§2. Determining philosophy from out of itself, taking our lead from a word of Novalis.

a) The withdrawal of metaphysics (philosophizing) as a human activity into the obscurity of the essence of man.

We have ultimately failed, then, in all these attempts to characterize metaphysics by way of detours. Yet have we not gained anything in so doing? Yes and no. We have not gained a definition or anything like that. No doubt we have gained an important and perhaps essential insight into what is peculiar about metaphysics; that we ourselves avoid confrontation with it, steal away from metaphysics itself and take to detours; yet also that no other choice remains than to ready ourselves and to look metaphysics in the face, so as not to lose sight of it again.

Yet how is it possible to lose sight of something that we have not yet caught sight of at all? How can metaphysics withdraw from us when we are not at all in a position to follow it to wherever it draws us? Are we really unable to see where it slips away to, or do we merely draw back in terror when faced with the peculiar effort entailed in grasping metaphysics directly?

The negative result is this: philosophy does not permit itself to be grasped or determined by way of detours or as something other than itself. It demands that we do not look away from it, but apprehend it from out of itself. Philosophy itself—what do we know of it, what and how is it? It itself is only whenever we are philosophizing. Philosophy is philosophizing. That does not seem very informative. Yet however much we seem merely to be repeating the same thing, this says something essential. It points the direction in which we have to search, indeed the direction in which metaphysics withdraws from us. Metaphysics as philosophizing, as our own human activity—how and to where can metaphysics as philosophizing, as our own human activity, withdraw from us, if we ourselves are, after all, human beings? Yet do we in fact know what we ourselves are? What is man? The crown of creation or some wayward path, some great misunderstanding and an abyss? If we know so little about man, how can our essence not be alien to us? How can philosophizing as a human activity fail to conceal itself from us in the obscurity of this essence? Philosophy—as we are presumably superficially aware—is not some arbitrary enterprise with which we pass our time as the fancy takes us, not some mere gathering of knowledge that we can easily obtain for ourselves at any time from books, but (we know this only obscurely) something to do with the whole, something extreme, where an ultimate pronouncement and interlocution occurs on the part of human beings. For why else would we have come along here? Or have we arrived here only because others also come along, or because we happen to have a free period just between five and six when it is not worth going home? Why are we here? Do we know what we are letting ourselves in for?

b) Homesickness as the fundamental attunement of philosophizing, and the questions concerning world, finitude, individuation.

Philosophy—an ultimate pronouncement and interlocution on the part of man that constantly permeates him in his entirety. Yet what is man, that he philosophizes in the ground of his essence, and what is this philosophizing? What are we in this? Where do we want to go? Did we once just stumble into the universe by chance? Novalis on one occasion says in a fragment: "Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere." A strange definition, romantic of course. Homesickness—does such a thing still exist today at all? Has it not become an incomprehensible word, even in everyday life? Has not contemporary city man, the ape of civilization, long since eradicatated homesickness? And homesickness as the very determination of philosophy! But above all, what sort of witness are we presenting here with regard to philosophy? Novalis—merely a poet, after all, and hardly a scientific philosopher. Does not Aristotle say in his Metaphysics: πολλά πειθόντα δοιοτι; Poets tell many a lie?

Yet without provoking an argument over the authority and significance of this witness, let us merely recall that art—which includes poetry too—is the sister of philosophy and that all science is perhaps only a servant with respect to philosophy.

Let us remain with the issue and ask: What is all this talk about philosophy as homesickness? Novalis himself elucidates: "an urge to be everywhere at home." Philosophy can only be such an urge if we who philosophize are not at home everywhere. What is demanded by this urge? To be at home everywhere—what does that mean? Not merely here or there, nor even simply in every place, in all places taken together one after the other. Rather, to be at home everywhere means to be at once and at all times within the whole. We name this 'within the whole' and its character of wholeness the world. We are, and to the extent that we are, we are always waiting for something. We are always called upon by something as a whole. This 'as a whole' is the world.

We are asking: What is that—world?

This is where we are driven in our homesickness: to being as a whole. Our very being is this restlessness. We have somehow always already departed

1. Novalis, Schriften. Ed. J. Minor (Jena, 1923). Vol. 2, p. 179, Frgm. 21. [Tr: The term 'urge' translates the German Trieb. more literally 'drive' or 'instinctual drive.' Trieb and its cognates (e.g., treiben, vor treiben, weg treiben, zurück treiben) are prominent both in the analyses of boredom and in the discussions of animal life which constitute the two major themes of the course.]

toward this whole, or better, we are already always on the way to it. But we are driven on, i.e., we are somehow simultaneously torn back by something, resting in a gravity that draws us downward. We are underway to this 'as a whole'. We ourselves are this underway, this transition, this 'neither the one nor the other'. What is this oscillating to and fro between this neither/nor? Not the one and likewise not the other, this 'indeed, and yet not, and yet indeed'. What is the unrest of this 'not'? We name it finitude.

We are asking: What is that—finitude?

Finitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way of being. If we wish to become what we are, we cannot abandon this finitude or deceive ourselves about it, but must safeguard it. Such preservation is the innermost process of our being finite, i.e., it is our innermost becoming finite. Finitude only is in truly becoming finite. In becoming finite, however, there ultimately occurs an individuation of man with respect to his Dasein. Individuation—this does not mean that man clings to his frail little ego that pulls itself up against something or other which it takes to be the world. This individuation is rather that solitude in which each human being first of all enters into a nearness to what is essential in all things, a nearness to world. What is this solitude, where each human being will be as though unique?

What is that—individuation?

What is all this, taken together: world, finite, individuation? What is happening to us here? What is man, that such things happen to him in his very ground? Is what we know of man: the animal, dupe of civilization, guardian of culture, and even personality—is all this only the shadow in him of something quite other, of that which we name Dasein? Philosophy, metaphysics, is a homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere, a demand, not blind and without direction, but one which awakens us to such questions as those we have just asked and to their unity: what is world, finitude, individuation? Each of these questions inquires into the whole. It is not sufficient for us to know such questions. What is decisive is whether we really ask such questions, whether we have the strength to sustain them right through our whole existence. It is not sufficient for us to simply abandon ourselves to such questions in an indeterminate and vacillating manner. Rather this urge to be at home everywhere is in itself at the same time a seeking of those ways which open up the right path for such questions. For this, in turn, we require the hammer of conceptual comprehension [Begriff] which can open such a path. We are dealing with a conceptual comprehension and with concepts of a primordial kind. Metaphysical concepts remain eternally closed off from any inherently indifferent and noncommittal scientific acumen. Metaphysical concepts are not something that we could simply learn in this way, nor something which a teacher or anyone calling themselves a philosopher might require to be simply recited and applied.

Above all, however, we shall never have comprehended these concepts [Begriffe] and their conceptual rigor unless we have first been gripped [ergreifen] by whatever they are supposed to comprehend. The fundamental concern of philosophizing pertains to such being gripped, to awakening and planting it. All such being gripped, however, comes from and remains in an attunement [Stimmung]. To the extent that conceptual comprehending and philosophizing is not some arbitrary enterprise alongside others, but happens in the ground [Gründe] of human Dasein, the attunements out of which our being gripped philosophically and our philosophical comprehension arise are always necessarily fundamental attunements [Grundstimmungen] of Dasein. They are of the kind that constantly, essentially, and thoroughly attune human beings, without human beings necessarily always recognizing them as such. Philosophy in each case happens in a fundamental attunement. Conceptual philosophical comprehension is grounded in our being gripped, and this is grounded in a fundamental attunement. Does not Novalis ultimately mean something like this when he calls philosophy a homesickness? Then this poet's word would not be at all deceptive, if only we extract what is essential from it.

And yet, what we have gained from all this is certainly not some definition of metaphysics, but something else. We saw that in our initial attempts to characterize metaphysics we were brought back time and again from all our detours and forced to grasp metaphysics in terms of itself. Even as we did so, metaphysics withdrew from us. Yet to where did it draw us? Metaphysics drew itself back and draws itself back into the obscurity of the essence of man. Our question: What is metaphysics? has transformed itself into the question: What is man?

Certainly we have found no answer to this either. On the contrary, man himself has become more enigmatic for us. We ask anew: What is man? A transition, a direction, a storm sweeping over our planet, a recurrence or a vexation for the gods? We do not know. Yet we have seen that in the essence of this mysterious being, philosophy happens.
Awakening a Fundamental Attunement in Our Philosophizing

Chapter One

The Task of Awakening a Fundamental Attunement and the Indication of a Concealed Fundamental Attunement in Our Contemporary Dasein

§16. Coming to a preliminary understanding about the significance of awakening a fundamental attunement.

a) Awakening: not ascertaining something at hand, but letting what is asleep become wakeful.

Our fundamental task now consists in awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophizing. I deliberately say: in our philosophizing, not in some arbitrary philosophizing nor even in philosophy in itself, for there is no such thing. It is a matter of awakening a fundamental attunement which is to sustain our philosophizing, and not the fundamental attunement. Accordingly, there is not merely one single attunement, but several. Which one concerns us? From where are we to derive such an attunement? We are faced with a choice concerning which fundamental attunement to awaken here. Yet we are faced not only with this choice, but also with the much more difficult question of the path upon which we are to awaken this or that fundamental attunement in our philosophizing.

Attunements—are they not something we can least of all invent, something that comes over us, something that we cannot simply call up? Do they not form of their own accord, as something we cannot forcibly bring about, but into which we slip unawares? If so, then we cannot and may not forcibly bring about such an attunement artificially or arbitrarily, if we are going to allow it to be an attunement. It must already be there. All we can do is to ascertain it. Yet how are we to ascertain a fundamental attunement of philosophizing? Can an attunement be ascertained as generally at hand, can it be demonstrated as a universally admitted fact? Is attunement in general something we take note of as something at hand, just as we notice, for example, that some people are fair and others dark? Is attunement something that one simply has or does not have? Of course, people will say, attunement is perhaps something other
than the colour of the hair and skin of human beings, yet something which
nevertheless can be ascertained with regard to human beings. How else should
we know about such attunements? Thus we will have to undertake a survey to
give us the fundamental attunement we are seeking. Granted that this could
be carried out, even merely within the circle of those present here and now—are
we really so sure that those we ask in each case in a position to inform us
about how this fundamental attunement of their Dasein is there ‘in them’?
Perhaps such a thing as the fundamental attunement we are seeking is precisely
something that cannot be ascertained in this way by an inquiry. It could be
that it pertains to ascertaining an attunement not merely that one has the
attunement, but that one is attuned in accord with it.

