For many, Gilles Deleuze’s last message, *What is Philosophy?*, written together with Felix Guattari, came as a surprise, even as something of a disappointment. Indeed, in *What is Philosophy?* we face a strong differentiation between the creations which are proper to philosophy, to science, and to art. I will leave art aside and concentrate on the differentiation between philosophy as a creation of concepts, and science as dealing with functions. More precisely, I will try to approach the striking affirmation that concepts and functions may well intersect, but only after each has achieved its own specific self-fulfilment. “It is in their full maturity, and not in the process of their constitution, that concepts and functions necessarily intersect, each being created by their own specific means.”

This affirmation, proposed without any explanation, has caused many to wonder or even to feel betrayed. Deleuze and Guattari were associated with the affirmation of productive connexions, the creation of deterritorializing processes escaping fixed identities, transgressing boundaries and static classifications, destroying the power of exclusive disjunction, that is the either/or alternatives, such as, for instance, doing either science or philosophy. Many would have anticipated a joyful celebration of a free experimental interplay between scientific references and philosophical ones. Some would have taken for granted that the open character of the process of the constitution of scientific enunciations would have been emphasized, as well as its undetermined boundaries with politics, economics, cultural imperialism, and so on. Why did they choose to produce a seemingly “classical picture,” with a mature science facing a mature philosophy, as illustrated by “great philosophers”?

This question will be my starting point. But I will not stay within Deleuze and Guattari’s text but rather follow Deleuze’s own advice: we should be interested in tools for thinking, not in an exegesis of ideas. An idea is always engaged in what he called a matter, always a specific one. An idea needs to be so engaged in order for the how and the why this idea indeed matters, the kind of difference it makes, to come into processual existence, what Deleuze calls “actualization” or “effectuation.” This is all the more so when we deal with the enigma of a choice: the “why” of this choice should not lead back to the authors’ intentions; it is a question that puts the reader of *What is Philosophy?* at risk, a question the answer to which must be created.
and effectuated following a line that belongs neither to the initiators nor to the reader but happens “between them.”

Not commenting but effectuating means experimenting with a line that is not that of the book, but which, if the effectuation is not a failure, should connect different aspects of this book that otherwise would appear as independent. The effectuation line I will experiment with stems from my conviction that, in spite of the seemingly “classical” outlook of *What is Philosophy?*, which disappointed many readers, this book may well be the most “political” of Deleuze’s books. It is his one book that addresses its reader as if he were perhaps a friend, but at that twilight hour “when one distrusts even the friend,” even the one who had most enthusiastically followed the great opening of possibilities that Deleuzian themes have inspired. Here, the crucial problem may well be that “we lack resistance to the present,”3 and to resist here does not mean to criticize or to denounce but to construct.

For instance, when we read that “philosophers have not been sufficiently concerned with the nature of the concept as philosophical reality,”4 the point would not be, or would not only be, to deal with a question of special interest for philosophers, a closure on a professional domain, it would be part of the problem of this lack of resistance, a problem that science and probably art also share, entailing the very strong likelihood of their destruction. But the point is also not “how to avoid destruction” as if it were the central question, as if our world would lose its very soul if philosophy, or science, or art were to become part of a destroyed past. If, as I read it, *What is Philosophy?* is indeed a political book, the point is that learning how to resist is a task which tolerates no economy. No great masterword (mot d’ordre) designating a common enemy may spare those who belong to a threatened practice from asking what kind of specific vulnerability this enemy is exploiting since he (or it) does not need to use violent, repressive means. Thus the seemingly modest task of a “pedagogy of the concept” may well be the only way for philosophy to situate itself among other threatened practices, each from the point of view of its own specific capacity to resist. For each of them, the point would be its own specific “bad will,” what forces it to think and create, as opposed to goodwill, being allowed to think by consensual evidence. Even the joyful affirmation of productive connexions may turn into “goodwill,” leading “to an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism.”5

The experimentation on *What is Philosophy?* I will propose stems from this guess. I will try and address disappointed Deleuzian “friends,” who wonder about Deleuze’s suddenly “acritical” turn, who deplore the fact that he seems to have suddenly forgotten he has been thinking all his life “against” the image of thought associated with dominant philosophy, and has chosen to celebrate all “great philosophers.” I will experiment with the feeling that, at this twilight hour, *What is Philosophy?* asks us to consider what Deleuze’s favourite “conceptual persona,” the idiot, keeps saying while others hurry towards consensual goals: that “there may be something more important.” “Something more important” does not mean something which would transcend our disagreements and reconcile us around a sacred cause. The idiot is unable to mobilize or convince; perhaps he can slow down the mobilization and have some mobilized certainties stutter.

The idiot will never acknowledge that somebody has correctly understood what was more important. It is the task for everyone to learn and feel where and how his or her slowing down and stuttering actually happened. My experimental reading stems from the feeling that Deleuze and Guattari were both addressing their epoch, that is their friends, and distrusting it and them, asking us to think with the epochal fact that bad will as such can no longer be taken for granted. This is why my reading will take the reader to a still more acritical position. It may well be that what we vitally need now is to honour what forces us to escape goodwill and consensual thought, what indeed causes us to diverge and to think, each with diverging means. And it may well be that what we have to honour will designate us as survivors, having to disentangle ourselves from all the words which designated our survival as something we did deserve.
matters of fact and states of affairs

Let us first address the question of scientific functions, and begin with a small problem of translation. When the translators of *What is Philosophy?* dealt with the claim that scientific functions refer to “*des états de choses,*” they chose to translate “*états de choses*” as “*states of affairs.*” This has rather strange consequences when those “*states of affairs*” are contrasted with “*things*” (and after that with “*bodies*”). With the literal translation “*state of things,*” the contrast does not bear on affairs as distinguished from things, but on the presence and absence of “*states.*” This is a meaningful contrast. Indeed, the triumph of the notion of “*state,*” at the centre of dynamics, is conditioned by the independence of the dynamic variables entering into “*state functions.*” Deleuze and Guattari’s characterization of “*things*” as entailing variables that are functions of each other (energetic coordinates of coupled systems) thus rather elliptically dramatized the challenge which produced nineteenth-century thermodynamics, with the distinction between external, controlling variables and internal ones, and the loss of the realist value associated with the new kinds of (thermodynamic) state functions which now derive from entropy.

