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Politics of Friendship

Jacques Derrida
Translated by George Collins
On Absolute Hostility: The Cause of Philosophy and the Spectre of the Political

The two fundamental principles of Empedocles — *philía* and *neikos* — are, both in name and function, the same as our two primal instincts, *Eros* and *destructiveness*, the first of which endeavours to combine what exists into ever greater entities, while the second endeavours to dissolve these combinations and to destroy the structures to which they have given rise. And no one can foresee in what guise the nucleus of truth contained in the theory of Empedocles will present itself to later understanding.

*Freud*

By overturning the address attributed to Aristotle ("O friends, no friend", to: "O enemies, no enemy"), Nietzsche's 'living fool' intensified a first seizure of vertigo. With this second stanza, this second apostrophe, one's head spins even faster.

This is not due only to the structure of the sentence, with which we have certainly not finished, not by a long shot. It is first of all due to a sort of *hyperbolic* build-up that is perhaps the very origin of good and evil, both beyond being (the *Republic* once defined the Good by this hyperbole that ranges beyond being): a hyperbole at the origin of good and evil, common to both, a hyperbole *qua* the difference between good and evil, the friend and the enemy, peace and war. It is this infinite hyperbole common to the two terms of the opposition, thereby making them pass into one another, that makes one’s head spin. Is there any hope for the person addressing his friends or his enemies in this way? An interviewer of the 'dying sage' or in that of the 'living fool' would have asked them: 'Are you "pessimistic" or "optimistic"?'.
ON ABSOLUTE HOSTILITY

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The Hostility: philosophy and the Political

The dual function of Empedocles—philosophy and politics, the same as our two effective strengths, the first of which dissolves into ever greater entities, while the second destroys these combinations and decomposes the things they have given rise to. And so the nucleus of truth contained in our two effective strengths will present itself to later ages.

Friedrich Nietzsche

To Aristotle (‘O friends, no friend’, no friend, no friend’), one’s ‘living fool’ intensified a first apostrophe, this second apostrophe, one’s very origin of good and evil, common to the distinction of friend and enemy; making them pass into one another, making them present themselves to one another: ‘Are you “pessimistic” or “optimistic”? Is your philosophy of human nature systematic, authentic, and coherent thinkers of the political fact (la chose politique) (Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc.). But would these thinkers have recognized themselves better in the sentence of the ‘dying sage’ or in that of the ‘living fool’? Their pessimism, from the moment there is no longer anything ‘psychological’ or moral about it, nevertheless consists only in the fact that they ‘presuppose (voraussetzen) in truth only the actuality/effectivity or the real possibility of the distinction of friend and enemy (die reale Wirklichkeit oder Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind).’

We shall have to question the logic of this presupposition. What is this ‘actuality/effectivity’? This ‘possibility’? Here, in one case or the other, what does ‘real’ mean? Under what conditions, from within what axiomatic, can Schmitt be assured that a knowledge is ‘right’ or ‘correct’ (richtig) in acknowledging—as does Hobbes, for example—that the conviction of possessing the truth, the good, the just, is what sparks the worst hostilities, or that the ‘war of all against all’ is neither the unchained monstrosity of a delirious imagination nor the ‘free competition’ of bourgeois capitalism, but ‘the fundamental presupposition of a specific political philosophy’?

Let us retrace our steps. Schmitt thinks there would be a difference between two forms of disagreement (diaphorie). He believes he can substantiate this when he defines the enemy—in other words, the political—when he thinks he can appeal so briefly to Plato to describe, explain, and illustrate this divide. One has the impression that sometimes the appeal to Plato serves as its justification. Attempting to take a closer look at the question, we were intent on emphasizing, among other points, that such a difference exists (their nonexistence or their disappearance)? Or in announcing to one’s enemies that there is no enemy? And what, on the contrary, is the ultimate in pessimism, if that can be said? Declaring that there is ‘no friend’, or still bemoaning the fact that there is no enemy? Would the ultimate of the ultimate be a theory of absolute ambivalence, in the Empedoclean tradition of Freud— that is, one hospitable to the death instinct? Herein, perhaps, lies the shared secret of the ‘dying sage’ and the ‘living fool’. It will have been understood that they have never stopped speaking an initiatory language. And to hit it off, laughing at one another: like fellows, companions, as thick as thieves.

While declaring: The question is not settled by psychological comments on “optimism” or “pessimism”?—words he deliberately leaves in quotation marks—Schmitt resolutely affirms, more than once, that only ‘pessimistic’ thinkers of human nature are systematic, authentic, and coherent thinkers of the political fact (la chose politique) (Machiavelli, Hobbes, etc.). But would these thinkers have recognized themselves better in the sentence of the ‘dying sage’ or in that of the ‘living fool’? Their pessimism, from the moment there is no longer anything ‘psychological’ or moral about it, nevertheless consists only in the fact that they ‘presuppose (voraussetzen) in truth only the actuality/effectivity or the real possibility of the distinction of friend and enemy (die reale Wirklichkeit oder Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind).’

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amounts to the same thing, that it belongs to the same. The two different forms of the disagreement are both natural, 'physical'. They remain natural even if one of them, civil war (stasis), sometimes takes on the figure of de-naturalization. For this would then be a de-naturalization of nature in nature: an evil, an illness, a parasite or a graft - a foreign body, in sum, within the body politic itself, in its own body. The body politic should, no doubt - but it never manages to - identify correctly the foreign body of the enemy outside itself. The purity of the distinction between stasis and pôlemos remains in the Republic a 'paradigm', accessible only to discourse. Occasionally, as we have seen, Plato recommends, from a certain vantage point, that this paradigmatic limit be erased, and that the enemies from outside be handled as the enemies within. Whether one claims to respect or to erase this limit, in any case its purity cannot be put into practice. One cannot do what one says. Neither what one says one will do nor what should be done. No praxis can correspond to indications contained in a léxis. Plato emphasizes this limit of the limit, this inevitable bastardization of opposed terms. In other words, marking in sum the inaccessibility of the border (the line of separation between concepts, as much as the one between the inside and outside of the body politic, the city, State or country), he sharpens all the more the cutting edge of this difference between praxis and léxis in the difference between the two sorts of disagreement: this difference is also in nature. This is a law of phusis: practical implementation does not get as close to truth as does discourse. 8

Practical conclusion: in practice, in other words, in this political practice that history is - this difference between the disagreements never takes place. It can never be found. Never concretely. As a result, the purity of pôlemos or the enemy, whereby Schmitt would define the political, remains unattainable. The concept of the political undoubtedly corresponds, as concept, to what the ideal discourse can want to state most rigorously on the ideality of the political. But no politics has ever been adequate to its concept. No political event can be correctly described or defined with recourse to these concepts. And this inadequation is not accidental, since politics is essentially a praxis, as Schmitt himself always implies in his ever-so-insistent reliance on the concept of real, present possibility or eventuality in his analyses of the formal structures of the political. Here we have another way of marking the paradox: the inadequation to the concept happens to belong to the concept itself. This inadequation of the concept to itself manifests itself pre-eminently in the order of the political or political practice, unless this order - or rather, its possibility - would situate the very place, the conceptual being of any concept to conceptual being of the concept, the pôlemos of an ideal politics, a regulative and practical politics in general - could never be a political'.

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would situate the very place, the phenomenon or the 'reason' of an inadequation of any concept to itself: the concept of disjunction \textit{qua} the conceptual being of the concept. It follows that even what is called politics, an ideal politics, a regulative and programmatic aim — indeed, an idea of politics in general — could never regulate (itself on) such a 'concept of the political'.

