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D. C. Greetham


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Textual Forensics

D. C. GREETHAM, professor of English and medieval studies at the City University of New York Graduate School, founded the interdisciplinary Society for Textual Scholarship and serves as its executive director and as coeditor of its journal, Text. He has edited Trevisa and Hoccleve and written essays on editing and textual theory (collected in Textual Transgressions: Essays toward the Construction of a Biobibliography [Garland, 1995]), Textual Scholarship: An Introduction (Garland, 1992), and Theories of the Text (Clarendon, 1996). He is editor of Scholarly Editing: A Guide to Research (MLA, 1995) and Margins of the Text (U of Michigan P, forthcoming). He is at work on a monograph on intertextual quotation and on an electronic archive of citation in the arts.

Text . . . L. textus . . . style, tissue of a literary work . . . that which is woven, web, texture . . . 1. b. . . . an original or authority . . . 2. c. . . . the original matter . . . 3. a. . . . The very words and sentences of Holy Scripture . . .

Oxford English Dictionary

forensic . . . pertaining to, connected with, or used in courts of law or public discussion and debate . . . forensics . . . the art or study of argumentation and formal debate.

forensic chemistry . . .
forensic medicine . . .
forensic psychiatry . . .

Random House Dictionary

forensic . . . A college exercise, consisting of a speech or . . . written thesis maintaining one side or the other of a given question.

Oxford English Dictionary

TEXTUAL SCHOLARSHIP is an antidiscipline because it does not occupy a permanent or consistent epistemological position and because it has no definable Fach, or subject matter. And textual scholarship is a postmodernist antidiscipline because it consists of co-opted and deformed quotations from other fields. Misappropriating concepts and vocabulary from law and jurisprudence, from ethics, philosophy, logic, theology, music, physics, mathematics, statistics, medicine, biology and genetics, sociology, and psychology, textual scholarship is a fragmented pastiche—in the words of Fredric Jameson, a “blank parody” without a central governing figure or even a defined body of knowledge (17).1 Textual scholarship thus exemplifies the postmodernist breakdown of the “master narratives” of intellectual discipline. If the paradigm for modernism is, as Clement Greenberg writes (Notion; “Modern”), an essentialist, opaque, nonreferential quidditas (or “whatness” [Joyce 213]), textual scholarship is closer to the postmodern, defined by Jameson as a co-option of reference or as paradoxical quotation
without a consistent transcendental grounding, without a fixed position from which this co-option can be evaluated.

Accordingly, the status of the raw data from which this antidiscipline draws its conclusions—the character and function of the evidence called on in formulations of empirical and rhetorical proof—may be emblematic of a postmodernist breakdown of the master narrative of evidence itself. What happens to the concepts of cause and effect, to the relations between the inductive, empiricist accumulation (and independent replication) of testable “fact” and the formulation of generative principles of demonstration, in an area of research where the rules for the definition and admissibility of evidence are in flux? One way of approaching this problem is to confront the ambivalent history of textual scholarship and the field’s equally ambivalent foundational term, text. The definitions quoted at the beginning of this essay show just two (contradictory) meanings of text from the first appearance of the word in English, in the fourteenth century. Text is an “authority,” an “original,” the word of God, and yet text is also something “woven,” a “tissue.” As the other quotations suggest, the forensics of text would therefore be both the rhetorical display of the textile “figure in the carpet” (a pattern that varies with different perspectives and rhetorics) and the demonstration of an irrefutable truth about origins and authority, empirical and testable as the hard facts of the physical universe are in the forensic laboratory (“Send the evidence to forensics”). Two sets of ambiguities create manifold possibilities for indeterminacy and confusion.

One of the indeterminacies of textual research is its relation to the disciplines that rely on the discovery and interpretation of evidence. In its attitudes to, and use of, evidence, is textual scholarship an art, a social science, or a physical science, a combination of the three, or some episteme not directly related to any of these classes of knowledge? The question is an old one, but it will not go away. Despite A. E. Housman’s declaration that “textual criticism is not a branch of mathematics, nor indeed an exact science at all” (131) and despite the efforts of even the strictest bibliographers to place fallible human judgment rather than objective empirical demonstration at the center of the textual enterprise (e.g., Tanselle, “Bibliography”), there remains among some textuists the residual conviction that textual scholarship is an activity separate from criticism and best aligned with the evidentiary protocols of the hard sciences. And the assumption that textual study is positivistic, empirical, and definitive is still too common among nontextuists.

The position of an antidiscipline among the disciplines affects, or even determines, the “whiteness” of the raw data on which the rhetoric of the field is constructed. Because textual scholarship is found nowhere and everywhere, there is no place for what I designate “textual forensics.” If text is both “authority . . . Holy Scripture” (textus) and “tissue” (textile) and if forensics is both the manipulation of argument to sustain a proposal (rhetoric) and the apparently objective, empirical study of the evidence on which this proposal relies for its probity (science), then current theoretical and practical work in textual scholarship should probably be placed at several mutually contradictory positions on an epistemological scale. At one end of the scale is the “Galileian” normative, abstract, and replicatory paradigm of science, and at the other end is the individual, symptomatic, “character”-based prescription for what Carlo Ginzburg calls “venatic lore” (103). In the following account of textual forensics, I cover the tension between these poles by addressing first the concept of “everything” in textual evidence, especially in the creation of evidence and in the role of contradictory evidence. I then confront different ways of reading texts for evidence, focusing on debates within bibliography, and investigate the phenomenological distinction between the substance and the accidence of textual evidence. Finally, I pose an epistemological distinction between the replicability of scientific evidence and the “symptomatic” nature of character and style and interrogate the correspondence between texts and a constative reality outside them.

Contradictory and Created Evidence: The Problem of “Everything”

The rule of contradictory evidence (Newton’s fourth law of reasoning) holds that “in experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred
by general induction from phenomena as accurate or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions” (qtd. in Van Doren 210). This rule has usually been accepted by analytical bibliographers—those who rigorously and empirically investigate the technology of the printed book.³ But, as Peter Davison shows, the relations between such physical evidence and its rhetorical formulation and interpretation in a forensics (of persuasion) are not necessarily governed by Newton’s principle. Davison wrestles with the “hypothetico-deductive” method described in D. F. McKenzie’s “Printers of the Mind” and comes to question the rule of contradictory evidence, which Davison states as follows: “every effort should be made to disprove a conjecture and if a single piece of contradictory evidence—a counter-instance—is thrown up, the conjecture must be abandoned” (“Selection” 104.)⁶ Unlike Newton, Davison argues that phenomena (contradictory or otherwise) do not just occur but are created as evidence. He claims that it “is difficult in bibliographic matters to ascertain what evidence ‘exists’”—that is, as “scientifically acceptable knowledge.” A more accurate description of the procedures of textual forensics, he says, is “[w]e find differences in running titles, in spellings, types; from this we create evidence about compositorial practice; upon this we base our conjectures” (105). The conjecture (the hypothetical forensics) depends on the prior construction of empirical data. But the act of finding in order to create is selective and interpretive, the first stage of a hermeneutics that eventually produces meaning that seems construable directly and unambiguously from the data. The problem is exacerbated when differing hermeneutic protocols produce two or more contradictory meanings from the same selection of data. For example, in a recent exchange in the Times Literary Supplement, Brian Vickers regards the first (“bad”) quarto of Hamlet as only a corrupted “memorial reconstruction” of Shakespeare, whereas Graham Holderness and Bryan Loughrey (editors of the quarto) and Evert Sprinckhorn, who reflect Steven Urkowitz’s innovative evaluation, find in the text evidence of direct authorial presence.