I would guess that the “*state of affairs*” translation stems from the fact that the usual translation for “*états de choses*” is “*matter of fact,*” and that “*matter of fact*” belongs to an empiricist tradition that the translators could not endorse. “*States of affairs,*” in contrast, may refer to the lucid, social constructivist stance that whatever scientists’ claims, they can never escape states of affairs for some purified “*matter of fact.*” Whatever their achievement, it will always refer to a “*state of affairs.*” But then would what we call “*things*” or “*bodies*” not transcend our “*states of affairs*”? It may well be that here the translators stopped trying to understand (those pages are the most elliptical and obscure ones in the book, anyway).

My guess may well be wrong, but I will take it as a problematic starting point. Let us forget about the distinction between states of things, things, and bodies; the challenge is that they are not described in terms of “*affairs.*” In order to dramatize this challenge I will designate them all using the opposite term that I suspect the translators wished to avoid: “*matters of fact.*” It seems that Deleuze and Guattari accept that functions may be defined by a reference which would be characterized as a “*matter of fact,*” that is as “*holding together*” by themselves, and not as obtaining their definition from the states of affairs and the power dimensions that those states of affairs include. A reader of *Mille plateaux,* who enjoyed the characterization of “*Royal Science,*” can only be disappointed. I was such a reader, and it is this first disappointment which led me to a political reading of *What is Philosophy?*

I now need to complicate the problem by recalling another aspect of the situation, the explicit thesis of Deleuze and Guattari that I started with, namely that it is only in their full maturity that philosophy and science may intersect. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari seem to create a privilege for what is usually called “*science made*” against the vivid, open, risky construction of “*science in the making,*” while most contemporary studies privilege “*science in the making*” as the relevant access to science. In order to dramatize this strange choice, I will refer to the contrast between “*science made*” and “*science in the making*” as characterized powerfully by Bruno Latour in his well-known *Science in Action* by a double, Janus-like figure. One face is that of a beardless youth describing the risky production of scientific facts and their social constructive dimensions, as this production requires the coming together of people whose interest must be gained and who participate in the very definition of the meaning and importance of the scientific facts. The other face is that of an old bearded man explaining the robustness of science by its truth, by its objectivity, by its respect of settled matters of fact, and so on.

This Janus-like figure may be sufficient to explain why Deleuze and Guattari claimed that philosophers should refrain from intervening in the collective construction of “*science in the making,*” even if the young beardless scientist is quite ready to welcome them, to quote them, and to gain their interest. They should resist the temptation, resist being seduced by the openness of “*science in the making,*” and also resist...
believing that there would be “new sciences” contradicting the closed, dogmatic character of “science made,” because the two faces offer no contradiction but a contrast, a contrasted unity. The kind of science that the youth has learned is the bearded one. He is speaking about a problem in construction but he knows that if he is to succeed, if the story of the construction is to be told as the story of a scientific achievement, it will be told in the terms of the bearded old man. In other words, the dreams of the youth, his ambitions, are bearded ones. If he succeeds and gets the beard of his dreams, philosophers will be left outside because the successful, stable, “mature” definition of matters of fact will be related to science’s own specific means.

But Deleuze and Guattari also ask philosophers to resist understanding a description such as Bruno Latour’s as a denunciation: the bearded old man would just be lying since what he celebrates – the power of “matters of fact” as purified from “states of affairs” – would just be a socially stabilized state of affairs. They ask us not to consensually recognize that if philosophers are left outside “mature science” then it is not, or not only, because the “mature” scientists have acquired the social power to claim that their results are “purely scientific.” Indeed, when Deleuze and Guattari defined the “creation of scientific function by science’s own specific means” they certainly did not agree with the old bearded-face explanation, but they nevertheless asked us to relate science as creation with science’s “own specific means,” which are associated, one way or the other, with the possibility of a scientist getting a beard.

Of course, the temptation to denounce the bearded old face is strong. A bit too strong for me when the contrast between the two faces is not alive – some so-called sciences do indeed seem to be born with a beard. This is why I will concentrate on experimental sciences; in their case we certainly may imagine, wish for, and struggle for a less dissociated or amnesic personality than the Janus one, for a bearded old man who would remember and celebrate the adventurous social process which any scientific achievement entails, instead of describing the achieved result as the direct consequence of a normal, rational method. This may indeed appear as the most important challenge, in political terms, because the price paid for the reduction of experimental achievement to a normal, rational operation is the general authority attributed to such an operation, that is the definition of science and scientific expertise as what I would call the thinking head of mankind. This is why social constructivism may so easily be identified with political emancipation against the authority of science.

The bearded dreams may well entail important problems of political power, but following my reading of the original political stance of What is Philosophy? there is something that is still more important. Indeed, the result of the denial that science would have “specific means” is that, whatever the scientific proposition, we know how to resist. We would not need to create in order to resist the bearded dream, we would just need to recognize it. It is because of this instant recognition that many readers will have identified Bruno Latour’s problematic contrast between the two faces of the scientist as “social constructivism”: they “recognized” the possibility of deriding the old bearded face, of claiming that behind any scientific (matter of) fact there is a (state of) affairs dressed with the social power to parade as authorizing scientific claims. This is precisely the path Deleuze and Guattari refused to take when they chose to celebrate the mature scientific function (and matter of fact) as a creation (science is a creation of functions).

A socially stabilized state of affairs, having acquired consensual authority, allowing scientists to feel that they know what they are saying, or that they can define what they are observing, is the very characterization of what Deleuze and Guattari proposed to name “functions of the lived” (fonction du vécu): functions whose arguments are consensual perceptions and affections. For those functions, there is no creation, only recognition. Deleuze and Guattari wondered whether all the human sciences should be included in this category: however sophisticatedly presented or statistically verified they would constitute just scientific opinion. But they did not hesitate with regard to logic as it comes to dominate philosophy when philosophy follows the route marked out by Frege and Russell.9 logicism heralds the very
triumph of goodwill functions depending on states of affairs, functions whose argument depends on consensual recognition. For Deleuze and Guattari, identifying science or whatever other practice as a question of “states of affairs only” is not a “lucid statement” but is the denial of their relation with “creation.” In other words, there is certainly a strong appeal in the “states of affairs” disenchantment of science, but it is a consensual appeal, which creates no possibility of resisting the probability that the “functions of the lived” will come to define everything. Such a “lucid” identification has a strong sense of truth, but this is the poisoning taste of resentment: it means telling scientists: “wake up, you are just like everybody else.” And, as is always the case with resentment, it is participating in the destruction of what is more important, namely the capacity to resist.