What makes us so sensitive to this problem? And why is it — precisely in a Schmittian-style discourse — something other than a methodological, epistemological, theoretical, speculative, even simply discursive problem, like an equivocation which logico-rhetorical precautions could easily eliminate? Because, in the remarkable effort of what can be called a modern 'political expert' to recover possession of the concept opening and commanding the field of his own discourse, the effect of this limit is capitalized \textit{en abyme}. We are saying 'political expert' here, for if Schmitt is a jurist-historian-of-the-theological-political, and so on, he would offer \textit{de jure} its conceptual foundations, its phenomenological and semantic axioms to a science of the political as such: he is a political expert who would acknowledge no other regional knowledge, no other experience than the 'political', the right to found a political discourse \textit{[politologie]}: an ontology or an epistemology of the political. Only the purely political can teach us how to think and formalize what is purely political. From the very first words of the 1963 preface to the second edition of \textit{The Concept of the Political}, this concern is recalled: concern for the tableau, spatial and taxonomic concern, methodological and topological concern. A concern which cannot last without hierarchical classification. The assigned task, the duty, is to frame and to enframe (\textit{encadrieren}), to put into order (\textit{orden}), to propose 'a theoretical framework for a measureless problem.' Hence a framework (\textit{ein Rahmen}) had to be given also to the problematic of the theory of right, to order its 'entwined thematic', and to discover 'a topology of its concepts'.

Despite or on account of such an aim, Schmitt tirelessly claims \textit{concrete}, living and relevant pertinence for the words of political language. Among these words, first and foremost for the word 'political'. These vocables must not and cannot remain, in their 'ultimate consequence', the correlate of ideal or abstract entities. Now this necessity of concrete determination would stem from the 'polemical sense' that always determines these terms. It is therefore all the more troubling that the meaning of \textit{polemos} remains, as we have just suggested, both natural and blurred, naturally and irreducibly blurred. And precisely where Schmitt would exclude politics from naturalness. This blurred impurity stems from the fact, recalled by Schmitt, that all
political concepts have a 'polemical sense', in two respects, as we shall see: these are concepts of the polemical, and they are never implemented except in a polemical field. These concepts of the polemical have a strictly polemical use.

There are moments when the form of this paradox can be judged pathetic. Schmitt goes to great lengths—in our judgement totally in vain, a priori doomed to failure—to exclude from all other purity (objective, scientific, moral, juridical, psychological, economic, aesthetic, etc.) the purity of the political, the proper and pure impurity of the concept or the meaning of the 'political'. For he wants, moreover—he will never renounce this—the polemical sense of this purity of the political to be, in its very impurity, still pure. Failing this, it could not be distinguished from anything from which it distinguishes itself. Schmitt would like to be able to count on the pure impurity, on the impure purity of the political as such, of the properly political. He would wish—it is his Platonic dream—that this 'as such' should remain pure at the very spot where it is contaminated. And that this 'as such' should dissipate our doubts concerning what 'friend' and 'enemy' mean. More precisely—and this difference is important here—the doubts must disappear not so much relative to the meaning of friendship or hostility but, above all, relative to who the friend and enemy are. If the political is to exist, one must know who everyone is, who is a friend and who is an enemy, and this knowing is not in the mode of theoretical knowledge but in one of a practical identification: knowing consists here in knowing how to identify the friend and the enemy. The practical identification of self—and from one self to another—the practical identification of the other—and from other to other—seem to be sometimes conditions, sometimes consequences, of the identification of friend and enemy (we shall have to come back to the logic of philautia or narcissism—even the fraternal double—working obscurely away at this discourse).

Schmitt wants to be able to count on the opposition, and reckon with it. Even if no pure access to the eidos or essence is to be had, even if, in all conceptual purity, it is not known what war, politics, friendship, enmity, hate or love, hostility or peace are, one can and must know—first of all practically, politically, polemically—who is the friend and who is the enemy.

This, it would seem to us, is the singular torsion marking, for example, the passage we shall quote shortly. The weight of the semantic or conceptual determination is carried in this passage, as we shall point out, by the word 'concrete'. Schmitt's entire discourse posits and supposes in fact, as we shall verify, a concrete sense of the concrete which he opposes—as if only in passing—and without the word being kept in the French translation—to the spectral (gespenstisch). In this analysis, the word, passing, like a passer-by—as a synonym would they be synonyms? Would the possibility, the abstract, and the spectral please us, feature? On the other hand, the use of the opposite of the spectral—the recurrence of the word 'concrete'—indeed provide food for thought. Schmitt's entire discourse posits and supposes in fact, as we shall point out, by the word 'concrete'. Schmitt wants to be able to count on the opposition, and reckon with it. Even if no pure access to the eidos or essence is to be had, even if, in all conceptual purity, it is not known what war, politics, friendship, enmity, hate or love, hostility or peace are, one can and must know—first of all practically, politically, polemically—who is the friend and who is the enemy.

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These efforts create the very polemical sense, remarkably at work in the passage, of the political. It will not be a matter for a purely theoretical discourse on it. For the concept of the political, in so far as it is of a concrete use, the practical and of the polemical, and they are never implemented except in a polemical field. These concepts

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It is of this paradox can be judged in our judgement totally in vain, a from all other purity (objective, a impurity of the concept or the moreover - he will never renounce of the political to be, in its very not be distinguished from anything it would like to be able to the purity of the political as such, of the as his Platonic dream - that this 'as not where it is contaminated. And doubts concerning what 'friend' and difference is important here - the to the meaning of friendship or the friend and enemy are. If the to everyone is, who is a friend and not in the mode of theoretical identification: knowing consists here in and the enemy. The practical identification another - the practical identification seem to be sometimes conditions, identification of friend and enemy (we of philautia or narcissism - even the the opposition, and reckon with it. essence is to be had, even if, in all war, politics, friendship, enmity, can and must know - first of all is the friend and who is the enemy. torsion marking, for example, the out of the semantic or conceptual as we shall point out, by the word its and supposes in fact, as we shall opposites - as if only in passing, French translation - to the spectral (gespenstisch). In this analysis, the spectral is evoked in passing - as if in passing, like a passer-by - as a synonym of 'abstract' or 'empty'. But why would they be synonyms? Would there be no difference between emptiness, the abstract, and the spectral? What are the political stakes of this figure? On the other hand, the unending insistence here on what would be the opposite of the spectral - the concrete; the compulsive and obsessional recurrence of the word 'concrete' as the correlate of 'polemical' - does indeed provide food for thought. What thought? Perhaps that the concrete finally remains, in its purity, out of reach, inaccessible, unbreachable, indefinitely deferred, thereby inconceivable to the concept (Begriff); consequently as 'spectral' (gespenstisch) as the ghost on its periphery, which one opposes to it and which could never be set apart. We shall see how this concretion of the concrete, this ultimate determination to which Schmitt ceaselessly appeals, is always exceeded, overtaken - let us say haunted - by the abstraction of its spectre. Is it not for this reason that so much effort must be exerted - vain effort - to find an intuition and a concept adequate to the concrete?

These efforts create the very tension of this strange book. They are remarkably at work in the passage devoted to the polemical sense of the political. It will not be a matter of the polemological contents of the concept of the political, in so far as it implies the enemy, war, pôlemos, hence qua concept of the polemical. It will be a matter, as we have announced, of only the polemical use of this concept of the political, its concrete use, the practical and effective modality of its implementation - let us say its very performativity. Such a necessity cannot leave intact a so-called theoretical discourse on it, a meta-discourse, a meta-polemical or meta-political discourse, a polemico-logical or politico-logical discourse. Can one conclude that Schmitt's discourse claims this pure theoreticity? In certain respects, we believe, the answer is yes, and this is to a large extent what makes his project interesting: it offers a pure and rigorous conceptual theory of the political, of the specific region of that which is properly and without polemical rhetoric called the 'political', the politicity of the political. Within this region, in the enclosure proper to a theoretical discourse, all examples, all facts, all historical contents should thus issue in knowledge; indeed, in those forms of disinterested theoretical reports called diagnostics. But would Schmitt say, for all that, that his discourse on politics is of a theoretical nature, and that it is not affected by the polemical modality, and therefore by the performativity, whose incessant contamination he has, on the other hand, described? Would he refuse his theorems the significance of taking sides, an act of war, a certain war? We are not sure that he
would. His attitude around this subject would undoubtedly be unstable and wily, and his cunning all the more significant. What appears to us more certain, on the other hand, is that the politological or polemological project and the political-polemical engagement are indissociable. It cannot be denied that their respective purity is a priori inaccessible. This is tantamount to saying that it can only be denied. This structural disavowal informs and constructs the political discourse and the discourse on the political. One like the other, one qua the other. We shall neither determine nor denounce here the fatalty of this performative disavowal as a logical fault, even less as a symptom that could be dissolved in analysis. It inscribes again, and at the same time, a principle of ruin and affirmation at the heart of the most coherent gestures, when their greatest force simultaneously takes on the figure of a performative contradiction, or - and this may amount to the same thing - the figure of a tautology that we were earlier calling teleiopoetic. We have already given many examples of this. Here, then, is another, one that we have just announced (we emphasize in the passage the word 'concrete'; all other emphasis is Schmitt's, even if the English translation we are quoting [which will be slightly modified] does not always point it out):

But the fact that the substance of the political is contained in the context of a concrete antagonism (konkrete Gegenältlichkeit) is still expressed in everyday language (der landläufige Sprachgebrauch), even where the awareness of the extreme case (of 'a case of war': das Beussestein des 'Einfalles') has been entirely lost.