Recognizing the insolubility of this conundrum, Jerome McGann declares that the aim of historical criticism, including textual historicism, is not a “[s]trict constructionist” recovery of the “lost phenomena” (the bibliographical evidence) but a “dialectical” and “rhetorical event” (a forensics) that is “invariably multiple” (“Literature” 166, 167). In his test case of the variant order of chapters 28 and 29 of Henry James’s The Ambassadors, McGann argues that true and false interpretations of the evidence cannot be clearly distinguished: “The scandal is that the novel makes no sense no matter which order the two chapters are put in.” The bibliographical variance, at first unnoticed and then regarded as error, does not expose an authorial or a production slippage from the truth but rather shows that “both ways of reading the novel are authorized at the bibliographical level” (168).⁷

The dual readings that McGann derives from evidence and the circularity in Davison’s prescription for textual forensics respond to what have long been considered major liabilities in the recognition, arrangement, and probity of a work’s “textual witnesses”—the successive states of the work, either extant or inferred. For example, the Lachmannian system of genealogical testing uses the concept of error to determine the status of witnesses in their dissemination of textual evidence and thus to position them on a family tree, or stemma. A witness containing an erroneous reading of a preceding witness is placed below the other on the stemma. Thereafter, the error in the lower witness may be used to evaluate the probity of the preceding witness—a perfect case of circular reasoning. Moreover, according to the principle of eliminatio codicum descriptorum (the elimination of derivative texts), any witness whose testimony derives solely from an extant witness can be disregarded: the testimony is a form of hearsay, with no independent, or even corroborative, authority (fig. 1).

The hermeneutic creation of evidence before the (editing) event is a widespread phenomenon. For example, the compilers of the MLA variorum edition of King Lear (in preparation) decided not to record the social and critical reception of the play in its Nahum Tate adaptation (in which Cordelia marries Edgar and Lear goes into a gentle retirement), even though that version was the only one
seen on stage for over a century. Thus a segment of the performance history and of the social evidence is rendered inadmissible in a scholarly publication—the critical variorum—which very rationale is to record “the ideology of difference” present in the “whole possible range of . . . textual variants, spectrum of meanings, critical approaches, historical and cultural changes of taste” (Knowles 40). Similarly, as Thomas L. Berger complains, the front matter of the Shakespeare First Folio (including “The Names of the Principall Actors in all these Playes” [fig. 2]) and other mentions of the actors in the folio (e.g., in Henry IV, Part 2 and Measure for Measure) are omitted from the through-line numbering system in Charlton Hinman’s facsimile: to Hinman “the front matter is not ‘text,’ quite literally, it does not count. The front matter, the material which authorizes and legitimates the texts which follow, doesn’t matter at all. It’s not part of the ‘text’” (Berger 196). Even in hypertext editing, where the (inter)textual play is presumably most liberal and comprehensive, the selection of evidence can have specific hermeneutic intentions and results. The editors of the Piers Plowman Archive, a
Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work. The problem is both theoretical and technical. When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche's works, for example, where should one stop? Surely everything must be published, but what is “everything”? Everything that Nietzsche himself published, certainly. And what about rough drafts of his works? Obviously. The plans for his aphorisms? Yes. The deleted passages and the notes at the bottom of the page? Yes. What if, within a workbook filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list: Is it a work, or not? Why not? And so on, ad infinitum. How can one define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death? A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory.

(103–04)

Where to stop? How to stop? How much information does an editor need to prove positions on such topics as intention, attribution, and style? The guidelines of the MLA Committee on Scholarly Editions, for example, have an even larger definition of everything than Foucault does, including “secondary” materials such as letters sent to the author and revisions made by copyeditors, proofreaders, and others besides the author. In an attempt to discern two classes of everything, Japanese editing makes a distinction between bungaku collections, of literary works, and zenshu, “everything written by the author,” although both terms imply completeness (Yamashita). In a prescription for vari- rum editing, Richard Knowles nicely catches the uncertainty about the evidence of everything when he cites R. P. Blackmur (“Use everything”), the Skeptic Pyrrho (“Trust nothing”), Richard Rorty (“Decide how well it works”), and Wittgenstein (“Only the exhaustive is interesting”) (41).

Recognizing that the evidentiary range in bibliographical research (“everything”) may be too large and yet too incomplete to allow an editor to use an analogy from science, Davison rejects the “hypothetico-deductive” method because of its dual assumptions that “all the evidence is theoretically recoverable” and that “such evidence is ‘hard’ not ‘created’ evidence” (“Selection” 105). His specific caveat against the counterinstance clause in this model is that since “what comes down to us can be the exceptional and the illogical” (107), the editor cannot necessarily determine whether extant data were typical or atypical in their original context, and the counterinstance may only be inferable, not demonstrable. The gap between inference and demonstration is crucial to bibliographical and editorial “proofing”—the effort to establish reliable evidence for the incidence of error in a text.¹⁸

But Davison’s recognition of an evidentiary gap between the forensics of hard science and the forensics of the creation and rhetorical manipulation of evidence in textual research is too concessive. In mapping the universe of data collection, he discusses rules of bibliographical evidence in terms of a putative scientific norm for plausibility, which is provable in the physical sciences and not in textual research. The plausibility of any body of knowledge, however, depends directly on its peculiar evidentiary circumstances: what is recoverable and what is lost, what is comprehensive and what is partial. While admitting, even celebrating, the “irrational” and the “exceptional,” Davison’s design for textual forensics is still based on a comparison in which the inevitable incompleteness of textual evidence makes this forensics inferior to what he regards as the scientific model. Yet even abstract science must make conceptual leaps when direct evidence is lacking: the theory of black holes still precedes their firm demonstration, and various features of the Einsteinian universe were “proved” empirically long after Einstein had argued that they ought to exist.¹⁹ I am not convinced that there is a single conceptual position, scientific or herme-
neutic, empirical or rhetorical, from which bibliographical evidence of the sort Davison confronts can be evaluated. Difference from (or similarity to) a particular discipline does not position textual scholarship on the current epistemological map.

