or by voluntarily disarming itself. The world will not thereby become depoliticalized, and it will not be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics. If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of politics, then another people will appear which will assume these trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule. The protector then decides who the enemy is by virtue of the eternal relation of protection and obedience.

[Schmitt's Note]

On this principle rests the feudal order and the relation of lord and vassal, leader and led, patron and clients. This relation is clearly and explicitly seen here. No form of order, no reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and obedience. The protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state. A political theory which does not systematically become aware of this sentence remains an inadequate fragment. Hobbes designated this (at the end of his English edition of 1651, p. 396) as the true purpose of his Leviathan, to instill in man once again "the mutual relation between Protection and Obedience"; human nature as well as divine right demands its inviolable observation.

Hobbes himself had experienced this truth in the terrible times of civil war, because then all legitimate and normative illusions with which men like to deceive themselves regarding political realities in periods of untroubled security vanish. If within the state there are organized parties capable of according their members more protection than the state, then the latter becomes at best an annex of such parties, and the individual citizen knows whom he has to obey. As has been shown (under Section 4 above), a pluralistic theory of state can justify this. The fundamental correctness of the protection-obedience axiom comes to the fore even more clearly in foreign policy and interstate relations: the simplest expression of this axiom is found in the protectorate under international law, the federal state, the confederation of states dominated by one of them, and the various kinds of treaties offering protection and guarantees.

It would be ludicrous to believe that a defenseless people has nothing but friends, and it would be a deranged calculation to suppose that the enemy could perhaps be touched by the absence of a resistance. No one thinks it possible that the world could, for example, be transformed into a condition of pure morality by the renunciation of every aesthetic or economic productivity. Even less can a people hope to bring about a purely moral or purely economic condition of humanity by evading every political decision. If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.

The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe. In this sense every theory of state is pluralistic, even though in a different way from the domestic theory of pluralism discussed in Section 4. The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world. If the different states, religions, classes, and other human groupings on earth should be so unified that a conflict among them is impossible and even inconceivable and if civil war should forever be foreclosed in a realm which embraces the globe, then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease. What remains is neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, art, entertainment, etc. If and when this
condition will appear, I do not know. At the moment, this is not the case. And it is self-deluding to believe that the termination of a modern war would lead to world peace—thus setting forth the idyllic goal of complete and final depoliticalization—simply because a war between the great powers today may easily turn into a world war.

Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet. The concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being—and hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept. That wars are waged in the name of humanity is not a contradiction of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an especially intensive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one's own and to deny the same to the enemy.

The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression of Proudhon's: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity. 23

23 On outlawing war, see above, Section 5. Pufendorf (De jure naturae et gentium, VIII, 6, #5) quotes approvingly Bacon's comment that specific peoples are "proscribed by nature itself," e.g., the Indians, because they eat human flesh. And in fact the Indians of North America were then exterminated. As civilization progresses and morality rises, even less harmless things than devouring human flesh could perhaps qualify as deserving to be outlawed in such a manner. Maybe one day it will be enough if a people were unable to pay its debts.
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and English, the League of Nations) but should properly be called a society of nations. This body is an organization which presupposes the existence of states, regulates some of their mutual relations, and even guarantees their political existence. It is neither universal nor even an international organization. If the German word for international is used correctly and honestly it must be distinguished from interstate and applied instead to international movements which transcend the borders of states and ignore the territorial integrity, impenetrability, and impermeability of existing states as, for example, the Third International. Immediately exposed here are the elementary antitheses of international and interstate, of a depoliticized universal society and interstate guarantees of the status quo of existing frontiers. It is hard to comprehend how a scholarly treatment of the League of Nations could skirt this and even lend support to this confusion. The Geneva League of Nations does not eliminate the possibility of wars, just as it does not abolish states. It introduces new possibilities for wars, permits wars to take place, sanctions coalition wars, and by legitimizing and sanctioning certain wars it sweeps away many obstacles to war. As it has existed so far, it is under specific circumstances a very useful meeting place, a system of diplomatic conferences which meet under the name of the League of Nations Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations. These bodies are linked to a technical bureau, that of the Secretariat. As I have already shown elsewhere, this establishment is not a league, but possibly an alliance. The genuine concept of humanity is expressed in it only insofar as its actual activities reside in the humanitarian and not in the political field, and only as an interstate administrative community does it at least have a tendency toward a meaningful universality. But in view of the League’s true constitution and because this so-called League still enables wars to be fought, even this tendency is an ideal postulate only. A league of nations which is not universal can only be politically significant when it represents a potential or actual alliance, i.e., a coalition. The jus belli would not thereby be abolished but, more or less, totally or partially, transferred to the alliance. A league of nations as a concrete existing universal human organization would, on the contrary, have to accomplish the difficult task of, first, effectively taking away the jus belli from all the still existing human groupings, and, second, simultaneously not assuming the jus belli itself. Otherwise, universality, humanity, depoliticized society—in short, all essential characteristics—would again be eliminated.