This becomes evident in daily speech and can be exemplified by two obvious phenomena. First, all political concepts, images and terms have a polemical meaning (einen polemischen Sinn). They are focused on a concrete conflict (eine konkrete Gegenältlichkeit) and are bound to a concrete situation (an eine konkrete Situation gebunden); the result (which manifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend-enemy grouping (Freund-Feindgruppierung), and they turn into empty and ghostlike (spectral) abstractions (werden zu leeren und gespenstischen Abstraktionen) when this situation disappears. Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know concretely (in concreto) who is to be affected, combated, refuted, or negated by such terms. Above all the polemical character determines the usage by language of the word political itself, regardless of whether the adversary is designated as 'apolitical' (ungpolitisch) (in the sense of: foreign to the world [äußertwärts], who is lacking the [sense of the] concrete [das Konkrete verfehld]), or vice versa if one wants to disqualify or denounce him as political in order to portray oneself as 'apolitical' (in the sense of: purely objective (rein sachlich) purely scientific, purely moral, purely legal, or on the basis of similar purities) and so forth.

This would be the first of the two announcements already evoked in parentheses, which Schmitt must transform in order to present this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not of the becoming-civil of this polemical phenomenon, Schmitt must transform instead of presenting this alternative pair of symmetrical possibilities, he would be a mistake to neglect the very first page, there is a reminder of the concept of the political, not
would undoubtedly be unstable and significant. What appears to us more or polemological project are indissociable. It cannot be inaccessible. This is tantamount to structural disavowal informs and discourse on the political. One like neither determine nor denounce it as a logical fault, even less as analysis. It inscribes again, and at the formation at the heart of the most force simultaneously takes on the - and this may amount to the that we were earlier calling many examples of this. Here, then, is what (we emphasize in the passage the Schmitt's, even if the English slightly modified] does not always purely scientific, purely moral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic, or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior.11

This would be the first of the two announced phenomena. One may already wonder whether Schmitt places his own discourse - and within it this very passage, precisely - in the order of the 'purely objective' or that of the 'purely scientific'. The doubts we have already formulated relative to his theoretical neutrality would not be dissipated by the allusion to 'everyday language'. This language must not mystify. Schmitt cannot analyse an 'everyday language' from the standpoint of a discursive instance that would be superior or foreign to it. The words and syntax forming the framework of his book forever belong to 'everyday language'. No refinement can extract them from it, if only because of the natural language in which they are found, which forbids any absolute formalization. A single indication would suffice to confirm this once again: Schmitt constantly considers it indispensable to justify his choice of terms - beginning with the words 'friend', 'enemy', 'war', or 'civil war' - by reference to everyday or predominant usage in such and such a natural European language: Greek, Latin, English. There is no other criterion for these quotations, and no other guarantee, than the statistical reference to the ordinary usage of the natural language.

The second of the two announced phenomena belongs to the logic already evoked in parentheses, when Schmitt names war and revolution as the two manifestations of the friend/enemy figure. This alternative had already marked a sort of logical contradiction in Schmitt's development, to the extent that he claimed to align his definition of the political on the possibility of exterior war, and then referred to Plato, to pôlemos so sharply distinguished from stásis. Now, though, in order to describe the second phenomenon, Schmitt must transport the entire polemical necessity of the discourse analysed hitherto in general to the order of domestic politics. But instead of presenting this alternative (foreign affairs/domestic politics) as a pair of symmetrical possibilities, he considers the interiorization, as it were, the becoming-civil of this polemic, as a weakening of the political unity of the State. Not of the political in general, but of this State form of the political that Schmitt intends to distinguish, whereas he often uses it as the telos or guiding thread of his definition of the political. But for all that, it would be a mistake to neglect the initial warnings of the work. On the very first page, there is a reminder that the concept of the State presupposes the concept of the political, not the other way round, even if the State - this particular modality of the mode of existence of the people (Volk) - lays
down the law in 'decisive' moments and even if, therefore, it constitutes, with regard to all thinkable 'statuses', the Status itself, the Status par excellence (der Status schlechthin), the stasis or the irreducible static stance [statique] that we have linked back up — on a suggestion from Schmitt himself, and at the price of considerable difficulties — with status. The State is the Status. Only the State can bestow status on the political, supposing that should be necessary. For even if he denounces the inadequacy of the vicious circle (ein unbefriedigender Zirkel), the errors and meanderings induced by this equation (the State = the political), can it not be said that at the precise moment when he distinguishes them, Schmitt continues to make one the teleological pole of the other? Does he not see the State as the political par excellence, that which serves as an exemplary guide for the definition of the political? If this were the case, despite the precautions we have just evoked and the wealth of differentiated analyses that such prudence and carefulness allow, Schmitt would still belong (and he would undoubtedly admit to this readily, at least concerning this particular point) to what he himself identifies as the German tradition of the doctrine of the State in its Hegelian form.

With regard to society, this doctrine considers the State other than and superior to it (qualitativ verschieden und etwas Höheres). Our hypothesis is that the path, at once continuous and discontinuous, coherent and — willy-nilly — self-critical (or auto-critical?), separating The Concept of the Political (1932) from The Theory of the Partisan (1962) is thoroughly informed by this logical matrix: the State presupposes the political, to be sure, hence it is logically distinguished from it; but the analysis of the political, strictly speaking, and its irreducible core, the friend/enemy configuration, can only privilege, from the beginning and as its sole guiding thread, the State form of this configuration — in other words, the friend or enemy qua citizen.

In 'everyday language' a second signal could be found to confirm that everything in politics is said in the polemical mode. It is that 'in the modes of expression of the polemic everydayness interior to state affairs (In der Ausdrucksweise der innerstaatlichen Tagespolemik) [the English translation gives: 'in usual domestic polemics'], the adjective 'political' is most often used today in the sense of 'party politics' ('parteipolitisch'). This does mark the absence of 'objectivity' ('Unsachlichkeit') of all political 'decisions'; it can provide only the 'reflection' (Reflex) of the discriminations between friend and enemy in so far as it is 'immanent' to all political behaviour. The 'depoliticization' at which some of these manoeuvres aim is but a ruse designed to promote and impose a party politics. Schmitt's diagnostic is one of a weakening of the State. When the thought of the 'political unit' ('that of the State', specifies Schmitt is verloren'), internal antagonisms within or the community on which the 'real possibility of combat' should be ever-present (vorhanden bleiben) no longer refers to war between Empires but, 'logically', 'coherently', the State calls for 'internal pacification' of the 'domestic, [or internal], enemy' that had a name in the Greek democracy (polémios or hostis)."

We must attempt to shed light on several typical problems. At stake is the possibility or eventuality said to be the condition of this 'real possibility' that it 'remain present' (vorhanden bleiben) meaning'. We have already alluded.

