Division of the entire work

First Part
Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment

First Section
Analytic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment

First Book
Analytic of the Beautiful

Second Book
Analytic of the Sublime

Second Section
Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment

Second Part
Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment

First Division
Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment

Second Division
Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment

Appendix
Methodology of the Teleological Power of Judgment
out whether it has as its ground sense or reflection; and that this affectability can yet sometimes be lacking, although as far as its use for the cognition of objects is concerned the sense is not at all defective otherwise, but is rather exceptionally acute. That is, one cannot say with certainty whether a color or a tone (sound) is merely agreeable sensations or is in itself already a beautiful play of sensations, which as such involves a satisfaction in the form in aesthetic judging. If one considers the rapidity of the vibrations of the light, or, in the second case, of the air, which probably far exceeds all our capacity for judging immediately in perception the proportion of the division of time, then one would have to believe that it is only the effect of these vibrations on the elastic parts of our body that is sensed, but that the division of time by means of them is not noticed and drawn into the judging, hence that in the case of colors and tones there is associated only agreeableness, not beauty of their composition.

But if one considers, on the contrary, first, what can be said mathematically about the proportion of the oscillations in music and of the judging of them, and judges of contrasts among colors, as is appropriate, in analogy with the latter, and if one takes into account, second, those admittedly rare examples of human beings who, with the best sight in the world, cannot distinguish colors and, with the most acute hearing, cannot distinguish tones, and also, for those who can do this, the perception of an altered quality (not merely of the degree of the sensation) in various positions on the scale of colors or tones, and further that the number of these is determinate for comprehendible distinctions: then one may see oneself as compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sensory impressions, but as the effect of a judging of the form in the play of many sensations. The difference between the one or the other opinion in the judging of music, however, would only alter the definition to this extent, that it would be explained, as we have done, as the beautiful play of sensations (through hearing), or as agreeable sensations. Only on the first definition would music be represented completely as a beautiful art; on the second, however, it would be represented as an agreeable art (at least in part).

Rhetoric can be combined with a painterly presentation of its subjects as well as objects in a play; poetry with music in song; this, in turn, with a painterly (theatrical) presentation in an opera; the play of the sensations in a piece of music with the play of shapes in dance, etc. Further, the presentation of the sublime, so far as it belongs to beautiful art, can be united with beauty in a verse tragedy, a didactic poem, an oratorio; and in these combinations beautiful art is all the more artistic, although whether it is also more beautiful (since so many different kinds of satisfaction are crisscrossed with each other) can be doubted in some of these cases. Yet in all beautiful art what is essential consists in the form, which is purposive for observation and judging, where the pleasure is at the same time culture and disposes the spirit to ideas, hence makes it receptive to several sorts of pleasure and entertainment – not in the matter of the sensation (the charm or the emotion), where it is aimed merely at enjoyment, which leaves behind it nothing in the idea, and makes the spirit dull, the object by and by loathsome, and the mind, because it is aware that its disposition is contrapurpose in the judgment of reason, dissatisfied with itself and moody.

If the beautiful arts are not combined, whether closely or at a distance, with moral ideas, which alone carry with them a self-sufficient satisfaction, then the latter is their ultimate fate. They then serve only for diversion, which one increasingly needs the more one uses them to banish the mind’s dissatisfaction with itself, by which one makes oneself ever more useless and dissatisfied with oneself. In general, the beauties of nature are most compatible with the first aim if one has become accustomed early to observing, judging, and admiring them.

The art of poetry (which owes its origin almost entirely to genius, and will be guided least by precept or example) claims the highest rank of all. It expands the mind by setting the imagination free and present-
sort; but temples, magnificent buildings for public gatherings, as well as dwellings, triumphal arches, columns, cenotaphs, and the like, erected as memorials, belong to architecture. Indeed, all domestic furnishings (the work of the carpenter and the like things for use) can be counted as belonging to the latter, because the appropriateness of the product to a certain use is essential in a work of architecture, while by contrast a mere picture, which is made strictly for viewing and is to please for itself, is, as a corporeal presentation, a mere imitation of nature, though with respect to aesthetic ideas: where, then, sensible truth should not go so far that it stops looking like art and a product of the power of choice.

The art of the painter, as the second kind of pictorial art, which presents sensible illusion in artful combination with ideas, I would divide into that of the beautiful depiction of nature and that of the beautiful arrangement of its products. The first would be painting proper, the second the art of pleasure gardens. For the former gives only the illusion of corporeal extension; the latter certainly gives this in truth, but gives only the illusion of employment and use for ends other than merely the play of the imagination in the viewing of its forms. The latter is nothing other than the decoration of the ground with the same variety (grasses, flowers, bushes and trees, even water, hills and valleys) with which nature presents it to intuition, only arranged differently and suited to certain ideas. The beautiful arrangement of corporeal things, however, is also given only for the eye, like painting; the sense of touch, however, cannot furnish any intuitable representation of such a form. To painting in the broad sense I would also assign the decoration of rooms by means of wallpaper, moldings, and all kinds of beautiful furnishings, which merely serve to be viewed; likewise the art of dressing with taste (rings, pill boxes, etc.). For a terrace with all kinds of flowers, a room with all sorts of decorations (even including the finery of the ladies) constitute, at a splendid party, a kind of painting, which, just like painting properly so called (which does not have the aim, say, of teaching history or knowledge of nature), is there merely to be viewed, in order to entertain the imagination in free play with ideas and to occupy the power of aesthetic judgment without a determinate end. The work in all these decorations may be, mechanically, quite different, and require very different artists; but the judgment of taste concerning what is beautiful in this art is determined in a single way: namely, to judge of only the forms (without regard to an end) as they are offered to the eye, individually or in their interconnection, in accordance with the effect that they have on the imagination. – But how pictorial art can be counted (by analogy) as gesture in a language is justified by the fact that the spirit of the artist gives a corporeal expression through these shapes to what and how he has thought, and makes the thing itself speak as it were in mime: a very common play of our fantasy, which attributes to lifeless things, in accordance with their form, a spirit that speaks from them.

3) The art of the beautiful play of sensations (which are generated from the outside), which must nevertheless be able to be universally communicated, can concern nothing other than the proportion of the different degrees of the disposition (tension) of the sense to which the sensation belongs, i.e., its tone; and in this extended meaning of the word it can be divided into the artistic play of the sensations of hearing and of sight, and thus into music and the art of colors. – It is remarkable that these two senses, besides the susceptibility to sensations to the extent that that is required in order to arrive by their means at concepts of external objects, are also capable of a special sensation connected with that, about which it cannot rightly be made

*a* In the first edition there is a comma rather than a period here.

*b* The first edition adds an "and" here.

* Reading *Analogie*, with the first edition, rather than *Anlage* (predisposition) with the second and third.
communicating the idea of which that object is considered as the expression.

Thus if we wish to divide the beautiful arts, we can, at least as an experiment, choose no easier principle than the analogy of art with the kind of expression that people use in speaking in order to communicate to each other, i.e., not merely their concepts, but also their sensations.*

* This consists in the word, the gesture, and the tone (articulation, gestilation, and modulation). Only the combination of these three kinds of expression constitutes the speaker's complete communication. For thought, intuition, and sensation are thereby conveyed to the other simultaneously and united.