We can see already that any so-called objective ascertaining of a fundamental
attunement is a dubious, indeed impossible undertaking. Accordingly, it is also
meaningless to ask in general about the pervasiveness and universality of
attunement or to brood over the universal validity of something ascertained
in this way. In other words, it is not necessarily an objection to our claim of
a fundamental attunement being there in our Dasein if one of you, or even
many, or all of you assure us that you are unable to ascertain such an attune­
ment in yourselves when you observe yourselves. For in the end there is nothing
at all to be found by observation—no matter how astute, even if it were to call
upon psychoanalysis for help.

Thus we shall not speak at all of ‘ascertaining’ a fundamental attunement
in our philosophizing, but of awakening it. Awakening means making some­
thing wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful.

b) The being-there and not-being-there of attunement cannot be
grasped via the distinction between consciousness and
unconsciousness.

‘Whatever is sleeping’ is in a peculiar way absent and yet there. When we
awaken an attunement, this means that it is already there. At the same time,
itis expresses the fact that in a certain way it is not there. This is strange:
attunement is something that is simultaneously there and not there. If, in the
customary manner, we now wished to continue philosophizing in a formal way,
we could say straightforward: Something that is simultaneously there and not
there has that kind of being which intrinsically contradicts itself. For being­
there [Da-sein] and not-being-there [Nicht-Da-sein] is a straightforward con­

1. [Tr: In order to render the German meaningfully in this context, it has been necessary
to translate Da-sein as ‘being-there’ and the associated Weg-sein as ‘being-away.’ Readers
should note that there is little consistency in the hyphenation of Da-sein and Nicht-Da-sein (‘not-being­
there’) in the German text; accordingly, we have translated the inconsistencies and indicated the
German where helpful.]
And yet the fact remains: whenever we awaken an attunement, this entails that it was already there, and yet not there. On the negative side, we have seen that the distinction between being there [Da-sein] and not being there [Nicht-Dasein] is not equivalent to that between consciousness and unconsciousness. From this, however, we may conclude something further: If attunement is something that belongs to man, is 'in him', as we say, or if man has an attunement, and if this cannot be clarified with the aid of consciousness and unconsciousness, then we will not come close to this matter at all so long as we take man as something distinguished from material things by the fact that he has consciousness, that he is an animal endowed with reason, a rational animal, or an ego with pure life-experiences that has been tacked on to a body.

This conception of man as a living being, a living being that in addition has reason, has led to a complete failure to recognize the essence of attunement. The awakening of attunement, and the attempt to broach this strange task, in the end coincide with the demand for a complete transformation of our conception of man.

In order not to make the problem too complicated here at the outset, I shall not enter into the question of what sleep properly is. For in a methodological respect one could say that we will acquire information about the essence of awakening only if we clarify what sleeping and waking mean. I shall mention merely that the task of clarifying such phenomena as sleeping and waking cannot be addressed extrinsically as one particular question. Rather, such clarification can occur only on the presupposition that we possess a fundamental conception of how a being must be structurally determined such that it can sleep or be awake. We do not say that the stone is asleep or awake. Yet what about the plant? Here already we are uncertain. It is highly questionable whether the plant sleeps, precisely because it is questionable whether it is awake. We know that the animal sleeps. Yet the question remains as to whether its sleep is the same as that of man, and indeed the question as to what sleep in general is. This problem is intimately bound up with the question concerning the structure of being pertaining to these various kinds of beings: stone, plant, animal, man.

In contrast to the many misinterpretations of sleep in modernity, we see already in the philosophers of antiquity that the fundamental character of sleep shows itself to have been grasped in a much more elementary and immediate manner. Aristotle, who has written a treatise specifically on waking and sleeping (Περὶ ὧππου καὶ ἑργηγόροπος), a treatise which has a peculiar character of its own, has noticed something remarkable in saying that sleep is an ἀκτινηρία. He does not connect sleep with consciousness or unconsciousness. Rather, he says that sleep is a δειμος, a being bound, a peculiar way in which αἰσθητικός is bound. It is not only a way in which perception is bound, but also our essence, in that it cannot take in other beings which it itself is not. This characterization of sleep is more than an image, and opens up a broad perspective which has by no means been grasped in its metaphysical intent. For fundamental metaphysical reasons we must forego entering into the problem of sleep, and must attempt to clarify on another path what it means to awaken an attunement.

c) The being-there and not-being-there of attunement
on the grounds of man's being as being-there
and being-away (being absent).

That it is by no means a matter of the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness in the case of man when we speak of this simultaneous being-there [Du-sein] and not-being-there [Nicht-Du-sein] becomes clear from an occurrence that happens when we are quite awake. If for the moment we posit awareness as conscious life in contrast to unconscious life (sleep). How often it happens, in a conversation among a group of people, that we are 'not there', how often we find that we were absent, albeit without having fallen asleep. This not-being-there, this being-away [Weg-sein], has nothing at all to do with consciousness or unconsciousness in the usual sense. On the contrary, this not-being-there can be highly conscious. In such being absent we are precisely concerned with ourselves, or with something else. Yet this not-being-there is nonetheless a being-away. Think of the extreme case of madness, where the highest degree of consciousness can prevail and yet we say: The person is de-ranged, displaced, away and yet there. Nor are being-there and being-away identical with waking and sleeping. Why we nevertheless rightly conceive of them in these terms will become apparent later.

We see that this potential to be away ultimately belongs to the way in which man is in general. Yet man has the potential to be away in this manner only if his being has the character of being-there [Da-sein]. We name the being of man being-there, Dasein, in a sense yet to be determined and in distinction to the being at hand of the stone. In the end, this being-away pertains to the essence of being there [Dasein]. It is not something which happens arbitrarily from time to time, but is an essential characteristic of man's very being that indicates how he is, so that a human being—insofar as he or she exists—is, in his or her being there, also always already and necessarily away in some manner. All this transpires in such a way that the distinction between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' turns out not to be a primary one, but can be ascertained both in being there and in being away.

An attunement is to be awakened. Yet this means that it is there and not there. If attunement is something that has the character of 'there and not there', then attunement itself has to do with the innermost essence of man's being, with his Dasein. Attunement belongs to the being of man. The possibility
PART TWO

Really Asking the Metaphysical Questions to Be Developed from the Fundamental Attunement of Profound Boredom. The Question: What Is World?

Chapter One

The Metaphysical Questions to Be Developed from the Fundamental Attunement of Profound Boredom

§39. The questions concerning world, individuation, and finitude as what is given to questioning through the fundamental attunement of profound boredom in our contemporary Dasein. The essence of time as the root of the three questions.

What we ought to find oppressive, then, is the absence of any oppressiveness as a whole, the very expanse of this emptiness as a whole. What do we mean by this expression 'as a whole'? How can Dasein find itself placed in this way among beings as a whole? And what is at work here when this 'as a whole' presses in upon us on every side? We shall designate the expanse of this 'as a whole', which manifests itself in profound boredom, as world. In accordance with what this fundamental attunement confronts us with, we must ask: what is world?

The moment of vision which properly makes Dasein possible is simultaneously announced in this telling refusal of beings as a whole. This moment is the look of resolute disclosedness of Dasein for its Da-sein, a Da-sein that in each case is as existing in the situation it has unreservedly seized upon, an existing which is always singular and unique. We are asking about what this fundamental attunement announces to us as possibility whenever we ask what this moment of vision is, whenever we ask what it is that occurs in and through this moment, whenever we ask concerning the individuation of Dasein with respect to itself.

We are not asking about world and individuation here as some arbitrary pair of questions, but rather as something which manifests itself precisely in the fundamental attunement of profound boredom in an original unity and structural link, something which only as this unity is capable of attuning us through...
and through in this telling refusal that announces, this telling announcement that refuses.

We are thus asking about what it is that this fundamental attunement of profound boredom properly and really gives us to question whenever we ask: Whence the necessity of this relation between ‘expanse’ and ‘extremity’, between horizon and moment of vision, between world and individuation, and why does it arise? What kind of ‘and’ is it that links these terms? Why must that expanse of the entrancing horizon ultimately be ruptured by the moment of vision? And why can it be ruptured only by this moment of vision, so that Dasein attains its existence properly precisely in this rupture? Is the essence of the unity and structural linking of both terms ultimately a rupture? What is the meaning of this rupture within Dasein itself? We call this the finitude of Dasein and ask: What does finitude mean? Only with this question have we attained the question that fully gains a purchase upon what it is that is trying to voice itself in that fundamental attunement. Is it not the finitude of Dasein that resonates in the fundamental attunement of profound boredom and attunes us through and through?

At the very beginning of our lecture course we simply posed, in a rather arbitrary and violent fashion, those three questions which the fundamental attunement of profound boredom leads us to ask: what is world?, what is finitude?, what is individuation? But now the matter is somewhat clearer. These questions do not arise from books, they have not been culled by adaptation from a variety of philosophical schools, nor have they merely been repeated in obeisance to a trivialized metaphysical tradition. On the contrary, they now betray their possibility, i.e., their necessity in the need of our Dasein. Only when these questions are rooted in the place from which we now see them arising, and only when they remain rooted there, do they represent genuine questions. Yet if they really are genuine in this way, then they are not new. However, if they are not new, they are not old either. Neither new nor old, these questions are essential questions. In what is essential, however, everything associated with mere striving after originality or—what amounts to the same but is even more suspect—everything that seeks to contest an originality that was never attempted in the first place, has also become a matter of irrelevance. The question which continues to face us is simply whether or not we are capable of experiencing, or at least releasing, the liberating power harbored within these questions as questions.

Our three questions were posed in the following order: [1.] What is world? [2.] What is finitude? [3.] What is individuation? We have developed them in such a way, however, that finitude has emerged as the third and pressing question. Yet third in what sense? As the unifying and original root of the other two. Because this question is the most originary, the one which holds together the other two, we place it in the middle of the series. This is intended to indicate its originary character. In the order in which we proceed to address our three questions, however, we shall only be able to engage with this one in third place. And this is also to say that in addressing the first and second questions, we shall in each case already find ourselves pressed to deal with the third.

