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After little more than a decade of enormously consequential work—including anthologies of texts, editions, major critical assessments, critical anthologies, bibliographies—the desire that women writers should be seen as contributors to English Renaissance literature should be uncontroversial. If this work began, as Elaine Hobby says about the impulses governing her groundbreaking *Virtue of Necessity*, "simply" with a desire "to know what was there" (such archival work is by no means complete)—and to share her discoveries with other women—what to make of this emerging body of material remains in question. For Hobby, this question is raised by the very historical context of her own work. Begun initially through her involvement in the Women's Liberation movement, her understanding of the texts she explored was shaped by living under an increasingly conservative British government in the 1980s (the U.S. parallel goes without saying) and by a splintering within the women's movement that inevitably complicated the sense of gender solidarity that provided Hobby's initial impulse. Hobby points, in criticizing her own work, to its failure to engage
questions of race and its lack of pressure on assumptions about
women's desires that inevitably configure them within the norms
of heterosexuality; these issues are, of course, recognizably those
that split the women's movement as it came to be seen as articulat-
ing programs that were aimed at white, middle-class, heterosexual
women. "Women" in the movement was not an umbrella term
but housed restrictions. Moreover, as Hobby also points out, in the
1980s feminists came to articulate definitions of women's "nature"
that were often complicit with the very systems of oppression un-
der attack—women as naturally docile and loving. For instance,
characterizations not all that far from the conservative politics that
wished to undo the women's movement and return women to home
and family. As Hobby puts it succinctly: "Since dominant ideas
about 'women's nature' also define us as nurturing, sexually passive
beings, I am not convinced that anti-sex, anti-violence feminist po-
sitions are really that radical at all" (p. 205). In the United States,
the clearest site of these complicities has been in the unholy al-
liance of MacKinnonite feminism—which, in these conservative
times, is fast becoming identical to feminism—and repressive, in-
trusive legislation around pornography.  

Although these developments within feminism could be thought
of as quite distant from an archival program, Hobby is quite forth-
right in stating what should be obvious: that we come to materia's
of the past from our positions in the present. Hobby's gesture to-
ward race and sexuality as necessarily on the agenda of any progres-
sive attempt to read these early materials points in a number of di-
rections: it recognizes that "women" is not a self-identical category,
and hence that gender analysis is inevitably complicated by other
questions, other ways in which gendered subjects are positioned. It
points, too, to the fact that these locations are not only gendered,
that inevitably gender is a relational category that exceeds the bi-
ary men/women. For, of course, racial, class, or sexual position-
are markers that are not confined to gender, although they are, ob-
viously enough, inflected by gender.
When (mainly male) legislators sign pieces of MacKinnonite legislation, we witness one site in which feminist agendas are not solely a single gender issue. "When I began this study," Hobby writes, "I was working on 'forgotten women.' By the time it was finished, I was concerned with the problem of what happens to subordinate groups living under reactionary regimes; and what happens to radicals when they lose their vision, their sense of purpose" (p. 205). While fine tuning is needed to collapse all subordinate groups (women, workers, Blacks, queers) into parallel positions of oppression, it is also important to note that Hobby's shift in focus represents an expansion of her project: finding lost women for other women is no longer enough.

To raise these issues allows one to note that much of the work of recovery of early women writers has not progressed in the directions that Hobby indicates. Rather, the prevailing trend has been tantamount: to the recovery of morally pure, suffering subjects whose goodness is legible in the terms that Hobby reveals. (Hence, the earliest kind of studies of women—the tradition of Women Worthies, as Natalie Zemon Davis labeled this approach, or what I am calling here the legend of good women—remains strongest among literary historians.) What to be done with these writers—beyond proclaiming their virtue—has translated into an endeavor whose conservatism is easily marked, indeed perhaps is implicit in any attempt aimed at recovery, which is definitional an act of conservation: the desire to make canonical space for these writers, to "counterbalance the canon," as one recent anthology offers as its goal. One question, Hobby notes, is that she was often asked about her authors was "Were they any good?" Rejecting the question out of hand for its complicity with "dominant literary and educational cultures" and for the ways in which so-called "good writing" supports the values of "white, heterosexual, middle-class men" (p. 25), Hobby's refusal of the canonical issue raises difficult questions: Must the inclusion of these texts in the canon necessarily support dominant values and the oppressive regimes they foster? Will a re-
fusal of the canonical question inevitably constitute these texts in a canonical relationship of marginality and minority? If so, what interests are served by such a subordination?