There are thus only three kinds of beautiful arts: the art of speech, pictorial art,* and the art of the play of sensations (as external sensory impressions). One could also arrange this division as a dichotomy, so that beautiful art would be divided into that of the expression of thoughts or of intuitions, and the latter in turn in accordance with their form or their matter (of sensation). But then it would look too abstract and not as suitable to ordinary concepts.

1) The arts of speech are rhetoric and poetry. Rhetoric is the art of conducting a business of the understanding as a free play of the imagination; poetry that of carrying out a free play of the imagination as a business of the understanding.52

The orator thus announces a matter of business and carries it out as if it were merely a play with ideas in order to entertain the audience.5 The poet announces merely an entertaining play with ideas, and yet as much results for the understanding as if he had merely had the intention of carrying on its business. The combination and harmony of the two cognitive faculties, the sensibility and the understanding, which to be sure cannot manage without each other but which nevertheless cannot readily be united with each other without constraint and mutual harm, must seem to be unintentional and to happen on their own; otherwise it is not beautiful art. Hence everything contrived and laborious in it must be avoided; for beautiful art must be free art in a double sense: it must not be a matter of remuneration, a labor whose magnitude can be judged, enforced, or paid for in accordance with a determinate standard; but also, while the mind is certainly occupied, it must feel itself to be satisfied and stimulated (independently of remuneration) without looking beyond to another end.

The orator thus certainly provides something which he does not promise, namely an entertaining play of the imagination; but he also takes something away from what he does promise, namely the purposive occupation of the understanding. The poet, by contrast, promises little and announces a mere play with ideas, but accomplishes something that is worthy of business, namely providing nourishment to the understanding in play, and giving life to its concepts through the imagination: hence the former basically provides less than he promises, the latter more.*

2) The pictorial arts or those of the expression of ideas in sensible intuition (not through representations of the mere imagination, which are evoked through words) are either those of sensible truth or of sensible illusion.51 The first are called the plastic arts, the second painting. Both make shapes in space into expressions of ideas: the former makes shapes knowable by two senses, sight and feeling (although in the case of the latter, to be sure, without regard to beauty), the latter only for the first of these. The aesthetic idea (archetype, prototype) is for both grounded in the imagination; the shape, however, which constitutes its expression (ectype, afterimage) is given either in its corporeal extension (as the object itself exists) or in accordance with the way in which the latter is depicted in the eye (in accordance with its appearance on a plane); or else, whatever the former is, either the relation to a real end or just the appearance of one is made into a condition for reflection.

The plastic arts, as the first kind of beautiful pictorial arts, include sculpture and architecture. The first is that which presents corporeal concepts of things as they could exist in nature (although, as a beautiful art, with regard to aesthetic purposiveness); the second is the art of presenting, with this intention but yet at the same time in an aesthetically purposive way, concepts of things that are possible only through art, and whose form has as its determining ground not nature but a voluntary end. In the latter a certain use of the artistic object is the main thing, to which, as a condition, the aesthetic ideas are restricted. In the former the mere expression of aesthetic ideas is the chief aim. Thus statues of humans, gods, animals, etc., are of the first

The reader will not judge of* this outline for a possible division of the beautiful arts as if it were a deliberate theory. It is only one of the several experiments that still can and should be attempted.

* die bildende Kunst
* Zusicher, in the first edition, Zuhörer (listeners).
* beurtheilen
* beurtbeiten

* The clause following the colon was added in the second edition.
* Archetyp, Urbild
* Nachbild
* Apparenz
* Auschein
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art in such a way that the latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary. But since the genius is a favorite of nature, the likes of which one has to regard as only a rare phenomenon, his example for other good minds gives rise to a school, i.e., a methodical instruction in accordance with rules, insofar as it has been possible to extract them from those products of spirit and their individuality; and for these beautiful art is to that extent imitation, to which nature gave the rule through a genius.

But this imitation becomes aping if the student copies everything, even down to that which the genius had to leave in, as a deformity, only because it could not easily have been removed without weakening the idea. This courage is a merit only in a genius, and a certain boldness in expression and in general some deviation from the common rule is well suited to him, but is by no means worthy of imitation, but always remains in itself a defect which one must seek to remove, but for which the genius is as it were privileged, since what is imitable in the impetus of his spirit would suffer from anxious caution. Mannerism is another sort of aping, namely that of mere individuality (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from imitators, yet without having the talent thereby to be exemplary at the same time. There are in general, to be sure, two ways (modus) of putting thoughts together in a presentation, one of which is called a manner (modus aestheticus) and the other of which is called a method (modus logicus), which differ from each other in that the former has no other standard than the feeling of unity in the presentation, while the latter follows determinate principles in this; for beautiful art, therefore, only the first is valid. But one calls a product of art mannered only if the presentation of its idea in that product is aimed at singularity rather than being made adequate to the idea. The ostentatious (precious), the stilted and the affected, intended only to distinguish oneself from the vulgar (but without any spirit), are like the behavior of someone of whom it is said that he is fond of the sound of his own voice, or who stands and moves as if he were on a stage, in order to be gaped at, which always betrays a bungler.

§ 50.
On the combination of taste with genius in products of beautiful art.

If the question is whether in matters of beautiful art it is more important whether genius or taste is displayed, that is the same as asking whether imagination or the power of judgment counts for more in them. Now since it is in regard to the first of these that an art deserves to be called inspired, but only in regard to the second that it deserves to be called a beautiful art, the latter, at least as an indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non), is thus the primary thing to which one must look in the judging of art as beautiful art. To be rich and original in ideas is not as necessary for the sake of beauty as is the suitability of the imagination in its freedom to the lawfulness of the understanding. For all the richness of the former produces, in its lawless freedom, nothing but nonsense; the power of judgment, however, is the faculty for bringing it in line with the understanding.

Taste, like the power of judgment in general, is the discipline (or corrective) of genius, clipping its wings and making it well behaved or polished; but at the same time it gives genius guidance as to where and how far it should extend itself if it is to remain purposive; and by introducing clarity and order into the abundance of thoughts it makes the ideas tenable, capable of an enduring and universal approval, of enjoying a posterity among others and in an ever progressing culture. Thus if anything must be sacrificed in the conflict of the two properties in one product, it must rather be on the side of genius: and the power of judgment, which in matters of beautiful art makes its pronouncements on the basis of its own principles, will sooner permit damage to the freedom and richness of the imagination than to the understanding.

For beautiful art, therefore, imagination, understanding, spirit and taste are requisite. *

§ 51.
On the division of the beautiful arts. 

Beauty (whether it be beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the expression of aesthetic ideas; only in beautiful art this idea must be occasioned by a concept of the object, but in beautiful nature the mere reflection on a given intuition, without a concept of what the object ought to be, is sufficient for arousing and

* The first three faculties first achieve their unification through the fourth. Hume in his history gives the English to understand that, although in their works they do not yield anything to any nation in the world with regard to evidence of the first three properties considered separately, nevertheless in that which unifies them they must come in second to their neighbors, the French. *

* Litreiche
* Beurteilung
nicated, not as a thought, but as the inner feeling of a purposive state of mind.

Taste is thus the faculty for judging a priori the communicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the mediation of a concept).

