said, one significance when they are construed as things, and that significance is of minor importance; they have another significance when they are construed as signs, and that significance is of greater importance. This is also the origin of the new interpretations which he has wished to make of the Scriptures. For the inner sense, namely, the symbolic reference of all the things recounted in the Scriptures to the spirit-world is, as he enthusiastically fancies, the kernel of their value, the rest being but the husk. But, then again, the important thing in this symbolic connection of corporeal things, as images, with the inner spirit-state, is the fact that all spirits at all times present themselves to each other under the semblance of extended forms, and the influences which these spirit-beings exercise upon each other, also arouse within them the appearance of yet other extended beings, and, as it were, the appearance of a material world, the images of which are, indeed, merely symbols of their inner state. Nonetheless, they produce a deception of the senses of such clarity and permanency as to equal the actual sensation of such objects. (A future interpreter will conclude from this that Schwedenberg is an idealist, since he denies of the matter of this world that it subsists in its own right, and may, for that reason, regard it simply as a coherent appearance arising from the connections holding in the spirit-world.) He speaks, therefore, of the gardens, the extensive regions, the dwelling-places, the galleries and arcades of the spirits, which he saw with his own eyes in the brightest light. He assures us that, having on many occasions spoken with all his friends after they had died, he almost always found that those who had died only recently could scarcely be persuaded that they had died, for they saw themselves surrounded by a world similar to the one in which they had lived. Moreover, he assures us that societies of spirits sharing one and the same inner state found that the region in which they were living and the things contained therein also presented to them one and the same appearance. An alteration in their state, however, was connected with the appearance of an alteration of place. Now, whenever spirits communicate their thoughts to human souls, those thoughts are always connected with the appearance of material things; they only present themselves to the person receiving them in virtue, ultimately, of their relation to the spirit-sense, albeit with every appearance of reality. It is this which explains the origin of that supply of wild and inexpressibly ridiculous forms, which our enthusiast thinks he sees in all clarity in his daily dealings with the spirits.

I have already indicated that, according to our author, the various
different powers and properties of the soul stand in sympathy with the organs of the body, over which they exercise control. The whole of the outer person corresponds, therefore, to the whole of the inner person. Thus, if a noticeable spirit-influence, emanating from the invisible world, should particularly affect one or other of that person’s powers of the soul, the person concerned will be harmoniously aware of the apparent presence of that influence in the members of his outer person, which correspond to the powers of the soul. He now refers a great variety of bodily sensations to that source, those sensations being at all times linked with the spirit-contemplation. The absurdity of that contemplation is, however, too great for me to venture mentioning even a single one of them.

On this basis, it is possible, if one thinks it worth the effort, to form a concept of an imagination, than which none is more quixotic or bizarre, and in which all his daydreams are united. Just as various powers and abilities constitute that unity which is the soul or the inner person, so the different spirits (the chief characteristics of which are related to each other in the same way in which the various different capacities of a spirit are related to each other) constitute a society. This society of spirits presents the appearance of a Great Man. In this phantom, each spirit sees itself as located in the place and in those seeming organs which suit its own particular organisation within such a spirit-body. But all spirit-societies together, and the whole world of all these invisible beings in their turn, present themselves under the appearance of the Greatest Man. This enormous and gigantic fantasy—the product, perhaps, of a representation dating from earliest childhood, such as is employed, for example, in our schools, when an entire region of the world is presented to the children, by way of mnemonic, under the image of a seated maiden, and the like—this fantasy contains a thorough-going community of the most intimate kind between one spirit and all, and between all spirits and one. And no matter what the position of the living beings in this world relative to each other may be, or how they have an entirely different position in the Greatest Man, that position they never alter; it only appears to be a place situated in a measureless space, whereas in fact it is a specific mode of the relations in which they stand and of the influences which they exercise.