We have attempted to unfold these three questions—What is world? What is individuation? What is finitude?—from out of a fundamental attunement of our Dasein, to unfold them in such a way that in the very process the fundamental attunement of that profound boredom should become ever more acute as possibility. We are not now leaving this fundamental attunement behind us as a supposedly ascertained fact that is finished and done with. On the contrary, the elaboration of these questions is nothing other than an accentuation of the possibility of that fundamental attunement. Yet this profound boredom, and boredom as such, is rooted in the temporality of Dasein. Thus in their origin, our three questions themselves reach back into the question concerning the essence of time. But the question concerning the essence of time is the origin of all the questions of metaphysics and of their potential unfolding. Whether in fact the problematic of metaphysics must always be developed on the basis of the temporality of Dasein, however, cannot be objectively decided for the whole of world history, as it were. The possibility of a different kind of necessary grounding for metaphysics must remain open. However this possibility is not some empty, formal or logical possibility; rather what is possible regarding this possibility depends entirely upon the fate of man.

Let us now look back once more over the path we have followed. Taking as our guideline the elucidated phenomenon of boredom in its relative clarity, and especially that of profound boredom, we have attempted to clarify one fundamental attunement of our Dasein, one experience of profound boredom in our Dasein. This elucidation proceeded as a form of questioning. In this connection we took as our point of departure one structural moment of profound boredom, namely being left empty in the sense of the telling refusal of being as a whole. In the profound boredom with which we are concerned, this corresponds to the absence of any oppressiveness and the lack of mystery in our Dasein—a Dasein which knows only neediness and the necessary acts of self-defense encountered in this attunement or perhaps on an even more superficial level of our Dasein. To this inner trait of being left empty, the absence of any oppressiveness, there corresponds a unique being held in limbo in the sense of the moment of vision which indirectly announces itself at the same time. Corresponding to the absence of oppressiveness as a whole, the necessity of responding to this situation is simultaneously announced, the necessity of the ultimate demand [Zumutung] upon man. This is the demand that he necessarily shoulder once more his very Dasein, that he explicitly and properly take this Dasein upon himself. Man must first resolutely open himself up to this demand again, or learn how to do so—not indeed because someone
Chapter Two
The Beginning of Metaphysical Questioning with the Question of World. The Path of the Investigation and Its Difficulties

§42. The path of a comparative examination of three guiding theses: the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming.

We begin with the first of our three questions: What is world? Even now we tend to take this explicit question as a free-floating question asked along the way just like any other. Initially we do not know where we should look for an answer to it. Indeed, if we consider the matter more closely, we do not even know what we are asking about, or in what direction our questioning is moving. The first path toward an initial clarification entails, as in all such cases, that we pay close attention to the word and pursue the history of the word ‘world’ and the historical development of the concept it contains. I have attempted to pursue this path in my essay On the Essence of Ground. It is true that the exposition offered there of the concept of κόσμος, mundus, ‘world’ merely indicates the characteristic stages of this history and above all remains wholly within the parameters set by the theme of the essay. The exposition given there can, however, serve as a preliminary orientation as far as the concept of the term is concerned. Yet the theme treated there not only requires a broader and more concrete exposition, it also needs to be supplemented, or rather founded for the first time by that history of the concept of world which is not expressed in the history of the word at all. The history of the word provides only the exterior. The inner history involved can only be perceived in connection with the fundamental problem of metaphysics and along the lines of a clarified understanding of the problem of world. I shall not repeat here what I said in that context, but acquaintance with the earlier discussion could be useful in this connection, and all of Section II of the essay is important generally concerning this problem. Here I would just like to give a very general indication of the context in which, from an external point of view, the problem of world initially arises. The most familiar aspect of the problem reveals itself in the distinction between God and world. The world is the totality of beings outside of and other than God. Expressed in Christian terms, such beings thus also represent the realm of created being as distinct from uncreated being. And man in turn is also a part of the world understood in this sense. Yet man is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears and which he makes up in part. Man also stands over against the world. This standing-over-against is a ‘having’ of world as that in which man moves, with which he engages, which he both masters and serves, and to which he is exposed. Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part he is at once both master and servant of the world.

However crude this distinction may be, it does indicate man’s ambivalent position in relation to the world—as well as the ambivalent character of the concept of world itself. Initially and for some time to come we shall employ the word ‘world’ in this ambivalent sense. Historical reflection is capable of bringing these connections into sharper focus.

In contrast to this historical path toward an understanding of the concept of world, I attempted in Being and Time to provide a preliminary characterization of the phenomenon of world by interpreting the way in which we at first and for the most part move about in our everyday world. There I took my departure from what lies to hand in the everyday realm, from those things that we use and pursue, indeed in such a way that we do not really know of the peculiar character proper to such activity at all, and when we do try to describe it we immediately misinterpret it by applying concepts and questions that have their source elsewhere. That which is so close and intelligible to us in our everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally remote and unintelligible to us. In and through this initial characterization of the phenomenon of world the task is to press on and point out the phenomenon of world as a problem. It never occurred to me, however, to try and claim or prove with this interpretation that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram. The path followed in Being and Time in the attempt to shed light on the phenomenon of world really requires a very broad and wide-ranging perspective which cannot even remotely be made visible here in this lecture.

Instead we have chosen to follow a third path at this point—the path of a comparative examination. As we said, man is not merely a part of the world but is also master and servant of the world in the sense of “having” world. Man has world. But then what about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things like the stone, for example? Are they merely parts of the world, as distinct from man who in addition has world? Or does the animal too have world, and if so, in what way? In the same way as man, or in some other way? And how would we grasp this otherness? And what about the stone? However crudely, certain distinctions immediately manifest themselves here. We can formulate these distinctions in the following three theses: [1.] the stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming.

In attempting to uncover the essence of worldlessness, of poverty in world, and of world-formation, we shall also be exploring the various ways in which beings can be related to world. Through a comparative interpretation of this kind it must be possible to open up the essence of world and bring it sufficiently close to us to really begin to ask about it for the first time. For the problem of world by no means lies simply in the need to provide a more exact and more rigorous interpretation of the essence of the world. On the contrary, the real task is to bring the worldly character of the world into view for the first time as the possible theme of a fundamental problem of metaphysics.

In addition to the aforementioned historical path, the second path (which proceeds from man's everyday understanding of the world and remains within this understanding), and the third path (that of the comparative examination upon which we are about to embark), there are other possible paths which we shall not introduce here. Yet all of these paths necessarily have their own specific limitations and difficulties. This is because each of these paths comes from without, that is, each one brings with it the principles and perspectives that are characteristic of ordinary understanding. And whichever way we have chosen to follow, our task will be to disabuse ourselves of these initially habitual perspectives and ways of questioning, or to transform them by virtue of the force of what we come to see with ever greater clarity. This is true of every metaphysical problem. And this implies that in principle we can never assess metaphysics by employing the criteria of ordinary understanding, irrespective of whether metaphysics is considered to be beneficial or inimical to culture. In fact metaphysics is neither of these things, or, viewed from an external perspective, metaphysics is both at once. Metaphysics is "ambiguous" precisely because it is basically prior to such distinctions.

It is true that the third path, the path of a comparative examination, seems the most approachable because it is so adaptable and because in the process of making and grasping distinctions we can first really glimpse whatever is self-same and concordant. And yet precisely this third path presents special difficulties of its own which must be mentioned briefly at the outset, if they are not continually to impede our progress. We shall merely state these difficulties here, not eliminate them.

§43. The fundamental difficulty with respect to content and method in determining the essence and accessibility of life.

The comparative examination concerns material things (the stone), animals, and man. In order even to negotiate the problem we must accordingly already have at our disposal certain essential distinctions between these three realms. Or at least it must be possible for us to indicate such distinctions if required.

Yet it is difficult to determine even the distinction between man and animal. Of course, it is easy to say that one is a rational living being, while the other is a non-rational living being. But the question is precisely this: what does reason, or the lack of reason, actually mean here? Even if we succeed in clarifying this question, it is still uncertain whether this distinction does in fact represent what is most essential and what is metaphysically important here. When we ask this question concerning the relation between man and animal, we cannot therefore be concerned with deciding whether or not man is descended from the ape. For we cannot begin to pose this question, let alone answer it, until we clearly appreciate what the distinction between them is and how this distinction should be drawn. And this does not mean finding out how humans and animals are distinguished from one another in this or that particular respect. It means finding out what constitutes the essence of the animality of the animal and the essence of the humanity of man and through what sort of questions we can hope to pinpoint the essence of such beings at all.

Again, we can only determine the animality of the animal if we are clear about what constitutes the living character of a living being, as distinct from the non-living being which does not even have the possibility of dying. A stone cannot be dead because it is never alive.

Yet the difficulty here is not merely one of content with respect to what life as such is but is equally and almost more emphatically a methodological one: by what path can and should we gain access to the living character of the living being in its essence? In what way should life, the animality of the animal, and the plant-character of the plant be made accessible to us? It is not sufficient merely to provide a morphological description of the animal's form, its limbs, and so on; it is insufficient to explore the physiological processes and then to add on some form of animal psychology. For in all of this we have already presupposed that the animal is alive, that in its behavior the animal is also disposed in a certain manner. How are we to get to the bottom of this? The animal can perhaps neither observe itself, nor communicate any such observations to us. And even if the animal expresses itself and announces itself, as it seems to us, in a variety of expressive sounds and movements, it is we who must first interpret and analyze such forms of expression.

We are thus confronted by two fundamental difficulties: [1.] What are we to determine the essence of life in general as? [2.] How are living beings as such—the animality of the animal and the plant-character of the plant—originally accessible? Or is there no possibility of any original access here at all? But what would that imply with respect to the essential character of living beings, however this character is given? In the course of our comparative considerations both of these questions must be left open, but that also means that we must always have some answer ready, however provisional and tentative, in order to guide us as we pursue our comparative considerations. On the other hand, these comparative consid-
erations can and must ultimately make some contribution toward the clarification and possible answering of these questions.