I will certainly not take as a confirmation of my thesis the dreadful historical irony that social constructivism may be described as unwittingly collaborating in the destruction of those very aspects of science that it derided. As we know, scientists are now asked more and more insistently to renounce their dreams and to deserve the money they get. And in order to deserve money they are asked to forget about the distinction between scientific matters of fact and states of affairs. For instance, biotechnology, and the possibility to insert new genes in a genome, in no way means that biology would be able to define the function articulating the so-called genes with the features they are meant to explain, but this does not matter: what matters is that the production of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has a very interesting strategic meaning for industrial states of affairs. This is not a confirmation that implies that the social constructivist analysis would be “objectively” guilty, as Stalinists would put it. But it is confirmation that we live in a dangerous world and that when one takes the easy consensual path of denouncing and deconstructing others’ dreams, there is always the danger of discovering that one has strange bedfellows.

“There is something more important,” “we lack resistance to the present.” “We,” here, means all of us, whatever our (good)will. Each practice is weakened by its own poisons, is infected by its own lack of resistance. The dissociated personality of the Janus-like scientists, the way the bearded old man describes as a matter of general methodology the scientific definition of a matter of fact, indeed poisons scientists and makes them unable to resist the reduction of their practice to technoscience, to resist the blind confusion between what Deleuze and Guattari insist must be defined as creation and the general power to manipulate. But we are also poisoned, lacking resistance to the present, when in all sincerity we denounce the bearded dreams of science, forgetting to create the means to resist being joined by others who have undertaken to destroy the dreamer. Resistance is a matter of creation, not of sincerity. Deleuze and Guattari were not “sincere” when celebrating mature science; they did not participate in a sincere, consensual belief in the “autonomy of science.” Celebrating mature science as creation, they endeavoured to create means – philosophical means – to tell another story, to escape the consensual opposition between the claims of a bearded science and the critical deconstruction of these claims. This is the process of creation I now wish to continue.

scientific functions as creations

Let us start again, explicitly taking into account what Deleuze and Guattari seem to ignore, namely the social constructive activity of science in the making. How do we nevertheless characterize (mature) scientific functions and their referred matters of fact as creation; that is, how do we resist the image of science as a simple case of social construction, producing functions of the lived? How do we tell, when a scientific function has been created, that something new has entered the world?

Again, Bruno Latour helps us here. In Pandora’s Hope he describes the kind of “state of affairs” the “young” unbearded scientist must organize in order to succeed in meeting the demands of a “science in the making.” This is a complex task indeed, as it includes four kinds of ongoing, distinct, and correlated processes of social construction. In order for his work to be possible, to gain importance, and to achieve consideration, an innovative scientist has to form
alliances with state or industrial powers, so as to get them to decide that they indeed need the kinds of results he is working to obtain. He has to achieve academic recognition, meaning that the academic demands and criteria for the new innovative field will then be the relevant ones, as autonomously produced and discussed by colleagues in this new field. He has to succeed in mobilizing the world, meaning getting the needed resources, i.e., the relevant instruments but also the ambitious, innovative well-educated students with an interest in, and loyalty to, the new field. Finally, he has to produce a public representation of this field, that is have it accepted as the legitimate outcome of scientific progress, as rationally answering important questions which do or should interest everyone, and/or as promising positive consequences for human development and well-being.

As such, each of these four processes of construction is not specific. Their strong correlation is already more specific, because if one of them fails then the others will be denounced as pathological in one way or another. But what makes them all properly scientific is the fifth ongoing activity which Latour characterizes as the making of Links and Knots. This designates the kind of activity most scientists would define as what truly matters, the actual production of those very matters of fact that the bearded old scientist will later use as sufficient by themselves to explain the scientific achievement.

Indeed, the first four activities, as Latour characterizes them, do construct a “state of affairs” with a rather peculiar stake. They create a relation with an outside which must be both actively interested and also placed at a distance (with a different kind of distance in a different kind of space for each one). In all cases the distance means that whatever the success of those four processes of construction, it must be possible to present and describe them as nourishing the making of Links and Knots, as being conditions for the achievement, not the explanation of this achievement. If one claims that it is a matter of presentation only, Latour’s description will be reduced to simple social constructivism, and lose any relevance for reading What is Philosophy? Avoiding this claim does not mean accepting the kind of easy separation that the art of distances is meant to promote. But it means addressing the making of Links and Knots as entailing those “specific means” which scientists define as what matter, what they have to protect, what makes the specificity of a scientific achievement.

What does it mean to achieve Links and Knots? Scientists are certainly not linked together by their common bearded submission to rationality or objectivity, or by some goodwill which explains how they are able to listen to each other and respect the rules of rational discussion. As I will try to show, the link is not among humans as such but exists only because those humans confer on the creation of reliable Knots, i.e., to the creation of reliable references between function and matter of fact, the power to link them, to force them to interact and entertain the kind of agonistic cooperation on which this achievement depends. When Galileo wrote that one man will win against a thousand rhetoricians, whatever their gift for persuasion or the authority of their references, if this one man has the facts on his side, we usually recognize it as some kind of positivist statement. And indeed Galileo was in the process of building the first public representation of experimental science, producing a state of affairs where experimental facts claim the power to silence both philosophers and theologians. But we should not forget that the Galileo who was writing was himself the product of the first experimental achievement, the first experimental knot.

In The Invention of Modern Science, I characterized this achievement as the ability to short-circuit the sceptical argument which refers any general statement to the power of fiction. I described the event of the experimental invention which produced Galileo as its spokesperson as “the invention of the power to confer on things the power to speak in their name.”12 Power intervenes three times in this description, each time, as I will now show, with a different meaning.

“Invention of the power to confer on . . .” refers to Galileo in the very process of discovering the power of the first experimental device, the inclined plane. This device did give him the power to transform a usual state of affairs, a consensual
function of the lived perception of falling bodies, into a scientific matter of fact correlated to a scientific mathematical function. Indeed, the power of the inclined plane was to transform the fact that heavy bodies do perceptively fall into an articulated fact, defined in terms of independent variables, variables whose value can be modified at will, and the articulation of which produces a functional (state) description. In other words, the reference of a mathematical function to an experimental matter of fact is neither some kind of right belonging to scientific reason nor is it an enigma, but actually the very meaning of an experimental achievement.