I am tired of reproducing the wild figments of the imagination of this worst of all enthusiasts, or of pursuing his fantasies further so as to include his descriptions of the state after death. I also have other reservations as well. For, although the naturalist displays in his show-cabinet, among those items of animal generation which he has collected and preserved in chemical preparations, monsters, he must, nonetheless, I think sensibly, avoid being too easily be pregnant women, on which little was noticed. And since my readers may include ideal conceptions, in the family were, for example, to take fright and warn them from the very start that the mooncalves, to which the result of this circumstance, will relate.

Incidentally, I have not surrendered myself by including any of my offering it to the reader who is not yet be that ready to satisfy their curiosity. Admittedly, I have omitted such wild figments of the imagination as sleep of a night. It is also true that I have not yet reached rather more familiar language to the subject. But this has not at all features of my outline. Notwithstanding these reservations, it is obvious to everyone, that the book, cannot serve as proofs of that which is not ready to satisfy the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing. Since the book cannot serve as proofs of that which is not ready to satisfy the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing. Since the book cannot serve as proofs of that which is not ready to satisfy the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing. Since the book cannot serve as proofs of that which is not ready to satisfy the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing. Since the book cannot serve as proofs of that which is not ready to satisfy the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing.

In examining this subject, I have only the enquiries and insistent demands imposed upon me. In putting my time. I have lost the confidence in Ansehung der idealen Empfindung, that of the best of the reader who is to be found in the last analysis, nothing.

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apparent.

Dahin bezieht er nun eine grosse Mannigfaltigkeit von Empfindungen an seinem Körper.
die Apparenz eines grossen Menschen.
in der Apparenz des grössten Menschen.
in der That aber eine bestimmte Art ihrer Verhältnisse und Einflüsse.
served in chemical preparations, not only natural formations, but also monsters, he must, nonetheless, be careful not to allow them to be seen by just anyone, or to be seen too clearly. For among the curious there may easily be pregnant women, on whom they could make a bad impression. And since my readers may include some who may likewise be in respect of ideal conception, I should very much regret it if they were, for example, to take fright at what they read. However, since I have warned them from the very start, I disclaim all responsibility, and I hope that the mooncalves, to which their fertile imagination may give birth as a result of this circumstance, will not be laid on my doorstep.

Incidentally, I have not surreptitiously added to the daydreams of our author by including any of my own. I have made a faithful selection, offering it to the reader who is careful of his comfort and his purse (he may not be that ready to satisfy his passing curiosity by sacrificing £7 sterling). Admittedly, I have omitted most of the immediate intuitions, for such wild figments of the imagination could only disturb the reader's sleep of a night. It is also true that I have, now and again, employed a rather more familiar language to clothe the confused sense of his revelations. But this has not at all detracted from the accuracy of the chief features of my outline. Notwithstanding, it would be futile to wish to conceal, since it is obvious to everybody, that the result of all this labour is, in the last analysis, nothing. Since the personal visions, alleged in this book, cannot serve as proofs of themselves, it follows that the only motive for dealing with them is to be found in the supposition that the author, in order to attest their truth, would, perhaps, appeal to occurrences of the kind mentioned above, such as could be confirmed by living witnesses. But no such instance is anywhere to be found. Thus it is that we withdraw from a foolish undertaking – and not without some abashment. We would merely add the following reasonable, albeit somewhat belated, remark: to think sensibly is generally an easy enough matter, but only, unfortunately, after one has allowed oneself to be deceived for a while.

In examining this subject, I have devoted myself to a thankless task, which the enquiries and insistent demands of inquisitive and idle friends have imposed upon me. In putting my efforts at the service of this frivolity I have not only deceived their expectations, I have also, at the same time, failed to contribute anything towards satisfying either the curious, by providing them with information, or the studious, by offering them reasons. If this was the only purpose of this effort, then I have been wasting my time. I have lost the confidence of the reader, for, by following a

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1. in Ansehung der idealen Empfindnis. 2. in anderen Umständen. 3. gangbare Sprache.
4. das Klugdenken.
5. dessen Erwartung / (dessen must be a slip of Kant's pen for the plural deren).