If one could assume that the mere universal communicability of his feeling must in itself already involve an interest for us (which, however, one is not justified in inferring from the constitution of a merely reflective power of judgment), then one would be able to explain how it is that the feeling in the judgment of taste is expected of everyone as if it were a duty.\[15\]

\[§ 41.\]

On the empirical interest in the beautiful.\[16\]

That the judgment of taste, by which something is declared to be beautiful, must have no interest for its determining ground has been adequately demonstrated above. But from that it does not follow that after it has been given as a pure aesthetic judgment no interest can be combined with it. This combination, however, can always be only indirect, i.e., taste must first of all be represented as combined with something else in order to be able to connect with the satisfaction of mere reflection on an object a further pleasure in its existence (as that in which all interest consists). For what is said of cognitive judgments (of things in general) also holds here in the aesthetic judgment: a posse ad esse non valet consequentia.\[a\] Now this other element can be something empirical, namely, an inclination that is characteristic of human nature, or something intellectual, as a property of the will of being determinable a priori through reason; both of which contain a satisfaction in the existence of an object, and can thus provide the ground for an interest in that which has already pleased for itself and without respect to any sort of interest.\[17\]

The beautiful interests empirically only in society; and if the drive to society is admitted to be natural to human beings, while the suitability and the tendency toward it, i.e., sociability, are admitted to be necessary for human beings as creatures destined for society, and thus as a property belonging to humanity, then it cannot fail that taste should also be regarded as a faculty for judging everythng by means of which one can communicate even his feeling to everyone else, and hence as a means for promoting what is demanded by an inclination natural to everyone.

For himself alone a human being abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either his hut or himself, nor seek out or still less plant flowers in order to decorate himself;\[18\] rather, only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a human being but also, in his own way, a refined human being (the beginning of civilization): for this is how we judge someone who is inclined to communicate his pleasure to others and is skilled at it, and who is not content with an object if he cannot feel his satisfaction in it in community with others. Further, each expects and requires of everyone else a regard to universal communication, as if from an original contract dictated by humanity itself; and thus, at first to be sure only charms, e.g., colors for painting oneself (roucou among the Caribs and cinnabar among the Iroquois),\[19\] or flowers, mussel shells, beautifully colored birds' feathers, but with time also beautiful forms (as on canoes, clothes, etc.) that do not in themselves provide any gratification, i.e., satisfaction of enjoyment, become important in society and combined with great interest, until finally civilization that has reached the highest point makes of this almost the chief work of refined inclination, and sensations have value only to the extent that they may be universally communicated; at that point, even though the pleasure that each has in such an object is merely inconsiderable and has in itself no noticeable interest, nevertheless the idea of its universal communicability almost infinitely increases its value.

However, this interest, attached to the beautiful indirectly, through an inclination to society, and thus empirical, is of no importance for us here, for we must find that importance only in what may be related to the judgment of taste a priori, even if only indirectly. For even if in this latter form an interest combined with it should be revealed, then taste would reveal in our faculty for judging a transition from sensory enjoyment to moral feeling; and not only would one thereby be better guided in the purposive employment of taste, but also a mediating link in the chain of human faculties a priori, on which all legislation must depend, would thereby be exhibited as such. This much can certainly be said about the empirical interest in objects of taste and in taste itself, namely, that since the latter indulges inclination, although this may be ever so refined, it also gladly allows itself to blend in with all the inclinations and passions that achieve their greatest variety and highest level in society, and the interest in the beautiful, if it is grounded on this, could afford only a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable.

\[a\] beurtheilen
\[\text{There is no valid inference from possibility to actuality.}\]
\[\text{Beurteilungsvermögen}\]
influence on the judgment. Now this happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting himself into the position of everyone else; merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judgment, which in turn accomplished by leaving out as far as is possible everything in one's representational state that is matter, i.e., sensation, and attending solely to the formal peculiarities of his representation or his representational state. Now perhaps this operation of reflection seems much too artificial to be attributed to the faculty that we call the common sense; but it only appears thus if we express it in abstract formulas; in itself, nothing is more natural than to abstract from charm and emotions if one is seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule.

The following maxims of the common human understanding do not belong here, to be sure, as parts of the critique of taste, but can nevertheless serve to elucidate its fundamental principles. They are the following: 1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself.* The first is the maxim of the unprejudiced way of thinking, the second of the broad-minded way, the third that of the consistent way. The first is the maxim of a reason that is never passive. The tendency toward the latter, hence toward heteronomy of reason, is called prejudice; and the greatest prejudice of all is that of representing reason as if it were not subject to the rules of nature on which the understanding grounds it by means of its own essential law: i.e., superstition. Liberation from superstition is called enlightenment,* since, although this designation is also applied to liberation from prejudices in general, it is

* One readily sees that while enlightenment is easy in the sense, in hypothese it is a difficult matter that can only be accomplished slowly; for while not being passive with his reason but always being legislative for himself is something that is very easy for the person who would only be adequate to his essential end and does not demand to know that which is beyond his understanding, nevertheless, since striving for the latter is hardly to be forbidden and there will never be lacking many who confidently promise to be able to satisfy this desire for knowledge, it must be very difficult to maintain or establish the merely negative element (which constitutes genuine enlightenment) in the manner of thinking (especially in that of the public).

* Beurteilung

* In the first edition, "in our" (in unserm).

* Following the second edition; the first edition has sense zurlichen der größten, die Natur sich Regeln, die der Verstand ihn durch . . . zum Grunde liegt, which would imply that it is nature rather than reason which in the case of prejudice fails to be subjected to the essential law of understanding.

superstition above all (in sense eminent) that deserves to be called a prejudice, since the blindness to which superstition leads, which indeed it even demands as an obligation, is what makes most evident the need to be led by others, hence the condition of a passive reason. As far as the second maxim of the way of thinking is concerned, we are accustomed to putting certain limited (narrow-minded, in contrast to broad-minded) whose talents do not suffice for any great employment (especially if it is intensive). But the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the way of thinking needed to make a purposive use of it, which, however small the scope and degree of a person's natural endowment may be, nevertheless reveals a man of a broad-minded way of thinking if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). The third maxim, namely that of the consistent way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can only be achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic. One can say that the first of these maxims is that maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of judgment, the third that of reason. —

I take up again the thread that has been laid aside through this digression, and say that taste can be called sensus communis with greater justice than can the healthy understanding, and that the aesthetic power of judgment rather than the intellectual can bear the name of a communal sense,* if indeed one would use the word "sense" of an effect of mere reflection on the mind: for there one means by "sense" the feeling of pleasure. One could even define taste as the faculty for judging* that which makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.

The aptitude of human beings for communicating their thoughts also requires a relation between the imagination and the understanding in order to associate intuitions with concepts and concepts in turn with intuitions, which flow together into a cognition; but in that case the agreement of the two powers of the mind is lawful, under the constraint of determinate concepts. Only where the imagination in its freedom arouses the understanding, and the latter, without concepts, sets the imagination into a regular play is the representation commu-
one. Pleasure of this kind, since it comes into the mind through the senses and we are therefore passive with regard to it, can be called the pleasure of enjoyment.