Thus we constantly find ourselves moving in a circle. And this is an indication that we are moving within the realm of philosophy. Everywhere a kind of circling. This circling movement of philosophy of course is alien to ordinary understanding which only ever wants to get the job in hand over and done with as quickly as possible. But going round in circles gets us nowhere. Above all, it makes us feel dizzy, and dizziness is something uncanny. We feel as though we are suspended in the Nothing. Therefore there must be no such circling and thus no circle in philosophy! This is, after all, a universal principle of logic. That is why all scientific philosophy prides itself on getting by without this circle. Yet anyone who has never been seized by dizziness in the presence of a philosophical question has never asked the question in a philosophical way, that is, has never entered the circle in the first place. The only thing that ordinary understanding can see in this circling motion is the movement around the periphery which always returns to its original point of departure on the periphery. Thus it misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of the circle as such, an insight made possible in such a circling movement and in this alone. For the centre only manifests itself as such as we circle around it. And this is why every attempt to argue away such circularity in philosophy only leads us away from philosophy itself. Likewise every objection which argues that our examination is circular already demonstrates that it is not a philosophical objection at all and is consequently quite vacuous as far as philosophy is concerned. Of course this is not to say that every circular proof is a sign of philosophical thinking (circle and turbulence).

To sum up, then, we find ourselves moving in a circle when we presuppose a certain fundamental conception concerning both the essence of life and the way in which it is to be interpreted and then proceed on the basis of this presupposition to open up a path which will lead us to a fundamental conception of life.

§44. Summary and renewed introduction following the vacation: metaphysics as comprehensive questioning; awakening the fundamental attunement of profound boredom; the metaphysical questions to be developed from the fundamental attunement. Guidelines for correctly understanding this talk about the fundamental attunement of philosophizing.

Metaphysics—metaphysical knowledge is a comprehensive questioning in this twofold sense: [1.] that beings as a whole are in each case conceptually included in every metaphysical question; and [2.] that whoever is involved in metaphysical questioning is in each case caught up in the question as well, and is fundamentally affected by the act of questioning and the object of questioning. Man only finds himself involved and affected at all if he is already capable of being affected in his Dasein and can find himself gripped in this ability to be affected, indeed if this possibility of being gripped lies in his very essence. This essential possibility of being gripped belongs to the essence of man insofar as its Da-sein always—but not exclusively—implies being attuned. Only a being that is intrinsically attuned in general can find itself adversely attuned. Whatever is adversely attuned can undergo a change of attunement. Where there is attunement, there is the possibility of a change of attunement, and thus also of awakening attunement. Consequently, in order to be able to develop such a comprehensive questioning, it was first necessary to awaken a fundamental attunement and create the possibility of our being gripped. The first part of our lecture course, which consisted in a quite specific interpretation of a profound boredom in the ground of our Dasein, was dedicated to just this task. Yet the investigations of the first part of the course only derive their justification and import from the second part. For it is here that we hope actually to ask the metaphysical questions to be developed out of the fundamental attunement. We developed three such questions: [1.] What is world? [2.] What is finitude? [3.] What is individuation? Here the second question is also the most originary and most central one. We will not pursue the connection between fundamental attunement and metaphysics any further at this juncture. I should merely like to offer certain guidelines with respect to a few points in order to facilitate our understanding of what is to come and to prevent the immediate misunderstandings which inevitably arise from the ambiguity of philosophy itself.

[1.] When we grounded our questioning in a fundamental attunement, this particular fundamental attunement, we did not mean to imply that the three questions developed out of this attunement also exhaust its metaphysical significance, as if these three particular questions were the only ones capable of being developed from this fundamental attunement. They are simply drawn from it.

[2.] Nor do we mean to imply that this particular fundamental attunement in itself is the only path which leads to these three questions. Precisely if they really are metaphysical questions, then we must be able to unfold them from out of every fundamental attunement of Dasein.

[3.] Yet which fundamental attunement we choose in order to develop and pursue these questions is not simply a matter of arbitrary decision on our part. It is true that in a certain sense we do choose, and do so freely, and yet in the deepest sense we are bound and compelled as well. This choice is certainly not merely a matter of making an arbitrary selection from what happens to lie before us. Rather:

[4.] The choice involves binding ourselves to the intrinsic character of metaphysics itself which compels the engagement of a particular finite Dasein, that is,
attunement of actual action. Our action in this context is a particular kind of attuned questioning. We began by characterizing our first question, What is world? We pointed out that there are various paths we can take in unfolding this question: [1.] the historical examination of the history of the concept of world [2.] the unfolding of the concept of world on the basis of our everyday understanding of world. And as a third way we have chosen the path of a comparative examination. The main points of our approach are encapsulated in three theses: [1.] The stone is worldless; [2.] The animal is poor in world; [3.] Man is world-forming.

Chapter Three
The Beginning of the Comparative Examination,
Taking the Intermediate Thesis That the Animal
Is Poor in World as Our Point of Departure

The path we shall follow in elaborating the question ‘What is world?’ will be that of a comparative examination. However, the question itself is not a rootless one. Fundamental attunement constitutes the enduring site of our question, and this is something we must constantly remember. By means of a comparative examination of our three theses (the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming) we hope to delimit in a provisional manner what we should understand by the term world in general, as well as the direction in which we should look for such understanding. What is world? That is our question. Yet we do not ask it in order to receive just any answer, nor one that takes the form of a “definition,” but in order to actually unfold a metaphysical question. Proper metaphysical comprehension lies in the correct unfolding of the question. Or, to put it in another way, metaphysical questions do not receive an answer, if that means communicating some known fact or other. Metaphysical questions remain without an answer, not because we cannot find one on account of the supposed impossibility of metaphysics, but because the kind of answer that consists in communicating some established fact is quite inadequate for such questions. Indeed it only corrupts and stifles them.

However, in order actually to unfold the question ‘What is world?’ we must acquire an initial understanding of what we mean by ‘world’ and what it is that we reserve this term for. We are undertaking the aforementioned comparative examination of stone, animal, and man, according to which the stone is worldless, the animal poor in world, and man world-forming, in order to provide this initial understanding. The perspective from which we shall make our comparison, that in respect of which we shall do the comparing, is the specific relation that stone, animal, and man in each case has toward world. The distinctions in respect of this relation, or in the absence of such a relation, will help to set in relief what we call world. Initially, a comparative examination of this kind seems to proceed in an extremely naive manner, as if the three beings we have mentioned were three things of the same order, as if they were all on the same plane. We shall begin our comparative analysis by starting from the middle, that is, by asking what it means to say that the animal is poor in world. Thus we shall also constantly be looking to two sides at once, both toward the worldlessness of the stone and toward the world-forming of man,
§45. The propositional character of this thesis and the relation between metaphysics and the positive sciences.

a) The thesis that 'the animal is poor in world' as a statement of essence and a presupposition of zoology.

The circular movement of philosophy.

Our guiding thesis with reference to the animal claims that the animal is poor in world. What sort of proposition have we here, and similarly in the cases of the other two? A proposition about the animal. The animal is the object of investigation in zoology. Is then our proposition borrowed from zoology? For zoology is surely a suitable kind of investigation, oriented as it is to all those facts circumscribed by the term 'animal'. Our thesis is a proposition like that which states that the worker bees in the bee community communicate information about newly discovered feeding places by performing a sort of dance in the hive, or like that which states that mammals have seven cervical vertebrae. However, we see at once that in fact our thesis does not tell us something merely about insects or merely about mammals, since it also includes, for example, non-articulated creatures, unicellular animals like amoebae, infusoria, sea urchins and the like—all animals, every animal. Expressed in a rather extrinsic way we could say that our thesis is more universal than these other propositions. Yet why is it more universal, and in what respect? Because this thesis is meant to say something about animality as such, something about the essence of the animal: it is a statement of essence. It is not a statement of essence simply because it holds true for all animals and not merely for some of them. Rather, it is the other way around: it holds true for all animals because it is a statement of essence. Universal validity can only result from our knowledge insofar as it is essential in each case, and not the other way around.

Yet where does the essential character of a statement like that possessed by our thesis lie, if not in its universality? Where does the proposition 'the animal is poor in world' come from? We can answer once again that it derives from zoology, since this is the science that deals with animals. But precisely because zoology deals with animals this proposition cannot be a result of zoological investigation; rather, it must be its presupposition. For this presupposition ultimately involves an antecedent determination of what belongs in general to the essence of the animal, that is, a delimitation of the field within which any positive investigation of animals must move. Accordingly, if our thesis already contains a presupposition of all zoology, we cannot expect to derive the thesis from zoology in the first place. This seems to imply that in elucidating the proposition we will simply dispense with all the detailed wealth of acquired knowledge in this field, knowledge that can no longer be mastered even by the experts in it. So it seems. But what possible criterion do we then possess for the truth of our thesis? Where do we draw that thesis from in the first place? Is it an arbitrary one, or is it a hypothesis, the truth of which can be confirmed only by a specific investigation?

It is neither of these. The proposition does not derive from zoology, but it cannot be elucidated independently of zoology either. It requires a specific orientation toward zoology and biology in general, and yet it is not through them that its truth is to be determined. However, we cannot analyze this relationship more closely at this juncture.

Here I merely wish to point out the peculiar character of the proposition in question and the manner in which ordinary understanding approaches such propositions. We seem to take them from the relevant science (here zoology) and, at the same time, we try to use them to first secure a specific domain for the science in question and thus to secure its possibility as a science. Thus it is that we find ourselves moving in a circle. Ordinary understanding can only perceive and grasp what lies straight in front of it: it thus wishes to advance in a straight line, moving from the nearest point on to the next one, and so on. This is called progress. Ordinary understanding can only perceive circular movement in its own way too: that is to say, it moves along the circumference, taking its movement around the circle as a straight forward progression, until suddenly it stumbles upon its starting-point and comes to a standstill, at a loss because of its lack of progress. Since progress is the criterion employed by ordinary understanding, such understanding finds any circular movement objectionable and considers it a sign of impossibility. The fatal thing, however, is that this argument about circular movement is employed in philosophy itself, even though it is but a symptom of a tendency to reduce philosophy to the level of ordinary understanding.