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tiresome detour, I have conducted him in his enquiry and in his thirst for knowledge to precisely the point of ignorance from which he set out in the first place. But, in fact, I did have a purpose in mind, and one which is, it seems to me, more important than the purpose I claimed to have. And in my opinion that purpose has been achieved. Metaphysics, with which, as fate would have it, I have fallen in love but from which I can boast of only a few favours, offers two kinds of advantage. The first is this: it can solve the problems thrown up by the enquiring mind, when it uses reason to spy after the more hidden properties of things. But hope is here all too often disappointed by the outcome. And, on this occasion, too, satisfaction has escaped our eager grasp.

Tres frustra comprensas manus effugiit imago
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.
Virgil

The second advantage of metaphysics is more consonant with the nature of the human understanding. It consists both in knowing whether the task has been determined by reference to what one can know, and in knowing what relation the question has to the empirical concepts, upon which all our judgements must at all times be based. To that extent metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason. A small country always has a long frontier; it is hence, in general, more important for it to be thoroughly acquainted with its possessions, and to secure its power over them, than blindly to launch on campaigns of conquest. Thus, the second advantage of metaphysics is at once the least known and the most important, although it is also an advantage which is only attained at a fairly late stage and after long experience. Although I have not precisely determined this limit, I have nonetheless indicated it sufficiently to enable the reader, once he has reflected on the matter further, to establish that he can spare himself the trouble of all futile research into questions, the answering of which demands data which are to be found in a world other than the one in which he exists as a conscious being. Thus, I have wasted my time in order to save it. I have deceived my reader in order to benefit him. And although I have not furnished him with any new insights, I have, nonetheless, eliminated the illusion and the vain knowledge which inflates the understanding and fills up the narrow space which could otherwise be occupied by the teachings of wisdom and of useful instruction.

The impatience of the reader, who has been tired without being instructed by my reflections so far, may be appeased by what Diogenes, it is said, promised to his yawning audience, when he came to the final page of a boring book: Courage, gentlemen, land is in sight! So far we have been wandering, like Democritus, in empty metaphysics have raised us, or when the stiuptic power of self-knowledge claims to have. When we find ourselves back on the human frontier, happy if we regard it as the place from which we may never also contains everything which ourselves to what is useful.

THIRD CHAPTER: DRAWN FROM THE

To pursue every curiosity and to apart from that of impotence — learning. But, from among the offer themselves, to choose that tance to man — such choice is then its course, it naturally arrives at dissatisfaction with itself: How many But reason, matured by experience, the mouth of Socrates, who, sour remarked: How many are the things very dissimilar aspirations eventually with they started out in very differently, and the other compositionally one must already have deed, impossible. But, eventually the limits imposed upon it by the less projects, however, which may thy, except that they lie outside vanities. It is then that even metaphor being at the moment, and which the companion of wisdom. For, as possible to attain to an understanding call in vain that such great aspirations which accompanies the assume the appearance of dutiful reflective contentment into the few.

Grenze der menschlichen Vernunft.

und da ein kleines Land jederzeit viel Grenze hat / (it is not at all clear why Kant specifies klein).

diese Grenze.

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wandering, like Democritus, in empty space, where the butterfly-wings of
metaphysics have raised us, conversing there with spirit-forms. Now, when the styptic power of self-knowledge has folded those silken wings, we find ourselves back on the humble ground of experience and common sense, happy if we regard it as the place to which we have been assigned: the place from which we may never depart with impunity, the place which also contains everything which can satisfy us, as long as we devote ourselves to what is useful.