The satisfaction in an action on account of its moral quality is by contrast not a pleasure of enjoyment, but of self-activity and of its appropriateness to the idea of its vocation. This feeling, however, which is called moral, requires concepts; and does not exhibit a free, but rather a lawful purposiveness, and therefore also cannot be universally communicated other than by means of reason, and, if the pleasure is to be of the same kind in everyone, by means of very determinate practical concepts of reason.

The pleasure in the sublime in nature, as a pleasure of contemplation involving subtle reasoning, also lays claim to universal participation, yet already presupposes another feeling, namely that of its super-sensible vocation, which, no matter how obscure it might be, has a moral foundation. But that other human beings will take regard of it and find a satisfaction in the consideration of the brute magnitude of nature (which cannot be truly ascribed to the sight of it, which is rather terrifying) is not something that I am justified in simply presupposing. Nevertheless, in consideration of what should be taken account of in those moral predispositions on every appropriate occasion, I can still require even that satisfaction of everyone, but only by means of the moral law, which for its part is in turn grounded on concepts of reason.

By contrast, the pleasure in the beautiful is neither a pleasure of enjoyment, nor of a lawful activity, and not even of a contemplation involving subtle reasoning in accordance with ideas, but of mere reflection: Without having any purpose or fundamental principle for a guide, this pleasure accompanies the common apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty of intuition, in relation to the understanding, as a faculty of concepts, by means of a procedure of the power of judgment, which it must also exercise for the sake of the most common experience: only in the latter case it is compelled to do so for the sake of an empirical objective concept, while in the former case (in the aesthetic judging) it is merely for the sake of perceiving the suitability of the representation for the harmonious (subjectively pur- postive) occupation of both cognitive faculties in their freedom, i.e., to sense the representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must nec-

*verfasstehende Contemplation*

1 In the first edition, there is a comma rather than a period here.

2 In the first edition, there is a comma and the word **and** (and) rather than a period here.

3 The word **genannt** (compelled or necessitated) was added in the second edition.

4 **Beurteilung**

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The power of judgment, when what is noticed is not so much its reflection as merely the result of that, is often called a sense, and there is talk of a sense of truth, a sense for propriety, for justice, etc., although one surely knows, or at least properly ought to know, that these concepts cannot have their seat in a sense, and that even less could such a sense have the slightest capacity for the expression of universal rules, but rather that a representation of truth, suitability, beauty, or justice could never enter our thoughts if we could not elevate ourselves above the senses to higher cognitive faculties. The common human understanding, which, as merely healthy (not yet cultivated) understanding, is regarded as the least that can be expected from anyone who lays claim to the name of a human being, thus has the unfortunate honor of being endowed with the name of common sense (sensus communis), and indeed in such a way that what is understood by the word common (not merely in our language, which here really contains an ambiguity, but in many others as well) comes to the same as the vulgar, which is encountered everywhere, to possess which is certainly not an advantage or an honor.

By **sensus communis**, however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental

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*Indeed* (*zwoll*) added in the second edition.

Kant prints the Latin word **vulgaris**.

Kant prints the first word in roman type and the second in italics, presumably meaning to add emphasis to the word "**communis**."
§ 38.
Deduction of judgments of taste.
If it is admitted that in a pure judgment of taste the satisfaction in the object is combined with the mere judging of its form, then it is nothing other than the subjective purposiveness of that form for the power of judgment that we sense as combined with the representation of the object in the mind. Now since the power of judgment in regard to the formal rules of judging, without any matter (neither sensation, nor concept), can be directed only to the subjective conditions of the use of the power of judgment in general (which is restricted neither to the particular kind of sense nor to a particular concept of understanding), and thus to that subjective element that one can presuppose in all human beings (as requisite for possible cognitions in general), the correspondence of a representation with these conditions of the power of judgment must be able to be assumed to be valid for everyone a priori. I.e., the pleasure or subjective purposiveness of the representation for the relation of the cognitive faculties in the judging of a sensible object in general can rightly be expected of everyone.*

Remark
This deduction is so easy because it is not necessary for it to justify any objective reality of a concept; for beauty is not a concept of the object, and the judgment of taste is not a judgment of cognition. It asserts only that we are justified in presupposing universally in every human being the same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find in ourselves; and then only if we have correctly subsumed the given object under these conditions. Now although this latter has unavoidable difficulties that do not pertain to the logical power of judgment (because in the latter one subsumes under concepts, but in the aesthetic power of judgment one subsumes under a relation that is merely a matter of sensation, that of the imagination and the understanding reciprocally attuned to each other in the represented form of the object, where the subsumption can easily be deceptive); yet nothing is thereby taken away from the legitimacy of the claim of the power of judgment in counting on universal assent, which only comes down to this: the correctness of the principle for validly judging for everyone on subjective grounds. For as far as the difficulty and the doubt about the correctness of the subsumption under that principle is concerned, it makes the legitimacy of the claim to this validity of an aesthetic judgment in general, and thus the principle itself, no more doubtful than the equally (although not as often and as easily) erroneous subsumption of the logical power of judgment under its principle can make the latter, which is objective, doubtful. But if the question were to be "How is it possible to assume nature as a sum of objects of taste a priori?" then this problem is related to teleology, because producing forms that are purposive for our power of judgment would have to be regarded as an end of nature that pertains to its concept essentially. But the correctness of this assumption is still very dubious, whereas the reality of the beauties of nature is open to experience.

§ 39.
On the communicability of a sensation.
If sensation, as the real in perception, is related to cognition, it is called sensory sensation; and its specific quality can be represented as completely communicable in the same way only if one assumes that everyone has a sense that is the same as our own - but this absolutely cannot be presupposed in the case of a sensory sensation. Thus, to someone who lacks the sense of smell, this kind of sensation cannot be communicated; and, even if he does not lack this sense, one still cannot be sure that he has exactly the same sensation from a flower that we have from it. Still more, however, we must represent people as differing with regard to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the sensation of one and the same object of the sensations; and it is absolutely not to be demanded that pleasure in the same objects be conceded to every-

* In order to be justified in laying claim to universal assent for judgments of the aesthetic power of judgment resting merely on subjective grounds, it is sufficient to admit: 1) In all human beings, the subjective conditions of this faculty, as far as the relation of the cognitive powers therein set into action to a cognition in general is concerned, are the same, which must be true, since otherwise human beings could not communicate their representations and even cognition itself. 2) The judgment has taken into consideration solely this relation (hence the formal condition of the power of judgment), and is pure, i.e., mixed with neither concepts of the object nor with sensations as determining grounds. If an error is made with regard to the latter, that concerns only the incorrect application to a particular case of the authority that a law gives us, by which the authority in general is not suspended.

1 *Betrachtigung
2 *Betrachtung
3 Sinnesempfindung
4 Here we follow the first edition, which has eingeziehtr, rather than the second, which prints eingerichtet (arranged for or equipped for).
5 *Betrachtung

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The perception of an object can be immediately combined with the concept of an object in general, for which the former contains the empirical predicates, for a judgment of cognition, and a judgment of experience can thereby be produced. Now this is grounded in a priori concepts of the synthetic unity of the manifold, in order to think it as the determination of an object, and these concepts (the categories) require a deduction, which, moreover, was given in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, by means of which the solution to the problem "How are synthetic a priori judgments of cognition possible?" was provided. 10 This problem thus concerned the a priori principles of pure understanding and its theoretical judgments.