Bibliographical Debates and Variable Concepts of the Text

The problem of perspective occurs even within bib-
liography: to what type of bibliographical research should data be attributed—historical? social? technical? D. F. McKenzie, a proponent of a social
approach to bibliography, tries to displace John Carter and Graham Pollard’s *An Enquiry into the Nature of Certain Nineteenth-Century Pamphlets*, on the forgeries perpetrated by T. J. Wise, from its usual position within analytical bibliography (the empirical examination of physical books as an aspect of technological history) to social history. Carter and Pollard’s book, “informed though it was by the historical evidence of trade documents, paper technology, and type, was seen more as a triumph of analytical bibliography than as an exercise in book history. As the title implies, it reinforced an editorial and bibliophiliac concern for authenticity” (“History” 293–94). McKenzie also chastises such monumental gatherings of bibliographical evidence as W. W. Greg’s *Bibliography of the English Printed Drama to the Restoration* and Harry Carter and Herbert Davis’s edition of Joseph Moxon’s *Mechanick Exercises on the Whole Art of Printing* for betraying the same “bibliocentric . . . resistance to generality and abstraction” (294)—that is, for concentrating so much on the technological trees that they cannot see the sociological wood.

Of course, McKenzie cannot stand fully outside the ideological history of the field he comments on, and he speaks necessarily from a particular moment in the evolution of a normative history of the interpretation of evidence. Because of his conviction that “the full range of historical and analytical studies” must be employed to sift the evidence of book history, McKenzie supports “the use of archival evidence to confute many ill-informed assumptions made by analytical bibliographers” (293, 294). G. Thomas Tanselle, however, attempts to incorporate within analytical bibliography the supposed generalities that McKenzie finds only in the social history of the book. Any history of publishing based solely or even primarily on archives and business records is inadequate, Tanselle insists, for it lacks the essential evidence:

> it must take precedence: the actual books *constitute* the evidence, whereas printers’ and publishers’ records contain statements *about* the books.  

Thus, Tanselle reverses McKenzie’s hierarchy, taking data from the sociology of texts and inscribing this evidence within, or as dependent on, the technological history promoted by analytical bibliography. He co-opts McKenzie’s social-based “full range of historical” evidence as merely a subclass of the normative evidence to be found in analytical bibliography; and where the two sets of evidence clash, the book is to be given probative primacy.

 Whereas McKenzie interprets this conflict over the status of evidence as an Anglo-American resistance to the general and the abstract, David Shaw dismisses French *bibliologie* in favor of the Anglo-American emphasis on “the internal or archeological examination of the book as evidence for the book and the book trade” (“La Bibliologie” 210).

And yet, in the fields of Continental philosophy and the history of the Renaissance, Paul Oskar Kristeller argues for a turn from general theories of history to specificities, particularly in textual history, which must “deal with details, many of them minor, and thus operates . . . on a lower and more modest level” than general history, the domain of laws “valid for all historical or literary developments” (5). The conflict between Kristeller and McKenzie over the abstract and the general raises larger questions about the position of textual scholarship. Is this field a science on the Galileian model, in which quantification and the repetition of phenomena can be used to determine abstract principles? Or is it one of the pursuits that Carlo Ginzburg labels “evidential and conjectural,” in which “the object is the study of individual cases, situations, and documents, precisely because they are individual, and for this reason get results that have an unsuppressible speculative margin” (106)?

The tension between a textual forensics that is specific, local, and provable and one that is conceptual, general, and speculative is epitomized by the work of Randall McLeod, who has tried to force a technical and epistemological disjunction between the local evidence derivable from analytical bibliography and the generalized evidence resulting from reading, which constructs large-scale
meaning from the symbolic codes of a document. In contrast to McGann’s insistence on the phenomenological inseparability of linguistic codes (the text itself, or the words) and bibliographical codes (the physical and spatial context in which the text is transmitted), McLeod considers it essential to segregate these two competing forms of evidence, because of the mutual “interference of signals” they provoke: “I can’t I I I I can’t simultaneously read I can’t read a book I can’t READ a book and LOOK at it at the same time” (“‘Tranceformations’” 61).

In this passage, McLeod differentiates symbolically the acts of looking at and reading a book (“read” progresses from roman type to italic to italic caps, while “look” is set in bold caps); similarly, he refuses to read the texts of Renaissance books, the better to understand their typographic codes. As he points out, “Renaissance books use different visual codes than ours. And not just neutrally different codes, but pointedly different, because we arrived at our codes by undoing theirs!” (76). In a series of brilliant, though sometimes infuriating, articles on bibliographical evidence, McLeod interrupts, prevents, and derrails any attempt to impose a linear, consistent, abstract reading on his research. To arrest the eye on the specificity of symbols, he has facsimiles and modern text printed upside down and diagonally; has material printed into and across the gutter and from recto to verso margins; presents an inverted picture of himself “not reading,” looking into his “collator in a handbag”; introduces “editorial” marginalia like “Go on. You can trust Randy” (“Information” 275); turns pages; begins an article twice, under different pseudonyms; and generally misorders the traditional scholarly format and narrative in a practical, visual demonstration that to “understand” textual “paradox we shall have to pass from a consideration of the . . . words as lexical items to the system of graphic codes in which they function” (250; figs. 3 and 4). These graphic codes are part of the game of detecting—or failing to detect—the evidence:

But why did I play that game with you, and make you feel stupid because you couldn’t find “the”? (After all, you’re not stupid.) Because that is what it was like to be a Renaissance reader. (And that’s what these say is about?)

McLeod’s simulation of Renaissance reading by modern looking makes readers feel stupid because they cannot see the evidence or can see it only as either a lexical or a bibliographical function: weighing evidence of one type disturbs the value of evidence of another type.

McLeod’s play on the disturbance caused by the interpreting of bibliographical features visually exemplifies Ginzburg’s characterization of philology as a site for the “conjecture” that is essential to a “speculative margin” requiring an individual and interpretive, even quirky, critic and creator of evidence. And yet, as McKenzie insists on the conceptual value of abstraction, Ginzburg maintains that “the abstract notion of text explains why textual criticism, even while retaining to a large extent its divinatory qualities, had the potential to develop in a rigorously scientific direction” (107). He senses the paradox in the definitions of text: if text is original, authoritative, and scriptural—that is, fixed but not immediately accessible in its concrete form—then it might be susceptible to a Galileian model of the general, in which “for the natural philosopher as for the philologist, the text is a profound, invisible entity to be reconstructed independently of material data” (108). But if text is tissue and web, it needs the critical, “divinatory” qualities of the speculative margin.

