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Nietzsche in the Light of his Suppressed Manuscripts

WALTER KAUFMANN

Since the eighteen-nineties there has been considerable discussion about the adequacy of the editing of Nietzsche's late works, and occasionally bitter polemics about suppressed material have appeared in German newspapers and periodicals as well as in a few books. In the mid-fifties the controversy was revived in the wake of a new three-volume edition of Nietzsche's works, edited by Karl Schlechta, but the acrimonious debate was not very illuminating, and the sensational claims that traveled across the ocean were largely misleading. More and more often it was asked how reliable our printed texts are; also, what new revelations may be expected from unpublished manuscripts. I shall try to answer both questions.

The discussion will revolve largely around a recent German work by Erich F. Podach who makes sensational claims about The Antichrist and, above all, Ecce Homo, and who wants to supersede all previous editions of these works, including Schlechta's.

II

Erich Podach holds a unique place in the Nietzsche literature: nobody else has contributed five genuinely important books. Yet Podach is not a philosopher, and he has never shown any profound understanding of Nietzsche's thought. The point is that all of his books make use of unpublished documents. His study of Nietzsche's Zusammenbruch (1930) was translated

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3 My article was completed before two reviews of Podach's book appeared in The Philosophical Review, April 1964, pp. 282–285, and in The Journal of Philosophy, April 23, 1964, pp. 286–288. Both reviews are by Henry Walter Brann: both accept uncritically Podach's editing and Podach's claims; and both add original errors. Brann says that Podach tells "the amazing story of the most brazen literary fraud committed in recent times," and he quotes Podach as saying that "Nietzsche is the most brazenly falsified figure of recent literary and cultural history with regard both to his life and to his works." (The last sentence is rendered into smoother English in The Philosophical Review, and the two reviews are altogether slightly different.) I shall try to show how Podach and Brann themselves have contributed to this "amazing story" by trying to convince us that one of Nietzsche's best books was not written by him.
into English in 1931. *Gestalten um Nietzsche* (1932)\(^4\) is his most interesting book and deserves to be translated: it offers chapters on Nietzsche's mother, Rohde, Gast, Bernhard and Elisabeth Förster (Nietzsche's sister and her husband), and Julius Langbehn. In 1887 Podach published *Der kranke Nietzsche: Briefe seiner Mutter an Franz Overbeck*, and after that *Friedrich Nietzsche und Lou Salomé*. All of these volumes are important for the biography of Nietzsche.

The fifth book aims to offer philologically reliable texts of *Nietzsches Werke des Zusammenbruchs*, i.e., *Nietzsche contra Wagner, Der Antichrist, Ecce Homo*, and *Dionysos-Dithyramben*. All of these were first published after Nietzsche had become insane (in January, 1889), and while no philosophically important changes were made, the early editors were not greatly concerned about philological exactitude.

*Nietzsche contra Wagner*, for example, as published first in 1895 and reprinted many times since, differs quite strikingly from the final version of which Nietzsche himself was reading proofs in January, 1889, when he collapsed. Yet a very few copies of the original version were actually printed in 1889. This version contained a third chapter, "Intermezzo," deleted in 1895 and ever since, and this, a page and a half long, ended with the poem variously called, in later collections of Nietzsche's verse, "Venice" or "Gondola Song." The reason for this omission was not at all sinister. Nietzsche was working on several books late in 1888. Initially, this section formed part of *Ecce Homo*; then he inserted it in *Nietzsche contra Wagner*; then he wrote his publisher that after all he preferred to move it back into *Ecce Homo*; but when soon thereafter he received proofs of *Nietzsche contra Wagner* that included this section he did not delete it. He even made some slight corrections in it. The editors included it in *Ecce Homo*, with the corrections Nietzsche had made in the proofs. Moreover, the 1889 edition ended with the poem "Von der Armuth des Reichsten," but this, too, was omitted in 1895 and in all subsequent editions. Instead it was included in the *Dionysos-Dithyramben*. Here, too, Nietzsche's intentions were unclear. Poems concluded both *Nietzsche contra Wagner* and *Ecce Homo*, but on January 1 Nietzsche sent the publisher a postcard and on January 2 a telegram, requesting the return of the poems to him. The first edition of *Ecce Homo* (1908) included the poem originally intended for it; all later editions did not. In any case, there was no conspiracy to suppress these poems: they were printed in 1891, along with four others, to be published together with Part Four of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, under the title *Dionysos-Dithyramben*. In 1898, when Nietzsche's sister first published his *Gedichte und Sprüche*, the chapter called "Dionysos-Dithyramben" contained

\(^4\) Both title page and copyright notice say 1932, but in the list of the author's previous books confronting the title page of his fifth volume the date is given as 1931. In the jacket blurb 1932 is given correctly, but another date is wrong.
nine items (instead of six) and included three poems from the fourth part of Zarathustra, in Nietzsche's own subsequent revision.