However, a perception can also be immediately combined with a feeling of pleasure (or displeasure) and a satisfaction that accompanies the representation of the object and serves it instead of a predicate, and an aesthetic judgment, which is not a cognitive judgment, can thus arise. Such a judgment, if it is not a mere judgment of sensation but a formal judgment of reflection, which requires this satisfaction of everyone as necessary, must be grounded in something as an a priori principle, even if only a merely subjective principle (if an objective principle for this kind of judgment would be impossible), but which, as such a principle, also requires a deduction, by means of which it may be comprehended how an aesthetic judgment could lay claim to necessity. This is the basis of the problem with which we are now concerned: How are judgments of taste possible? This problem thus concerns the a priori principles of the pure power of judgment in aesthetic judgments, i.e., in those where it does not (as in theoretical judgments) merely have to subsume under objective concepts of the understanding and stands under a law, but where it is itself, subjectively, both object as well as law.

This problem can also be represented thus: How is a judgment possible which, merely from one’s own feeling of pleasure in an object, independent of its concept, judges this pleasure, as attached to the representation of the same object in every other subject, a priori, i.e., without having to wait for the assent of others?

That judgments of taste are synthetic is readily seen, because they go beyond the concept and even the intuition of the object, and add to that as a predicate something that is not even cognition at all, namely the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure). However, that such judgments, even though the predicate (of one’s own pleasure that is combined with the representation) is empirical, are nevertheless, as far as the requisite assent of everyone is concerned, a priori judgments, or would be taken as such, is already implicit in the expressions of their claim; and thus this problem of the critique of the power of judgment belongs under the general problem of transcendental philosophy: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?

§ 37.
What is really asserted a priori of an object in a judgment of taste?

That the representation of an object is immediately combined with a pleasure can be perceived only internally, and would, if one wanted to indicate nothing more than this, yield a merely empirical judgment. For I cannot combine a determinate feeling (of pleasure or displeasure) a priori with any representation, except where my ground is an a priori principle of reason determining the will; for then the pleasure (in the moral feeling) is the consequence of it, but precisely on that account it cannot be compared with the pleasure in taste at all, since it requires a determinate concept of a law, while the judgment of taste, by contrast, is to be combined immediately with the mere judging, prior to any concept. Hence all judgments of taste are also singular judgments, since they combine their predicate of satisfaction not with a concept but with a given singular empirical representation.

Thus it is not the pleasure but the universal validity of this pleasure perceived in the mind as connected with the mere judging of an object that is represented in a judgment of taste as a universal rule for the power of judgment, valid for everyone. It is an empirical judgment that I perceive and judge an object with pleasure. But it is an a priori judgment that I find it beautiful, i.e., that I may require that satisfaction of everyone as necessary. 11
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that could only be made if it were an objective judgment resting on cognitive grounds and capable of being compelled by means of a proof.

§ 34.

No objective principle of taste is possible.

By a principle of taste would be understood a fundamental proposition under the condition of which one could subsume the concept of an object and then by means of an inference conclude that it is beautiful. But that is absolutely impossible. For I must be sensitive to the pleasure immediately in the representation of it, and I cannot be talked into it by means of any proofs. Thus although critics, as Hume says, can reason more plausibly than cooks, they still suffer the same fate as them. They cannot expect a determining ground for their judgment from proofs, but only from the reflection of the subject on his own state (of pleasure or displeasure), rejecting all precepts and rules.

However, what critics nonetheless can and should reason about, in a way that is useful for correcting and broadening our judgments of taste, is this: not the exposition of the determining ground of this sort of aesthetic judgments in a universally usable formula, which is impossible, but the investigation of the faculties of cognition and their functions in these judgments and laying out in examples the reciprocal subjective purposiveness, about which it has been shown above that its form in a given representation is the beauty of its object. Thus the critique of taste itself is only subjective, with regard to the representation by means of which an object is given to us: that is, it is the art or science of bringing under rules the reciprocal relation of the understanding and the imagination to each other in the given representation (without relation to an antecedent sensation or concept), and consequently their concord or discord, and of determining it with regard to its conditions. It is art if it shows this only in examples; it is science if it derives the possibility of such a judging from the nature of this faculty as a faculty of cognition in general. It is with the latter, as transcendental critique, that we are here alone concerned.

It should develop and justify the subjective principle of taste as an a priori principle of the power of judgment. Criticism, as an art, merely seeks to apply the physiological (here psychological) and hence empirical rules, according to which taste actually proceeds to the judging of its objects (without reflecting on its possibility), and criticizes the products of fine art just as the former criticizes the faculty of judging them itself.

§ 35.

The principle of taste is the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general.

The judgment of taste differs from logical judgment in that the latter subsumes a representation under concepts of the object, but the former does not subsume under a concept at all, for otherwise the necessary universal approval could be compelled by proofs. All the same, however, it is similar to the latter in that it professes a universality and necessity, though not in accordance with concepts of the object, and hence a merely subjective one. Now since the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (that which pertains to the cognition of the object), but the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts, it is grounded only on the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the faculty for judging itself, or the power of judgment. This, employed with regard to a representation by means of which an object is given, requires the agreement of two powers of representation: namely, the imagination (for the intuition and the composition of the manifold of intuition), and the understanding (for the concept as representation of the unity of this composition). Now since no concept of the object is here the ground of the judgment, it can consist only in the subsumption of the imagination itself (in the case of a representation by means of which an object is given) under the condition that the understanding in general advance from intuitions to concepts. I.e., since the freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept, the judgment of taste must rest on a mere sensation of the reciprocally animating imagination in its freedom and the understanding with its lawfulness, thus on a feeling that allows the object to be judged in accordance with the purposiveness of the representation (by means of which an object is given) for the promotion of the faculty of cognition in its free play; and taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of intui-

Grundsatz
Bezeiegnunde
Beurteilung
Die Critik
magnitude of the pyramids one must neither come too close to them nor be too far away. For in the latter case, the parts that are apprehended (the stones piled on top of one another) are represented only obscurely, and their representation has no effect on the aesthetic judgment of the subject. In the former case, however, the eye requires some time to complete its apprehension from the base level to the apex, but during this time the former always partly fades before the imagination has taken in the latter, and the comprehension is never complete. —

The very same thing can also suffice to explain the bewilderment or sort of embarrassment that is said to seize the spectator on first entering St. Peter’s in Rome. For here there is a feeling of the inadequacy of his imagination for presenting the ideas of a whole, in which the imagination reaches its maximum and, in the effort to extend it, sinks back into itself, but is thereby transported into an emotionally moving satisfaction.

I shall not yet add anything about the basis for this satisfaction, which is associated with a representation from which one should least expect it, namely one that makes us notice the inadequacy, consequently also the subjective non-purposiveness of the representation for the power of judgment in the estimation of magnitude; rather I only note that if the aesthetic judgment is to be pure (not mixed up with anything teleological as judgments of reason) and if an example of that is to be given which is fully appropriate for the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment, then the sublime must not be shown in products of art (e.g., buildings, columns, etc.), where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude, nor in natural things whose concept already brings with it a determinate end (e.g., animals of a known natural determination), but rather in raw nature (and even in this only insofar as it by itself brings with it neither charm nor emotion from real danger), merely insofar as it contains magnitude.