The first of these questions is implicated in a recent and ambitious volume, Barbara Kiefer Lewalski's *Writing Women in Jacobean England*. One has to be struck by the fact that every chapter nominates its literary subject as a "first"—Rachel Speght is "the first Englishwoman to identify herself, unmistakably and by name, as a polemicist and critic of contemporary gender ideology" (p. 153); Elizabeth Cary is not only "the first Englishwoman to write a tragedy," but also "the first Englishwoman to write a full-scale history" (p. 179); Aemilia Lanyer is "the first Englishwoman to publish a substantial volume of original poems" (p. 213); Mary Wroth writes "the first prose romance and the first sonnet sequence" (p. 243); these "firsts" add up to a group of women commandeering traditional forms and genres. Many of these "firsts" are fudged in their qualifications—what does "substantial" or "original" mean? What is the value of a name? Why privilege print over manuscripts? Why ignore continental precedents? One is struck, too, by Lewalski’s continuing evaluative gestures, and, as Margaret Ferguson notes acutely in a review of the book, by the ways in which these always qualified affirmations of value continually measure these texts against "male" standards of literary performance and with an eye to high canonical values; so, too, Lewalski’s book imagines its readership to be men who need to be convinced that these texts by women are worth their attention. Lewalski’s rhetoric, Ferguson concludes, concedes much; indeed, "some feminists will feel it’s the whole shop."* How is one to argue the value of these texts? How are these texts to be read in the English Renaissance?

These questions are approached in the two chapters that follow, the first occasioned by the inclusion of selections from Lanyer’s *Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum* (1611) in recent editions of the *Norton Anthology of English Literature*—a sign, surely, of canonization. There are, of course, good reasons to distrust canonization—those
that Hobby lists seem to me compelling—especially when canonization succumbs to these valuations. In his recent, stringent contribution to the canon debate, John Guillory has sought to argue that exclusions from the canon are not to be understood in terms of the social categories that Hobby names, and that the inclusion of the excluded will not automatically restructure social and political relations. While Guillory's arguments are far too complex to be engaged here in a systematic fashion, I would turn to his caveats about the inclusion of "lost" women writers in the canon as one path toward an answer to the question of what is to be made of these newly discovered writers. For Guillory, to include these early women writers would be an ahistorical act, a response to present concerns (about gender equality) cast in modern terms. However, to argue that the inclusion of women writers in the canon merely responds to a demand for the addition of works representative of "new social identities and new writers" (p. 15), as Guillory does, is to take the fact that from the nineteenth century on women have been visibly productive authors as a supposed historical warrant for the marginalization of earlier writing by women (for Guillory they can only be the subject of what he refers to as a research program). Although Guillory argues, correctly, that women-as-women is a problematic category and that Renaissance women writers represent only a fraction of the population (most women were illiterate), this was also, if less massively so, the case for men (and for canonical male authors). Certainly Renaissance women writers cannot be taken to represent all women, but there is no problem in considering the writings of women in this period as part of the scene of literary production—or of what will come to be seen as literary production (Renaissance authors did not write for modern-day classrooms, nor are many of their texts now canonized marked by high literary aspirations). To relegate women writers to the status of the noncanonical is to reproduce the very activity of canon formation as it has been commandeered by the school and particularly by the university curriculum in the twenti-
eth century. While Guillory's aim to situate canon formation as part of a history of schooling and literacy is certainly admirable, it also leads him to ignore all the other sites that produce canonicity—editions of works, anthologies, encyclopedias, biographies—and the complex negotiations between these publications and their readers and the texts assigned in schools.