“...a thing having the power of conferring on a human...” is the very definition of what the experimental “knot” achieves when tying a matter of fact to a scientific function. “Knot” is a very happy word and this achievement is a case of what Deleuze and Guattari called a “marriage against nature.” The idea that science would “naturalize” anything is a complete nonsense. It would mean attributing to nature what we must describe as an event, the local entanglement between two lines which generally have nothing in common. Before the event, falling bodies and the problem of the kind of knowledge we can gain about things were mutually indifferent. There was only a discursive reference, among others, to the perceptual fact that bodies do fall down. Such a falling down had no power to force thinking, it was consensual evidence. All heavy bodies do fall down. This apple is a heavy body. Thus this apple will fall down if I open my hand. After Galileo, you no longer have apples, or a tree crashing to the ground, or a man falling from a window. You have something new: a Galilean body, a body which can exist nowhere but in the lab or in the sky, since its motion must approximate a frictionless one in order for the function to have any power of definition. Correlatively, the line of human discursive argumentation about the definition of valid knowledge as opposed to interpretation and fiction has bifurcated. One particular functional interpretation has got a reliable witness. Galileo no longer has any need to argue; he is able to turn his back against his human brothers, to cut any kind of intersubjective debate. The experimental device gave the Galilean body the power to allow Galileo to remain mute, to show just the facts.

“...the power to speak in their name.” It is because Galileo can present himself as essentially mute that he can claim that he has the power to speak in the name of the falling bodies. He is just representing the thing. The so-called objective scientific representation is an event because it may claim to be authorized by what is represented, while what is represented has no human voice. But who will be interested in this claim? Who will celebrate as an event the fact that Galileo is able to represent the way in which a body falls in a frictionless environment? Galileo needs colleagues who will take as primordial the verification that a knot has indeed been created, that none of their objections can defeat it. He needs colleagues who will accept being linked not to him, and not because of his persuasive power, but by the production of the knot. In other words, in order for the specific character of his achievement to be verified, he needs not the goodwill of colleagues agreeing with him but the specific bad will of colleagues for whom what first matters is to test the reliability of the witness he claims to have produced.

In order to celebrate the successful knot, scientists will sometimes announce that “Nature has spoken.” This triumphal statement is obviously misleading, but the way in which it is misleading is important. Indeed, the point is not the traditional philosophical one, namely that things are mute and only humans speak. The point is that if nature had indeed spoken, all humans would be concerned. Listening with respect would be the normal answer. A knot, a “marriage against nature” on the other hand, is always a local, selective event. The only ones concerned are those who belong to the two lines, those non-humans which can effectively, that is experimentally, be defined as reliable witnesses, and those humans – those I call competent colleagues – who will consider it as crucial to their own active practice to verify that a colleague was indeed authorized to claim the triple power achievement. Those and only those will be linked by the event as a matter of collective concern, exploring the consequences, testing the “if... then maybe...” that may follow as eventually
entailed by the event. A “marriage against nature” is never between “man” and “nature,” which would mean a convergence, an adequate knowledge at last. The marriage knot produces a divergence, it links these kinds of humans, endorsing very strong specific obligations, and those kinds of phenomena, verifying very selective requirements.

It takes the production of Links and Knots as the fabrication of an actively diverging adventure, embodying Deleuze’s claim that there is no relativity of truth but there is truth only of what is relative. There is a scientific experimental kind of truth because science is relative to the adventure of the creation of Links and Knots, to the creation of knots and the production of links as what scientists explore together. The important point here is that there are many kinds of adventures, and each has its own truth and its own kind of loyalty, as it affirms its own diverging value. We may think here of the adventure of making a movie, of writing a text, and also of an alpinist’s careful and risky climb, or of a mathematician in the process of producing a demonstration, or even of a judge hesitating about his or her judgement. The important point is that none of these adventures needs to belittle the other ones in order to affirm itself. Each of them is by definition a minority adventure, as Deleuze and Guattari positively characterize a minority as that which does not dream of becoming a majority. And it is precisely because a minority collectively produces a divergence without a dream of convergence, of representing a future majority or consensus, that some transversal connections are possible. A writer can understand something about an alpinist’s discipline, or a mathematician about the judge’s selective and creative processing of a case.

This is the way I understand Deleuze and Guattari’s proposition about the complementary lines of science and philosophy. Science would actualize and effectuate the event of the created knot as it produces its many consequences, taking or not taking into account objections following the states of affairs. And philosophy would counter-effectuate the event and isolate, that is create, its concept. Not reflecting on science but diverging from science. Indeed, such a philosophical “counter-effectuation” would not be a strange “Mime,” but would create by its own means what busy scientists so easily forget, namely the “dignity of event” that makes them busy. This is a case of vital communication between diverging adventures and a demanding, selective one for the sciences, as the question of the event they are in the process of effectuating would leave so much of today’s so-called science “born with a beard” aghast and speechless.

Such a perspective has a dreamlike quality, however. It may help philosophers to resist, but we need to know what they have to resist, to characterize the kind of present they lack resistance to. We thus need to go back to the social construction of science, to Bruno Latour’s four correlated social processes of construction. Philosophers have no part in the creation of Links and Knots but we now have to ask which part scientists propose they play in “science in the making,” a part Deleuze and Guattari refuse when they ask that philosophers refrain from intervening before a science is “mature.”

science and its public

I have already emphasized how misleading the statement “Nature has spoken” is. I now have to emphasize how it dramatically expresses one of the ways in which the scientific adventure may become an epic, the scientist then becoming the thinking head of mankind, the one who is able to get out of the cave, to escape a world of mere opinion, of arbitrary human fabrications and conventions. The “Nature has spoken” statement is part of the public representation of a scientific achievement, and so are all other more sophisticated epistemological versions of scientific objectivity: their common feature is the demand that we all feel concerned.

Returning to Latour’s characterization of “science in the making,” it is now crucial to note that the four correlated processes he distinguishes are marked by a strange contrast. A scientist will never tell a colleague, a demanding ally or a provider of mobilizing resources that “Nature has spoken,” and that they have to listen. Their interest has to be won, and cannot be dismissed as blind. In contrast, the public designates all those who are bound to be concerned,
whose interest does not have to be won, but may be demanded. Science must matter for the public which is thereby defined as mere opinion, to be convinced that it is its only chance to escape irrational belief and blind interests.