Unquestionably, the early editors were not philologists; and in the nineties Nietzsche did not seem to merit critical editions. His books had been failures commercially and did not yet command a scholarly audience. Nietzsche was still living, hopelessly insane (he died in 1900); and any emphasis on his shifting intentions during the last weeks of 1888 when he was writing his last books must have seemed likely to discredit these books. The editors believed in the value of these books at a time when Nietzsche's importance was still far from assured, and they could argue in good faith that they were doing the best they could do under the circumstances.

When the Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe of Nietzsche's Werke and Briefe, begun in 1933, was abandoned during the war, after publication of four volumes of letters and five of "works," all chronologically arranged, it had not even reached Nietzsche's first book, much less his last works. All we got instead was Karl Schlechta's edition of Nietzsche's Werke in drei Bänden (1954–1956), and this, though plainly much less complete than quite a number of previous editions, was very widely hailed as philologically adequate. After all, Schlechta had worked in the Nietzsche archives in the thirties, and his third volume offered a Philologischer Nachbericht (pp. 1383–1432). Podach shows that Schlechta's edition is not as sound as it might and should have been: while Schlechta assumed that the archives in Weimar, in East Germany, could no longer be consulted after the war, Podach did work in Weimar to prepare his edition, and he is extremely scornful of Schlechta.5

Indeed, Podach quotes seven pages (pp. 418–425) from a review of the third volume of the Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe of the Werke that he contributed to a Swiss newspaper in 1935, to show how utterly inadequate Schlechta's work was even then.6 It was the publication and widespread success of Schlechta's three-volume set that promoted Podach's publication of his new book.

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5 The archives are now housed with the Goethe and Schiller archives and were also consulted, in the summer of 1959, by Frederick R. Love whose Young Nietzsche and the Wagnerian Experience (1965) I am reviewing for the next issue of this journal.

6 Podach's central charge is that the 166-page apparatus at the end of the volume, though extremely scholarly in appearance, "leaves totally unclear what in [Nietzsche's] notes is, on the one hand, original or the result of his studies—in brief, more or less his own—and what is merely something he read. Above all, the postscript does not fulfill the duty of showing from where Nietzsche got his quotations. . . . The inclination is palpable to ascribe to Nietzsche original sources where in fact he merely used second- or third-hand sources. In short, already with its third volume the edition has become Nietzsche-apologetic" (p. 419). Schlechta was the editor of Nietzsche's "philosophical notes"; and by taking p. 392 as an illustration which he analyzes in detail, Podach demonstrates "the superficiality of these Kant studies" with which Schlechta had credited Nietzsche. Then he scores against H. J. Mette who, in the same volume, printed as a poem by the young Nietzsche a poem by Theodor Storm (1817–1888), published in 1851, that the young Nietzsche had copied. The errors are plain, but it is doubtful whether Schlechta's, any more than Mette's, were prompted by apologetics.
At first Podach intended to write a critical review for the *Deutsche Rundschau*; but while he was at work on that, photostats of manuscripts that he had requested from Weimar convinced him that Schlechta's inadequacies far surpassed anything that could be set straight in an article: something like the new book was required. At this point Podach's own words must be quoted: "This compelled the author once again to occupy himself intensively not only with Nietzsche, which in any case is not one of the pleasant things in life, but also with the Nietzsche literature which is, with few exceptions, insufferable. But in the long run it was not possible to pass over in silence a literary deception of such dimensions" (p. 431).

This book, then, is not a labor of love. Its inspiration is negative, and in the 150 pages contributed by the editor we can distinguish two different polemical thrusts. The most brilliant pages are once again, as in *Gestalten um Nietzsche*, the devastating quotations from men the author despises, along with his vitriolic comments. Here one may particularly single out the members of the *Wissenschaftliche Ausschuss* that supervised, at least nominally, the publication of the Historical-Critical *Gesamtausgabe* (412 ff.),7 and two interpreters of one of Nietzsche's poems (360 ff.), especially Volkmann-Schluck,8 a philosophy professor and Heidegger disciple. In the last case, Podach's critique is couched in a parody of the professor's Heideggerian prose.

Once again, Podach has made a contribution to our understanding of German *Kulturgeschichte*: as in some of the portraits in his *Gestalten*, he shows us the corruption of the intellectual atmosphere. His recounting of the failings of so many editors is at times chilling. And this is deliberate. Podach

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7 Those discussed and quoted by Podach include C. G. Emge, Oswald Spengler, Walter F. Otto, Martin Heidegger, and Hans Heyse. H. W. Brann's remarks about the committee and the *Gesamtausgabe*, in the penultimate paragraph of his above-mentioned piece in *The Philosophical Review*, misrepresent not only the facts but also Podach's claims.