How can Schmitt, at one and the same time, he does not reduce the political possibility of war between States to the exterior war and civil war, and the enemy, sometimes the foreigner, sometimes the fellow countryman, seem to lie in the prevailing doctrine once both a paradox and a possible war between the weakened State for the seizure or reconstitution of its power, or between States. This specification when Schmitt seems to be aligning the two concepts of the State, or any war that would be but one case of war in war between States. This specification when Schmitt seems to be aligning the two concepts of the State, or any war that would be but one case of war between States. This specification why Schmitt writes: ‘For to the enemy concept below the 'real possibility' as present (vorhanden) are the two predicates:

For to the enemy concept below the 'real possibility' as present (vorhanden) is the two predicates:
friendship

and even if, therefore, it constitutes, Status itself, the Status par excellence reducible static stance [statique] that is distinguished from Schmitt himself, and at the same time as Schmitt himself, and at the same time as the State. The State is the Status. Only political, supposing that should be understood inadequacy of the vicious circle and meanderings induced by this inadequacy of the vicious circle not be said that at the precise point Schmitt was ever-present (vornehmlich) 'when one is talking about the political', no longer refers to war between units of peoples organized into States or Empires but, 'logically', 'coherently', to civil war. This weakening of the State calls for 'internal pacification' and attends the rise of the concept of the 'domestic, [or internal], enemy', a public enemy for which public law had a name in the Greek democracies as well as in Rome, as Schmitt recalls (polēmos or hostis).

We must attempt to shed light here on at least two concepts and emphasize several typical problems. At stake each time is the obscure status of a possibility or eventuality said to be 'real' and 'present'. It is only under the condition of this 'real possibility' (reale Möglichkeit) that 'remain present' (vornehmlich bleiben), that the 'concept of the enemy has its meaning'. We have already alluded to this, and must return to it now.

How can Schmitt, at one and the same time, privilege the State (even if he does not reduce the political to it), base the concept of enemy on the possibility of war between States, and nevertheless symmetrically align, as he does, exterior war and civil war - as if the enemy were sometimes the foreigner, sometimes the fellow citizen? The answer to this question would seem to lie in the prevailing determination of civil war in this analysis. At once both a paradox and a piece of good sense, this determination establishes civil war as a war between two States, a war in view of the State, a war between a weakened State and a potential State to be constituted, a war for the seizure or reconstitution of State power. War within a State would be but one case of war in general, war in the proper sense - that is, war between States. This specification is given in passing, in parentheses, when Schmitt seems to be aligning symmetrically the two concepts of war, civil or domestic war and exterior war. In truth, there is only one concept of war, and the notion of real possibility as present (vornehmlich) ensures the synthetic mediation between the two predicates:

For to the enemy concept belongs the ever present possibility of combat (im Bereich des Realen liegende Eventualität eines Kampfes). All peripherals must be left aside from this term, including military details and the development of weapons technology. War is armed combat between organized political entities; civil war
In both cases, it is an armed combat. In view of killing. 'Weapon' designates here, in the concept of its essence, the means in view of 'physical' death, as the killing of a man (ein Mittel physischer Tötung von Menschen). The death of a human being, thus implied in this concept of the enemy – that is, in all war, exterior or civil war – is neither natural death, since the enemy must be killed, nor murder, for wartime killing is not seen as a crime. The war crime is something else again; it would consist in transgressing this law to revert to the savageness of a violence that no longer respects the laws of war and the rights of people (Schmitt doesn’t like that at all, although he is quicker to denounce this transgression on the part of the stranger or enemy). What is said here of the enemy is not symmetrical and cannot be said of the friend, even under the heading of ambivalence, during a war and exactly in 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915). 17

1. One can infer symmetrically that there is no friend without this possibility of killing which establishes a non-natural community. Not only could I enter into a relationship of friendship only with a mortal, but I could love in friendship only a mortal at least exposed to so-called violent death – that is, exposed to being killed, possibly by myself. And by myself, in love, in an essential, not an accidental, manner. To love in love or friendship would always mean: I can kill you, you can kill me, we can kill ourselves. Together or one another, masculine or feminine. Therefore, in all cases, we already are (possibly, but this possibility is, precisely, real) dead for one another. We shall later question in several ways this possibility that intersects with the one Freud analyses in his own style, under the heading of ambivalence, during a war and exactly in 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death' (1915).

2. But to this logic one can, precisely, oppose opposition: what is true of the enemy (I can or I must kill you, and vice versa) is the very thing that suspends, annuls, overturns or, at the very least, represses, transfigures or sublimates friendship, which is therefore simultaneously the same (repressed) thing and something altogether different. What is said of the enemy is not symmetrical and cannot be said of the friend, even under the heading of structural or shared conditions of possibility. Friendship would consist in the suspension of this structure of possibility. To love in love or in friendship (unless the distinction which interests us would pass at this exact place between the two, and 'killing' would be an affair of love, not of friendship), would precisely be the putting of death (morden). Freud recalls, the most categoric 'I can kill' confirms, and hence says, the putting would be interrupted while expressing it.

3. Let us not forget that the possibility endlessly binds or opposes the friend or drive or decision of death, in the other.

We were speaking of the political aimer?

A hypothesis, then: and what if we were bound to an affirmation of trivality, only in seeking its way (in itself) in the step beyond the political or another politics for love? Must one dissociate or affirm philia, φιλία, and so forth? If a choice were bound to an affirmation of trivality. Without it – and this is that choice, we would choose one.

Hence we must be patient at the place. Without it – and this is where would be possible, nor ever an other place? No, there.

Let us return to Schmitt, who He sees in it a sense of ontological Ursprünglichkeit) that one must recognize but first of all and on the back ontology of 'human life': it is a combatant ('Kämpfer'), says Schmitt, in the ontological distinction of the being-for-death of this human being-for-death (the terms for-putting-to-death or for-death), that the being-for-death of this human being-for-death of this determination (it is that respect for individuals of the same sense, that a being-for-death that would be interrupted while expressing it.)
FRIENDSHIP

but called up into question again by this parenthetical: dadurch aber problematisch

...of killing. 'Weapon' designates means in view of 'physical' death, as�or von Menschen). The death of the enemy - that is, in all mortal death, since the enemy must not be seen as a crime. The war consists in transgressing this law to no longer respect the laws of battle. It isn't like that at all, although he is on the part of the stranger or different. But what is said of the enemy is precisely the opposite of ‘friendship, would be an affair of love, not of...
Just as hostility is entirely dependent on the real possibility of this putting-to-death, so also, correlatively, there is no friendship independent of this deadly drive — which is not necessarily to say, this criminal drive. The deadly drive of the friend/enemy proceeds from life, not from death, not from some attraction of death by death or for death. This deadly necessity could not be purely psychological, although it is anthropological. Impossible as it may seem and, in truth, remain for us, this hostility, could not be purely psychological, although it is anthropological. Impossibility thought is a hostility without affect or, at least, without an individual or 'private' affect, a purified aggressivity, with all passion and all psychology removed: a pure hostility and, ultimately, a purely philosophical one. As we shall see below, Lenin is, for Schmitt, an illustrious representative — and a radical one, too — of such a pure hostility, but in a tradition whose first moment, in The Theory of the Partisan, is extremely difficult to determine.

This possibility can remain a possibility, and this is why it becomes the object of an analysis and a report which make a claim to neutrality — indeed, to some kind of positivism in the diagnostic: Schmitt says it is not bellicist, pacifist, militarist or imperialist — it is, all in all, purely theoretical. (We have just expressed doubts about this kind of theoreticity which can be nothing else but a cunning or a strategy indissociable from the political practice of Schmitt himself.) But even if this possibility remains a possibility, it must already be, or still be, concrete, 'real', and, to this extent, 'present'.