THIRD CHAPTER: PRACTICAL CONCLUSION DRAWN FROM THE TREATISE AS A WHOLE

To pursue every curiosity and to allow no limits to the thirst for knowledge apart from that of impotence—such zealfulness does not ill-become learning. But, from among the innumerable tasks which spontaneously offer themselves, to choose that task, the solution of which is of importance to man—such choice is the merit of wisdom. When science has run its course, it naturally arrives at the point of modest mistrust and says, dissatisfied with itself: How many are the things which I do not understand? But reason, matured by experience into wisdom, serenely speaks through the mouth of Socrates, who, surrounded by the wares of a market-fair, remarked: How many are the things of which I have no need. In this way, two very dissimilar aspirations eventually flow together, even though to begin with they started out in very different directions, the one being vain and dissatisfied, the other composed and contented. For, in order to choose rationally one must already have knowledge of what is superfluous, indeed, impossible. But, eventually science arrives at the determination of the limits imposed upon it by the nature of human reason. All the fathomless projects, however, which may not in themselves, perhaps, be unworthy, except that they lie outside the sphere of man, fly to the limbo of vanity. It is then that even metaphysics becomes that which it is far from being at the moment, and which one would least expect it to be, namely, the companion of wisdom. For, as long as the opinion survives that it is possible to attain to an understanding of such remote things, wise simplicity will call in vain that such great aspirations are superfluous. The feeling of satisfaction which accompanies the extension of knowledge will very easily assume the appearance of dutifulness and convert that deliberate and reflective contentment into the foolish simplicity, which wishes to oppose

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4 die stiptische Kraft. 1 niedrigen.
5 einem jeden Vorwitz nachzuholen und der Erkenntnissucht keine andere Grenze zu verstatten als das Unvormige, ist ein Eifer, welcher der Gelehrsamkeit nicht ubel ansteht.
6 aber endlich gelangt die Wissenschaft zu der Bestimmung der . . . Grenzen (a certain ambiguity attaches to this sentence: it is not clear whether gelangt . . . zu der Bestimmung means 'arrives at the task of determining' or 'succeeds in determining').
the ennoblement of our nature. Questions concerning the spirit-nature, freedom, predestination, the future state, and such like, initially activate all the powers of the understanding; and those questions, in virtue of their elevated character, draw a person into a speculation which is eager to triumph; that eagerness is indiscriminate in its constructing of hypotheses and drawing of conclusions, in its teachings and refutations—always happens with specious understanding. But if this enquiry should turn into philosophy, and if this philosophy should subject its own procedure to judgement, and if it should have knowledge not only of the objects themselves but also of their relation to the human understanding, its frontiers will contract in size and its boundary-stones will be securely fixed. And those boundary-stones will never again permit enquiry to leave the realm which is its home, and cross the boundary to range abroad. We found that some philosophy was necessary if we were to know the difficulties surrounding a concept which is commonly treated as very ordinary and very easy to handle. Somewhat more philosophy removes this phantom of knowledge still further away, convincing us that it lies wholly beyond the horizon of man. For in the relations of cause and effect, substance and action, philosophy, to start with, serves to unravel the complex phenomena and reduce them to simpler representations. But if one eventually arrives at relations which are fundamental, then the business of philosophy is at an end. It is impossible for reason ever to understand how something can be a cause, or have a force; such relations can only be derived from experience. For our rule of reason only governs the drawing of comparisons in respect of identity and contradiction. If something is a cause, then something is posited by something else; there is not, however, any connection between the two things here which is based on agreement. Similarly, if I refuse to regard that same something as a cause, no contradiction will ever arise, for there is no contradiction in supposing that, if something is posited, something else is cancelled. It follows from this that if the fundamental concepts of things as causes, of powers and of actions are not derived from experience, then they are wholly arbitrary, and they admit of neither proof nor refutation. I know, of course, that thinking