For in this sort of representation nature contains nothing that would be monstrous (or magnificent or terrible); the magnitude that is apprehended may grow as large as one wants as long as it can be comprehended in one whole by the imagination. An object is monstrous if by its magnitude it annihilates the end which its concept constitutes. The mere presentation of a concept, however, which is almost too great for all presentation (which borders on the relatively monstrous) is called colossal, because the end of the presentation of a concept is its magnitude it annihilates the end which its concept constitutes.

The imagination, by itself, without anything hindering it, advances to infinity in the composition that is requisite for the representation of magnitude; the understanding, however, guides this by numerical concepts, for which the former must provide the schema; and in this procedure, belonging to the logical estimation of magnitude, there is certainly something objectively purposive in accordance with the concept of an end (such as all measuring is), but nothing that is purposive and pleasing for the aesthetic power of judgment. There is also in this intentional purposiveness nothing that would necessitate pushing the magnitude of the measure and hence the comprehension of the many in one intuition to the boundaries of the faculty of imagination and as far as the latter might reach in presentations. For in the understanding’s estimation of magnitudes (in arithmetic) one gets equally far whether one pushes the composition of the units up to the number 10 (in the decimal system) or only to 4 (in the tetradic system); the further generation of magnitude in composition, or, if the quantum is given in intuition, in apprehension, proceeds merely progressively (not comprehensively) in accordance with an assumed principle of progression. In this mathematical estimation of magnitude the understanding is equally well served and satisfied whether the imagination chooses for its unit a magnitude that can be grasped in a single glance, e.g., a foot or a rod, or whether it chooses a German mile or even a diameter of the earth, whose apprehension but not composition is possible in an intuition of the imagination (not through comprehsensio aesthetica though

* Reading Ideen as in the second edition, rather than the singular Idee as in the first.
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§ 26.

On the estimation of the magnitude of things of nature that is requisite for the idea of the sublime.

The estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts (or their signs in algebra) is mathematical, but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) is aesthetic. Now we can, to be sure, obtain determinate concepts of how great something is only by means of numbers (or at any rate through approximations by means of numerical series progressing to infinity), whose unit is the measure; and to this extent all logical

estimation of magnitude is mathematical. But since the magnitude of the measure must still be assumed to be known, then, if this in turn is to be estimated only by means of numbers whose unit would have to be another measure, and so mathematically, we can never have a primary or basic fundamental measure, and hence we can never have a determinate concept of a given magnitude. Thus the estimation of the magnitude of the basic measure must consist simply in the fact that one can immediately grasp it in an intuition and use it by means of imagination for the presentation of numerical concepts — i.e., in the end all estimation of the magnitude of objects of nature is aesthetic (i.e., subjectively and not objectively determined).

Now for the mathematical estimation of magnitude there is, to be sure, no greatest (for the power of numbers goes on to infinity); but for the aesthetic estimation of magnitude there certainly is a greatest; and about this I say that if it is judged as an absolute measure, beyond which no greater is subjectively (for the judging subject) possible, it brings with it the idea of the sublime, and produces that emotion which no mathematical estimation of magnitudes by means of numbers can produce (except insofar as that aesthetic basic measure is vividly preserved in the imagination), since the latter always presents only relative magnitude through comparison with others of the same species, but the former presents magnitude absolutely, so far as the mind can grasp it in one intuition.

To take up a quantum in the imagination intuitively, in order to be able to use it as a measure or a unit for the estimation of magnitude by means of numbers, involves two actions of this faculty: apprehension (apprehensio) and comprehension (comprehensio aesthetica). There is no difficulty with apprehension, because it can go on to infinity; but comprehension becomes ever more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest basic measure for the estimation of magnitude. For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses that were apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones, then it loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot go.

This makes it possible to explain a point that Savary notes in his report on Egypt: that in order to get the full emotional effect of the
that something is great is also something entirely different from saying that it is absolutely great (absolute, non-comparative magnum). The latter is that which is great beyond all comparison. So what does the expression ‘great’ mean? It is not a pure concept of the understanding that is thereby designated, still less an intuition of sense, and just as little a concept of reason, since it does not bring with it any principle of cognition at all. It must therefore be a concept of the power of judgment, or derive from such a concept, and be grounded in a subjective purposiveness of the representation in relation to the power of judgment. That something is a magnitude (quantum) may be cognized from the thing itself, without any comparison with another; if, that is, a multitude of homogeneous elements together constitute a unity. But how great it is always requires something else, which is also a magnitude, as its measure. However, since in the judging of magnitude not merely the multitude (number) but also the magnitude of the unit (of the measure) is involved, and the magnitude of this latter in turn always needs something else as a measure with which it can be compared, we see that any determination of the magnitude of appearances is absolutely incapable of affording an absolute concept of a magnitude but can afford at best only a comparative concept.

Now if I simply say that something is great, it seems that I do not have in mind any comparison at all, at least not with any objective measure, since it is not thereby determined at all how great the object is. However, even though the standard for comparison is merely subjective, the judgment nonetheless lays claim to universal assent; the judgments “The man is beautiful” and “He is great” do not restrict themselves merely to the judging subject, but, like theoretical judgments, demand everyone’s assent. But because in a judgment by which something is described simply as great it is not merely said that the object has a magnitude, but rather this is attributed to it to a superior extent than to many others of the same kind, yet without this superiority being given determinately, this judgment is certainly grounded on a standard that one presupposes can be assumed to be the same for everyone, but which is not usable for any logical (mathematically determinate) judging of magnitude, but only for an aesthetic one, since it is a merely subjective standard grounding the reflecting judgment on magnitude. It may be, by the way, empirical, as in the case of the average magnitude of the people known to us, of animals of a certain species, of trees, houses, mountains, etc., or a standard given a priori, which because of the deficiencies of the judging subject is restricted to subjective conditions of presentation in concreto: as in the practical sphere, the magnitude of a certain virtue, or of public freedom and justice in a country; or in the theoretical sphere, the magnitude of the accuracy or inaccuracy of an observation or measurement that has been made, and so on.

Now it is noteworthy here that even if we have no interest at all in the object, i.e., its existence is indifferent to us, still its mere magnitude, even if it is considered as formless, can bring with it a satisfaction that is universally communicable, hence it may contain a consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive faculties: but not a satisfaction in the object, as in the case of the beautiful (since it can be formless), where the reflecting power of judgment finds itself purposefully disposed in relation to cognition in general; rather in the enlargement of the imagination in itself.

If (under the above-mentioned restriction) we say of an object absolutely that it is great, this is not a mathematically determining judgment but a mere judgment of reflection about its representation, which is subjectively purposive for a certain use of our cognitive powers in the estimation of magnitude, and in that case we always combine a kind of respect with the representation, just as we combine contempt with that which we call absolutely small. Moreover, the judging of things as great or small applies to everything, even to all their properties; hence we call even beauty great or small; the reason for which is to be sought in the fact that whatever we may present in intuition in accordance with the precept of the power of judgment (and hence represent aesthetically) is entirely appearance, and hence is also a quantum.