About Aemilia Lanyer it is therefore salutary to recall the evidence that Margaret Ezell has assembled, documenting the widespread dissemination of early modern women authors through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In that context one must note that George Ballard's 1752 Memoirs of Several Ladies of Great Britain, a set of lives of sixty-three learned and literary women from the sixteenth through the early eighteenth century (a book in the Women Worthies tradition), includes Lanyer's name in the preface along with fifteen other seventeenth-century figures (including Mary Wroth), whom, he writes, "I well know to have been persons of distinguished parts and learning, but have been able to collect very little else relating to them." Thus, more than a century after the publication of Salve Deus Rex Judaeorum, Lanyer's name—and presumably her poem—were known to Ballard. Given the protocols of Ballard's project, which, as Ezell argues, presents a definition of the woman of letters allied to "the domestic, the melancholic, and the impulse for self-sacrifice over the public, the witty, or the defiant (not to mention the erotic)" (p. 88)—and in which women authors too racy for this definition, or authors who wrote for profit go unnamed—Aphra Behn is one notable example here, and the chapter below considers ways in which even recent radical re-estimations of Behn fall sway to some Ballard-like protocols—it is difficult to know whether the failure to do more than name Lanyer arises from the possibility that Ballard knew the kinds of facts about her biography that pose an obstacle to declaring her virtue. Whether or not that was the case (and the chapter that follows takes up some of the ways in which recent critics handle the biographical evidence), to the point here is the recognition that
Lanyer's name still had some currency in the middle of the eighteenth century. Ballard's book, in fact, includes several of the figures studied in the pages that follow—Margaret Roper and the Countess of Pembroke, for instance—as well as a number that would now be studied in any full-scale treatment of Renaissance women writers—among them, Elizabeth I, Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, Katherine Philips—as well as numerous others yet to be given critical attention. What this forcibly suggests is that the recovery of women authors from the early modern period in many instances means nothing more than the belated recognition in the academy of texts that once were more widely known and the inclusion of writers that once were canonical. (By "canonical" I mean nothing more than that the names of these writers were recognizable items on a list of early modern authors.) As Ezell argues, the history of the publication of early women writers involved a continuing process of separating male from female writers, a narrowing of the scope of what counted as feminine and thus the increasing marginalization and decreasing publication of earlier women writers as the nineteenth century progressed. The exclusion of women authors from the standard curriculum, as much as the refusal to acknowledge anything but heteronormativity as the foundational plot of literature, are contributions of the academy and the canon as it came to be formed from the moment when vernacular literature was included in the university syllabus (the Greeks and Romans had already been bowdlerized). Because her work really is part of the history of English literature, if for no other reason, Aemilia Lanyer's canonization, and the inclusion of other early women writers, is justified. No arguments about literary value need be made; no assumptions that the university inevitably reproduces dominant values have to be endorsed. 13

In the chapters that follow, one aim is to consider how the arguments for the value of Lanyer and of Aphra Behn have been shaped by the Worthies tradition, how they are constituted as good writers by being shown to be good women. In exploring these questions
for Lanyer, I take my cue from an important essay by Ann Baynes Coiro, a study that nonetheless could fall prey to Guillory's caveat insofar as Coiro's salutary attention to class difference as inevitably fracturing any definition of "women" seeks to claim Lanyer as a spokesperson for her class; a modern notion of class solidarity intrudes in the argument and produces its own suspect hagiographic effect. I follow as well an agenda in reading Lanyer (and Behn, as well as the other authors considered in later chapters) that points to the second meaning in the title of this book—an exploration of the desires represented in these texts. Here I seek to further the project that Hobby names when she points to her ongoing work on Katherine Philips "as part of a new project around seventeenth-century sexuality, and especially homosexuality"; in this context, she writes: "I doubt if my statements about romantic love will look the same once this thinking has gone further" (p. 205). Not only romantic love but also the presumption that the only desire possible to discern in these texts is one shaped by the obligations of marriage must come into question: questions of other structures of desire inevitably point to forms of social relationship other than those dictated by the hierarchical relations of men and women that marriage means to assure. Once again, one has to note how infrequently considerations of sexuality are pursued in recent criticism. Thus, in the chapter on Lanyer, while I find much to further my argument in the work of Wendy Wall, it has to be said that her important observations about gender transitivity, cross-gender positions and identifications never lead her outside a matrix of heteronormativity. This blockage around gender, and the inevitable reproduction of normative definitions of femininity that it entails, certainly relates to the strain of feminist thinking that Hobby identifies but there are, of course, other vibrant feminist contributions that lead to considerations of questions of sexuality, and it is these that guide my path (it will be regrettable if this approach appears to some as a repudiation of feminism). Guillory would no doubt censure such considerations of sex and gender for their reliance on
modern categories of identity. My argument in this book, as in *Sodomities*, is not meant to declare anything about anyone's "sexual orientation"; indeed, I am as wary as anyone when identity categories become sites of what Wendy Brown incisively labels "wounded attachments," that is, when identities are embraced as sites of victimage demanding redress. To formulate identity in this way inevitably reifies power as entirely in the hands of others; it reduces identity to the field of experience in which claiming an identity amounts to little more than announcing victimhood and in which collectivity (or community) is achieved by limiting membership to those who will testify to their status in the terms that the group demands. 18