8 His little opus, *Nietzsches Gedicht* "Die Wüste wächst, weh dem, der Wüsten birgt . . ." (Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1958, 42 pp.), is probably the funniest item in the whole Nietzsche literature. If it were not for compelling external evidence, one might assume that this is a dead-pan parody of Heidegger; but Heidegger considers Volkmann-Schluck one of his ablest and most promising disciples (or at least did on Easter Sunday, 1953, in a conversation with me), and the book looks, from the outside, too, like several of Heidegger's own essays which were brought out by the same publisher.

There are only two prerequisites for the thorough enjoyment of this interpretation: one must have read some of Heidegger's own late essays, and one has to know Nietzsche's poem, which the author kindly reprints at the outset. (For an English translation of the almost identical earlier version of the poem that forms part of Zarathustra IV, see *The Portable Nietzsche*, pp. 416 ff.)

The oddest feature of Volkmann-Schluck's hyper-professorial and solemn exegesis is that it shows no inkling of the whimsical humor of the poem. Like his master, the author never shows a trace of a sense of humor: but why, then, did he have to tackle this particular poem? I give only two very brief illustrations: "Von welcher Art der Zustand ist, in dem sich der Schatten Zarathustras befindet, sagt vor allem die 3. Strophe: er ist aus der noesis durch die Klüt hindurch in die aesthesis gefallen. Seit Plato bewegt sich das Denken . . ." (p. 18). "Das Zweibeinige und Einbeinige betrifft zunächst das Verhältnis zur Zeit" (p. 26). It is to be hoped that the author can be persuaded to publish similar commentaries on Christian Morgenstern's *Galgenlieder*. Meanwhile, it is one of the merits of Podach's big book that he has called our attention to this little one.
is appalled by the new legend that the philosopher's sister can be blamed for everything; and though in the 'thirties he was one of her leading opponents and repeatedly made use of previously unpublished materials to expose her distortions, he now defends her in places without retracting his earlier charges—defends her against those who suggest that she alone lacked integrity, as if dozens of professors and editors had not compromised themselves wretchedly, too.

The other polemical thrust is directed against Nietzsche. Podach's dislike of the man to whom he has devoted five books is not only openly expressed on the last page of the fifth book, in the passage last quoted; it is also in evidence here and there—especially in his treatment of The Antichrist and Ecce Homo.

Podach's version of Nietzsche contra Wagner follows the edition of 1889 and holds no surprises for anyone fortunate enough to have seen one of the exceedingly few copies of that. And Podach's treatment of the Dionysos-Dithyramben does not call for detailed discussion: his main point is that there never was a Druckmanuskript, there only were two handwritten copies, neither ready for the printer; and Schlechta's version is, according to Podach, high-handed and contains such mistakes as taking the break at the bottom of a page for the end of a stanza— with dire results for Volkmann-Schluck's exegesis. But The Antichrist and Ecce Homo require detailed attention.

III

Podach's version of The Antichrist differs from most previous editions in two respects. First, he restores words that had been omitted in three places when the book was first published in 1895. These words are also found in Schlechta's edition and, in two cases out of the three, in the English translation of The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche. Indeed, the deleted words were published by Josef Hofmiller in 1931.

9 Selected and translated, with an introduction, prefaces, and notes, by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1954). Includes new translations of Zarathustra, Twilight, Antichrist, and Nietzsche contra Wagner, all complete, and of selections from Nietzsche's other works, his notes, and his letters.

10 "Nietzsche" in Süddeutsche Monatshefte, November, 1931, pp. 73-131. This was the lead article, and Hofmiller was a respected critic. But to see Podach and Schlechta in perspective, it is not irrelevant that the banner headline on the January 1932 issue read "Die jungen Mädchen von heute"; and on the February issue, "Homöopathie." Ironically, the same issue that began with Hofmiller's "Nietzsche" also contained a short article "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff": the scholar whose first important publications were two polemics in 1872 and 1873 that sought to destroy Nietzsche's reputation, on the heels of the publication of The Birth of Tragedy, had died September 25, 1931. That article began, "The greatness of this worthy, whose star has just sunk under the horizon..." and ended: "But we, to whom it was granted to turn our eyes toward him while living and, at the sight of such greatness, to feel strengthened and educated, want at least to try... to fix the 'image of the worthy' also for later generations." Hofmiller on Nietzsche ended: "What, then, remains of Nietzsche? Enough remains... The critic and diagnostican of the time remains. The moralist remains, taking that word in its French, not its German sense.... What will remain longest of all are the three works of his middle period: Human, All-too-human and The Dawn, and The Gay Science. What will remain are les plus belles pages...".