Substance, Accident, and Critical Apparatus

The Galilean view of text recalls the work of W. W. Greg and Fredson Bowers, in which an “ideal text” may be nonextant as a documentary, material phenomenon but can be constructed under Platonist principles. According to this concept, a text is composed of two elements: the accidentals, or surface features (punctuation, capitalization, spelling, and so on), and the substantives, or meaning (the words). In the Greg-Bowers theory of “dual [divided] authority,” the best evidence for the accidentals comes from an authorial manuscript or early print, in which the surface features are least disturbed by the social transmission (copying or printing) of the text, whereas evidence for the substantives may come from any subsequent stage of transmission in which revision has authority—usually because there is reason to think that the author
presided over or carried out the revisions (Greg, “Rationale”; Bowers, “Greg’s ‘Rationale’”). The result is an eclectic text, a text that never was, which fulfills ideal rules of composition but is constructed under two systems of evidence.

Greg formulated his so-called copy-text rationale, suggesting an evidentiary distinction between substance and accidence, pragmatically in the context of the production conditions of Renaissance drama, in which scribes and compositors indeed might quickly contaminate an author’s accidentals. However, through the proselytizing zeal of Bowers and Tanselle, the rationale was exported as a principle into periods and genres undreamed of by Greg—including nineteenth-century American literature (Bowers, “Some Principles”), philosophy (Boydston, “Collected Works”), and even biblical, classical, and medieval literature (Tanselle, “Classical”; Greetham, “Place”—and was eventually enshrined in the principles of the MLA Center for Editions of American Authors. To be replicated in times and places other than the original Renaissance context, Greg’s textual protocols had to be turned from a speculative margin into an abstract, Galileian paradigm. The great majority of editions awarded seals by the CEAA and its successor, the Committee on Scholarly Editions, have been eclectic, ideal-text editions.11

Greg’s notion of dual types of evidence was not unopposed, contrasting, for example, with the editorial rationale promoted by Philip Gaskell (399–40) and others. In this alternative view, a manuscript is not direct evidence of its author’s intentions, since an author submitting a work for publication usually assumes that the accidentals of the manuscript will be changed to conform to house

through the verso of its leaf, which you are now turning to gaze on. For the light falling over your left shoulder still illuminates the opening that you have not fully closed. Not a single solitary mirror-image word of it departing, glimpsed before it could evenAt first I did very well in the Combray School. I was training to be a textual editor.

The doctor they referred me after it happened the second time—actually a whole battery of them. One of them suggested that the backaches headaches and dreams (and the “behavioural things”) were concocted in some way with this missionary position. This person thought up this term. (Would I have dreamt of it on my own?) That I should left my eye sometimes go right where it wanted to go. Or the other eye. That it was alright for either of them to want to—to do these things on its own. “The book will not be hurt,” she quipped. “Let your eyeballs do their things—it’s OK,” I can recall her quiping and cajollying me encouragingly many times.

So five six years ago I’ve become as you see me now in that time. You wouldn’t mistake me for a textual editor, now, eh? I sought a way to adapt my training. (No question of just chucking it!) I undertook a systematic MATURE SCHOLAR SEeks VISUALLY ARRESTING BOOK NOT TO READ, and at last I have chosen Harington’s translation of Orlando Furioso. Have been looking at copies of first two eds. ever since. (They are like big picture books, but for grownups.) My project is not just not to read the Orlando, but not to read it over and over again until I have a new way to read. (I will explain why I gaze at it upside down in just a minute.)

Fig. 3. Randall McLeod’s determination to avoid reading a text in order to see it. His article “From ‘Tranceformations in the Text of Orlando Furioso’” includes an upside-down photograph of himself looking at a book in the McLeod Portable Collator, which inverts the text page: “MATURE SCHOLAR SEeks VISUALLY ARRESTING BOOK NOT TO READ.”
styling. For Greg and Bowers, evidence for intention is psychologistic; for Gaskell, it is social and contractual. McGann’s social textual criticism extends the arguments of Gaskell, Donald Pizer (“On the Editing”; “Self-Censorship”), and James Thorpe (esp. 48) in favor of the collaborative model of authorship and dissemination by changing the evidentiary definitions of such basic concepts as the primary witness (Critique). To Greg, Bowers, and the intentionalists, primary documents are those over which the author might have had some oversight, including posthumous documents, such as the Shakespeare First Folio, that are at least in part based on lost states possibly seen by the author. But to the textual critic, any textus receptus, no matter how far removed from a demonstrable authorial intention—indeed, even if it contradicts such an intention—acquires primary evidentiary status as a cultural artifact (see, e.g., Pizer, “Self-Censorship” 156–60, on Dreiser) and cannot be impugned as inadmissible.

Beyond the evaluation of authorial control over substance andaccidence, eclectic text theory also affects the evidence presented to the reader. The typical eclectic edition gives prominence to a “clear text” page unsullied by any indication of where and how the evidence for substantives and accidentals was used in the construction of the ideal text. All such evidence is buried in lists of variants at the back of the book, together with evidence for the editor’s critical intervention (fig. 5). E. Talbot Donaldson calls the philosophy behind clear-text methods an editorial “death-wish” (105)—a desire to conceal the evidence of one’s editorial handwork so that the resulting clueless text acquires transparency and authority, seeming not to depend on the demonstrable intervention of a fallible editor’s many choices among often contradictory pieces of evi-
The Dynamic of the Actual

**RANDOM CLOVD**

*The struggle for text is the text.*

R. Cloud

- how texts were written transmitted and read in the Renaissance, that we recognize this dynamic not as an airy adjunct to textual study, but as something rooted so deep in texts of the period that it is ineradicable (Unless, of course, you edit them.), because, simply, it is text.

In the 18th century, when the Editing of Shakespeare As we Know It began, there was no practical means of broadcasting the texts of the Renaissance without a laborious resetting of them, type by type. Inevitably, by sheer weight of numbers and the inaccessibility of original editions (and lack of knowledge about them, in any case), it was modernizing editions that became the standards of reference. In stating these facts of production and use, I don't apologize for an ideology that was also at work, reshaping historic texts for a new market. Not only had the language changed, and taste changed, and the theatre changed—all of which weighed on the editors who, as a class, intervened between the old textual evidence and the new reading public (which had itself changed along with the rest), but also it was generally perceived that there was a role Shakespeare could be made to play in the shaping of contemporary national and class identities. All of these factors and more worked to transform texts.

- But the photographic revolution of the 19th century has put our relationship to the printed books of the Renaissance on a technological basis quite different from that of the editorial founding fathers in the century before. The dynamic world of editing has been slow to realize this fact, and it may take the electronic revolution of our own century to propel it into the 19th. What the photo-facsimile achieved is the exposure of the 18th-century edition and its modern descendants as being in the evidence. Of course, this death wish has a major advantage: the text can be easily separated from its apparatus and published in a different format for a nonspecialist audience, as was done with several CEAA volumes reprinted in the Library of America series. The alternative to clear text is “inclusive text”—a page in which editorial sigla and apparatus interrupt the reader’s linear progression (fig. 6). Recent editions of Emerson (Ferguson et al.), Wordsworth (Parrish), Yeats (Finneran et al.), and *Ulysses* (Gabler) use inclusive texts.