To point the relevance of these concerns to the topic of inquiry here, we might recall Lewalski's "firsts," which is one way in which she produces an identity category—female "autonomy." This is a suspect category, as Margaret Ferguson argues at length, and not least when applied to the gentry and aristocratic women studied, whose "freedom" is often a matter of their social status rather than a sign of rebellion. But if gender is taken as *eo ipse* oppressive, then there is no other way to understand how a woman could ever be empowered enough to write and publish. Any other answer would need to reckon with their power positions. Individualizing answers beg such questions. These "firsts" arise as Worthy Women, exceptional women triumphing over the constraints of gender. As Ferguson puts it wryly, it's the Horatio Alger story one more time, "this time for women" (p. 361); more bleakly, one could say that such celebrations of proto-bourgeois individualism mystify the conditions of oppression of modern society, ignoring how "autonomy" for some entails oppression for most others; one might also recall that the Alger story has erotic valences quite at odds with its normative capitalistic venture. 19

The constitution of a legend of good women as the prevailing narrative of early women writers is comprehensible not only in terms of the kinds of conservatism that Hobby underscores but as
a reaction to prevailing descriptions of women in the period as sites of unbridled desire. Because female desire was described in the most stigmatized ways, and as the excuse for institutionalized forms of control—including control over publication—scholarship has often sought to argue against such imputations, to assure the propriety of women and the decorum of their public appearances in print. These protocols have served, however, as constraints; by rescuing women from oblivion and stigma, normative women, bound in a community of interests as women, have become a standard topos. If one looks, for instance, to the introduction that Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar provide for the volumes in their Women of Letters series published by Indiana University Press, one finds exactly the same kind of celebration of firsts found in Lewalski. Gilbert and Gubar found their "female literary tradition" on "the first feminist utopia," Christine de Pisan’s Book of the City of Ladies, and it has immediately to be noted that they thereby ignore the placement of Christine performed by Natalie Zemon Davis, who lists her as a latecomer in a tradition going back to Plutarch and his book on eminent women. Each woman writer is treated as a particular "individual," yet all are "citizens" of Christine’s city. “Such a City has always existed,” Gilbert and Gubar affirm: this is a transhistorical community of women united in their suffering and abjector. Gender is conserved as a site of pain. Gilbert and Gubar’s women are, moreover, a highly selective lot: only those texts that can be read this way fit this canon. Guilloir’s misapprehension about the history of women writers is amply confirmed as well by their labors on The Norton Anthology of Women Writers, excoriated by Ezell precisely for furthering Victorian aims: the anthology includes few early women writers, and it preserves texts in which women write about properly female topics.

Something more needs to be done, then, as any number of feminist historians, literary critics, and theorists would urge: considerations of this writing within social relations that widen an understanding of the work that gender does; a realization that texts by
women are not simply ones in which the only thing to be considered is their representation of women; more than the occasional noting that something other than heterosexuality is involved in these texts. Although one could be heartened, for instance, to find Louise Schleiner opening her recent study of women's communities and their practices of reading and writing, *Tudor and Stuart Women Writers,* by entertaining the possibility that these relationships were “sometimes lesbian”—and I agree with her that “a social-power differential in a warm personal relationship, whether homosexual or heterosexual, typically carries a potential for erotic loading” (p. 25177)—it is disappointing to find that speculation immediately foreclosed: “Direct clues on that point will have to be left to other studies” (p. 3). “Clues,” of course, may not exactly be what is needed; biographical proof that some of these writers were lesbians misses the point. As Valerie Traub has incisively argued, it is not the case that lesbian desire and its representation are transparently available to any critic, or that “lesbians” can simply be produced by the critic out of the archives. 22