The realization is but the passage to the limit, the extreme accomplishment, the eschaton of an already real and already present possibility. The realization is not the actualization of a possible but something altogether different: the radicalization of a possible reality or a real possibility. Here we are no longer in the conventionally Aristotelian opposition of potentiality and act. This is why Realisierung should not be translated, as it has been, by 'actualization':

The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning (ihren realen Sinn) precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing (auf die reale Möglichkeit der physischen Tötung). War follows from enmity, for war is the existential negation of the enemy (seinmäßige Negierung eines anderen Seins). It is the most extreme realization of enmity (die äußerste Realisierung der Feindschaft). It does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain present as a real possibility (als reale Möglichkeit vorhanden bleiben) for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid.39

The logic of this discourse implements a strategy that is at once original (a displacement of the traditional concept of possibility) and classic (in the recourse to a condition of possibility analysis). This logic is this strange (s incipient or naive) oscillation between the political: sometimes the political (with the following consequences than politics, or, if you will, belief (political) enemy; but you will notice from another angle: as friend, love, and not should not be confused with some qua real possibility, invades the enmity's existence, whether individual or community. This is what allows the friend/enemy to proceed from life, the possibility, the real possibility, and the question 'who' is at the heart of this fundamentalist stratification of the spiritual sphere (der geistige Welt) — the response to the question: 'who are 'pluralistic': 'each nation has its real meaning (ihren realen Sinn) precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing (auf die reale Möglichkeit der physischen Tötung). War follows from enmity, for war is the existential negation of the enemy (seinmäßige Negierung eines anderen Seins). It is the most extreme realization of enmity (die äußerste Realisierung der Feindschaft). It does not have to be common, normal, something ideal, or desirable. But it must nevertheless remain present as a real possibility (als reale Möglichkeit vorhanden bleiben) for as long as the concept of the enemy remains valid.39

The logic of this discourse implements a strategy that is at once original (a displacement of the traditional concept of possibility) and classic (in the
The real possibility of this putting into friendship independent of this to say, this criminal drive. The drive from life, not from death, not for death. This deadly necessity though it is anthropological. Impossible for us, what would have to be at least, without an individual or with all passion and all psychology a purely philosophical one. As fact, an illustrious representative - hostility, but in a tradition whose mission, is extremely difficult to and this is why it becomes the take a claim to neutrality - indeed, Schmitt says it is not bellicist, as well as all, purely theoretical. (We kind of theoreticity which can be indifference: the political possibility remains a possibility, 'real', and, to this extent, 'present'.) But, the extreme accomplishment, 'present' possibility. The realization of something altogether different: the possibility. Here we are no longer a question of potentiality and act. This is this has been, by 'actualization':

they receive their real meaning (ihren realen Bedeutungen), possibility of physical killing (auf die physikalische Tötung) follows from enmity, for war is the of political killing (der politische und der äußere Realisierungs Seins). It is something ideal, or desirable. But it possibility (als reale Möglichkeit vorhanden) remains valid."

This strategy that is at once original (a of possibility) and classic (in the recourse to a condition of possibility in a transcendental-ontological type of analysis). This logic is this strategy. It consists in a sophisticated (or ingenuous or naive) oscillation between two situations, two stratifications of the political: sometimes the political is a particular and grounded stratum (with the following consequence: you may very well live something other than politics, or, if you will, beyond politics, and you may love your (political) enemy; but you will not love him politically, you will love him from another angle: as friend, lover, neighbour, human being - the political should not be confused with something else, etc.): sometimes the political, qua real possibility, invades the entire fundamental or grounding stratum of existence, whether individual or communal. All the eventualities we have just summarily considered would then be excluded or contaminated in advance by the real possibility of the very thing from which they are cut. This fundamentalist stratification makes the political at once both a regional stratum, a particular layer, however grounding the layer is, and the supplementary or overdetermining determination cutting through all other regions of the human world or of the cultural, symbolic, or 'spiritual' community. This is what allows Schmitt to affirm that 'all of the concepts of the spiritual sphere (der geistigen Sphären), including the concept of spirit (Geist)' must be 'understood in terms of concrete political existence'. They cannot be neutral or neutralizable, nor can they be reduced to unity; they are 'pluralistic': 'each nation has its own concept of nation', and so forth. One can see what such a warning frees for the differentiated analysis of all these concepts. But one can also sense to what alliance of politicalism and empiricism it can expose itself.

This is the strategy of presupposition (Voraussetzung). In some of its features, it could be analogous to Heidegger's existential analytic. This said, it always demands that the presupposition of real possibility or eventuality be present in a determined (vorhanden) mode. And this presupposed presence is that of political decision: the decision deciding who the enemy is. The question 'who' is at the heart of the principle, it summons and commands [mande et commande]. The major moments of political decision are those of the response to the question: 'who is the enemy?'. Cromwell is exemplary here in his jubilant denunciation of 'The Enemies to the very Being of these Nations': 'Why, truly, your great Enemy is the Spaniard. He is a natural enemy. He is naturally so; he is naturally so throughout - by reason of that enmity that is in him against whatsoever is of God . . . enmity is put into him by God.' He is 'the natural enemy, the providential enemy' [in English in the text], 'and he who considers him to be an "accidental enemy" is "not well acquainted with Scripture and the things of God".'
Victorious war and revolution belong neither to the ‘social’ nor to the ‘ideal’. Military combat is not the pursuit of politics by other means, as in the Clausewitzian definition, ‘generally incorrectly cited’. War has its own rules and perspectives, its strategies and tactics, but they presuppose (voraussetzen) a political decision (politische Entscheidung). They presuppose, in fact, that this decision, naming ‘who is the enemy’ (wer der Feind ist), is preliminary (bereits vorliegt). It is no easy task to determine the place assigned by Schmitt to this pure preliminary decision, nor is it easy to know if, qua free act, it breaks with or is in accord with the state of belonging to a people, group, class, etc. In short, it is no easy task to decide whether this decision supposes, rends, undermines or produces the community; or to decide what binds it to itself in a friendly attraction or a self-conservation which resembles philia or philautia.

The fact remains that this allegation of presupposition, always present as real possibility, allows at one and the same time for war to be waged as the political’s condition of possibility without it being for all that, in any respect, the aim, the finality or even the content of the political!

Let us read Schmitt emphasizing the word ‘presupposition’:

War is neither the aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as a real possibility it is an ever present presupposition (die als reale Möglichkeit immer vorhandene Voraussetzung) which determines in a characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behaviour.22

This is neither the time or the place to follow up the decisive occurrences of this surprising and strategically precious concept of ‘real possibility’. It would also be possible to see it as a rhetorical ploy in a disguised polemic. Let us be content with situating the play with the sensitive notion of neutrality which the ploy, for example, allows, simultaneously in the theoretical sense (a scientific, phenomenological or ontological discourse which analyses or describes without taking sides) and in the polemico-political sense (a State that has not declared war). The real possibility of ‘real possibility’, as one might say, enables two contradictory propositions to be held successively or simultaneously: yes, neutrality is always possible, but no, it is impossible, unless it be the end of the political. And the enemy (O enemies, there is no enemy!). And thereby, the end of the friend (’O my friends, there is no friend!). The very concept of neutrality, as we shall see, is swept away by its own possibility; it contradicts itself and is destroyed in itself. There is a neutrality of the neutral, but it cannot be found politically. One would be friend or enemy, friend and enemy before all possible neutrality, yet that would be to us in that a certain thought of neutrality, but cannot, in any case, in this century, notably in the world experience and a thought of friend.