The essential feature of the circular movement of philosophy does not lie in running around the periphery and returning to the point of departure. It lies in that view of the centre that this circular course alone can provide. The centre, that is, the middle and ground, reveals itself as such only in and for the movement that circles it. The circular character of philosophical thought is directly bound up with its ambiguity, an ambiguity that is not to be eliminated or, still less, levelled off by means of dialectic. It is characteristic that we repeatedly find in the history of philosophy such attempts to level off this circularity and ambiguity of philosophical thinking through the use of dialectic, and most recently in a grand and impressive form. Yet all dialectic in philosophy is only the expression of an embarrassment.
from the perspective of man, or alternatively to explain life by means of laws adopted from the realm of material nature. Yet both of these erstwhile forms of explanation produce an inexplicable residue which in general is simply explained away. What is lacking in all this is insight into the necessary task of securing above all else the essential nature of life in and of itself and a resolute attempt to accomplish it. The fact that we may not take success for granted here, as the history of the problem shows, suggests that the disconcerting false trails we have followed hitherto are not the result of superficial thinking. There are essential reasons for them. On the other hand, we can see that the conception of life in terms of its intermediate position between material nature and human existence often forms the core of a general view that interprets man and everything else from the perspective of life: the biological worldview. Max Scheler recently attempted to treat this hierarchical sequence of material beings, life, and spirit in a unified manner within the context of an anthropology. He did so in the conviction that man is the being who unites within himself all the levels of beings—physical being, the being of plants and animals, and the being specific to spirit. I believe this thesis to be a fundamental error in Scheler’s position, one that must inevitably deny him any access to metaphysics. The extent to which this is the case will become apparent as our considerations proceed. Nevertheless, the way in which Scheler has posed the question, however programmatic it has remained, is still an essential one in many respects and superior to anything yet attempted.

§46. The thesis that ‘the animal is poor in world’ in relation to the thesis that ‘man is world-forming’. The relation between poverty in world and world-formation does not entail hierarchical assessment. Poverty in world as deprivation of world.

If we now return from these fundamental considerations to our thesis that the animal is poor in world, we must admit that recent research in biology, provided that we are capable of interpreting it in a philosophical way, strongly suggests the possibility of illustrating this thesis directly. At the same time the thesis is framed in such a way that, like every metaphysical thesis, it is capable of compelling positive research to engage in fundamental reflection. Indeed, at first sight, our thesis seems to run directly counter to the most penetrating fundamental reflections in biology and zoology, when we consider that ever since J. von Uexküll we have all become accustomed to talking about the environmental world of the animal. Our thesis, on the other hand, asserts that the animal is poor in world. It would make an instructive contribution to our understanding of the problem in question if we could now enter into a detailed and philosophical interpretation of the recent theory of life. But we cannot do so at this juncture, especially since the main thrust of our considerations does not rest upon a thematic metaphysics of life (of animals and plants).

We have placed our thesis that the animal is poor in world between the other two, which assert that the stone is worldless and that man is world-forming. If we now consider the second thesis in relation to the third, then it immediately becomes clear why we have done so. Poor in world implies poverty as opposed to richness; poverty implies less as opposed to more. The animal is poor in world, it somehow possesses less. But less of what? Less in respect of what is accessible to it, of whatever as an animal it can deal with, of whatever it can be affected by as an animal, of whatever it can relate to as a living being. Less as against more, namely as against the richness of all those relationships that human Dasein has at its disposal. The bee, for example, has its hive, its cells, the blossoms it seeks out, and the other bees of the swarm. The bee’s world is limited to a specific domain and is strictly circumscribed. And this is also true of the world of the frog, the world of the chaffinch and so on. But it is not merely the world of each particular animal that is limited in range—the extent and manner in which an animal is able to penetrate whatever is accessible to it is also limited. The worker bee is familiar with the blossoms it frequents, along with their colour and scent, but it does not know the stamens of these blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the roots of the plant and it cannot know anything about the number of stamens or leaves, for example. As against this, the world of man is a rich one, greater in range, far more extensive in its penetrability, constantly extendable not only in its range (we can always bring more and more beings into consideration) but also in respect to the manner in which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability. Consequently we can characterize the relation man possesses to the world by referring to the extendability of everything that he relates to. This is why we speak of man as world-forming.

If we now look more closely at the distinction between poverty in world and world-formation in this form, this distinction reveals itself as one of degree in terms of levels of completeness with respect to the accessibility of beings in each case. And this immediately supplies us with a concept of world: world initially signifies the sum total of beings accessible to man or animals alike, variable as it is in range and depth of penetrability. Thus ‘poor in world’ is inferior with respect to the greater value of ‘world-formation’. This is all so obvious that there is no need to discuss it any further. We have long been familiar with such self-evident observations, so much so that we do not understand what all the commotion is about or what this distinction is supposed to contribute to determining the essence of the animality of the animal. It looks as if we are simply tampering with the problem by introducing specific terms like world and environmental world into the discussion.
Certainly the relation we have described above between the animal's poverty in world and the world-formation of man has a suspiciously self-evident clarity that actually disappears as soon as we really come to grips with the issue. Nevertheless, we must be aware of this apparent clarity if we are to understand the kind of arguments to which our supposedly most natural considerations always tend so casually to appeal. We identified a relation of difference in degree with respect to the accessibility of beings, a relation of more and less, of lower and higher, a relation of levels of completeness. Yet even a little reflection soon renders it questionable whether in fact poverty is necessarily and intrinsically of lesser significance with respect to richness. The reverse might well be true. In any case this comparison between man and animal, characterized in terms of world-formation and poverty in world respectively, allows no evaluative ranking or assessment with respect to completeness or incompleteness, quite irrespective of the fact that such evaluative ranking is factically premature and unsuitable here. For we immediately find ourselves in the greatest perplexity over the question concerning greater or lesser completeness in each case with respect to the accessibility of beings, as soon as we compare the discriminatory capacity of a fowl's eye with that of the human eye or the canine sense of smell with our own, for example. However ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the animal, such an assessment is deeply questionable, especially when we consider that man can sink lower than any animal. No animal can become deprived in the same way as man. Of course in the last analysis this consideration itself reveals the need for careful examination to determine its legitimacy, its limits, and its usefulness. The questionable character of this approach also affects the judgments we make within the animal realm itself. Here too we are accustomed to speaking about higher and lower animals, but it is nevertheless a fundamental mistake to suppose that amoebae or infusoria are more imperfect or incomplete animals than elephants or apes. Every animal and every species of animal as such is just as perfect and complete as any other. Thus it should be clear from everything we have said that from the outset this talk of poverty in world and world-formation must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation. Certainly we wish to articulate a relation and a distinction here, albeit in another respect. In what respect? That is precisely what we are seeking to discover. But first of all it is necessary to determine the concept of poverty [Armut] in an appropriate manner and to define its specific meaning in connection with the phenomenon of world if we wish to comprehend our thesis concerning poverty in world.

What is poor here by no means represents merely what is 'less' or 'lesser' with respect to what is 'more' or 'greater'. Being poor does not simply mean possessing nothing, or little, or less than another. Rather being poor means being deprived [Entbehren]. Such deprivation in turn is possible in different ways depending on how whatever is poor is deprived and comports itself in its deprivation, how it responds to the deprivation, how it takes this deprivation. In short: with regard to what such a being is deprived of and above all to the way in which it is deprived, namely the way in which it is in a mood [zu Mute]—poverty in mood [Armut]. It is true that we rarely employ or understand the idea of poverty in this proper sense which relates to the characteristic way in which man is poor. We tend to employ it in the more extended and weaker sense of 'poor' or 'meagre', in talking of the poor or meagre flow of water in a stream, for example. Yet even here it is not merely a case of comparing what is less at one moment with what is more at another. In this context 'poor' implies having a lack or insufficiency. Here too poverty represents a lacking or absence of something which could be present and generally ought to be present. This weaker sense of 'poor' must be distinguished from the other sense of being poor which is a kind of being in a mood [Zusturz]sines], one that we must characterize by the term 'in a mood of poverty' [Armmutigkeit], by analogy with 'in a mood of melancholy' [schwermutig] or 'in a mood of humility' [einemütig]. This is meant to indicate that poverty is not merely a characteristic property, but the very way in which man comports and bears himself. Poverty in this proper sense of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and necessarily so. Yet from such deprivation we can draw our own peculiar power of procuring transparency and inner freedom for Dasein. Poverty in the sense of being in a mood of poverty [Armmutigkeit] does not simply imply indifference with respect to what we possess. On the contrary, it represents that preeminent kind of having in which we seem not to have. Poverty as a noun in its weaker usage implies both these senses, including the 'poor' flow of water in the river, even though in this case the river in its being deprived cannot be in any kind of mood.

What then is the significance of the word 'poverty' in the expression 'world-poverty'? How is the 'poverty in world' of the animal to be understood? In what sense is the animal domain to be described as poor? At the moment all this remains obscure. It cannot be decided by reflections on language but only by taking a look at animality itself. In any case the poverty in question does not express a purely quantitative difference. Yet this is already to say that in the expressions 'poverty in world' and 'world-formation' the term 'world' itself cannot express quantity, sum total, or degree with respect to the accessibility of beings.
Now that we have defined the concept of poverty more precisely as a kind of deprivation in some sense, we can begin to take another step toward understanding what the poverty in world of the animal signifies. If poverty implies deprivation then the thesis that 'the animal is poor in world' means something like 'the animal is deprived of world', 'the animal has no world'. This step also helps to define our second thesis in relation to the third, according to which man is world-forming. For man does have a world.

But then the relation between the second thesis and the first, according to which the stone is worldless, instantly becomes problematic because there no longer seems to be any distinction between them. The stone is worldless, it is without world, it has no world. Neither the stone nor the animal has world. But this not-having of world is not to be understood in the same sense in each case. The different expressions worldlessness and poverty in world already indicate that there is indeed a distinction here. But if the animal is thus brought into such proximity to the stone, then we immediately find ourselves confronted by the decisive question as to the distinction between the way in which the stone has no world and the way in which the animal does not have a world.

Being worldless and being poor in world both represent a kind of not-having of world. Poverty in world implies a deprivation of world. Worldlessness on the other hand is constitutive of the stone in the sense that the stone cannot even be deprived of something like world. Merely not having world is insufficient here. The possibility of being deprived of world requires further conditions. What do we mean, then, when we say that the stone cannot even be deprived of world? We must initially clarify this point at the present stage of our investigation.