Since Galileo, the epic story of scientific progress, grounded on facts as opposed to arbitrary opinion, has been part of the public representation of science, requiring and maintaining a definition of the public as having to trust science as the only way to escape opinion. And here, unhappily, philosophy enters the scene, but not as a creation of concepts. The kinds of philosophers that the public representation of science needs will not be partners in the production of links and the creation of knots but allies participating in the public representation of science – allies whose interest must not be won, whose goodwill is demanded. But the nature of this demanded goodwill is rather undetermined: philosophers are welcome if they put their own means, whatever they may be, at the service of the image of thought that science requires. It may be through a direct celebration of the opposition between rational science and opinion but it does not need to be: as long as a philosopher helps, one way or the other, in enforcing the idea that opinion is something to be criticized and overcome, a strategic alliance is possible and scientists may include him in their public representation. Even Heidegger has been so included.

It may be interesting to approach the situation I have just described with the concepts that Deleuze and Guattari used in *Mille plateaux* in order to describe how the war machine was “encasted” by the state. Indeed, when science is presented as a convergent epic, scientists come to be respected as a “caste” in the famous ivory tower. But as a cast they are captured, bound into the service of the (modern) state by their static identification with the rational, apolitical aim they come to embody. The public representation of science is no mere ideology; it is the bind, what makes it possible to transform the diverging creations of science into the kinds of convergent values the state needs for its own production. And we could then describe the present-day situation as the transition from being encasted to being appropriated proper. Read Donna Haraway’s *Modest Witness*, for instance, to feel what is now happening. The kind of adventure I have just characterized may be relevant for Galileo Galilei, Robert Boyle, Louis Pasteur, and Frédéric Joliot-Curie, but not, emphatically not, for contemporary biomedicine or biotechnology. Indeed, in those cases we can say that the art of distance required by demanding construction of Links and Knots has been swept away, and that we are dealing with a new kind of articulation between powers. It will no longer be possible to tell the tale of those developments without having for the leading protagonists those powerful allies who are quite ready to accept nominal definitions provided it means new possibilities for industrial innovation.

What has been bound lacks resistance against appropriation. But the reverse may be the case. The only chance for science to resist its appropriation, to survive as a minority diverging adventure, may be to break the bind, namely the old strategic alliance with the great consensual, convergent theme of the struggle of reason against mere opinion. This bind is indeed what makes scientists unable to defend themselves, that is to try and produce kinds of alliances other than the ones which are in the process of appropriating them. They cannot call in those that they defined as mere opinion. They are alone, feeling betrayed, feeling that mankind is betraying its thinking head.

Now, at last, we face the problem of modifying, not destroying, the old bearded face in Latour’s Janus-like figure, the face unable to celebrate a scientific achievement in words other than those which present the general, consensual triumph of rationality over opinion. And here we have to avoid any consensual, majority masterwords, such as a general democratic right of the public to participate, nicely turning what was mere opinion into an untapped source of wisdom. The bind will not be broken. Scientists will be polite, but indifferent. Indeed, they know the hard work it takes to gain allies, to gain autonomy, to mobilize. Already their colleagues, if they are not in the same field, have only a very vague idea about the issues at stake. How could “sovereign” citizens of goodwill be able to participate in those complex constructions? The consensual transformation of the “ignorant public” masterword into the
“citizens” masterword is an Empty Great Idea. It will not work.

Does an idea work? Is it able to make a difference? What kind of difference? These are the questions of pragmatism. It is a “pragmatic” distinction I am drawing between the “citizens” masterword and the “public” involved in the public representation of science, the public that is asked to accept science as authority. While citizens are a goodwill, convergent, political fiction, and as such lack resistance to the present, the public is much more interesting because the problem with the public is its eventual bad will.

Here I am following the path opened in John Dewey’s *The Public and its Problems*. Dewey argued powerfully against the abstract ideal of citizens who would be able and interested in participating in all political decisions, as they are entitled to do. In order to resist accepting democracy as just an empty word, he created a new conception of the public. “In no two ages or places is there the same public” because the Deweyan public is not something which exists, but something which emerges around a problem, and emerges as an objecting power not as a sovereign judge. The emergence of the public is an event, and for Dewey the identity of the state is the historical translation of a succession of such events, the transformation of the scope and nature of the responsibility of a state being the static answer to the successful emergence of a new public.

The Deweyan public is not as such part of a creation process, however: it emerges, objects to, and demands the solution to a problem. It asks the state to answer, to provide the solution. Furthermore, Dewey was unable to get beyond the mere hope for a new emergence of the public since he had to acknowledge that the modern so-called democratic states coincide with the silence of a bound, remarkably passive population, with a general lack of resistance to the double power of the state and capitalism.

However, there may be a small, precarious possibility, part of our epoch, that a new kind of public is emerging, and that such a public may be able to make another kind of difference. In contrast with the Deweyan public, what we now see emerging and stuttering has features of what Deleuze and Guattari called “minorities,” creating their own diverging lines of escape, their own ways. These may be called “objecting minorities,” minorities producing not as their aim but in the very process of their emergence the power to object and to intervene in matters which they discover concern them. The emergence of these divergent, problem-creating, multiple, “empowered” minorities is what I would define as an unknown of our epoch. It does not concern the sciences specifically but it is the only possibility I can envisage against the probability of the scientific adventure being appropriated – that is, being destroyed.

Deleuze and Guattari ask that we think “par le milieu,” meaning both without going to the root or to the final aim of a question and taking into account the environment that this question requires and creates. The emergence of empowered minorities already produces a very interesting transformation in the “milieu” of science, completely foreign to the “fundamental questions” about the grounds or aims of knowledge, but effectively modifying the scientists’ dreams, which bound them to the state and capitalism. In recent years, the fact that public minorities were able to object has been a source of great surprise for concerned scientists. Among competent colleagues, objections certainly do matter. In order to construct an alliance, to mobilize, or to gain autonomy, objections have to be taken into account and negotiated. But the public was identified as something which was either “against science” or “supporting science.” Some scientists now begin to wonder whether the powerful allies who claimed to protect them against an irrational public were not instead using the public representation of science as opposed to “mere opinion” in order to silence objections that they discover indeed do matter, and indeed put into question the blind divide into the so-called scientific, objective definition of a problem on the one hand, and ignorant irrational beliefs and traditional values on the other.