For Schmitt, the criterion of fact entail that a ‘determined person’ friend or the enemy of another. If one is talking about is not linked by it, even though the decision that ‘a state of neutrality is not politically meaningful (politisch sinnvoll)’:

As with every political concept, the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility is that of a determined neutrality (dieser letzten Voraussetzung einer realen Möglichkeit), which would come to an end. The ploy of politics, whenever the possibility of this decisive eventuality (entscheidenden Falles), the actual possibility this eventuality is or is not given (dieser Fall gegeben ist oder nicht).23

(Such a singular decision that determines is or is not ‘given’ – is this an unconscious? Free or not? Resolved, and to whom, relative to whom? does not know, with this decision, depth or, on the contrary, whether this eventuality is or is not given; sweep it away, forget it, unthink oblivion itself)

The exception is the rule – the possibility thinks. The exception of course, of the event, the real possibility of the decision on the subject of the case or situation (dieser Fall) and does not suspend, sublate or alter character’. On the contrary, the
neither to the 'social' nor to the 'political' of politics by other means, as in correctly cited. War has its own tactics, but they presuppose the entscheidung. They presuppose, the enemy (wer der Feind ist), is to determine the place assigned to the enemy, nor is it easy to know if, qua with the state of belonging to a, it is an easy task to decide whether this reproduces the community; or to say attraction or a self-conservation fact remains that this allegation of possibility, allows at one and the same time, the finality or even the content of each condition of possibility without form, the finally or even the content supposition:

As with every political concept, the neutrality concept is also subject to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility of a friend-enemy grouping (unter dieser letzten Voraussetzung einer realen Möglichkeit der Freund-und Feindgruppierung). Should only neutrality prevail in the world, then not only war but also neutrality could come to an end. The politics of avoiding war terminates, as does all politics, whenever the possibility of fighting disappears. What always matters is the possibility of this decisive eventuality taking place (die Möglichkeit dieses entscheidenden Falles), the actual war (des wirklichen Kampfes), and the decision whether this eventuality is or is not the given case (die Entscheidung darüber, ob dieser Fall gegeben ist oder nicht). Such a singular decision that decides if it is the case or not, if an eventuality is or is not 'given' — is this an active or a passive decision? Conscious or unconscious? Free or not? Responsible or not? A decision as to what is given, and to whom, relative to knowing who, 'who is who,' etc.? One does not know, with this decision, whether a decisionism informs it in depth or, on the contrary, whether it does not negate such a decisionism, sweep it away, forget it, unless the decision would always be linked to oblivion itself.

The exception is the rule — that, perhaps, is what this thought of real possibility thinks. The exception is the rule of what takes place, the law of the event, the real possibility of its real possibility. The exception grounds the decision on the subject of the case or the eventuality. The fact that the case or situation (dieser Fall) arises only exceptionally (nur ausnahmsweise) does not suspend, sublate or annul (hebt . . . nicht auf) its 'determining character'. On the contrary, this exceptionality grounds (begründet) the
eventuality of the event. An event is an event, and a decisive one, only if it is exceptional. An event as such is always exceptional.

As for war, this is a paradoxical consequence, concerning killing also, which here is not just one example among others: it is because killing is exceptional that it remains the decisive ordeal. And, one might say, the more exceptional, unusual, improbable it is, the more it weighs decisively on decision. A diagnostic for our times: today, notes Schmitt, if wars are less frequent, less usual and more exceptional (if that can be said of the exception) than in former times, the 'total' purchase of their power has increased in the same proportion. The real possibility of killing tends to be infinite. That means that today war, the state of war, the case of war (der Kriegfall), still remains the decisive ordeal, the serious thing, the major critical affair, the 

end of the sentence naming its teleiopoetic or quasi-messianic 1 teleiopoetic or quasi-messianic 1 of Nietzschean statements, which haunts them. Schmitt if not the very law of score conjunctive disjunction binding that is how the conjunction comes to place. It is found at the end of the 'case of war' (we stress actual/effective consequential) in

This tension is to be conquered place to which one gains access must be overcome; it is conquered and gain on itself out to its extremity.

The extreme consequence of this seem to us as unavoidable as it is recognized by Schmitt, at least not in this form. It has been said above, that the rarest exception or of decision (war, the more decisive, intense and extreme consequence) (die ausserst seltenen Ausnahmen oder Entscheidungen) politicizes (as would be the case according to the Schmitt of 1931) intensifies the tension and the relation to the degree of the less war there is, the more 'common sense' than it would according to a change in all the signs, supersystematically so

What would the symptom of depoliticization (die Abstrichung) that Schmitt learned truth, an over- or hyperpoliticized there is, the less enemies there are; the friends-increases according to extreme proportion. Hence the inverse reflection in which the 'dying said: This is in fact the same number

For only in actual/effective consequential the extreme consequence (die ausserst seltenen Ausnahmen oder Entscheidungen) human life gains (gewinnt) its
end of the sentence naming its possibility (this is perhaps the spring of the teleiopoetic or quasi-messianic logic that we were analysing above in terms of Nietzschean statements, whose possibility, however, verily haunts all statements. Yes, haunts them. For what is this 'real possibility' haunting Schmitt if not the very law of spectrality?). Oscillation and association, the conjunctive disjunction binding real actuality/effectivity and possibility – that is how the conjunction conjuncts and disjuncts at one and the same time. It is found at the end of the paragraph speaking to the ‘case of war’ as ‘case of war’ (we stress actual/effective and possibility):

For only in actual/effective combat (im wirklichen Kampf) is revealed the most extreme consequence (die äusserste Konsequenz) of the political grouping of friend and enemy. From this most extreme possibility (Von dieser extremsten Möglichkeit her) human life gains (gewinnt) its specifically political tension (Spannung). This tension is to be conquered: it is not a given fact, it is conquered like a place to which one gains access; it is won as a victory is, when a resistance must be overcome; it is conquered as an intensity which can always increase and gain on itself out to its extreme limit.

The extreme consequence of these propositions, the one which would seem to us as unavoidable as it is properly disastrous, is of course not drawn by Schmitt, at least not in this form, but we must draw it: if it is true, as has been said above, that the rarer or the more improbable the situation of exception or of decision (war, hostility, the political event as such, etc.), the more decisive, intense and revealing it is, and in the end the more it politicizes (as would be the case in the modernity of the rarefaction of wars, according to the Schmitt of 1932), then one must conclude that rarefaction intensifies the tension and the revealing power (the ‘truth’ of the political): the less war there is, the more the hostility, etc. This is less a default of ‘common sense’ than it would appear, to be sure, but it does inevitably lead to a change in all the signs, and therefore to having to measure politicization in terms of the degree of depoliticization.

What would the symptom of neutralization and depoliticization (Entpolitisierung) that Schmitt learnedly denounces in our modernity reveal? In truth, an over- or hyperpoliticization. The less politics there is, the more there is, the less enemies there are, the more. The number of friends increases according to exactly the same proportion and in the same proportion. Hence the inversion and the vertigo, hence the mirror reflection in which the ‘dying sage’ and the ‘living fool’ reflect themselves. This is in fact the same number and the same calculation. The inversion
and the vertigo are not sophisms. These enunciations unfold a structure of decision and of the event, and account for any logic purporting to calculate their incalculable singularity. We are simply formulating a principle of ruin or spectrality at the heart of this discourse on the political, a discourse of madness allied to an excess of common sense. A double hyperbole, a chiasmus of double hyperbole. When we suggested above that Schmitt did not draw this consequence himself, we specified 'at least not in this form'. For The Theory of the Partisan can be considered the intrepid exercise of this paradoxical consequence. Through an exploration of the future of the Second World War and of everything preceding it over centuries, Schmitt analyses a general hyperbolization of the political. But the unleashing of pure hostility appears to him, gives itself over to his diagnostic, through all the phenomena of depoliticization, through everything that is destructive of the classical limits of the political.

Consequently, depoliticization, the 'without politics' which is not necessarily the 'withdrawal of the political', could characterize a world which would no longer be a world, a 'world without politics', reduced to a 'terrestrial globe' abandoned by its friends as well as its enemies; in sum, a dehumanized desert. And this is indeed what Schmitt literally says – we shall quote him again. But he could say exactly the opposite (and he will say it later, willy-nilly). In both cases, the 'possibility' of combat remains the arbiter: 'A world in which the possibility (die Möglichkeit) of war is utterly (without a remainder: restlos) eliminated, a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics.'