It is ironic that Donaldson upbraids textual scholars who aim for anonymity, however, for although George Kane’s and his famous edition of the B version of *Piers Plowman* is inclusive, its text carefully marked with every sign of editorial intervention (even notations of expansions of conventional scribal abbreviations), it has been accused of an evidentiary sleight of hand, of seeming to provide evidence while in fact concealing it. For example, Charlotte Brewer charges that Kane and Donaldson’s decision to record in the apparatus only the readings that depart from the edited text creates the impression that all other (uncited) witnesses agree with the editors’ judgment—an assumption that is frequently unwarranted, given the enormous gaps in the testamentary coverage of this highly variant poem. From the evidence cited in the apparatus, the reader cannot tell “whether Kane and Donaldson’s reading originates from [the A or C text] or whether, instead, it is the product of the editors’ conjectural emendation” (61–62).

This edition provides a complex example of variable testamentary states—and the lack of them—that have to be interpreted continually through fact or inference in the apparatus of recorded variants and textual notes. Unfortunately, few scholars have sufficient interest or competence to navigate the deep waters of apparatus successfully. Jo Ann Boydston, the editor of the complete thirty-seven-volume edition of John Dewey’s writings, dolefully reports that her knowledge not a single study of Dewey has ever referred for evidence to the enormous end-of-volume apparatus of rejected variants (“In Praise” 9). As Davison
had a noble boy about a year old, who bore a marvellous resemblance to Mehevi, whom I should certainly have believed to have been the father, were it not that the little fellow had no triangle on his face—but on second thoughts, tattooing is not hereditary. Mehevi, however, was not the only person upon whom the damsel Moonoony smiled—the young fellow of fifteen, who permanently resided in the house with her, was decidedly in her good graces. I sometimes beheld both him and the chief making love at the same time. Is it possible, thought I, that the valiant warrior can consent to give up a corner in the thing he loves? This too was a mystery which, with others of the same kind, was afterwards satisfactorily explained.

| 189.25-28 | had . . . happening. E |
| 190.6     | these E               |
| 190.15-16 | but . . . hereditary. E |
| 190.19-21 | I . . . loves? E      |
|           | had . . . happening. A |
|           | these A               |
|           | but . . . hereditary. A |
|           | I . . . loves? A      |
|           | appeared to be equally at home. AR |
|           | those AR              |
|           | [omitted] AR          |

Fig. 5. Top, Lines 13–22 of page 190 from a clear-text edition of Melville’s Typee (Hayford, Parker, and Tanselle). Bottom, An excerpt from the list of substantive variants in the back of the book, showing some of the variants for pages 189–90 (354). The reader must consult this list to learn that the editors have, for example, restored large sections cut by the author. The ellipses in the list may refer to anything from a phrase to virtually an entire chapter.

Replicability, Symptoms, and Stylometrics

This trusting of apparatus points to another major difference between textual scholarship and science in their use of evidence (and experimentation). According to the idealist Galilean paradigm, replicability is vital to the evidentiary truth of a scientific principle (as the failure of replication in cold-fusion experiments recently demonstrated). Kane and Donaldson invoke the principle of replicability when they claim that the only way a critic can systematically challenge their findings is to reedit the text using the same data (220). Of course, no one—not even Kane and Donaldson—would expect such a procedure to replicate ideal form exactly. The resulting edition would differ from the original because textual and editorial scholarship, mixing abstraction and the speculative margin, is closer to Ginzburg’s prescription for “medical semiotics” than it is to natural science: “The definition of the chosen method [of Hippocratic medicine] depended on the explicit notion of symptom (seneioin). The Hippocratic school maintained that only by attentively observing and recording all symptoms in great detail could one develop precise ‘histories’ of individual diseases; disease, in itself, was out of reach” (105). Analogously, the text of Piers Plowman or Shakespeare or Homer or the Bible is observable only in its symptoms.

Nonetheless, the symptoms can be described—even quantified—and can be used as evidence for historical reconstructions, with the proviso that symptoms are always part idiosyncratic and part systemic and are therefore not perfectly replicable. To be replications, data or their organization into texts must recur in sufficiently alike form, constitut-
ing classes or sets. The more specific phenomena are and the more they are products of individual intervention, the less likely replication is. Ginzburg describes a descending scale from the set to the individual when he discusses how a scribe’s hand exhibits “character,” which betrays identity while still assigning the hand to a class, to what the paleographer calls a script:

[S]cientific value, in the Galileian sense of the term, decreased abruptly as one passed from the universal “properties” of geometry to “properties common to the century” in writing and then to the “individual properties” of paintings—or even calligraphy.

This descending scale confirms that the real obstacle to the application of the Galileian paradigm was the centrality (or the lack of it) of the individual element in the single disciplines. The more that individual traits were considered pertinent, the more the possibility of attaining exact scientific knowledge diminished. (111)

This issue of the identifiable properties of a class or an individual can most clearly be shown in attribution studies conducted “symptomatically,” at the level of both character and style. What does it mean, for instance, to find that a Continental manuscript bears Insular “symptoms”—that some of its forms show the influence of the rounded or pointed scripts of Ireland or England, famous in the Latin (round) text and Anglo-Saxon interlinear (pointed) glosses of the Lindisfarne Gospels? These symptoms might confirm the circumstantial—that is, extratextual—historical account asserting that Irish and English monks exported Insular Christianity to central Europe at such foundations as Bobbio, Fulda, Reichenau, and St. Gall. By this measure of character, present (i.e., surviving) conditions sustain a cultural hypothesis and demonstrate a putative past condition: the existence of Insular manuscripts (now lost) on the Continent, from which the symptoms in extant manuscripts are derived. This reasoning exemplifies the development of what Ginzburg calls “venatic lore,” the “ability to construct from apparently insignificant experimental data a complex reality that could not be experienced directly” (103). Ginzburg connects this tie of present with past to the forensics of Holmesian and the basic motivation of Freudian psychoanalysis, “a method of interpretation based on discarded information, on marginal data, considered in some way significant” (101).