I am now in a position to address the question of what philosophers may have to create for a vital communication between science and philosophy’s diverging adventures to be possible and to give each of them some means to resist their respective and probable destruction. We need specific,
philosophical means to escape our own encasted academic claims, more ancient ones than the scientists. The opposition between “mere opinion” and what transcends opinion was the poison which modern science, since Galileo, inherited from philosophy and used to produce its own public representation. But when we come to philosophy it is not a matter of public representation only, it is a common-sense consensual conviction we philosophers inherit before we begin to think.

a pragmatic concern for conventions

One way of characterizing the role that philosophy has played in the epic representation of science against mere opinion leads to the problem of “convention.” Philosophers would ratify by their own means the great divide between what are only “pragmatic conventions” on the one hand, which “work” but may be analysed away in terms of habits, settled interests, and the balance of power, and on the other what is worth thinking about, beyond mere states of affairs. And here we may make a brief return to the problem of social constructivism. The fact that social constructivists entered the scene as those who were betraying the role that the public representation of science attributed to philosophers is something that requires attention. Indeed, you cannot betray a role without first claiming it, here claiming it for your job to test the great opposition between science and mere convention. But social constructivists did not see themselves as philosophers. It is thus possible to take up the role of philosophers while claiming to belong to fields such as sociology or cultural studies.

I would propose that social constructivists were able to assume the role of philosophers without recognizing it because they “knew” what conventions are, that is, they recognized them, as a matter of the “functions of the lived.” As a result of this proposition, I would stress that escaping their role in the public representation of science implies that philosophers create the means to escape such a consensual recognition.

And it is precisely such a creation that Deleuze and Guattari celebrate in the vibrant homage they pay to pragmatism as associated with the Anglo-American tradition of adventurous – non-analytical – empiricism:

The English nomadize over the old Greek earth, broken up, fractalized, and extended to the entire universe. We cannot even say that they have concepts like the French and the Germans; but they acquire them, they only believe in what is acquired – not because everything comes from the senses but because a concept is acquired by inhabiting, by pitching one’s tent, by contracting a habit […] Wherever there are habits there are concepts, and habits are developed and given up on the plane of immanence of radical experience: they are “conventions.” That is why English philosophy is a free and wild creation of concepts. To what convention is a given proposition due; what is the habit that constitutes its concept? This is the question of pragmatism. (105–06)

With each new convention, something new has entered the world, a new tent has been pitched, and not on a settled ground that would explain its stability but in a process of fractalization: the new ground is produced together with the new tent pitched upon it. In each case the pragmatic “it works” may be counter-effectuated as it entails considering what has been created in this case, the new “it works” now resounding, as an event which the convention, always this convention, effectuates. What may become a matter of consensus, the functions of the lived, settled interests and balance of power that will be used afterwards to explain or justify it, does not explain a convention. A convention is never explained by something else, it proceeds from a creation, a “marriage against nature.” And yes the scientific achievement of an experimental knot is a convention, but it is not “only a convention,” it fractalizes the ground following its own diverging demands, its own definition of what matters and how.

The awful, despicable pragmatic “it works” may then become a matter of concern, of evaluation, not of disqualification. For instance, the strength of the proper scientific convention, the reliability of the created knots, may be evaluated as achieving a convention which depends specifically on the power successfully conferred on things to intervene in human affairs and discussions. But
the possibility for the thing to become an actual, crucial part in a scientific convention has as its condition that all competent objections are to be taken seriously, as it must be verified that the experimental device gives the experimenter the power to answer those objections. The thing is not able to make a difference “by itself,” it is enabled to make this difference by and for a collective which is enabled to test this difference, which is linked by the obligation not to silence a relevant critique. This is why the power of such a convention changes in nature as soon as it leaves its birthplace and concerns human affairs where all protagonists are not enabled to object, where some are a priori defined as not mattering. The effectuation of the event, the meaning of the “it works,” radically changes as soon as the tent is pitched on the settled ground of interests and power, and as soon as the habit of the public to accept being addressed as powerless, mere opinion, unable to object and propose, is an ingredient in its concept.

To repeat the precarious political pragmatic hope I presented, it is only if we become able, as philosophers, to put scientific achievements on the same plane of immanence together with other diverging conventions, each with its demanding definition of what matters, that we can stop poisoning this hope, that we can share, instead, the pragmatic concern for the itinerant process of creation of new “it works” as they mark the process of empowerment of new minorities, with new actively diverging “habits” that must be celebrated each time as something new entering the world and indeed as modifying it. When Deleuze and Guattari emphasized the need for a “pedagogy of the concept” they were pragmatists because pedagogy means the creation of a habit, here learning the “taste” of concepts, being modified by the encounter with concepts.

The Deleuzian definition of science as dealing with functions is precious for protecting this pragmatic concern against any scientific paradigm. Whatever the function, be it produced by a successful marriage against nature or by a lived consensus about what matters and how, any function requires a stable world, allowing for a stable articulation between those aspects the functional being is taking into account. No function can deal with learning, producing, or empowering new habits, as all require and achieve the production of different worlds, non-consensual worlds, actively diverging worlds. There will be no scientific explanations, be they psychological, sociological, cognitivist, or neurophysiological, of the way new, non-consensual, diverging habits may come into being. It is probably what Félix Guattari had in mind when, in Chaosmosis, he called for a new paradigm that would be an ethico-aesthetico-political one. It is tempting to think that such a paradigm, as it aims at making the creation of new perceptual and affective habits a matter of concern, should privilege art, which is the third kind of creative adventure characterized in What is Philosophy?

But here we must slow down and pay attention. There may be something more important. We should not forget that the very possibility of associating science, art, and philosophy to creation first testifies for a depopulated world. These are practices that are now in danger of lacking resistance to the present, of being appropriated, but they are also the surviving ones, the ones which were tolerated or domesticated, “encasted” while so many others were destroyed by what we call “modernization.” As a result, these practices must also be considered from the point of view of the price they pay for their domesticated or tolerated survival: diverging prices but heavy ones anyway. Deleuze considered the price philosophy paid when it was associated with the triple ideals, all of which imply judgement and may enter into the strategic alliance against opinion: contemplation, reflection, and communication. I have considered the price science pays as presenting itself in the guise of the old fight of reason against mere opinion. Instead of considering the price art may be paying, I will stress that Guattari’s ethico-aesthetico-political paradigm may as well designate “magic” as the neo-pagan and political activist witch Starhawk does.16 That is, not in supernatural terms but as an experiential and experimental art, daring to try and test what it takes and what it requires to produce ethico-aesthetico-political empowerment.
survivors

We no longer burn witches, but taking interest in empowering processes needs the knowledge that we risk having those words used against us. Indeed, it may well mean facing such accusations as irrationality, superstition, and regression: back to Plato’s cave. My conviction is that, as philosophers, we may and indeed have to “counter-effectuate” this eventual accusation. And here I must go not beyond Deleuze but elsewhere. In approaching the question “What is philosophy?” my first concern is to resist words that would characterize our right to exist while ratifying our own domestication and the destruction we survived.