Were a world state to embrace the entire globe and humanity, then it would be no political entity and could only be loosely called a state. If, in fact, all humanity and the entire world were to become a unified entity based exclusively on economics and on technically regulating traffic, then it still would not be more of a social entity than a social entity of tenants in a tenement house, customers purchasing gas from the same utility company, or passengers traveling on the same bus. An interest group concerned exclusively with economics or traffic cannot become more than that, in the absence of an adversary. Should that interest group also want to become cultural, ideological, or otherwise more ambitious, and yet remain strictly nonpolitical, then it would be a neutral consumer or producer co-operative moving between the poles of ethics and economics. It would know neither state nor kingdom nor empire, neither republic nor monarchy, neither aristocracy nor democracy, neither protection nor obedience, and would altogether lose its political character.

The acute question to pose is upon whom will fall the frightening power implied in a world-embracing economic and technical organization. This question can by no means be dismissed in the belief that everything would then function automatically, that things would administer themselves, and that a government by people over people would be superfluous because human beings would then be absolutely free. For what would they be free? This can be

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answered by optimistic or pessimistic conjectures, all of which finally lead to an anthropological profession of faith.

7

One could test all theories of state and political ideas according to their anthropology and thereby classify these as to whether they consciously or unconsciously presuppose man to be by nature evil or by nature good. The distinction is to be taken here in a rather summary fashion and not in any specifically moral or ethical sense. The problematic or unproblematic conception of man is decisive for the presupposition of every further political consideration, the answer to the question whether man is a dangerous being or not, a risky or a harmless creature.

[Schmitt's Note]

The numerous modifications and variations of this anthropological distinction of good and evil are not reviewed here in detail. Evil may appear as corruption, weakness, cowardice, stupidity, or also as brutality, sensuality, vitality, irrationality, and so on. Goodness may appear in corresponding variations as reasonableness, perfectibility, the capacity of being manipulated, of being taught, peaceful, and so forth. Striking in this context is the political significance of animal fables. Almost all can be applied to a real political situation: the problem of aggression in the fable of the wolf and the lamb; the question of guilt for the plague in La Fontaine's fable, a guilt which of course falls upon the donkey; justice between states in the fables of animal assemblies; disarmament in Churchill's election speech of October 1928, which depicts how every animal believes that its teeth, claws, horns are only instruments for maintaining peace; the large fish which devour the small ones, etc. This curious analogy can be explained by the direct connection of political anthropology with what the political philosophers of the seventeenth century (Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf) called the state of nature. In it, states exist among themselves in a condition of continual danger, and their acting subjects are evil for precisely the same reasons as animals who are stirred by their drives (hunger, greediness, fear, jealousy). It is unnecessary to differ with Wilhelm Dilthey: "Man according to Machiavelli is not by nature evil. Some places seem to indicate this... But what Machiavelli wants to express everywhere is that man, if not checked, has an irresistible inclination to slide from passion to evil: animality, drives, passions are the kernels of human nature—above all love and fear. Machiavelli is inexhaustible in his psychological observations of the play of passions... From this principal feature of human nature he derives the fundamental law of all political life." In the chapter "Der Machtmensch" in Lebensformen Eduard Spranger says: "For the politician the science of man is naturally of prime interest." It appears to me, however, that Spranger takes too technical a view of this interest, as interest in the tactical manipulation of instinctive drives. In the further elaboration of this chapter, which is crammed full of ideas and observations, there can be recognized time and again the specifically political phenomena and the entire existentiality of the political. For example, the sentence "the dignity of power appears to grow with its sphere of influence" relates to a phenomenon which is rooted in the sphere of the political and can therefore be understood only politically. It is, to be sure, applicable to the following thesis: the weight of the political is determined by the intensity of alignments according to which the decisive associations and dissociations adjust themselves. Also Hegel's proposition concerning the dialectical change of quantity into quality is comprehensible in the context of political thought only (see the note on Hegel, pp. 62-63). Helmuth Plessner, who as the first modern

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CARL SCHMITT

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