The marginal, which Ginzburg correlates with calligraphic “flourishes” (118), plays a similar role in efforts of attribution through style (and stylometrics) in art history, literature, and any other medium in which there is an attempt to move down a descending scale from the ideal of Galileian science to the idiosyncratic, symptomatic level of the individual artist. Ginzburg cites Freud’s well-known interest in Giovanni Morelli’s method of attribution in painting, which emphasized the involuntary, the

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**Fig. 6.** Part of an inclusive-text (“synoptic”) page from an edition of *Ulysses* (Gabler 18). Through an elaborate system of brackets, raised numerals, and so on, all the witnesses speak at the same time, even when they contradict one another.
inadvertent, and the unintended over the conscious and the striking. According to Freud, Morelli

had caused a revolution in the art galleries of Europe by questioning the authorship of many pictures, showing how to distinguish copies from originals. . . . He achieved this by insisting that attention should be diverted from the general impression and the main features of a picture, and he laid stress on the significance of minor details. . . . It seems to me that his method of inquiry is closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis. It, too, is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from unconsidered or unnoticed details, from the rubbish heap, as it were, of our observations. (Moses of Michelangelo; qtd. in Ginzburg 99)

The connection between psychoanalysis and editing is a staple of current textual theory, as various arguments on authorial intention, the slip, and the error testify. But in attribution studies, the measuring, quantification, and interpretation of the non-Galileian, medical symptom—the individual character—become crucial to the adjudication of ambivalent documentary evidence. All too often, scholars engaged in such adjudication have looked only for the intentional and the normative. The essays in David V. Erdman and Ephim G. Fogel’s Evidence for Authorship and in René Wellek and Alvaro Ribeiro’s Evidence in Literary Scholarship concentrate on the conscious formation of “style and ideas.” Arthur Sherbo’s prescriptions on “the uses and abuses of internal evidence” define this approach:

Internal evidence divides nicely into two parts, style and ideas. Stylistic considerations include such matters as length and structure of sentences (structure includes antithesis, balance, parallelism, repetition, inversion, etc.), verbal and phrasal likes and dislikes, kind of vocabulary (i.e. Latinate or not, polysyllabic or not, frequency of certain parts of speech, etc.), characteristic imagery, peculiarity of spelling and punctuation . . . range and density of learning and allusions, and parallels of various kinds with known works by the particular writer in question. (7)

The problem with this formulation is that virtually all its features of attributable style (especially “likes and dislikes,” which involve volition) are replicable by others. They are open to copying, influence, and downright forgery—the factors that Morelli’s (and Freud’s and Holmes’s) concentration on the nonvolitional, the “flourish,” seek to remove. Erdman recognizes the potential flaw in Sherbo’s list when he notes that “[p]arallels can be illusory or coincidental; recognition of the author’s signature in characteristic constructional rhythms or in modes of metaphor and metaphysics can be precarious.” But he nonetheless concludes that the “combination” of these features “constitutes the most satisfactory internal evidence” (53); in other words, evidence is quantifiable, and quantification lends it plausibility and then authenticity. But such a view does not resolve the problem posed by Davison and Foucault: how much is “everything,” and what specific combination(s) of the components of everything engender(s) meaning?

A more Morellian approach to stylometrics would construct (or test) the author’s idiolect—the personal pattern of choices from the available linguistic resources—from neutral or semantically empty terms (function words, pronouns, etc.) and would be particularly wary of a context that might make these units less than neutral. Derek Pearsall and R. A. Cooper properly chastise a stylometric study of Pearl that shows the poem to have a high incidence of “I,” “me,” “she,” and “her” and a low incidence of “he,” “him,” “they,” and “them”; a quick look at the context of Pearl—a dialogue between a dreamer narrator and a vision of a maiden—immediately shows that this pattern is determined by authorial decisions outside the idiolect. Thus, apparently neutral stylometric studies ought to concentrate on unconscious selections within the idiolect, not on the volitional choices favored by Sherbo.

On Internal and External, Documentary and Circumstantial Correspondences

Much of the discussion in Erdman and Fogel’s Evidence for Authorship centers on the disputable relations between the sort of internal, stylometric evidence enlisted by Sherbo and “external evidence” derived from documents that provide information on such matters as date, logistics of creation and reception, and contemporary attribution and that are regarded as closer to the scene of composition than the latter-day textual critic is. Erdman proposes a distinction between the two classes, derived
from Coleridge: “Any work which claims to be held authentic, must have had witnesses, and competent witnesses; this is external evidence. Or it may be its own competent witness; this is called internal evidence” ("Intercepted Correspondence"; qtd. in Erdman 45). This distinction corresponds to Tanselle’s insistence that the book is “its own competent witness,” separate from the indirect testimony of the archive. But can the distinction hold, and does it always mean what Coleridge (and Erdman) wants it to mean? In forgery, it clearly cannot, for the forged document passes itself off as containing authentic internal evidence while being at best an incompetent external witness to something else. What can be known about the documentary profile of Latin culture when, as Anthony Grafton estimates, “some 10,576 of the 144,044 inscriptions in the great Corpus of Latin inscriptions are faked or suspect[,] many of them . . . the work of imaginative Renaissance antiquaries” (28)?

Distinguishing between the authentic and the forged document from internal evidence of character, initially paleography, was the basis of the linear arrangement of cultural phenomena known as historical criticism, established as an evidentiary paradigm by Lorenzo Valla and other Renaissance scholars. Valla invoked the historical principle that the fake descends from the authentic, not vice versa, and used linguistic and historical evidence to determine that, for example, the Donation of Constantine, purportedly written in the fourth century by the first Christian Roman emperor to cede all temporal power to the papacy, was a fake because its character was eighth or ninth century. A. R. Braunmuller suggests that Valla’s “destruction of the Donation of Constantine was a moment when criticism turned a text from document into work” and that Valla’s denial of the documentary authority of the Donation and affirmation of an “ulterior purpose” (that is, forged authorial intention) are comparable to early Stuart parliaments’ changing the Magna Carta from a “transparent legal document (like a judicial decision in the yearbooks) into a source of endless constitutional debate and, consequently, interpretation.”

Braunmuller regards Valla’s bibliographical skepticism as “the founding act of the modern editorial tradition” (224). This tradition reaches its apotheosis in Tanselle’s distinction between the texts of “works,” created by authors, and historical “documents” (Rationale; “Texts”).

The principles of Valla’s interrogation, which aduced the inauthenticity of internal evidence from external evidence, are central to textual study. It is not clear, however, that these principles can hold for all cases that rely on Coleridge’s conceptual division between internal and external witness. Lee Patterson accepts the premises of the Coleridge-Erdman formula as a working distinction: “external evidence has to do with manuscripts in which a reading occurs and the frequency of its attestations . . . internal evidence [with] the quality of a reading in relation to its variants.” He recognizes that external evidence so defined is usually considered “documentary,” existing “to be dated, counted, and assessed,” whereas internal evidence is “judgmental,” and that the distinction “must be drawn by the skill of the editor” (55). But unlike Coleridge and Erdman, Patterson rejects any assumptions about a qualitative or critical difference between external and internal evidence:

At heart, external evidence is nothing other than the fact that a particular reading occurs in one or more manuscripts, that is, attestation: internal evidence is nothing other than the fact that there are on many occasions more than one reading, that is, variation. Both internal and external evidence are evidence of originality: both are, in themselves, equally factual, equally objective, equally historical. Both are used for the same purpose, which is to discover the history of transmission, on the presumption that once this history is known, the editor will be able to revise it, to run the process backward until the original comes into view. (57)

Patterson’s strategy is to demolish the presumption that the external has inherent authority as unambiguous historical evidence and that the internal, in contrast, is a conjectural or temporary critical construct. This strategy brings a hermeneutic dimension to the classification of documents into external and internal, just as Davison brings hermeneutics into the finding and creating of evidence.