One of the things that makes Hobby’s work so important is that, unlike many other studies, its focus is not on individual authors, and it does not aim at biographical readings, in which women’s texts are indices to their lives or the lives of women *tout court,* inevitably cast in private terms. Genre and historical developments on a broad social scale place the writing that Hobby examines. Granted, it is far easier to do this in a book about mid-seventeenth-century writing than with earlier texts; in *The Currency of Eros,* Ann Rosalind Jones solves this problem by pairing her writers in terms of strategies of writing, class position, and across national boundaries. Jones’s book is also among the few that engage texts in terms of the desires they enunciate. Her work is motivated by the recognition that cultural production arises out of sites of negotiation and contestation, that prescriptions against women’s desires or women’s writings are not simply repressive mechanisms whose force must be acknowledged, but sites inevitably engaged
and rescripted by the writing produced by women in the period, women who, thanks to their literacy, cannot be considered simply as marginalized or oppressed members of their culture. I take my cue from Jones in the pages that follow—I, too, "want to resist interpretive frameworks that doom women of the past—or the present—to a relentlessly disempowered relation to political and cultural practices" (p. 9).

Although the book that follows does not match Hobby or Jones in its ambition or scope, I hope to make possible explorations no longer bound to the prevailing protocols of reading. In the two chapters in this section, I engage the possiblity of reading Lanyer and Behn beyond the constraints I have noted above. "Translating Women" looks at writing by Margaret More Roper and Mary Sidney, Countess of Pembroke, beyond the usual view that tends to dismiss translation—precisely because it was a permitted sphere—as therefore necessarily trivial as a writing activity. The last section of this book engages the question of the thematization of the woman writer in Elizabeth Cary's work, as well as seeking to problematize it through a manuscript that may—or may not—be an example of writing by a woman. These chapters are guided by the double desire that titles this book—the desire that there should be women writers in the Renaissance and that the desires articulated in their texts be acknowledged. These are not perfectly congruent desires: the former takes its impulse from the feminist critique of the canon that has, working in pincers fashion, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick puts it, insisted both on the addition of works by women to the canon and on rereading canonical texts in ways that apply pressure so that they can no longer disguise themselves as repositories of truth but must be read as "a particular canon, a canon of mastery, in this case of men's mastery over, and mastery against, women." To read these texts on the lookout for their structures of desire, is, to follow Sedgwick, to acknowledge "that no one can know in advance where the limits of gay-centered inquiry are to be drawn" (p. 53). That is: such questions can be asked of any text. Al-
though this book confines itself to a few examples rather than attempt a survey of writing by English women in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I hope, through readings as attentive as I am able to perform, to widen the possibilities for understanding of the place of these texts in the social and cultural formation called the English Renaissance.24
NOTES

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION


2. In the United States, the landmark for this division is usually taken to be the 1982 Barnard conference, papers from which appear in Vance.

3. For a consideration of this collapse, as well as an urgent argument for an ongoing relationship between a feminist tradition in support of sexual freedom and queer theory, see Butler, "Against Proper Objects."

4. On this point, see the fundamental essay by Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in her *Gender and the Politics of History*, pp. 28–50.

5. The issue of race—addressed in some of the chapters of this book—has begun to be explored thanks to the essays in Hendricks and Parker, and is notably advanced in Hall.

6. See, e.g., Hackett, who tells the by now familiar story of the attack on Lady Mary Wroth launched by Edward Denny (p. 47), but fails to note that Wroth replied scathingly, rhyme for rhyme; who wor-
eries the question of Wroth's complicity with "a male or masculine gaze in ways which are oppressive to her own sex" (p. 58), ignoring thereby the evidence she also presents—of women as likely readers of romance—and thus the possibility that Wroth might be invested in such scenes. Rather than contemplating that relations between women could partake of the erotic charge of violence, Hackett opts for a reading of the text in terms of autoeroticism, thus collapsing relations between women into relations of the same, and before long violence and difference in the text is coded as male, whereas relations between women are described as scenes of "peaceful reciprocity" (p. 59) offering models of "female community or autonomy" (p. 60). One need not read far into Book One of the 
Utopia to take stock either of the fierce antipathies of Antistia and Pamphilia, or to note that the resolution of their evasions, fighting, and lying is consummated in bed, but such dynamics—such erotics—are rendered impossible of notice if mutuality, support, and loving community must be discovered as the properly feminine.