Details will
In section 29 three words were deleted in all editions until 1954: "the word idiot." Hofmiller made this public to show that Nietzsche was insane when he wrote The Antichrist. In fact, the phrase is one of many indications that Nietzsche's image of Jesus was decisively influenced by Dostoevsky's portrait of Prince Myshkin in The Idiot.\(^{11}\)

In section 35 a few lines were omitted after "... he loves with those, in those, who do him evil" and before "Not to resist, not to be angry..." They read:

The words to the malefactor on the cross contain the whole evangel. "That was truly a godlike man, 'a child of God,'" says the malefactor. "If you feel that"—replies the Redeemer—"then you are in Paradise, then you, too, are a child of God."

This was presumably omitted because it is not found in the Gospels this way. But the reaction to this deletion was surely as misguided as the deletion itself. Hofmiller crowed that the words "are still today suppressed by the editors because they are not right. 'Truly this was a son of God!' is said not by the malefactor but by the centurion, and only after the Savior has died (Matt. 27:54). The words of the malefactor (Luke 23:40) are importantly different. What is characteristic of this kind of criticism of religion is its naive dilettantism" (pp. 94 f.). Podach takes a far dimmer view of Nietzsche than Hofmiller did. But this kind of criticism only shows that they are dilettantes—and prigs besides. A scholar in the field of German philosophy would surely know that Hegel's numerous quotations from Goethe and Schiller are frequently inexact and evidently always from memory, and that Kant's criticism of his predecessors, like Aristotle's, leaves much to be desired. And what a common failing it is to recall a Gospel passage inaccurately! Of course, Nietzsche should have checked it; but he was trying feverishly to finish several books—and this was the sort of thing that his young friend Gast, who got one set of the proofs, had full authority to delete. Hence it is misleading to speak of "suppression."

What is surprising is that there are so few such mistakes or lapses in spelling or syntax. Podach makes much of the fact that at one point in Ecce Homo Nietzsche wrote "Cagliari" instead of "Chiavari," although the two towns are "two and a half degrees of latitude" apart! Hundreds of professors whose eyesight, health, and working conditions are beyond compare with Nietzsche's do far worse—even men who pride themselves on their carefulness and who quite lack Nietzsche's high-strung artistic temperament.

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The last restoration: in the final paragraph of section 38 some editions have "a prince" instead of "a young prince." The word "young" was apparently omitted in 1895 because it seemed to make the reference to the young Kaiser Wilhelm II too obvious and possibly actionable. But this word was long restored in Kröners Taschenausgabe, and Schlechta, too, has it though he elicits Podach's scorn for confessing his inability to discover the deletion in section 38.

Finally, Podach's version also includes some new material at the end of *The Antichrist*: a one-page “Law Against Christianity” (*Gesetz wider das Christentum*) that comprises seven "propositions," and then a concluding quotation from *Zarathustra*: section 30 from the chapter "On Old and New Tablets" (*Twilight of the Idols*, finished a few weeks earlier and published in January 1889, concluded with section 29).

To begin with the quotation, Podach corrects Nietzsche: “not as Nietzsche indicates, *Zarathustra* 3, 90 (*The Hammer Speaks*) but 3, 30 (*On Old and New Tablets*)." But here it is Podach who errs: in the first edition of *Zarathustra*, section 30 is found on p. 90 of Part 3, as indicated by Nietzsche. The title "The Hammer Speaks" is not found there for either section 29 or section 30, but was evidently meant to be added before the quotation, as it had been in *Twilight*.

Why were the "Law" and the quotation omitted from all editions before Podach's? The "Law" is so shrill that it plainly weakens the book, and the quotation is somewhat irrelevant and anticlimactic. Nietzsche seems to have added both as a momentary and ill-advised afterthought. But unlike the three deletions in the text which, according to Podach, are due "with a probability verging on certainty, to the printer or publisher" (p. 403), the omission of the "Law" and the quotation was due, *pace* Podach, also with a probability verging on certainty, to Nietzsche himself.

Podach seems to have included this material for the very reason for which some early editors might have felt tempted to suppress it if it had formed part of the manuscript: he plainly wishes to compromise Nietzsche. Now this matter of the "Law Against Christianity" calls for two comments.

First, one would expect that a man who writes a book like *The Antichrist*, which is exceedingly shrill in many places, must very probably have penned still shriller passages. Finding an example should cause no surprise, and if Nietzsche in his last days really had placed such a page at the end instead of discarding it, this would in no way alter the value of the book we know.