and willing move my body, but I can never reduce this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to another phenomenon by means of analysis; hence, I can recognise the phenomenon but I cannot understand it. That my will moves my arm is no more intelligible to me than someone's claiming that my will could halt the moon in its orbit. The only difference between the two cases is this: I experience the former, whereas the latter. I am acquainted with the arm within a living subject; in other words, with my power of will, and so for this different in kind from everything else is cancelled. In the concept of body, I naturally think of being. Whether this incorporates independently of the body can a nature of that being, which is kind with beings of my own kind through can in no wise establish from what am not also connected, or could it could in accordance with other laws, which independently of the mediation concerning the way in which my spirit it is now or may in the future be never be more than fiction from having even the value of the things which are called hypotheses. In the invention of fundamental forces, one already knows through experience the phenomena; their possibility requires proof. By contrast, in the former of new fundamental relations of ever to have the least concept of before inventing these relations in what you will. The fact that variation of intelligible by means of establishes nothing in favour of these is of anything, if one is entitled to feels inclined. We must therefore, constructed in a future world, by means of forces within our thinking self, was thus that later observations, af- fected us to the force of att. of this force one will never be able seems to be a fundamental force property beforehand, without having disposal, he would have justly des. made the object of mockery. Nor reason do not, in such a case, have
experience the former, whereas my senses have never encountered the
latter. I am acquainted with the alterations which take place within me as
within a living subject; in other words, I am acquainted with my thoughts,
with my power of will, and so forth. And since these determinations are
different in kind from everything which, taken together, constitutes my
concept of body, I naturally think of myself as an incorporeal and perma­
nent being. Whether this incorporeal and permanent being will also think
independently of the body can never be established by appealing to the
nature of that being, which is known from experience. I am connected
with beings of my own kind through the mediation of corporeal laws, but I
can in no wise establish from what is given to me whether, in addition, I
am not also connected, or could not ever be connected, with such beings,
in accordance with other laws, which I shall call pneumatic laws, and be so
independently of the mediation of matter. All judgements, such as those
concerning the way in which my soul moves my body, or the way in which
it is now or may in the future be related to other beings like itself, can
ever be anything more than fictions* - fictions which are, indeed, far
from having even the value of those which feature in natural science and
which are called hypotheses. In the case of such hypotheses one does not
invent fundamental forces, one rather connects the forces, which one
already knows through experience, in a manner which is appropriate to
the phenomena; their possibility must, therefore, at all times be capable of
proof. By contrast, in the former case, one actually assumes the existence
of new fundamental relations of cause and effect, where it is impossible
ever to have the least concept of their possibility, and where one is there­
fore inventing these relations in a creative or chimaeric fashion, call it
what you will. The fact that various true or alleged phenomena are ren­
dered intelligible by means of such assumed fundamental ideas estab­
lishes nothing in favour of these ideas. For it is easy to specify the ground
of anything, if one is entitled to invent activities and causal laws as one
feels inclined. We must therefore wait until we may, perhaps, be in­
structed in a future world, by means of new experiences and new concepts
of forces within our thinking self, which are as yet concealed from us. It
was thus that later observations, after they had been analysed by mathemat­
ics, revealed to us the force of attraction in matter. And of the possibility
of this force one will never be able to form a more complete concept (for it
seems to be a fundamental force). If anyone had wished to invent such a
property beforehand, without having any proof from experience at his
disposal, he would have justly deserved to have been treated as a fool and
made the object of mockery. Now, since the considerations adduced by
reason do not, in such a case, have the least force either to invent or to