Moreover, external evidence may not be as neutral as it seems, and it may work only for those who are already convinced of its probity. Gary Taylor playfully posits an external document that might
provide “reliable early testimony to Shakespeare’s habits of composition. An autograph letter, for instance. ‘Dear Anne, I’ll be home next week, as soon as I finish revising that old play of mine, King Lear. Your loving Willy. London. 1 April 1610.’” But Taylor undercuts the probity of even this evidence by suggesting that “[a]ritists, after all, do, often enough, lie about their work. For all we know, ‘revising King Lear’ might have been Shakespeare’s alibi, to cover an adulterous weekend” (296–97). Indeed, how can “external” evidence be considered purely external, since it may establish its authority largely by being a reliable witness to itself? The apparent neutrality of the external document seems transparent witness to the evidence for the text it refers to. Before accepting the theory of Shakespeare’s adulterous weekend, the critic-historian would demand a second level of external evidence (say, an innkeeper’s register), which should be confirmed by another external witness, down the mise en abyme. The question is whether testamentary transparency can ever exist, and, if so, how it can be recognized.

Transparency of testimony depends on a witness to the witness and on the establishment of genre (among other things). External demonstration that Melville was responsible for the cutting of the criticisms of Christian missionaries in the second edition of Typee is not enough evidence to convince Tanselle and his coeditors, because the cuts “represent not so much his intention as his acquiescence.” Seeking a hermeneutics of external evidence, Tanselle declares that “one cannot automatically accept such statements at face value; as in any historical research, statements can only be interpreted” (“Editorial Problem” 193–94). Similarly, the arguments over whether D. H. Lawrence approved of the cuts to his early work by the editor Edward Garnett depend on which parts of the Lawrence correspondence are given authority as transparent external evidence—those that praise Garnett’s intervention or those that castigate it. And Yamashita is confident that he can ignore Akutagawa Ryonosuke’s explicit preference for the version of “Rashomon” in the second, Hana edition of the complete works because the letter expressing this authorial instruction was “probably intended only to remind him to take note of the revisions found in this edition.” In such cases, both the authorizing of external evidence and the use of it become critical acts.

Citing the external as a potential class of evidence assumes that the editing of a text has some relation to an external reality. In an essay on this topic (“‘External Fact’”), Tanselle shifts from disjunctions between internal and external (such as Keats’s historically inaccurate “stout Cortez” surveying the Pacific in the sonnet “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer”) to more problematic cases (for the most part, in the Melville texts) of an evidentiary conflict between truth derived from external, historical, and cultural research and accuracy, or fidelity to a document or an intention whether or not it is truthful. Confronting the same conflict, Fredson Bowers states that an editor would be fully justified in emending Fitzgerald’s geography of New York City so that in walking from West 158th Street to Central Park, one proceeds southward not eastward (“‘Notes’” 249). Following a similar principle, an editor preparing the first book publication of Natsume Sōseki’s novel I Am a Cat reduced the number of kittens from eight, in the original serial publication, to four, on the authority of “a zoological garden” (Yamashita), and Matthew J. Bruccoli’s edition of The Great Gatsby changes the age of Daisy’s little girl, Pammy, from three to two, because otherwise Daisy would be nine months pregnant at her marriage. John Worthen dismisses Bruccoli’s argument (that “[t]he editor of a critical edition is not compelled to retain a factual error because it derives from an authoritative document” [qtd. in Worthen 12]) and defends the right of an author of imaginative fiction to be wrong about external fact.

These adjustments exemplify the general problem of the truth claims of literature, at issue since Plato’s Ion and Republic, book 10, and Aristotle’s resuscitation of poetry as more philosophical or general than history. As Mario Valdés notes, the sort of “fit” between external and internal demanded by Bowers and Bruccoli would be incomprehensible to analytical philosophy, which argues “that the imaginative experience is non-falsifiable and also non-verifiable; therefore, it is not a truth-claim, for verifiability requires the possibility of confirmation, and thus, since any claim to truth on my own terms must be simultaneously a rejection
of falsehood, the imaginative construct is neither true nor false” (16–17). For Valdés, the literary “truth-claim is always a relationship between the text and the reader,” and truth in literature is “primarily a matter of the action of appropriation, which at all times calls for judgement” (19). Bowers and Brucoli, in contrast, attempt to adjudicate the action of appropriation while adhering to a “correspondence” theory of literature, in which “[w]hat is expressed must in some sense conform to what is actually the case” (T. M. Greene, The Arts and Art Criticism [1940]; qtd. in Valdés 18). To appropriate the evidence of external phenomena, such as the location of Central Park, is proper to “realist” textual critics and invalid to Worthen and Valdés.

The choice of what to appropriate and why is fairly clear in such circumstances, but only if the external evidence does not contradict the rival internal truth claims of the literary work being edited. External evidence suggesting that Keats wanted to correct his historical error by substituting “Balboa” for “Cortez” would contradict internal evidence—Sherbo’s symptoms of style—since the emended line would barely scan. David C. Fowler responds to the same kind of contradiction in the Kane-Donaldson Piers when he rejects the edition’s metrical regularity, which the editors impose even when there is no documentary evidence for it. Fowler asserts that the author’s comment on the issue would have been, “It may not alliterate, but it’s true!” (Fowler 32).

The problems with which textual critics grapple—truth, accuracy, and the fit between textual testimony and a constative reality—are central to current epistemological and ontological concerns. Researchers in scientific, social, and humanistic areas of contemporary study ask the same type and range of questions as practicing archaeologists, bibliographers, and editors. What kind of thing is this concept or episteme called “text,” and how can its properties and its history be known? Can there be any universal standards of testamentary authority, from within or without the text, to which all researchers can appeal—an abstract, general, and replicable Galileian description and formulation of the laws of textuality? How is internal evidence to be distinguished from external evidence, direct from indirect, conclusive from circumstantial, primary from secondary, as the probity, authority, and reliability of a text are explored? Is the construction of a narrative of cause and effect (or motive and action) necessary for the disparate elements of evidence to be established and connected, and would the presence of gaps in this narrative vitiate its evidentiary status? Would such a narrative inevitably be the product of the narrator’s technical characteristics, idiosyncrasies, and resources, and could procedural constraints account for these influences? Does the observation and examination of one type of evidence affect or predetermine the results obtained from measuring other types? Does the body of evidence have to be of a certain size—or be “complete”—to be susceptible to a single evaluation? In a quantum universe, is Newton’s fourth rule of reasoning, on the counterexample, still valid? Or are human subjects at the end of the twentieth century left only with Morelli’s flourish: the datum or act without meaning or made without volition—inscrutable, as it always was and always may be?