This 'world without politics' may present all manner of oppositions, contrasts and competitions, but no enemy (and thus no friend) will be found there, nor this antagonism which 'authorized to shed blood, and kill other human beings'. The allusion to blood is anything but secondary and rhetorical (no more so than in Rosenzweig, or Benjamin – precisely on the theme of state violence). To kill without bloodshed, with the help of new techniques, is perhaps already to accede to a world without war and without politics, to the inhumanity of a war without war. Regardless of whether this 'world without politics' is an ideal (and Schmitt's decision on this subject is clear, even though he pretends to be interested only in the theoretical and neutral determination of political non-neutrality), the only conclusion The Concept of the Political purports, then, to hold after this properly phenomenological neutralization of the two 'ideals' is that the 'phenomenon of the political' cannot be grasped or apprehended (begreifen) without this reference to the 'real possibility (die reale Möglichkeit) of the friend and enemy grouping'.”

We believe it is necessary to reduce the process of political non-neutrality to a 'real possibility'. Not only because the haunting nature of depoliticization is a fact and a necessity. We have just raised the question of a world without politics or spectrality at the heart of this discourse on the political, a discourse of madness allied to an excess of common sense. A double hyperbole, a chiasmus of double hyperbole. When we suggested above that Schmitt did not draw this consequence himself, we specified 'at least not in this form'.

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friend and enemy grouping'. Whatever consequences may be drawn from this 'real possibility' - that is, from the structure of the political - whether these consequences be moral, religious, aesthetic, or economic, they will not be able to reduce the properly political phenomennality of this 'real possibility'. We believe it is necessary to insist on the recurrence of this call to a 'real possibility'. Not only because its concept remains obscure, but because the haunting nature of this recurrence confirms both a difficulty and a necessity. We have just referred to phenomenology (and it is indeed a matter of a phenomenology of the friend as well as of the enemy) because at stake is indeed the 'phenomenon of the political', as Schmitt himself says, and the sense of this phenomenon, the presentation of its presence after the eidetic reduction of everything it is; but also because what is at stake in the same stroke is indeed a phenomenalization as revelation, manifestation, unveiling.

The three criteria (reality, possibility, presence) intertwine here at the heart of the same 'eventuality'. At the heart of a selfsame eventness of the event. How does the friend/enemy grouping manifest itself, how does it present itself? How is their 'real possibility' presented or realized, either as possible or as real? How can this reality mark sometimes presence, sometimes possibility itself? In war. In any case in war as an extremity, as the extreme limit of a state of exception, as 'extreme eventuality' (als extreme Eventualität). It is on this account that this reality is revealing; it constitutes a fact from which an essence can be read - surely - but read first of all from an uncommon, non-empirical fact, exemplary in a teleological (the telos as extreme limit) and paradigmatic sense. The 'presence' (Vorhandenheit) thereby manifested in the real possibility, this real or possible presence, is not that of the fact or example, it is that of a telos. Not that of a political telos, of one or another political end, of one or another politics, but that of the telos of the political (die Möglichkeit) of war is eliminated, a completely pacified distinctive of friend and enemy and

friend and enemy grouping'. Whatever consequences may be drawn from this 'real possibility' - that is, from the structure of the political - whether these consequences be moral, religious, aesthetic, or economic, they will not be able to reduce the properly political phenomennality of this 'real possibility'. We believe it is necessary to insist on the recurrence of this call to a 'real possibility'. Not only because its concept remains obscure, but because the haunting nature of this recurrence confirms both a difficulty and a necessity. We have just referred to phenomenology (and it is indeed a matter of a phenomenology of the friend as well as of the enemy) because at stake is indeed the 'phenomenon of the political', as Schmitt himself says, and the sense of this phenomenon, the presentation of its presence after the eidetic reduction of everything it is; but also because what is at stake in the same stroke is indeed a phenomenalization as revelation, manifestation, unveiling.

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syntax of this question, which we have already cited, does not admit of a
decision on whether the double alternative (oder . . . oder) is of the order of
presence (vorhanden ist oder nicht) or of the order of modalities of this
presence (real or effective/actual possibility, real possibility or real effectivity/
actuality: reale Möglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit). In the first case the grouping
of the political (friend/enemy) would always be present, in one mode or
another; in the other, it could be present or not. The consequences of
these two distinct alternatives — certain, but apparently subtle and fragile —
indeed seem limitless: what does ‘politically’ ‘present’ mean? And present
in this mode (Vorhandenheit)? On this subject there is no need to refer to a
Heideggerian style of questioning (for example, regarding the
Vorhandenheit) to recognize the necessity, be it political or not, of these interrogations.
Sometimes it is presence itself that seems spectral, a disappearing virtuality
of apparition. Sometimes the sole presence (at once present and recurrent) figures to which a call must be made, a despairing call, in
order to resist the return of the spectral — in a word, to exorcize, to
conjure, to ‘repress’ the returning ghost [le revenant]. As for the meaning
of war, and the question of knowing under what condition a war is sinnvoll,
Schmitt never hesitates: he judges it indubitable that war always has a
meaning; war has a meaning, and no politics, no social bond qua social
bond, has meaning without war, without its real possibility. But this does
not necessarily mean that in his eyes war is good, useful, that it has meaning
in the moral or religious sense of an ideal or of a telos to be attained. It
simply means that in order for the concept of war (and hence politics) to
have meaning, for the phenomenological and semantic determination of the
discourse on war, conditions of possibility must be ascertained. And this
is what The Concept of the Political purports to do. If it is not a telos in the
sense of a moral or religious ideal, nor even in the sense of a determined political ideal, this semantic–teleological content is nevertheless intrinsi-
cally teleological. Its structure is teleologically immanent, auto- and tauto-
teleological (war aims at the death of the enemy, etc.), even if — or, rather,
because — this political telos is irreducible to any other. But it does seem
that, as a conscious or unconscious strategy, the Schmittian phrase strives to
dissociate the two teleological values (war is not good in view of another
end, moral, religious, etc., but it has its end in itself) while constantly
oscillating from one to the other, going so far, in the operation of a
‘partisan’, as to smuggle in one for the other. This seems to be made
possible — and easy — by the constant presenar, by the surviving presence —
in any case by the presence of war ‘yet today’ — as ‘real possibility’. Even if
today, in the form of ‘the very last war of humanity’, wars are waged in a
particularly inhuman manner, of making him an inhuman man political (über das Politische hin
back within its boundaries’ (Scht.)
doubt answer that physical killing and the annihilation of a people, despite everything, to the presence of such war is particu-
larly sense. We have already sensed and and of testimony which allows a clear (deutlich) he is relying on the di
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In the first case the grouping of types be present, in one mode or not. The consequences of it apparently subtle and fragile – deliberately 'present' mean? And present in fact there is no need to refer to a sample, regarding the Vorhandenheit or not, of these interrogations. spectral, a disappearing virtuality (at once permanent and must be made, a despairing call, in fact – in a word, to exorcize, to revenant). As for the meaning of what condition a war is sinnvoll, substitutable that war always has a politics, no social bond qua social is its real possibility. But this does not mean good, useful, that it has meaning or of a telos to be attained. It is not of war (and hence politics) to what extent and semantic determination of possibility must be ascertained. And this has to do. If it is not a telos in the sense of Schmitt's phrase strives to this fact is not good in view of another (no end in itself) while constantly being so far, in the operation of a to any other. But it does seem clear, the Schmittian phrase strives to not exceed the political (uber das Politische hinausgehend [Schmitt's emphasis]), making the enemy someone who must be 'annihilated', not only driven back and led back within its boundaries' (Schmitt's emphasis, and one wonders what difference he sees between 'physical killing', whose aim he judges indispensable, and the annihilation which he seems to concern. He would no doubt answer that physical killing concerns the individual life of soldiers but not the annihilation of a people or a State); well, this war 'yet today' attests, despite everything, to the presence of the political as 'real possibility': 'The possibility of such war is particularly illustrative (besonders deutlich) of the fact that war as a real possibility (als reale Möglichkeit) is still present today (heute noch vorhanden ist), and this fact is crucial for the friend-and-enemy antithesis and for the knowledge [or recognition, the determining identification, the accounting, Erkenntnis] of the political.'