* Erdichtungen. 1 Grundkräfte. 7 schöpferisch oder chimärisch.
confirm such a possibility or impossibility, it follows that all one can do is
to concede to experience the right to decide the issue. In exactly the same
way, I leave it to time, which brings experience, to establish something
definite concerning the much lauded curative powers of the magnet in
dental maladies. And that confirmation will be furnished if we are able to
show that there are as many observations of magnetic rods exercising an
influence on flesh and bone as there are of their exercising an influence
on iron and steel. If, however, certain alleged experiences cannot be
brought under any law of sensation, which is unanimously accepted by the
majority of people,* and if, therefore, these alleged experiences establish
no more than an irregularity in the testimony of the senses (as is, in fact,
the case with the ghost-stories which circulate), it is advisable to break off
the enquiry without further ado, and that for the following reason. The
lack of agreement and uniformity in this case deprives our historical
knowledge of all power to prove anything, and renders it incapable of
serving as a foundation to any law of experience, concerning which the
understanding could judge.

Just as, on the one hand, a somewhat deeper enquiry serves to teach us
that the convincing and philosophical insight in the case under discussion
is impossible, so, on the other hand, one will have to admit, if one considers
the matter quietly and impartially, that it is superfluous and unnecessary.
Science in its vanity, readily excuses its activity on the grounds of its
importance. And here too the claim is likewise commonly made that a
rational understanding of the spirit-nature of the soul is very necessary to
the conviction that there is life after death, and that this conviction, in its
turn, is necessary if one is to have a motive for leading a virtuous life. But
idle curiosity adds that the genuineness of the apparitions of the souls of
the dead can furnish a proof of all this from experience. But true wisdom
is the companion of simplicity, and since, in the case of the latter, the
heart commands the understanding, it normally makes the elaborate appa-
ratus of learning* superfluous, its purpose needing only the means which
lie within the reach of everyone. What, is it only good to be virtuous
because there is another world? Or is it not rather the case that actions will
one day be rewarded because they are good and virtuous in themselves?
Does not the heart of man contain within itself immediate moral prescrip-
tions? Is it really necessary, in order to induce man to act in accordance
with his destiny here on earth, to set the machinery moving in another

世界? Can that person really be virtuous, who would readily abandon
not for the deterrence of future punishment, to say that, although he fears to
his soul a vicious character, that present the appearance of virtue, experi-
ence teaches that there are as many observations of magnetic rods exercising an
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1 durch die Maschinen an eine andere Welt.  
2 der tugendähnlichen Handlungen / C & S: la virtu.  
3 Die Eitelkeit der Wissenschaft.  
4 den reinigen der Sitten.  
5 la apparenza della virtù.  
6 der moralische Schein.  
* * * * * * * * * * 

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world? Can that person really be called honest, can he really be called virtuous, who would readily abandon himself to his favourite vices, were it not for the deterrence of future punishment? Would one not rather have to say that, although he fears to practise wickedness, he nourishes within his soul a vicious character, that he loves the advantage of actions which present the appearance of virtue, while hating virtue itself? And, indeed, experience teaches that there are many people who, instructed and convinced of the existence of a future world, nonetheless abandon themselves to vice and baseness, thinking only of the means by which they can cunningly evade the future consequences which threaten them. But there has never existed, I suppose, an upright soul which was capable of supporting the thought that with death everything was at an end, and whose noble disposition has not aspired to the hope that there would be a future. For this reason, it seems more consonant with human nature and moral purity to base the expectation of a future world on the sentiments of a nobly constituted soul than, conversely, to base its noble conduct on the hope of another world. Such is also the character of the moral faith; its simplicity is able to dispense with many of the subtleties of sophistry; it alone and uniquely is fitting to man in whatever situation he finds himself, for it leads him directly to his true purposes. Let us, therefore, leave all these clamourous theories about such remote objects to the speculation and care of idle minds. These theories are, indeed, a matter of indifference to us. And although the fleeting illusion of reasons for or against may perhaps win the applause of the schools, it will scarcely decide anything relating to the future fate of people of honest character. Nor has human reason been endowed with the wings which would enable it to fly so high as to cleave the clouds which veil from our eyes the mysteries of the other world. And to those who are eager for knowledge of such things and who attempt to inform themselves with such importunity about mysteries of this kind, one can give this simple but very natural advice: that it would probably be best if they had the good grace to wait with patience until they arrived there. But since our fate in that future world will probably very much depend on how we have comported ourselves at our posts in this world, I will conclude with the advice which Voltaire gave to his honest Candide after so many futile scholastic disputes: Let us attend to our happiness, and go into the garden and work!1

1 durchaus die Maschinen an eine andere Welt ansetzen.
2 der tugendähnlichen Handlungen / C & S: azioni conformi a virtù / Co: actions qui ressemblent à la vertu / G: actions similar to virtue / L: actions d’apparence vertueuse / V: azioni che hanno l’apparenza della virtù.
3 der Reinigkeit der Sitten. 1 der moralische Glaube. 1 alle lärmende Lehrverfassungen.
4 der augenblickliche Schein.