Let us provisionally define world as those beings which are in each case accessible and may be dealt with, accessible in such a way that dealing with such beings is possible or necessary for the kind of being pertaining to a particular being. The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is 'touching' the earth. But what we call 'touching' here is not a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like that relationship which the lizard has to the stone on which it lies basking in the sun. And the touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being. The lying upon..., the touching involved in our three examples is fundamentally different in each case. Returning to the stone: it lies upon the earth but does not touch it. The earth is not given for the stone as an underlying support which bears it, let alone given as earth. Nor of course can the stone ever sense this earth as such, even as it lies upon it. The stone lies on the path. If we throw it into the meadow then it will lie wherever it falls. We can cast it into a ditch filled with water. It sinks and ends up lying on the bottom. In each case according to circumstance the stone crops up here or there, amongst and amidst a host of other things, but always in such a way that everything present around it remains essentially inaccessible to the stone itself. Because in its being a stone it has no possible access to anything else around it, anything that it might attain or possess as such, it cannot possibly be said to be deprived of anything either. The stone is, i.e., it is such and such, and as such turns up here or there or is simply not present. It is—but is essentially without access to those beings amongst which it is in its own way (presence at hand), and this belongs to its being. The stone is worldless. The worldlessness of a being can now be defined as its having no access to those beings (as beings) amongst which this particular being with this specific manner of being is. Having no access belongs to and characterizes the specific manner of being of the particular being in question. It is beside the point to regard the fact that the stone has no access as some kind of lack. For having no access is precisely what makes possible its specific kind of being, i.e., the realm of being of physical and material nature and the laws governing it.

The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely crop up in the world. It has sought out this stone and is accustomed to doing so. If we now remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie wherever we have put it but starts looking for its stone again, irrespective of whether or not it actually finds it. The lizard basks in the sun. At least this is how we describe what it is doing, although it is doubtful whether it really comports itself in the same way as we do when we lie out in the sun, i.e., whether the sun is accessible to it as sun, whether the lizard is capable of experiencing the rock as rock. Yet the lizard's relation to the sun and to warmth is different from that of the warm stone simply lying present at hand in the sun. Even if we avoid every misleading and premature psychological interpretation of the specific manner of being pertaining to the lizard and prevent ourselves from 'empathetically' projecting our own feelings onto this animal, we can still perceive a distinction between the specific manner of being pertaining to the lizard and to animals, and the specific manner of being pertaining to a material thing. It is true that the rock on which the lizard lies is not given for the lizard as rock, in such a way that it could inquire into its mineralogical constitution for example. It is true that the sun in which it is basking is not given for the lizard as sun, in such a way that it could ask questions of astrophysics about it and expect to
find the answers. But it is not true to say that the lizard merely crops up as present at hand beside the rock, among other things such as the sun for example, in the same way as the stone lying nearby is simply present at hand amongst other things. On the contrary, the lizard has its own relation to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other things. One is tempted to suggest that what we identify as the rock and the sun are just lizard-things for the lizard, so to speak. When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word 'rock' in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet is not known to the lizard as a rock. If we cross out the word we do not simply mean to imply that something else is in question here or is taken as something else. Rather we imply that whatever it is is not accessible to it as a being. The blade of grass that the beetle crawls up, for example, is not a blade of grass for it at all; it is not something possibly destined to become part of the bundle of hay with which the peasant will feed his cow. The blade of grass is simply a beetle-path on which the beetle specifically seeks beetle-nourishment, and not just any edible matter in general. Every animal as animal has a specific set of relationships to its sources of nourishment, its prey, its enemies, its sexual mates, and so on. These relationships, which are infinitely difficult for us to grasp and require a high degree of cautious methodological foresight on our part, have a peculiar fundamental character of their own, the metaphysical significance of which has never properly been perceived or understood before. We shall learn more about this fundamental character when we come to our concluding interpretation later on. The animal has a specific relationship to a circumscribed domain with respect to its sources of nourishment, its prey, its enemies, and its sexual mates. But throughout the course of its life the animal also maintains itself in a specific element, whether it is water or air or both, in such a way that the element belonging to it goes unnoticed by that animal, although as soon as the animal is removed from its appropriate element and placed in an alien environment it instantly reacts by attempting to escape from the new element and striving to return to its original one. Thus certain things are accessible to the animal in a way which is not arbitrary and within limits which are not arbitrary either. The animal's way of being, which we call 'life', is not without access to what is around it and about it, to that amongst which it appears as a living being. It is because of this that the claim arises that the animal has an environmental world of its own within which it moves. Throughout the course of its life the animal is confined to its environmental world, immersed as it were within a fixed sphere that is incapable of further expansion or contraction.

Yet if we understand world as the accessibility of beings, how can we possibly claim that the animal is poor in world—especially if poverty implies being deprived—when it is obvious that the animal does have access of some kind? Even if the animal has access to beings in a different way from ourselves and within more narrowly circumscribed limits, it is still not entirely deprived of world. The animal has world. Thus absolute deprivation of world does not belong to the animal after all.

§48. The sense in which the animal has and does not have world: attaining a place from which to begin the elucidation of the concept of world.

The preceding comparative examination has already succeeded in clarifying the significance of our three theses, but that only means that our guiding problem, the question concerning the concept of world, has become more acute. Our perplexity about what we should understand by world and the relationship to world has increased. If by world we understand beings in their accessibility in each case, if such accessibility of beings is a fundamental character of the concept of world, and if being a living being means having access to other beings, then the animal stands on the side of man. Man and animals alike have world. On the other hand, if the intermediate thesis concerning the animal's poverty in world is justified and poverty represents deprivation and deprivation in turn means not having something, then the animal stands on the side of the stone. The animal thus reveals itself as a being which both has and does not have world. This is contradictory and thus logically impossible. But metaphysics and everything essential has a logic quite different from that of sound common understanding. If these propositions concerning the having and not-having of world in relation to the animal are legitimate, then we must be employing the ideas of world and accessibility of beings in a different sense in each case. In other words, the concept of world has still not been clarified. We cannot as yet see our way forward on account of the obscurity of this concept. Nevertheless we have found the place where such elucidation must begin and have identified the knot which we must first strive to undo. We shall only be able to do so if we pursue its intricate entanglements and the convolution of the propositions that the animal has and does not have world. For this is where the two extremes of worldlessness and world-formation are, as it were, intertwined with one another. Only in solving this problem in an original fashion will we be able to see what world means and, even more importantly, see whether we really understand the concept and the phenomenon of world or whether all this simply remains an empty phrase for us. This intertwining is expressed in the intermediate position occupied by the thesis concerning the animal. Consequently we must attempt once again to acquire further insight into the essence of the animal and its animality. But we will now no longer be able to proceed with the same naivety as we did before. For
We have only discussed such behaviour toward the light as an example of one mode of behaviour. Our reference to the peculiar forms of orientation proper to the animal, and to animal behaviour within and toward the light, is simply intended to show that, just as in the case of smell and colour, light too possesses a quite peculiar significance for the animal. Yet all the same, and precisely for this reason, the behaviour of the animal, even if it does imply a certain directedness toward something, cannot be interpreted as meaning that such behaviour itself could grasp as such to which it relates. In spite of all this, our own interpretation still gives the impression of being somewhat arbitrary. We understood the movement toward the light as a movement away from the darkness, the movement toward the darkness as a movement away from the light. But why on earth should we privilege the movement away from the darkness, the movement toward the darkness as a movement away from the light? And why not the reverse? Is it simply because the first alternative suits our preconceived ideas? By no means. For strictly speaking neither alternative is appropriate. We shall therefore continue to follow the injunction expressed above to maintain critical vigilance with respect to the supposedly more plausible positive interpretation of eliminative behaviour. But why does an apparently negative impression arise when we are discussing the character of behaviour as eliminative? It arises because the animal's behaviour expresses a kind of rejection on the part of the animal with respect to what it relates to in its behaviour. In this rejecting things from itself we see the animal's self-absorption. The latter does not imply that the organism is encapsulated within itself, cut off from any and every relation to the environment. But nor does this relational aspect belonging to behaviour represent an attentiveness to what is present at hand as present at hand within the environment. This eliminative character of all behaviour, the way in which it leaves things to one side, is an enigma which repeatedly forces us to address the question: What then is behaviour related to and what is the nature of this relation? Or we can now also ask: Where is the ring with which the animal is encircled as such, and how does it encircle the animal? What is this encircling [Umringer] like, if a relation to other things is not merely sustained, but constantly brought about [errangen] by this encircling?

In order to attempt to clarify the eliminative character of behaviour let us begin once again with an elementary observation. One could say that if behaviour is something thoroughly eliminative, then it is so constituted as behaviour that it does not let anything present at hand stand as it is, but rather obviates it so as to be rid of it as it were. Eliminative behaviour thus represents the continual production of an emptiness. Yet a relation to something like emptiness is only possible where there is a relation to beings as such. Thus in turn the very possibility of seeking an emptiness is given only where a relation to beings as such is possible. If we attempted to understand eliminative behaviour as a seeking of emptiness, then we should already have to understand the animal's behaviour fundamentally as a self-comportment toward beings as such. Yet that is precisely what is impossible. However this also implies that animals do not comport themselves indifferently with respect to beings either. For such indifference would also represent a relation to beings as such. But if behaviour is not a relation to beings, does this mean that it is a relation to nothing? Not at all. Yet if it is not a relation to nothing, it must always be a relation to something, which surely must itself be and actually is. Certainly, but the question is whether behaviour is not precisely a kind of relation to... in which that to which the behaviour relates in the manner of not attending to it is open in a certain way for the animal. But this certainly does not mean manifest as a being. There is no indication that the animal somehow does or ever could comport itself toward beings as such. Yet it is certainly true that the animal does announce itself as something that relates to other things, and does so in such a way that it is somehow affected by these other things. I emphasize this point precisely because this relation to... which is involved in animal behaviour, even though it essentially lacks the manifestness of beings, has either been quite overlooked in previous attempts to define the concept of the organism and the essence of the animal in general, or has merely been inserted as an afterthought. The possibility of providing an adequate definition of the organism as such depends upon the possibility of grasping this fundamental character of behaviour in an adequate fashion. If it is the case that the animal does not comport itself toward beings as such, then behaviour involves no letting-be of beings as such—none at all and in no way whatsoever, not even any not letting-be. But in that case the inevitably misleading term for the fundamental character of behaviour, namely as elimination [Be-seitigen], must be taken in a quite fundamental sense. Behaviour is eliminative, i.e., it is certainly a relating to... but it is so in such a way that beings can never, and essentially never, manifest themselves as beings. It is only through this interpretation that we can discover the essence of behaviour and captivity. Yet behaviour is not blind either, in the sense in which we might want to say that beings are certainly there for the animal even though it cannot grasp them because it is not endowed with reason and does not think.

b) Animal behaviour as encircled by a disinhibiting ring.