If, however, we call something not only great, but simply, absolutely great, great in every respect (beyond all comparison), i.e., sub-
dance with laws the principle of which we do not encounter anywhere in our entire faculty of understanding, namely that of a purposiveness with respect to the use of the power of judgment in regard to appearances, so that this must be judged as belonging not merely to nature in its purposeless mechanism but rather also to the analogy with art. Thus it actually expands not our cognition of natural objects, but our concept of nature, namely as a mere mechanism, into the concept of nature as art: which invites profound investigations into the possibility of such a form. But in that which we are accustomed to call sublime in nature there is so little that leads to particular objective principles and forms of nature corresponding to these that it is mostly rather in its chaos or in its wildest and most unruly disorder and devastation, if only it allows a glimpse of magnitude and might, that it excites the ideas of the sublime. From this we see that the concept of the sublime in nature is far from being as important and rich in consequences as that of its beauty, and that in general it indicates nothing purposive in nature itself, but only in the possible use of its intuitions to make palpable in ourselves a purposiveness that is entirely independent of nature. For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely one in ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of the former — a very necessary introductory remark, which entirely separates the ideas of the sublime from that of a purposiveness of nature, and makes of the theory of the sublime a mere appendix to the aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature, since by this means no particular form is represented in the latter, but only a purposive use that the imagination makes of its representation is developed.

§ 24.

On the division of an investigation of the feeling of the sublime.

As far as the division of the moments of the aesthetic judging of objects in relation to the feeling of the sublime is concerned, the analytic will be able to proceed in accordance with the same principle that was used in the analysis of judgments of taste. For as a judgment of the aesthetic reflecting power of judgment, the satisfaction in the sublime, just like that in the beautiful, must be represented as universally valid in its quantity, as without interest in its quality, as subjective purposiveness in its relation, and the latter, as far as its modality is concerned, as necessary. Thus the method here will not depart from that in the preceding section, though some account must be taken of the fact that there, where the aesthetic judgment concerned the form of the object, we began with the investigation of quality, but here, in view of the formlessness that can pertain to that which we call sublime, we will begin with quantity as the first moment of the aesthetic judgment on the sublime; the ground for which, however, is to be seen from the preceding §.

But one division is necessary in the analysis of the sublime which that of the beautiful did not require, namely that into the mathematically and the dynamically sublime.

For since the feeling of the sublime brings with it as its characteristic mark a movement of the mind connected with the judging of the object, whereas the taste for the beautiful presupposes and preserves the mind in calm contemplation, yet this movement is to be judged as subjectively purposive (because the sublime pleases), thus this movement is related through the imagination either to the faculty of cognition or to the faculty of desire, but in both relations the purposiveness of the given representation is judged only with regard to this faculty (without an end or interest): for then the first is attributed to the object as a mathematical, the second as a dynamical disposition of the imagination, and thus the object is represented as sublime in the twofold manner intended.

### A.

#### On the mathematically sublime

§ 25.

Nominal definition of the sublime.

We call sublime that which is absolutely great. However, to be great and to be a magnitude are quite different concepts (magnitudo
§ 23.
Transition from the faculty for judging the beautiful to that for judging the sublime.

The beautiful coincides with the sublime in that both please for themselves. And further in that both presuppose neither a judgment of sense nor a logically determining judgment, but a judgment of reflection: consequently the satisfaction does not depend on a sensation, like that in the agreeable, nor on a determinate concept, like the satisfaction in the good; but it is nevertheless still related to concepts, although it is indeterminate which, hence the satisfaction is connected to the mere presentation or to the faculty for that, through which the faculty of presentation or the imagination is considered, in the case of a given intuition, to be in accord with the faculty of concepts of the understanding or of reason, as promoting the latter. Hence both sorts of judgments are also singular, and yet judgments that profess to be universally valid in regard to every subject, although they lay claim merely to the feeling of pleasure and not to any cognition of the object.

But notable differences between the two also strike the eye. The beautiful in nature concerns the form of the object, which consists in limitation; the sublime, by contrast, is to be found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it, or at its instance, and yet it is also thought as a totality: so that the beautiful seems to be taken as the presentation of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but the sublime as that of a similar concept of reason. Thus the satisfaction is connected in the first case with the representation of quality, but in this case with that of quantity. Also the latter pleasure is very different in kind from the former, in that the former (the beautiful) directly brings with it a feeling of the promotion of life, and hence is compatible with charms and an imagination at play, while the latter (the feeling of the sublime) is a pleasure that arises only indirectly, being generated, namely, by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital powers and the immediately following and all the more powerful outpouring of them; hence as an emotion it seems to be not play but something serious in the activity of the imagination. Hence it is also incompatible with charms, and, since the mind is not merely attracted by the object, but is also always reciprocally repelled by it, the satisfaction in the sublime does not so much contain positive pleasure as it does admiration or respect, i.e., it deserves to be called negative pleasure.

The most important and intrinsic difference between the sublime and the beautiful, however, is this: that if, as is appropriate, we here consider first only the sublime in objects of nature (that in art is, after all, always restricted to the conditions of agreement with nature), natural beauty (the self-sufficient kind) carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems as it were to be predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus constitutes an object of satisfaction in itself, whereas that which, without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure appear in its form to be contrapurposeful for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that.

But from this one immediately sees that we express ourselves on the whole incorrectly if we call some object of nature sublime, although we can quite correctly call very many of them beautiful; for how can we designate with an expression of approval that which is contrapurposeful? We can say no more than that the object serves for the presentation of a sublimity that can be found in the mind; for what is properly sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form, but concerns only ideas of reason, which, though no presentation adequate to them is possible, are provoked and called to mind precisely by this inadequacy, which does allow of sensible presentation. Thus the wide ocean, enraged by storms, cannot be called sublime. Its visage is horrible; and one must already have filled the mind with all sorts of ideas if by means of such an intuition it is to be put in the mood for a feeling which is itself sublime, in that the mind is incited to abandon sensibility and to occupy itself with ideas that contain a higher purposiveness.

The self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature, which makes it possible to represent it as a system in accor-
Yet there is still a distinction between the normal idea of the beautiful and its ideal, which on the grounds already introduced can be expected only in the human figure. In the latter the ideal consists in the expression of the moral, without which the object would not please universally and moreover positively (not merely negatively in an academically correct presentation). The visible expression of moral ideas, which inwardly govern human beings, can of course be drawn only from experience; but as it were to make visible in bodily manifestation (as the effect of what is inward) their combination with everything that our understanding connects with the morally good in the idea of the highest purposiveness — goodness of soul, or purity, or strength, or repose, etc. — this requires pure ideas of reason and great force of imagination united in anyone who would merely judge them, let alone anyone who would present them. The correctness of such an ideal of beauty is proved by the fact that no sensory charm is allowed to be mixed into the satisfaction in its object, while it nevertheless allows a great interest to be taken in it, which then proves that judging in accordance with such a standard can never be purely aesthetic, and judging in accordance with an ideal of beauty is no mere judgment of taste.

Definition of the beautiful inferred from this third moment.

Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end.

It might be added as a counterexample to this definition that there are things in which one cannot see a purposive form without cognizing an end in them, e.g., the stone utensils often excavated from ancient burial mounds, which are equipped with a hole, as if for a handle, which, although they clearly betray by their shape a purposiveness the end of which one does not know, are nevertheless not declared to be beautiful on that account. Yet the fact that they are regarded as a work of art is already enough to require one to admit that one relates their shape to some sort of intention and to a determinate purpose. Hence there is also no immediate satisfaction at all in their intuition. A flower, by contrast, e.g., a tulip, is held to be beautiful because a certain purposiveness is encountered in our perception of it which, as we judge it, is not related to any end at all.