We have already sensed and suggested that when Schmitt says that this is clear (deutlich) he is relying on a logic of inference, of proof, of indication and of testimony which allows him always to decide for the presence of the political. He decides thus either in terms of positive and univocal signs of the presence of the political, or in terms of what the disappearance of these signs witnesses of their possible and permanent presence – indeed demonstrates it, a contrario, through a denegation which would indiscernibly be in the things themselves, in real history and in the Schmittian discourse – in truth, in the entire tradition which he represents and repeats with so much cunning as authority. This disavowal potentializes a logic of negativity that will always allow, from The Concept of the Political to The Theory of the Partisan, for the multiplication of refined intuitions – so crucial for an analysis of our times – while at the same time diagnosing a depoliticization which, in sum, would be but the supplementary and inverted symptom, the abyssal hyperbole, of a hyperpoliticization. This depoliticization would apparently blur the criteria for boundaries of the political; it would neutralize them only to expand the control of the political to the point of absolute hostility, in its most pristine philosophical purity.

We shall see how absolute hostility would then be the affair of philosophy, its very cause.
Notes

2. CP, p. 63; p. 63 [The English translation has omitted the quotation marks.]
3. For example, ibid., p. 64; p. 65.
4. Ibid. [Translation modified.]
5. Ibid., p. 64; p. 65.
6. 472e.
7. See above, pp. 90–91. This would suffice to justify circumspection in having recourse to this opposition, and especially to the single word stásis. But there is more. Recalling that 'Plato shares with all his contemporaries' the 'logic' of the opposition of complementarity between πολέμος and stásis, Nicole Loraux adds, by way of drawing interesting consequences, the following point: 'But the insistence on emphasizing that, in the case of civil war, stásis is a name is especially Platonic. Only a name: a simple appellation, indeed, as a passage from Laws suggests, an inaccurate appellation. Defining "the worst scourge for a city", the Athenian-nomothete is at great pains to contest the pertinence of the standard appellation of civil war, "whose right name would indeed be rather diastasis than stásis."' 'Crayle à l'épreuve de Stásis', in Revue de philosophie ancienne, no. 1, 1987, pp. 56–7.
8. 473a.
9. For Benjamin, spectral (gespenstisch) is the force of law in the figure of the police, such that it can assure politics and protect the whole question, such as a scholarly thesis I would defend before any scholarly body in the world.'

[The text continues with further notes and citations, providing a detailed analysis of Schmitt's theories on political concepts and their philosophical implications.]
the force of law in the figure of the sovereign; everything outside the sovereign is an enemy. Between the people and its enemies there is nothing left in common but the sword."

16. CP, p. 33; p. 32 [translation modified].

17. An attentive reading of 'Thoughts for the Times...' in this context would undoubtedly be necessary. To my knowledge, Schmitt never showed much interest (no more than Heidegger in any case, and this fact is by no means without import) in someone he could have classed, according to his own criteria, among the authentic thinkers of the political — that is, those beginning with a pessimistic vision of mankind. Man is not originarily good — according to Schmitt, this is the fundamental thesis of a theory of the political. It is also the resigned thesis of 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', which, in addition, on the subject of the essential violence of the State, piles up statements of a Schmittian or Benjaminian sort. Freud indeed insists on the fact that if the State forbids the individual from having recourse to injustice, it is not in order to suppress injustice but to maintain a monopoly on it. Concerning the 'optimistic' answer to the question of man ('man is born noble and good'), Freud declares it 'of no answer to the question of man ('man is born noble and good'), Freud declares it 'of no

18. Proximity to Heidegger. Does the being-for-death of Dasein include, in the structure of its essence, war and combat (Kampf) or not? We have taken up this point in 'L'oreille de Heidegger' ['Heidegger's Ear, Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)', in John Sallis (ed.) Reading Heidegger, trans. John P. Leavey, Jr, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991]. Among the many themes of the chiasmus through which the Heideggerian and Schmittian discourse interact in a distancing and an opposition, there is not only the theme of technics (which, according to both thinkers, seems only to
depoliticize or neutralize — and this only within certain limits, limits we are approaching in this century which we, however, believe to be delivered over to technics), there is also the theme of death. But here divergence prevails. This may seem paradoxical, but the real possibility of putting-to-death (execution), which is an irreducible condition of the political, and indeed the ontological structure of human existence, means for Schmitt neither an ontology of death or of dying nor a serious consideration of a nothingness (neant) or of a Nichtigkeit; nor, in another code, the position of a death principle or instinct. Execution indeed proceeds from an oppositional negativity, but one which belongs to life through and through, in so far as life opposes itself in affirming itself. Not to life against death, but to life against life, to spirit against spirit, as The Concept of the Political concludes, here again, in Hegelian and anti-Hegelian expressions (Hegel would not have affirmed as easily as Schmitt that spirit, or life as the life of the spirit, does not confront death itself). This affirmation of life (in the war of life against life) culminates precisely in a condemnation of modern technologism which would strive to neutralize the political (and the politicity of technics) by relying on the antithesis mechanical/organic qua the antithesis the dead/the living: 'A life confronted with nothing more than death is no longer life; it is pure impotence and distress.' Life can only love life, even when it is opposed to itself. One should therefore (Schmitt does not say so) ‘love’ one’s enemy, at least in so far as he is living. To be put to death, the enemy must precisely be a living being. 'The person knowing no other enemy than death, and who sees in this enemy but an unhinged mechanism, is closer to death than to life, and the facile antithesis that opposes the organic to the mechanical stems itself from a primitive mechanism (etwas Roh-Mechanisches)' (p. 95). We shall come across the logic of this evaluation of the ‘technicized earth’ and economic planning once again, in Ex Captivitate Salus (Greven Verlag, Cologne 1950), with a pathos more marked by history, and a stress that is not so far from that of Heidegger.

19. But what would a purely collective or communal affect be without the least individual or ‘private’ dimension, a purely public affect? Yet it is essential to Schmitt to have this undiscoverable limit. He is hopelessly seeking the signs of such an affect everywhere — linguistic clues, testimonies that would at least come to mark the desire or the need of this impossible distinction. This is why he would undoubtedly judge our indistinct usage illegitimate and lacking in rigour (but who does not use them in this way? And why, fundamentally, are they thus used? What is the shared root, the analogy, of such use?) of words such as philia, ‘friendship’, ‘love’, ‘enmity’, ‘hostility’, and so forth, as long as we do not specify if it is a matter of feeling or not, of a universal or political feeling (that is, from one community to the other), of private or public feeling, one being heterogeneus to the other. Philile or amare, for example, would not mean ‘to love’ in the Christian sense of love of one’s neighbour. A footnote to the 1963 edition of The Concept of the Political (p. 118) recalls that in the New Testament, enemy in Latin is inimicus, not hostis; to love is diligere, not amare; in Greek, agape, not philia. The concept of hatred, as a feeling, would have not juridical or political meaning, and the concept of enemy (juridical or political: hostis) in no way implies hatred. Alvaro d’Ars: `hat is no term of law’ [in English]. Spinoza, in the Theological-Political Treatise: ‘hostem enim impeti non odium sed jus facit’ (ch. XVI).

20. CP, p. 33; p. 33. Derrida’s emphasis [translation modified].
21. CP, p. 67; p. 68.
22. CP, pp. 34–5; p. 34. [The English translation has been modified (including,
above all, the restitution of the stress on 'presupposition', absent in translation) to follow Derrida's modifications of the French translation of the German original.]
23. CP, p. 35, pp. 34-5.
24. CP, p. 35, p. 35.
25. We are evidently thinking here of another delimitation and of another beyond-the-political in its traditional form, of another 'withdrawal of the political'. I refer the reader to the rewarding volume with this title (Le Retrait du politique, Galliée 1983) which, after Rejouer le politique (Galliée 1981), brought together remarkable papers given at the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political at the Ecole normale supérieure, under the direction of Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe and J.L. Nancy. If my memory serves me well, there is no mention of Schmitt, nor of his concept of depoliticization, in these papers. My work here would be, as a sign of gratitude, a modest and belated contribution to work that was important for my own.
26. CP, p. 35.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., pp. 36-7.