Now if something resembling a surrounding environment is open for the animal and its behaviour, we must now ask whether it is possible to clarify this any further.

Instinctual and subservient capability for... the totality of its self-absorbed capability, is an interrelated drivenness of the instinctual drives which enircles the animal. It does so in such a way that it is precisely this encirclement which makes possible the behaviour in which the animal is related to other things.
Related to other things—although these other things are not manifest as beings. Capability for . . . is not a matter of comportment toward beings. Capability for . . . never passes over into its correlative behaviour because as such announce themselves in such and such a way for the animal. But the other things in question do not stand in a mechanical relation to the animal either since, in its capability for . . . , the animal opens itself to what is other in approaching it. That is, the capability for . . . is what intrinsically makes it possible for something other to occasion anything like a capability to produce a specific form of behaviour in the first place, and to maintain the capability as driven in this behaviour. Capability for . . . and thus behaviour itself is open for such occasions, for stimuli, for that which initiates, i.e., disinhibits the capability for . . . in such and such a way in each case. That which the animal's behaviour relates to is such that this behaviour is open to it. This other is taken up into this openness of the animal in a manner that we shall describe as disinhibition [Enthemmung]. Since capability for . . . thoroughly governs the animal's specific manner of being, a being such as the animal, when it comes into relation with something else, can only come upon the sort of entity that 'affects' or initiates the capability in some way. Nothing else can ever penetrate the ring around the animal. Here we are not yet concerned with any particular content whatsoever, but only with the fundamental character of that to which the animal can stand in relation at all.

Yet if the instinctual drives are precisely characterized by their uninhibitedness, then why should the instinctual drive have to be disinhibited in the first place? Should we not rather say that it is the other which the animal comes upon which inhibits the instinctual drive? We speak with a certain legitimacy of the uninhibitedness of instinctual drives when we consider the results of such activity as it were, what these drives drive toward and what they are driven to do, and especially when we also relate these things to our own possible comportment in and toward them—the question of control and so on. But if on the other hand we reflect upon the instinctual drive intrinsically as such—rather than upon the instinctual activity into which it can be released—and consider the instinctual structure itself, then we can see that the instinctual drive precisely possesses an inner tension and charge, a containment and inhibitedness that essentially must be disinhibited before it can pass over into driven activity and thus be 'uninhibited' in the usual, ordinary sense of the word.

That which behaviour as instinctual capability comes upon is always disinhibiting in some way. That which disinhibits in this way, and stands in relation to behaviour only insofar as it is disinhibiting, constantly withdraws [entzieht sich] from behaviour as it were and does so necessarily on account of its own manner of 'showing itself'—if we may talk in such terms at all. Since that which disinhibits behaviour essentially withdraws and eludes it, so too the relation of behaviour to that which occasions it is a not attending to it. No permanence as such is ever attained, nor indeed any change as such. The encirclement of the animal within the interrelated drivenness of its instinctual drives is intrinsically open for that which disinhibits it. Thus the intrinsic self-encirclement [Sich-Einringen] of the animal is not a kind of encapsulation. On the contrary, the encirclement is precisely drawn about the animal in such a way that it opens up a sphere within which whatever disinhibits can do so in this or that manner. The behaviour of the animal, contrary to how it might appear, does not and never can relate to present-at-hand things singly or collectively. Rather, the animal surrounds itself with a disinhibiting ring which prescribes what can affect or occasion its behaviour. Since this self-encirclement belongs to the animal, it always intrinsically bears its disinhibiting ring along with it and does so as long as it is alive. Or more precisely—the life of the animal is precisely the struggle [Ringen] to maintain this encircling ring or sphere within which a quite specifically articulated manifold of disinhibitions can arise. Every animal surrounds itself with this disinhibiting ring, and not merely subsequently once the animal has already been living for a certain period of time, because this encircling belongs to the innermost organization of the animal and its fundamental morphological structure. The way in which the animal is in each case taken by the whole is directed by the range of possible disinhibitions within its encirclement. Such being taken is open for manifold forms of disinhibition, but this openness is precisely not the manifestness of anything that behaviour could relate to as beings. This open being taken intrinsically involves the withholding of any possibility of apprehending beings. This self-encircling entails an open absorption in it—not in the so-called 'interior' of the animal, but in the ring of the interrelated drivenness of instinctual drives as they open themselves up.

This question now leads us toward the distinction we tried to express by talking of man's world-forming and the animal's poverty in world, a poverty which, roughly put, is nonetheless a kind of wealth. The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that in our questioning we always and inevitably interpret the poverty in world and the peculiar encirclement proper to the animal in such a way that we end up talking as if that which the animal relates to and the manner in which it does so were some being, and as if the relation involved were an ontological relation that is manifest to the animal. The fact that this is not the case forces us to claim that the essence of life can become accessible only if we consider it in a deconstructive [abbauenden] fashion. But this does not mean that life represents something inferior or some kind of lower level in comparison with human Dasein. On the contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness with which the human world may have nothing to compare.

In its instinctual relatedness to . . . , behaviour is open for . . . But as instinctual activity it can at the same time only be touched or affected by something that brings the instinctual relatedness into play, i.e., by something that can disinhibit it. That which disinhibits and releases the inhibitedness of the instinctual drive, that which allows the instinctual activity to respond to
the disinhibition, and thus allows the animal to move within certain instinctual drives, must always be in accordance with its essence withdraw itself. It is nothing enduring that could stand over against the animal as a possible object—whether as something changed or unchanged [in the process]. The self-withdrawal of that which disinhibits corresponds to the essential inability to attend to it which is involved in behaviour, that is, the inability to attend to that which disinhibits as something objectively present at hand.

It is only because the animal's specific manner of being is behaviour, and because that which disinhibits correlatively belongs to such behaviour, that the animal can be affected by stimuli. Precisely the ability to be stimulated, or to be aroused (irritability), has been identified as the distinctive characteristic of 'living substance'. Johannes Müller, one of the most important physiologists, has investigated precisely this characteristic feature of life from various perspectives in his *Handbook of Human Physiology.* Yet even to this day the essence of stimulus and of the ability to be stimulated has not yet been adequately determined either in the field of physiology or that of psychology, i.e., it has not been brought back to an examination of its structural conditions. Even to this day we have not recognized that the task is to ask: What are the conditions of the possibility of any stimulation in general? For the stimulus and the process of being stimulated is not the condition of possibility for the disinhibition of an instinctual drive. On the contrary, it is only where there is disinhibition and intrinsic encirclement that stimulation is possible. Of course one is accustomed to distinguishing the effect of a stimulus from a mechanical relation of cause and effect precisely by saying that in the case of mechanical pressure or impact there is always an immediate reaction of counter-pressure and counter-impact, whereas the stimulus is not subjected to any correlative counter-effect by whatever is stimulated. What it is that stimulates still remains unclarified here.

It is easy to see the extent to which this customary interpretation of stimulus and the various relations into which it enters is all too clearly oriented around a comparison with mechanical relations. Yet even disregarding this fact, the interpretation is false, so false that it actually covers over the decisive feature of the stimulus-relation. Certainly, that which is stimulated does not exert a counter-effect, a counter-stimulus as it were, back upon the stimulus that elicits the stimulation. But that by no means implies that what can be stimulated is not already related and indeed must be related to that which is supposed to be able to stimulate it. This relation to the potential stimulus must indeed be an instinctual one. It is only if this *prior relatedness* of what can be stimulated to that which can stimulate it already possesses the character of an instinctual drive which *instinctually en-counters* the stimulus, that anything like the eliciting of a stimulus is possible in general. This is the only way in which we can make the peculiar distribution and manifold forms of receptivity toward stimuli intelligible. For receptivity is always grounded in the range and directedness of the encompassing driveness of the instinctual drives, delimited as it is in every case by the disinhibiting ring. In other words, it is only from this perspective that we can understand the peculiar fact that individual animals and species of animal are restricted to a quite specific manifold of possible stimuli, i.e., that their ring of possible disinhibition is distributed in quite specific directions with regard to receptivity or non-receptivity. However strong or intense a stimulus is, objectively speaking, a particular animal may be utterly unresponsive to particular stimuli. It is not as if some kind of barrier were erected in front of the animal. Rather the animal, in the unity of its captivation, does not have any intrinsic drives that are oriented in this direction. It is not instinctually open for this particular possibility of disinhibition.

Thus we can see that the circumscribed range of possible disinhibition or, as we put it, the disinhibiting ring, is intrinsic to the animal itself; that in its factual life amongst beings in each case the animal itself carves out a quite specific encircling ring [Umringung] within which it can be stimulated, i.e., a prior ring of potential disinhibition. Every animal surrounds itself with such an encircling ring, but it does not do so subsequently, as if the animal initially lived or ever could live without this encircling ring altogether, as if this encircling ring somehow grew up around the animal only at a later stage. On the contrary, every living being, however rudimentary it might appear to be, is surrounded in every moment of its life by such an encircling ring of possible disinhibition. More precisely, we must say that life is nothing but the animal's encircling itself and struggling [Ringen] with its encircling ring, a ring by way of which the animal is absorbed without its ever being with itself [bei sich selbst] in the proper sense.

which two guest-friends share between them and bequeath to their children, so that if the latter happen to meet later, they can hold together the halves of the ring to see if they fit, and can thereby recognize one another as belonging together, i.e., as befriended via their fathers. We cannot here pursue any further the more extensive history of the meaning of this word. We have here the intrinsic meaning of σύμβολον: being held to one another and simultaneously proving to belong together, or, as we generally say: agreement in being held together, being held-to one another (compared).