*beurteilen
* Beurteilung here and in the next clause of this sentence.
* The second edition here omits the word "also" from the first.
* In the first edition, "however."
* beurteilen.

Fourth Moment

of the judgment of taste, concerning the modality of the satisfaction in the object.

§ 18.

What the modality of a judgment of taste is.

Of every representation I can say that it is at least possible that it (as a cognition) be combined with a pleasure. Of that which I call agreeable I say that it actually produces a pleasure in me. Of the beautiful, however, one thinks that it has a necessary connection to satisfaction. Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective necessity, where it can be cognized a priori that everyone will feel this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me, nor a practical necessity, whereby means of concepts of a pure will, serving as rules for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary consequence of an objective law and signifies nothing other than that one absolutely (without a further aim) ought to act in a certain way. Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment, it can only be called exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of all to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a universal rule that one cannot produce. Since an aesthetic judgment is not an objective and cognitive judgment, this necessity cannot be derived from determinate concepts, and is therefore not apodictic. Much less can it be inferred from the universality of experience (from a complete unanimity in judgments about the beauty of a certain object). For not only would experience hardly supply sufficient evidence of this, but it is also impossible to ground any concept of the necessity of these judgments on empirical judgments.

§ 19.

The subjective necessity that we ascribe to the judgment of taste is conditioned.

The judgment of taste ascribes assent to everyone, and whoever declares something to be beautiful wishes that everyone should approve of the object in question and similarly declare it to be beautiful. The should in aesthetic judgments of taste is thus pronounced only conditionally even given all the data that are required for the judging: One solicits assent from everyone else because one has a ground for it that
idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging it as a thing belonging to a particular species of animal; second, the idea of reason, which makes the ends of humanity so far as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging of its figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealed. The normal idea must take its elements for the figure of an animal of a particular species from experience; but the greatest purposiveness in the construction of the figure, which would be suitable as a universal standard for the aesthetic judging of every individual of this species, the image which has as it were intentionally grounded the technique of nature, to which only the species as a whole but not any separate individual is adequate, lies merely in the idea of the one who does the judging, which, however, with its proportions, can be represented fully in concreto as an aesthetic idea in a model image. In order to make it somewhat comprehensible how this happens (for who can entirely unlock its secret from nature?), we shall attempt a psychological explanation.

It should be noted that the imagination does not only know how to recall for us occasionally signs of concepts, even after a long time, in a way that is entirely incomprehensible to us; it also knows how to reproduce the image and shape of an object out of an immense number of objects of different kinds, or even of one and the same kind; indeed, when the mind is set on making comparisons, it even knows how, by all accounts actually if not consciously, as it were to superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean that can serve them all as a common measure. Someone has seen a thousand grown men. Now if he would judge what should be estimated as their comparatively normal size, then (in my opinion) the imagination allows a great number of images (perhaps all thousand) to be superimposed on one another, and, if I may here apply the analogy of optical presentation, in the space where the greatest number of them coincide and within the outline of the place that is illumined by the most concentrated colors, there the average size becomes recognizable, which is in both height and breadth equidistant from the most extreme boundaries of the largest and smallest statures; and this is the stature for a beautiful man. (One could get the same result mechanically if one measured all thousand men, added up their heights, widths (and girths) and then divided the sum by a thousand. But the imagination does just this by means of a dynamic effect, which arises from the repeated apprehension of such images on the organ of inner sense.) Now if in a similar way there is sought for this average man the average head, the average nose, etc., then this shape is the basis for the normal idea of the beautiful man in the country where this comparison is made; hence under these empirical conditions a Negro must necessarily have a different normal idea of the beauty of a figure than a white, a Chinese person a different idea from a European. It will be exactly the same with the model of a beautiful horse or dog (of a certain breed). — This normal idea is not derived from the proportions taken from experience, as determinate rules; rather it is in accordance with it that rules for judging first become possible. It is the image for the whole species, hovering among all the particular and variously diverging intuitions of the individuals, which nature used as the archetype underlaying her productions in the same species, but does not seem to have fully achieved in any individual. It is by no means the entire archetype of beauty in this species, but only the form that constitutes the indispensable condition of all beauty, and so merely the correctness in the presentation of the species. It is, as was said of Polycletus's famous Doryphorus, the rule (and Myron's cow could be used in the same way in its species). For that very reason it cannot contain anything specifically characteristic, for then it would not be the normal idea for the species. Its presentation also does not please because of beauty, but merely because it does not contradict any condition under which alone a thing of this species can be beautiful. The presentation is merely academically correct.*

* One will find that a perfectly regular face, which a painter might ask to sit for him as a model, usually says nothing: because it contains nothing characteristic, and thus expresses more the idea of the species than anything specific to a person. What is characteristic in this way, when it is exaggerated, i.e., when it itself breaks with the normal idea (of the purposiveness of the species), is called caricature. Experience also shows that such completely regular faces usually betray an inwardly only average human being, presumably for this reason (if it may be assumed that nature expresses in the exterior the proportions of the interior), that if none of the mental characteristics stand out beyond those proportions that are required merely to constitute a faultless human being, then nothing may be expected of that which is called genius, in which nature seems to depart from its usual relations among the powers of the mind in favor of a particular one.

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The second edition here omits the phrase "to reproduce" from the first.

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taste by someone else, who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looked to the end of the object), even though both judge correctly in their way: the one on the basis of what he has before his sense, the other on the basis of what he has in his thoughts. By means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of taste, by showing them that the one is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied judgment of taste.

§ 17.
On the ideal of beauty.19

There can be no objective rule of taste that would determine what is beautiful through concepts. For every judgment from this source is aesthetic, i.e., its determining ground is the feeling of the subject and not a concept of an object. To seek a principle of taste that would provide the universal criterion of the beautiful through determinate concepts is a fruitless undertaking, because what is sought is impossible and intrinsically self-contradictory. The universal communicability of the sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed one that occurs without concepts, the unanimity, so far as possible, of all times and peoples about this feeling in the representation of certain objects: although weak and hardly sufficient for conjecture, this is the empirical criterion of the derivation of a taste, confirmed by examples, from the common ground, deeply buried in all human beings, of unanimity in the judging of forms under which objects are given to them.

Hence some products of taste are regarded as exemplary — not as if taste could be acquired by imitating others.20 For taste must be a faculty of one’s own; however, whoever imitates a model certainly shows, so far as he gets it right, a skill, but he shows taste only insofar as he can judge this model himself.21 From this, however, it follows that the highest model, the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which everyone must produce in himself, and in accordance with which he must judge.

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Models of taste with regard to the arts of discourse must be composed in a dead and learned language: the former, in order not to have to suffer the alterations that unavoidably affect living languages, which make noble expressions flat, common ones outmoded, and newly created ones of only brief currency; the latter, so that it should have a grammar that is not subject to any willful change of fashion but has its own unalterable rules.

* In the second edition, the verb bunte replaces wende (turning to), used in the first.
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Change of the aesthetic power of judgment