These are real, substantive questions, not rhetorical ones. The relations between substance and accidence, whole and part, truth and accuracy, cause and effect have been called into question with renewed urgency by the postmodernist dispersal of form, authority, and essentialism. If Jameson’s “blank parody,” or pastiche, in which all such relations are indeterminate, is the presiding figure for the postmodern ethic, then the attitudes in textual study toward evidence may enact and display this ethic with particular resonance.

Notes

1Examples of misappropriated terms include substance and accidence, from theology and philosophy; calculus of variants, from mathematics; distributional analysis, from statistics; witness and examinatio, from law; rules of parsimony and rings of probability, from logic; sincere manuscripts, good and bad quartos, and the motto lectio difficilior probior est (“the more difficult reading is the more moral [or ‘honest’]”), from ethics. In “Editorial and Critical Theory,” I argue that this co-option and lack of center is not “simple imperialism” or the “reflexive distance that textual criticism needs to define itself” but is instead “the very ‘construction’ . . . of our epistemology: a system of
knowledge based on inadequacy, a system of quotation and an
annexation without a core of givens” (21).
2See the wide range of testimony on this large topic in Chan-
dler, Davidsdon, and Harootonian. The breakdown of the deﬁni-
tion or ontology of evidence has been the subject of much
recent debate, in works as diverse as Simon Schama’s Dead
Certiﬁcates / Unwarranted Speculations, John Gross’s The
Rhetoric of Science, and John Fowles’s “novel” A Maggott.
3Roland Barthes brings out the rich connotations of this ety-
mology. See also Scholes; Gracia, Metaphysics and Theory; and
the chapter “Ontology” in my Theories of the Text for further
discussion of this ambiguity.
4The literature on this conﬂict is enormous. For example, Se-
bastiano Timpanaro rejects the “metaphysics” of Freudian
analysis in favor of textual criticism as science (78, 87, ch. 7);
Eugène Vinaver declares that recent work has “raise[d] textual
criticism to the position of a science” (351); Fredson Bowers
avers that the “social” textual theories associated with Jerome
McGann use “the language of literary criticism . . . not of strict
textual criticism” (“Unﬁnished Business” 8); Hiroshi Ya-
mashita looks forward to the day when the editing of Japanese
literature will become truly a “science”; and in Scholarly Edit-
ing, a collection of essays I edited, contributors from diverse
ﬁelds discuss the scientiﬁc aspirations of textual study.
5The location of bibliography within technology (and the
consequent reliance on material, testable evidence) appears in
the work of John Bidwell and of Allan Stevenson on paper, of
Fredson Bowers on the printer’s measure (“Bibliographic
Evidence”) and on running titles (“Running-Title Evidence”),
of G. Thomas Tanselle on type damage (“Use”), of Robert K.
Turner, Jr., on reappearance type, of Adrian Weiss on repro-
ductions, and of Richard N. Schwab and his collaborators on Guten-
berg’s ink (“Cyclotron”; “Ink Patterns”; “Proton”). But evidence
has recently become equally signiﬁcant in the social history of
bibliography, as in C. Paul Christianson’s study of the manu-
script book trade and Kate Harris’s of book ownership.
6Note that Davison regards as unauthorized not just New-
ton’s contrary “hypothesis” (as does Newton) but also the hard
physical counterinstances, the phenomena that Newton accepts
as a reason for reformulating the original hypothesis.
7In “The Case of The Ambassadors and the Textual Condi-
tion,” McGann situates his study of the bibliohistorico-
hermeneutic crux in James within the general epistemological
challenge of contemporary textual study: “The anomaly of [the]
text [of The Ambassadors] is an emblem of textuality as such,
where endless meaning seems to pour forth from dead letters.
We glimpse such endlessness, however, not in the power of
spiritual imagination, but in the deathlessness of the material
scripts, in the ‘spirit’ of their facticity—in that ‘positive exist-
ence’ that Paul de Man, wrongly, thought literary works could
never have” (165). See also McGann, “Revision.”
8W. Speed Hill and David Shaw address differently the
problem of proofing on a statistical basis of limited, even deﬁned,
certiﬁcate. Hill postulates a “calculation of error” whereby a form
of the law of diminishing returns sets in as the editor attempts to
narrow the possible range of error with each successive proof-
ing of the evidence. Shaw deﬁnes a series of “unreliability” fac-
tors to indicate the correlation among such data as the number
of variant copies extant, the number of sheets printed before a
ﬁnal proof correction, and the percentage of veriﬁably correct
sheets—and thus the degree of certitude—that the editor should
arrive at by manipulating these data (“Sampling Theory”).
9For example, the direct evidence for the Bose-Einstein con-
densate (a type of matter, unlike a solid, liquid, or gas, in which
atoms lose their separate identities and react as a single struc-
ture) was produced only in June 1995, seventy years after Bose
and Einstein predicted the existence of the condensate (Browne).
10For further analysis of this conceptual-cultural conﬂict, see
Greetham, Rev. of Book Encompassed, “Textual Imperialism,”
and the chapter “Society and Culture in theText” in Theories.
11The current CSE guidelines no longer endorse a speciﬁc
copy-text theory. This shift results from changes in the ideologi-
cal climate since the heyday of Greg and Bowers, from the
1960s to the 1980s, and shows how evidentiary rules of bibli-
ography are in constant ﬂux.
12Davison observes that the cumulative force of the tradition
of reportage—embedded in the apparatus of variorum and criti-
cal editions—invites and yet at the same time discourages a
replication of the empirical research that created the tradition
(“Selection”). One of the persistent marketing claims for edi-
tions is that they are “fresh” (“freshly edited,” “based on a fresh
examination of the documentary evidence” or “fresh investiga-
tion of the witnesses,” and so on) rather than merely inher-
ted. Yet readers tend to take on trust the basic research of
others when it has become traditional.
13Timpanaro (an anti-Freudian work); Tanselle, “Editorial
Problem”; McLawerty, “Concept” and “Issues”; Greetham,
“Slips,” the chapter “Psychoanalysis of the Text” in Theories,
and “Manifestation” (which encompasses post-Freudian [e.g.,
Lacanian] models, as well).
14Similarly, the United States Constitution has been trans-
formed from an authorless document into an authored work
through being read hermeneutically by strict constructionists
and historical relativists.

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