This is why I choose to take the risk of using the term “magic,” just as witches themselves take this risk. For them the very fact of naming magic as what they are doing is already an act of magic, producing the needed experience of discomfort which makes perceptible the power over us of consensual functions of the lived. If those contemporary witches took it upon themselves to call themselves witches, such a shocking name, it was in order to produce the living, disturbing memory of the Time of Burning, the destruction of the Great Art, which happened in the very epoch when Man as the majority standard came to impose converging, consensual functions of the lived, explaining away as illusions and superstitions every active divergence except the three surviving ones – philosophy, science, and art. To name themselves witches is to present themselves as survivors, and what I ask is that we, as philosophers, understand ourselves, as far as we resist the power of functions of the lived, as survivors.

Naming witches and magic does lead towards the question “what is philosophy?,” with a doubly antagonistic move. On the one hand, it leads back towards the historical origin which may certainly be associated with their repudiation, with the choice of public and consensual arguments against dangerous powers, to be excluded or domesticated. But on the other hand, it leads towards the power of transformation that Deleuze associates with the philosophical concept as such when he writes, for instance, that thinking “implies a sort of groping experimentation and its layout resorts to measures that are not very respectable, rational or reasonable. . . . To think is always to follow the witch’s flight.” Indeed, it may be that if philosophy was able to survive its Greek origin, to resist many threatening presents, it is because it unwittingly captured, in a disguised manner, something quite different from rational argumentation. It may be that the “prephilosophical plane” it built on and secretly, unwittingly continued was inhabited not only by urban Sophists, as is officially recorded, but also by those others whose not very respectable, rational or reasonable measures the sophist art of language had already urbanized. And it may well be that if you separate philosophy from what it profits from and secretly, unwittingly continues, then you kill philosophy.

For Deleuze, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others are killers. But my conviction is that, as philosophers, scientists, and artists, we cannot save ourselves from such killers alone, by our own means only. We have to think in front of those who did not survive. And this conviction is also a speculation for the future, a future where philosophy could play a part in the kind of environment needed for Guattari’s ethico-aesthetico-political paradigm, an environment able to resist the power of consensual functions. Counter-effectuation may well be philosophy’s specific active divergence, its active way of resisting such a power. However, as Deleuze rightly remarks, it may be presented as a Stoic, or a Spinozist one, amor fati. A great model for bad weather, for dangerous times, certainly, but a bit too “beautiful” a model for my taste. If in all goodwill we accept such a model, how do we avoid using words that will also ratify the destruction of obviously non-Stoic or Spinozist witches and thus lack resistance to the great tale of progress which justified their destruction?

I thus claim that philosophers need to honour the active divergence that counter-effectuation creates with words which exhibit in a more open, self-jeopardizing way the not very respectable, or not very public, measures which do enable philosophical creation. Amor fati is not compromising enough, it seems too much of a general, converging ideal, and the path it needs may quite easily become an ethical, solitary version for the old majority tale of Mankind having to get out of
Plato’s cave. We may well stress, with Deleuze, the need for a pedagogy of the concept, meaning the need to learn how to encounter the power of concepts and the witch’s flight that it induces. But it took Deleuze his whole life to reach that “point of nonstyle, where one can finally say ‘What is it I have been doing all my life?’”18 I think we have a vital need to be more explicit about why the pedagogy of concepts matters and enables philosophers to resist the present. We need to present ourselves as indebted to something we call concepts, because it is only through encountering the efficaciousness of concepts, through experimenting with the witch flight they produce, that we may become philosophers.

It is indeed something very hard for a Stoic or a Spinozist to admit: the truth of the relative implies being in debt, not an infinite debt, but a debt which needs to be openly, self-jeopardizingly, cultivated. It is much more comfortable to produce deep, beautiful meditations about an author not being the author of what he or she writes than reaching this point of nonstyle when you simply affirm that writing is not a spontaneous activity of human goodwill but puts the writer in debt to what makes him or her write.

Debt must be honoured. This is the lesson I learned from the witches. They do not at all to believe in a Goddess as a supernatural, transcendent being, but they learned the pragmatic need for empowering rituals honouring a power whose answer is nothing other than the very process of empowering, of becoming able to resist the present, which the ritual is made to induce.

In order to make this point a little more concrete, I will finally turn to an example: that of the very strange flight, truly a witch’s flight, of Alfred North Whitehead, this mathematician-turned-philosopher who most perfectly embodies the English way of doing philosophy to which Deleuze and Guattari paid homage.

honouring what makes us able to diverge?

Whitehead’s adventure was indeed a strange, self-jeopardizing one, and he paid the price for leaving the consensual ground. His name has been obliterated by English philosophy, and in particular in his original home town, Cambridge, as if it defaced the noble college he had so long inhabited. We may well say that Whitehead’s failure was complete from the usual pragmatic point of view, since our world is still dominated by the modern abstractions he wanted to displace, the mutually incoherent abstractions of transcendent freedom, as attributed to humans, and of functional explanation, as objectively defining the world. But the important point is the kind of “bad will” that forced his adventure and which is a condition for reading him. Never did a philosopher so pragmatically develop and give up (faire et défaire) concepts in utter disregard for the kind of pious loyalty we so easily dedicate to what aims at truth.

The problem in reading Whitehead is that the witch’s flight that his concepts do create cannot be disentangled from his explicit definition of the task of philosophy: it should take care of our abstractions. As the equipment, both the tools and the lure, for feeling and thinking, abstractions need “engineering.” But to define philosophy as an engineering of abstractions puts to the test our wish to go beyond abstractions of our own making, to escape the prison of our own fabrication. Whitehead asks us to accept leaving aside any kind of dramaturgy, any kind of dramatic presentation of philosophy as thinking the unthinkable or addressing what cannot be represented. He endeavoured instead to counter-effectuate abstractions, pragmatically evaluating and modifying the kind of lure and constraint that abstractions provide, going so far as to include the creation of a concept of God, as he discovered that such a concept was required by the problem as he was constructing it. How can we take on that engineered concept of God after so many years of celebrating the Death of God, or deploring his final absence?

“This concept is required by the problem I construct and because of the way I constructed it. It may be that another definition of the problem our modern abstractions impose on us would need no God, but this in no way puts it into question.” This could be Whitehead’s answer, and the discomfort becomes explicit: does he believe that he is free to go against the very pride we cultivate in being able to live without God, or the very solitude we suffer having to live without God, and

last enigmatic message

164
all that because of the way he constructed his problem? We may feel the same kind of experience of discomfort as with the witches’ Goddess. The Goddess is just a fiction, how can we honour Her?