7. See Davis, "Women's History," Davis opens her essay by pointing to this tradition that extends from Plutarch through Boccaccio and Christine de Pisan to the present (p. 83) and closes by urging a new direction: "from Women Worthies to a wiser sort" (p. 93). It is perhaps a mark of the direction that Gobby notes, that Davis's most recent book, 
Women on the Margins, while rich in context and contrastive materials, nonetheless is framed as a set of biographies of notable individual women.

8. I cite the subtitle of Haselkorn and Travitsky; questions of canon are addressed in Travitsky's "Introduction" to the volume.


10. See Guillory, esp. ch. 1. Guillory's arguments are not always as logical as they appear to be; he notes, for instance, of the inclusion of texts chosen in terms of categories of race or gender, that this points to the fact "of their being read now" not "that they have become canonical" (p. 17), but later admits that "changing the syl-
labus cannot mean in any historical context overthrowing the canon, because every construction of a syllabus institutes once again the process of canon formation” (p. 31). If the latter point is true, then it must follow that precisely when texts are included in the syllabus they are involved in a process of canonization.

See Ezell, Writing Women’s Literary History, esp. chs. 3 and 4. Ezell mounts her evidence against such canonizing activities as the initial edition of The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women, which, as she demonstrates, is fully in line with Victorian anthologies of women writers that exclude earlier authors in favor of modern ones, and that choose which authors and which texts to represent on the basis of culturally normative notions of femininity.

Ballard, p. 54. Ballard’s reference is noted in the headnote to Lancy in Mahl and Koon, one of the earliest recent anthologies, p. 73.

I do not mean to imply here that the university is a site for the free exchange of ideas, or that it is some utopian space unrelated to the inequities of the culture; I mean only to affirm it is a site of possible contestation whose consequences in the world cannot be decided in advance.

For her work on this project, see Hobby, “Katherine Philips: Seventeenth-Century Lesbian Poet.” The Philips described in this essay is not the celebrant of desexualized female friendships, as in conventional accounts, but one who reworks and reoccupies power relations toward the enunciation of same-sex desire.

As Maclean argues, marriage is the most restrictive domain governing women—definitionally as well as legally and socially. Nonetheless, it is not the only domain that defines women.

Donoghue, an important exception to this statement, overlaps only with the latest figure considered in this book, Aphra Behn.

See Wall, Impression of Gender, ch. 5 passim, for extraordinarily rich discussions of women writers, which, nonetheless, also stop short of full consideration of questions of sexuality.

Wendy Brown’s “Wounded Attachments” appears in her States of Injury, which furthers its arguments; it also is to be found in Rajchman, pp. 199–227, which contains a number of important
essays, including Scott, "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity," which argues strongly for the kind of expanded definition of gender that I seek to articulate and voices necessary suspicion about the evidence of experience for its inevitable policing and normativizing of identity categories and its reduction of social questions to individual ones (see esp. pp. 10–11).

19. On this point, see Moon.

20. I cite from the "Foreword" as it appears in Schleiner, pp. ix–x.

21. The second edition of The Norton Anthology of Literature by Women (1996) attempts to redress these and other shortcomings. It offers additional texts by some sixteenth- and seventeenth-century writers (e.g., Mary Sidney, Lanyer, Cavendish, Philips, Behn), and includes several authors not previously represented (e.g., Isabella Whitney, Elizabeth Cary, Mary Wroth); almost a hundred additional pages of this anthology feature pre-nineteenth-century writing.

22. See Traub, "The (In)significance of 'Lesbian' Desire."

23. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet, p. 50; further page citations appear in the text.

24. "Renaissance" is a term that causes some misgivings for its homosocial implications; however, "early modern" is also problematic in its implicit teleological valuation of modernity. It would also be inaccurate for the parameters of this project, which do not extend into the eighteenth century.

Canonizing Aemelia Lanyer

1. Coiro, pp. 357–58. For a more recent intervention along similar, if less fully argued, lines, see Schnell, which also argues for social disparity and resentment as inevitably fracturing an idealized sisterhood of oppressed women.

The process of canonization for Lanyer began with her inclusion in a number of anthologies of women's writing, among them: Gilbert and Gubar; Greer et al.; Mahl and Koon; Travitsky, Paradise of Women. Schleiner presents an excerpted version of Salve Deus Rex Judæorum in an appendix.