Second, it seems plain that Podach's procedure at this point does not reflect Nietzsche's final intentions. Podach found the "Law" in the *Ecce Homo* file but argues from the pagination and the contents that these pages were really intended for *The Antichrist* (pp. 77–80). While his argument is convincing, it shows no more than that these pages were at one time meant to conclude *The Antichrist*, but the "Law" was quite evidently not found at the end of this
manuscript but rather among Nietzsche's notes. Even upon finishing Podach's preface to his version of The Antichrist, a critical reader must conclude that it is most probable that Nietzsche removed the "Law" from The Antichrist and then, instead of filing or destroying it, left it lying around. By the time one reaches p. 400, this surmise becomes a certainty. Here we find a concession in small print which is neither hinted at nor referred to in the preface: the page in question "is covered with a crust of glue; it was evidently formerly glued shut or covered up with a page glued over it—probably a measure Nietzsche took to keep secret his world-historical laws up to the moment of their promulgation. As a matter of fact, the page escaped Overbeck. The text is missing in the copy he made of The Antichrist." In sum, Podach's inclusion of the "Law" at the end of The Antichrist can be supported only by the guess, in small print on page 400, that Nietzsche pasted over this text to keep it secret. This guess, however, is not merely extremely tenuous; Podach's procedure at this point is far more unscrupulous than dozens of offenses for which he chides earlier editors.

Podach's respect for Overbeck's scholarly and human integrity is evident in all of his books, and he never questions that Overbeck copied what was there to be copied. The "Law" plainly was not there at the end of the manuscript. As if this were not enough, it appears that something was pasted over it; but Podach assumes, without argument, that a blank page was pasted over it to keep the text secret—although the Ecce Homo manuscript abounds in instances where changes are made by pasting the new version over the old one.

IV

Podach's attempt to debunk Nietzsche reaches its climax in his editing of Ecce Homo. He quotes Nietzsche's letter to Gast of November 13, 1888, with the news that Ecce Homo, begun October 15, was finished November 4, and comments that Nietzsche's "reliability in matters relating to himself was never very great" (p. 166). We are assured that "Ecce Homo was finished neither November 4 nor on any other day...." (p. 169)—which is a half-truth. There seems to be no reason—and Podach adduces none—for doubting the following information provided by Professor Raoul Richter in his scholarly postscript to the first edition of the book (1908). Since this was a limited edition and the postscript has never been reprinted, these points merit a fairly detailed statement.

Nietzsche apparently did finish Ecce Homo on November 4, 1888, and before the middle of the month he sent the manuscript to his publisher, Nau...
mann, to get it printed and published. In a letter of November 20, he mentions additions to Georg Brandes in Copenhagen, the first professor who gave lectures on Nietzsche; and then he also mentioned the additions to his publisher. On a card, postmarked November 27, he asked Naumann to return "the second part of the MS . . . because I still want to insert some things." He explained that he meant "the whole second half of the MS, beginning with the section entitled 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra.' I assume that this won't delay the printing for even a moment as I shall send back the MS immediately. . . ." On December 1, he acknowledged receipt of the second half but requested the return of the whole MS, including the additions: "I want to give you a MS as good as the last one, at the risk that I have to be a copier for another week." The next day he wrote Gast that he had asked the MS back once more. On December 3, Naumann wrote Nietzsche that he was returning the MS, but "copying it once more I do not consider necessary; I merely should especially recommend that you read the proofs carefully although I shall make a point of doing likewise." Evidently, then, the MS struck Naumann as finished, clear, and printable. On December 6, Nietzsche telegraphed Naumann: "MS back. Everything reworked [umgearbeitet]." And on the 8th, Nietzsche wrote Gast: "I sent Ecce Homo back to C. G. Naumann day before yesterday after laying it once more on the gold scales from the first to the last word to set my conscience finally at rest."

Then Nietzsche hesitated whether Nietzsche contra Wagner or Ecce Homo should appear first. He had worked on both books during the same time, and both represented attempts to preclude misunderstandings of his outlook and what he stood for. He was thinking of having Ecce Homo appear simultaneously in German and in English and French translations and, though he had given some thought to the question of the translators, this would clearly involve a delay of up to a year. On December 15, he decided in favor of publishing Nietzsche contra Wagner first, but on the same day the publisher dispatched the first installment of the proofs of Ecce Homo, sending one set to Nietzsche and another to Gast, and on the 18th the second installment was sent to both men. On the 20th Nietzsche sent his publisher a card, and then also a telegram, expressing the wish to see Ecce published first after all; the same day he also requested the publisher to move the "Intermezzo" from Nietzsche contra Wagner to Ecce Homo, as originally planned.

The path we have been following is sinuous, but for all that the development seems clear, and nothing suggests that there was no finished manuscript. The week from December 27 to January 2—the last week before Nietzsche's collapse—adds a few final twists. On the 27th Nietzsche writes his publisher: "Much obliged for the zeal with which the printing progresses. I have returned, ready for the printer, both the second installment of the proofs of
Ecce and the two installments of N. contra W. . . . Everything considered, let us publish in the year 1889 The Twilight of the Idols and Nietzsche contra Wagner. . . . Ecce Homo, which must be turned over to the translators as soon as it is finished, could not in any case be ready before 1890 to appear simultaneously in all three languages. For the Revaluation of All Values [i.e., The Antichrist], I do not yet have any date in mind. The success of Ecce Homo will have to precede it. That this work is ready for the printer I have written you."