The fact that Alfred North Whitehead was a mathematician-turned-philosopher may explain why he dared to conceive philosophy as an openly constructive adventure and a self-proclaimed speculative one. Mathematicians are used to giving mathematical existence to very strange beings, provided they fulfil mathematical constraints and are needed for unfolding a mathematical problem. Those beings are like poles for the tent they are pitching; their value is to allow the problem to achieve its full amplitude in order to arrive at a successful working solution. Mathematicians are probably those who know best that they are not free, that the problem that they construct is what matters. They know that an answer has meaning only because and through the constructive adventure of the problem that their question induces. This is why creative mathematicians do not need to dream of the power of converging recognition. What they honour is the power of the question to which they are indebted because this question empowers them, forces them to think and create as mathematicians. What they may teach us is that to honour is not to believe in a transcendent power but pragmatically to call forth the “marriage against nature” that any empowerment process requires.

Whitehead gave to a very simple question the power to force him to think and create as a philosopher: how to produce coherence where (modern) incoherence rules? And he gave its full amplitude to the problems his demand for coherence entailed, accepting the thought all the way down to its consequences; that is, creating the means to dramatize and not to tame the incoherence of modern thought. For Whitehead, no hopeful, good-willed, fuzzy interdisciplinary unity, no dream of some “half-way house” where functions would sweetly loose some of their power, allowing for something which could resemble a philosophical concept of freedom, or at least its function of the lived version. No seducing terms promising both to explain and to give room to what we should protect against explanation. Instead, the most fabulous process of creation of odd and habit-disturbing concepts, openly speculative ones, openly constructed ones.

In order to try and feel the efficaciousness of those concepts, you have to accept a witch’s flight far from the ground of any secure good-willed opposition or settled habit. But you then may taste their power which may resemble that of a magic formula, as they empower becoming in the devastated landscape of our impassable contradictions. Indeed, Whitehead’s concepts are neither true nor false, they do not refer to any state of affairs, nor to any matter of fact, nor to any experience transcending the engineering of abstractions. They are efficacious, deliberately engineered in order to deprive thought of any power to judge or explain away part of our experience in the name of another part of our experience, without creating the kind of confusion we fear if we stop judging and explaining away. What we discover instead is the rather strange possibility of appreciating judgement or explaining away together with what is judged or explained away, all put on the same plane, all exhibiting in their own diverging ways creativity as the ultimate they all exemplify and which exists nowhere but in its exemplifications.

It may be that a mathematician was needed to dare to take the philosophical step of pragmatically engineering concepts as witches engineer rituals, in order to induce and experiment with the empowering transformation those concepts produce and the new lures for feeling they create. When a mathematician concludes “it works!” he is celebrating the truth of what is relative, the only kind of important truth, the truth of the problem which has achieved the production of its own specific empowering means and obligations. But so also do the witches celebrate when their rituals produce the empowering presence of the Goddess to whom they pragmatically define themselves as indebted. So also could a philosopher celebrate, or an artist, or whoever knows that what empowers their creation is not theirs. And so should we learn to celebrate scientists when announcing the coming into being of a new matter of fact endowed with the power to act as a reliable witness.
At the very end of his life, in Some Problems of Philosophy, William James wrote:\textsuperscript{19} We can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet off the ground into or towards a world of which we trust the other parts to meet our jump – and only so can the making of a perfected world of pluralistic pattern ever take place. Only through our precursive trust in it can it come into being. There is no inconstancy anywhere in this, and no “vicious circle” unless a circle of poles holding themselves upright by leaning on one another, or a circle of dancers revolving by holding each other’s hands, can be “vicious”. The faith circle is so congruent with human nature that the only explanation of the veto that intellectualists pass upon it must be sought in the offensive character to them of the faiths of certain persons.

Here may be the great lesson of speculative, conceptual pragmatism, and it sounds like a dangerous, self-jeopardizing one indeed, since we know that not only are there many diverging kinds of jumps, but that some jumps are dangerous ones. Leaving the common, settled ground is always a risk. This, however, is no argument against what William James calls the “faith circle” as it is not something we would have “discovered” but something non-modern traditions knew very well. They knew that parts of the world which come and meet some jumps may be devouring ones, and that some may become devouring ones if we do not know how to honour them when we have called them up. Félix Guattari’s ethico-aesthetico-political paradigm thus implies that we can learn from the non-modern wisdom, learn how to care without vetoing the jumps or reducing them to some functions of the lived. This may be why he told of the need for an “ecosophy.”

notes

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\textsuperscript{1} G. Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (London: Verso, 1994) 161. Hereafter WP.

\textsuperscript{2} I am speaking of Deleuze only, here, because Guattari wrote openly political books. It is not by chance that my text will end with a free interpretation of Guattari’s ecosophy, introduced in The Three Ecologies.

\textsuperscript{3} WP 108.

\textsuperscript{4} Ibid. II.

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid. 12.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. 122.

\textsuperscript{7} Forget it on this occasion, but the distinction is nevertheless a most important one. Indeed, it offers a line of escape from the Great Sad Problem of scientific reductionism, and its poisoning consequence: the very sad role accepted by philosophers when they see their task as that of defending human values, experience, or responsibility against its reduction to scientific explanatory frameworks. When a scientist affirms that experience should be, and will be, naturalized, explained (away) in “scientific terms,” we forget to ask “which function, referring to what?” We recognize the inexorable advance of scientific knowledge that will reduce experience, one way or another, to properties of “the central nervous system.” This indeed is a “state of affairs,” dominated by consensual recognition. Philosophers try to define human experience in such a way that it would exhibit a recognizable irreducibility to “scientific properties,” and scientists take such definitions as their aim, as what they have to explain away. Both science and philosophy are thus poisoned by the state of affairs they produce for one another.


\textsuperscript{9} WP 135.

\textsuperscript{10} Consensual does not mean dominant but may be connected with the majority/minority contrast proposed in Mille plateaux. A position may well be affirmed by a qualitatively minority group and will be a majority position if it presents itself as what should be accepted by everyone, i.e., as a potentially consensual claim (even if such a consensus would mean defeating powerful illusions, ideologies, balances of power, and so on).
13 WP 130.
14 Ibid. 159.
16 *Dreaming the Dark* (Boston: Beacon, 1997).
17 WP 41.
18 Ibid. 1.

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