Aristotle tells us: Discourse is what it is, i.e., it forms a sphere of understand-ability, whenever there is a γένεσις of a σύμβολον, whenever a being held together occurs in which there also lies an agreement. Discourse and word are to be found only in the occurrence of the symbol, whenever and to the extent that an agreement and a holding together occur. This occurrence is the condition of the possibility of discourse. Such an occurrence is lacking in the case of the animal, although the animal does produce sounds. These sounds designate something, as we say, they bear witness to something, and yet these utterances are not words, they have no meaning, they cannot give anything as meaningful. Only the genesis of the symbol makes this possible, the entire occurrence in which, from the very beginning, there occurs a holding together: man's holding himself together with something in such a way that he can come into agreement with whatever he is holding himself together with, and do so in the manner of referring [Meinen]. In accordance with his essence, man holds himself together with something else, insofar as he holds himself in a comportment toward other beings, and on the basis of this comportment toward other beings is able to refer to these other beings as such. Since sounds emerge within such an occurrence, and emerge for this referring, they enter into the service of meanings, which thus befit them, as it were. Only something which is referred to as such in the utterance can be held together, something with which, in uniting it, this holding together agrees. Sounds which emerge out of and for this fundamental relation of letting something come into agreement and holding it together are words. Words, discourse, occur in and out of such agreement with whatever can be referred to from the beginning and can be grasped as such, with something that several people can and must simultaneously agree with one another on, as that which is meant to be referred to in discourse. Because the λόγος is grounded in the γένεσις of the σύμβολον, it is κατά συνθήκην: by agreement.

What Aristotle sees quite obscurely under the title σύμβολον, sees only approximately, and without any explication, in looking at it quite ingeniously, is nothing other than what we today call transcendence. There is language [Es gibt Sprache] only in the case of a being that by its essence transcends. This is the sense of Aristotle's thesis that a λόγος is κατά συνθήκην. I have no inclination to recall what people have made of this Aristotelian thesis when interpreting it. Yet it is not by chance, either, that interpretations have gone astray here, because in thoughts on the essence of the λόγος prior to Aristotle there indeed arose two theories or theses that make it look as though Aristotle took one side of this debate. Aristotle states: The λόγος is not φάσμα, is not some product of a physical event or process; it is not anything like digestion or the circulation of the blood, but it has its γένεσις, in something quite different: not φώςει, but κατά συνθήκην. Corresponding to this is that part of the earlier theory of the λόγος which says that language is θέσει: Words do not grow, they do not occur and form like organic processes, but are what they are on the basis of reaching an agreement. Since Aristotle also says κατά συνθήκην, it looks as though he were of the opinion that language formed in this way, that sounds are produced and humans reach an agreement: we will understand such and such by this. This does happen, but it does not reach the inner essence of the γένεσις of language itself, which Aristotle saw much more profoundly by indeed starting from these theories in a certain way, yet by taking decisive new steps to overcome them. Words emerge from that essential agreement of human beings with one another, in accordance with which they are open in their being with one another for the beings around them, which they can then individually agree about—and this also means fail to agree about. Only on the grounds of this originary, essential agreement is discourse possible in its essential function: σημαίνειν, giving that which is understandable to be understood.

b) Discourse as exhibiting (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) in its possibility of revealing-concealing (ἀληθεύειν-μεθεύεσθαι).

We have thus achieved some initial understanding of what the inner possibility of the λόγος consists in, taken in this quite broad sense. However, Aristotle says: λόγος ἄπαξ, μὲν σημαντικός, every λόγος indeed gives something to be understood—ἀποφαντικός δὲ ὁ πᾶς, but not every discourse is an exhibiting, i.e., one which, in the manner in which it gives something to be understood, has the specific tendency merely to exhibit as such whatever it is referring to. By propositional statement we mean only the λόγος ἀποφαντικός, discourse that points out. Requesting, εὐχή, for example, is a non-apophatic λόγος. If my discourse is a requesting, then it is not attempting to inform the other person about something in the sense of increasing his or her knowledge. Nor, however, is the request a communicating of the fact that I desire something or am filled with a desire. Nor is this discourse a mere desiring, but rather the concrete act of 'requesting of another'. Aristotle says: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι

4. Ibid., Chap. 4, 17a 2f.
Every \( \text{\textalpha\textgamma\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron} \) is \( \text{\sigma\mu\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron} \) which is why \( \text{\textalpha\textgamma\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron} \) is \( \text{\phi\omega\nu\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} \), a forming of understandability occurring by way of vocal utterance—but not every \( \text{\textalpha\textgamma\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron} \) \( \text{\sigma\mu\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\textalpha\phi\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} \). The question is: Which \( \text{\textalpha\textgamma\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron} \) is apophantic, and how does it become such? What is the distinguishing feature of propositional discourse compared to all other kinds of discourse? Aristotle says: Only that \( \text{\textalpha\textgamma\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron\textomicron} \) is \( \text{\textalpha\phi\omicron\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} \), \( \text{\epsilon\nu} \) \( \text{\textomicron\textomicron\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\omicron} \) \( \text{\omicron\nu\micr
of the symbol occurs, which we interpret as the agreement of man with that toward which he comports himself. On the basis of agreement with beings, man can and must come to utter his understanding, form those alliances of sounds which are the coinings of meanings, utterances that we call words and vocabulary. All discourse is determined by this γένεσις of the σύμβολον. But not all discourse is a λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς, a propositional discourse, one which has the tendency to point out as such that which is being spoken about. What is it, then, that determines such a λόγος? The fact that ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψέυδεσθαι occurs in it, revealing or concealing. The λόγος that points out, therefore, is that λόγος which has the intrinsic possibility of revealing and concealing. We must note, however, that this possibility of revealing and concealing is not a contingent property of the λόγος, but its inner essence. The λόγος that points out must point out even when it conceals. In order to make a false judgement, I must, in so far as I speak discursively, live in a discursive tendency that is concerned with pointing something out. Even concealing is grounded in a tendency to point out. The other person must have taken my discourse as though it were supposed to communicate something to him. The character of this tendency to point out lies at the basis both of revealing and of concealing.

c) Apprehending something as something in forming a unity (σύνθεσις νοημάτων ὄσπερ ἐν ὑπόνοιαν), the 'as'-structure, as the essential ground of the possibility of the revealing-concealing pertaining to the λόγος as exhibiting.

If we now wish to pursue this structure of the apophantic λόγος more carefully, we must ask how this specific λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς is connected with the general essence of the λόγος, namely σημαένειν. We have heard that the essence of discourse in general, both non-apophantic and apophantic, lies in σηματικός, in the γένεσις of the σύμβολον, in the occurrence of this fundamental connection of an agreement that holds together. If a discourse becomes apophantic, then this σηματικός must become transformed in the manner indicated, i.e., what happens is not simply an agreement in general between the meaning and what is intended, rather the meaning and the meaningful content of the λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς agrees with what is meant in such a way that this λόγος as discourse and in its discursivity seeks to point out what is meant itself. Discourse now has the tendency to let whatever the discourse is about be seen—to let it be seen, and this alone. The 'propositional statement' is a kind of discourse which in itself, in accordance with its discursive intention, is either revealing or concealing. However elementary this characterization may be, it is nevertheless decisive for understanding the whole problem of the λόγος. It also provides a measure of the history of this problem, of the extent to which that history has distanced itself from its fundamental roots up to the present day. All attempts to reform logic must remain merely arbitrary, unless they arise from an engagement with the core of this problematic. To make just one point: Philosophy today, for various reasons, is impelled toward dialectics, and toward a renewal of the dialectical method in the context of a renewal of Hegelian philosophy. Dialectics moves within a speaking—λόγος—and counter-speaking, thesis and antithesis. The possibility of one speaking, one λόγος, being opposed and counter to another λόγος, the ἀντικείσθαι of λόγος and λόγος, can be understood only if we know what the λόγος itself is. Only then can we know what dialectic is, and only then can we know whether dialectic is justified and necessary, or whether it is a stopgap measure, perhaps because it does not comprehend the problem of the λόγος. What is permitted today in philosophy and even in theology with respect to this problem exceeds all imagination.

We shall pursue only one thread from the problematic of the λόγος, so as to unfold the problem of the 'as' and the 'as a whole'. We arrived at the result that what is distinctive about the λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς is its ability to reveal or conceal. This possibility of doing one or the other constitutes the positive essence of this λόγος. We shall now ask about the ground of this essence. What is it that grounds this possibility of either revealing or concealing? How must the λόγος in itself be, in accordance with its innermost essential structure, if it is to have the possibility of revealing or concealing? Aristotle provides us with some information on this (at a point which is not insignificant with respect to the whole problem) in his treatise Περὶ ψήφισμάτων Γ.6.7 This deals with the essence of life and the levels of living beings (cf. λόγον ἐχον—ἄλογον above). He does not provide this information within his theory of the λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς as such, then, although it is also mentioned there (see below). It is odd that there is talk of λόγος precisely in this treatise "On the Essence of Life. Yet it is not so odd as soon as we recall that Aristotle grasps the concept of life in a very broad sense that includes the being of plant, animal, and human. Book Three of this treatise deals precisely with living beings in the sense of man. The distinguishing feature of man is the λόγος. And this is why this treatise deals with the λόγος. At this particular point Aristotle provides us with information about what it is that grounds the possibility for the λόγος to be either true or false. He states: ἐν αἷς δὲ κατ' ὅ ν ὅ δε κατ' ὅ ἀληθὲς, σύνθεσις τῆς ἕνδη κοινομάτων ὄσπερ ἐν ὑπόνοιαν.8 In the field of that in relation to which both what conceals and what reveals become possible, something like an assembling (a taking together) of whatever is apprehended has already occurred, and in such a way that whatever is apprehended forms

8. Ibid., Γ6, 430a 27f.
Martin Heidegger

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
World, Finitude, Solitude

Translated by
William McNeill
and
Nicholas Walker

Indiana University Press
Bloomingston and Indianapolis