On the 29th, Nietzsche sends the publisher "the poem which should conclude Ecce Homo." On the 22nd he had first mentioned the idea of including this poem in Ecce in a letter to Gast, but then he had referred to its possible insertion between two chapters. On the 30th, Nietzsche sends his publisher a postcard requesting the insertion of one sentence in the "Intermezzo." On January 1, he sends another card asking the publisher to return the poem to him once more, and on January 2, finally, he sends Naumann a telegram requesting the manuscripts of the two final poems—possibly because he had decided to conclude neither Ecce nor N. contra W. with a poem.

It is for publishers to say whether many authors are that much trouble. I suspect that a few who quite lack Nietzsche's genius are. Certainly, very few complete so many books in one year: The Wagner Case, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, and Nietzsche contra Wagner—few great writers have produced five comparable works in such a short time. Under the circumstances, Nietzsche's excitement, his indecision about the most effective order of publication for the last two titles, and his changes of mind about various details are far from surprising. What is surprising is Podach's attitude toward Ecce Homo.

Podach claims, as we have seen, that the book was not really finished—and he prints the manuscript with Nietzsche's many editorial directions, such as requests to insert or move passages; he prints alternative versions of the same passage, one after the other; he indicates where something has been pasted over and prints both the latter version and the former. All this is valuable up to a point, and we are in the editor's debt for letting us see easily what it took him considerable work to find out. What is unfortunate is Podach's manifest conviction that all this serves to debunk the book and its author.

Indeed, Podach makes his version look more chaotic than the original manuscript version, in at least one important respect: "I have not indicated where whole sections in 'the final manuscript' ['Druckmanuskript'] are crossed out. Here some of the texts show plainly that they are variants or preliminary versions, while in other cases it cannot be decided whether N or Gast has deleted them" (p. 408). On purely philological grounds, Podach's procedure seems wholly unjustifiable. Why should preliminary versions that have been
crossed out and superseded be printed as if they had been neither crossed out nor superseded, leaving it to the reader to make a choice where the author made his choice over seventy years before? Since the publisher evidently found that the manuscript sent to him was printable and did not need copying over—and thus apparently did not contain alternative versions of the same passages—the suggestion that in some cases it cannot be decided whether Nietzsche or Gast eliminated the variant versions seems implausible. But even if this should be true in some cases, the philologically correct procedure would surely be to indicate the final version in all cases, to relegate variants to an appendix or at most to footnotes, and to indicate in which cases there is room for doubt whether the deletions were effected by Nietzsche's hand.

The way a writer works and the way his books look shortly before they are finished—or even the way a patient publisher is willing to send them to the printer—the follies an author narrowly avoids and his momentary indecision about two ways of putting a point—all this should not shock a reasonably sophisticated reader, and it certainly could not shock anybody who has gone through remotely similar processes, whether as a writer or as an editor or publisher. But Podach shows once again, and more blatantly than ever before, how little feeling he has for the man to whom he has devoted five books and from whose name his own literary reputation is inseparable.

Podach's characterization of Ecce Homo (pp. 205 ff.), which he dislikes intensely, is exceedingly unperceptive and invites parodies in the form of similar exposés of other great works of literature. While there is no need to discuss that, the last sentences of his long introduction to the text deserve to be quoted and criticized:

[We] must renounce an illusion that has become dear. The hitherto familiar Ecce Homo does not exist. But now we have access to that which has been preserved of Ecce Homo as Nietzsche wrote it.... All this belongs to Ecce Homo....

An 'Ecce Homo' is not a writing that may be edited.... It is not permitted to borrow titles from the Bible and from Cardinal Newman [Nietzsche really did not do the latter] to proclaim that one wishes to say what one is and how one became, in order to employ the art of mise en scène when it comes to the confession of character and life and to resist, in spite of all assurances, an undisguised self-portrait.

Genuine confessions are irrevocable. They do not permit crossing out, nor cancelled passages, nor secrets that are held back. Then only will it be shown what is mask and original image, joke and seriousness, histrionics and self-illumination, abandonment to myth and persevering will to truth and reality.

Podach plainly fails to understand the difference between notes a man might take to show them to his psychoanalyst and works like Goethe's Dichtung und Wahrheit and Plato's Apology. Ecce Homo is obviously
modeled on Goethe and Socrates, and the title of the first chapter, "Why I am so wise," points back to Socrates' claim, in his immensely unapologetic "apology," that he was the wisest of men—not because he was so exceedingly wise but because his contemporaries were so incredibly stupid.

Borrowing titles from the Bible is permitted to everyone, including ephemeral writers who do not brook comparison with Nietzsche, and is not a privilege that entails special rules. In literature and philosophy crossing out is always permitted, and cancelled passages suggest that the author has done some work instead of merely serving up his stream of consciousness. The dichotomy of joke and seriousness frequently breaks down in great works of literature: again one may recall the Apology; also Goethe's Faust and much of the best literature of the twentieth century, including Gide and Kafka, Sartre and Wittgenstein, and some fine contemporary German writers. One of the reasons why so much of the literature about Kierkegaard and Nietzsche is so wide of the mark is that most of the contributors utterly lack the mordant humor of those two.

Most of the men who have written about Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have really found these men utterly un congenial, though few have said this as plainly as Podach has on the last page of his fifth book on Nietzsche. Now it may seem that likemindedness, temperament, and even the range of a writer's emotional and intellectual experience are altogether irrelevant when the points at issue do not concern appreciation or over-all interpretation but philological accuracy. Yet while this would be nice, it plainly is not so, and it is by no means the least interesting point about Podach's book that it shows this so clearly.¹³

V

Here a word about the facsimiles of manuscript pages and notes is in order. Podach has made it very difficult to match up the plates with the pages in the text on which transcripts are offered: one has to hunt for references to the plates in the last thirty pages. But when one does make comparisons, it ap-

¹³ Another minor illustration of Podach's bias: while he cites hardly anything from the Nietzsche literature which, as we have seen, he finds "with few exceptions, insufferable" (p. 431), he singles out Ernest Newman's The Life of Richard Wagner, Vol. 4, as "important for the knowledge of Nietzsche's relations with Wagner" (p. 11; cf. 593), and he relies uncritically on A. H. J. Knight's Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche (p. 407). For a detailed critique of Newman's treatment of Nietzsche's relations with Wagner, see my Nietzsche (1950), pp. 33-36 (rev. ed., 1956, pp. 43-46 and 369 f.). Use of the index, ibid., will show how utterly unreliable Knight's book is and how wrong it is on the point on which Podach cites it. Newman accepted the unscrupulous book of Bäumler, the leading Nazi interpreter of Nietzsche, as a "masterly epitome of Nietzsche's thinking" (p. 335), and he was, as I put it in 1950, "apparently unaware of the full extent of Knight's indebtedness to Frau Förster-Nietzsche, Richard Oehler (her nephew), and Bertram, of Knight's many 'original' factual errors, and of Bäumler's near-perfect perversion of Nietzsche." How then can one explain Podach's honorable mention of, and reliance on, Newman and Knight? Their books share a contempt for Nietzsche and an abundance of easily avoidable errors that place him in a bad light.
pears that his vaunted fidelity to the manuscripts is by no means unexceptionable, though he is vitriolic about the slightest errors of previous editors. He claims that he indicates where words have been crossed out but in fact often fails to do this, and there are other small deviations. On Plate XII, we are given a facsimile of a six-line note which is characterized in the text as one of Nietzsche's "intimate conversations with himself" (p. 176): it is not a draft and evidently dredged up only to compromise its author. In this note, a word crossed out in the manuscript is printed without any indication that it was crossed out; nor does Podach indicate that one word was underlined; and the printed version breaks off without any punctuation while the manuscript ends with three dots. It would also seem that Podach has deciphered some things that clearly cannot be deciphered with any certainty. The point here is not merely or mainly that his contempt for all previous editors is ill-taken, nor is it only that Podach's fidelity to the manuscripts cannot be sustained: his ideal of historical-critical fidelity is questionable. This last claim must surely sound extreme and unreasonable, but a single example may suffice to show what is meant.

It will be best to turn again to Ecce Homo, and Plate XVI, already cited, will do. Even if Podach's printed version did not fail in the respects just noted, it would still fall short by not indicating in any way well over a dozen inserts Nietzsche made on the manuscript page, ranging in length from one or two words to a line. These afterthoughts and attempts to improve his style are surely more interesting than Podach's occasional indications that something has been crossed out and can no longer be read.

Would a really faithful critical edition be worth the trouble? It would certainly do more harm than good if those who bought or read it agreed with Podach and his publisher that all previous editions belonged "in the junk room for editorial-literary manipulations..." (These words appear on the jacket, but Podach himself says as much and makes very unjusticious use of the word "manipulation.") More volumes of facsimiles, reproduced large enough for reading and accompanied by pertinent information, would be most welcome as throwing light on Nietzsche's working habits; but they can no more take the place of the finished works than his drafts and notes could. Moreover, judicious use of manuscript materials of this sort will always require judgment as well as honesty, and in such cases judgment depends on some congeniality and a deliberate empathy. At the point where the scholar's work approaches the detective's, a refusal to put oneself in one's subject's place and the insistence on hostility unmitigated by sympathy can be ruinous.

In the 'fifties, Schlechta reacted against the popular overvaluation of The

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14 Cf. Plates VI and XVI with pp. 156 f. and 254 ff. In the latter instance only a single deletion is indicated, in the last line.
18 E.g., Plate XVI, line 5.
Will to Power: he was not content to tell his readers, as others had done before him, that the material known under this title consisted merely of some of the notes Nietzsche had jotted down in the period from 1884 to 1888, the systematic arrangement being due to editors who never stopped to consider which notes Nietzsche had long put to use in his later books and which notes he had not used because he probably was not satisfied with them; no, Schlechta reprinted the material in the order in which it was found in Nietzsche's notebooks. Perhaps the day will come when others will discover that here and there he did not really follow the sequence in the notebooks as accurately as he thought he did. But how much does this really matter? Since Nietzsche sometimes put notes in the back, or on right pages, first, the order was admittedly not chronological, and Schlechta's presentation is simply chaotic and makes The Will to Power almost unreadable.

The sister's edition, for all the absurd pretensions that this was Nietzsche's systematic magnum opus, at least had the virtue that one could find at a glance where there were a lot of notes about art or Christianity or epistemology. To be sure, Nietzsche's thought defies neat systematization; still this edition was useful for those who realized that these were merely notes, and in the two best editions an appendix listed the approximate date of composition for every single note—information not given in Schlechta's three-volume set. In sum, Schlechta tried to all but destroy the material along with the sister's pretensions.

Now Podach has tried to do much the same with Ecce Homo: he has succeeded in giving us a text that almost everybody will find utterly unreadable. Such reactions against the old Nietzsche legends and decades of abuses are certainly understandable, but they obviously overshoot the mark. Of course, Podach has not literally destroyed Ecce Homo: we can still read the old version and then compare it with Podach's, and for the wealth of new information he gives us we can be grateful to him.

VI

Some of this information is incidental and not directly concerned with the books of 1888. One example may illustrate this. Podach describes how Nietzsche's sister forged a letter—an interesting addition to Schlechta's long discussion of her forgeries. The letter, written by Nietzsche to his sister toward the end of October, 1888, no longer exists; all that has survived in the archives is a copy in the sister's hand, with her notation: "Original burnt at my mother's request, end of 1896." There is no reason to believe that the

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16 P.S. The day has come: see pp. 202-206 in Podach's sixth book on Nietzsche (see section 9 below). Ibid., p. 8, Podach says that "Nietzsche as a rule used his notebooks from back to front."

17 Werke, III, 1409–1423.
mother had anything whatever to do with this. The copy is incomplete:

Omissions are marked in the copy by . . . , in the printed version by [— — —]. The published version differs strikingly with the copy in two places. In the third paragraph the printed text omits after "I except Germany; only there have I had ugly experiences": "because—this I have very often written to you—the Germans are the meanest people!—[das gemeinste Volk]."

In the fourth paragraph, on the other hand, the published version offers more than the copy which merely says: "Our new Kaiser, however, pleases me more and more: his latest is that he has taken a very sharp stand against anti-Semitism [die Antisemiterei] and the Kreuzzeitung [a rightist, anti-Semitic paper]. Do likewise, my brave Lama [Nietzsche's nickname for his sister who had married an anti-Semitic leader] . . . ." For the benefit and edification of Wilhelmian Nietzscheans, the five dots were replaced in the published version by the tribute: "The will to power as a principle would surely make sense to him."

This little revelation (p. 163) gives a fair indication of the interest of long-suppressed information that can be brought to light by work in the Nietzsche archives. Nietzsche's sister suppressed some remarks directed against herself, her husband, Richard Wagner, the Germans, Jesus, and Christianity; also some remarks that directly or indirectly impugned his health and might suggest that his last works were products of insanity. No doubt, some remarks about Jesus and Christianity invited suppression for this last reason no less than on account of the offense they would give.

We can distinguish the following motives for suppression: (1) to shield the objects of Nietzsche's attacks, particularly when these were people still living (this includes clearly indicated omissions in his letters, as published under the sister's supervision); (2) to shield Nietzsche against avoidable enmities and against the imputation that he must have been out of his mind long before he collapsed in January, 1889; (3) to keep from public knowledge what her brother had written to her and about her. To illustrate this last category, a single example from Schlechta's third volume (p. 1421) will suffice: "between a vengeful anti-Semitic goose and myself there can be no reconciliation." To bolster her own authority as her brother's best interpreter, she did not even shrink from forgeries, as Schlechta has shown in considerable detail.

Almost all of this trickery, however, is confined to Nietzsche's letters—and is philosophically quite uninteresting. The sister did not invent letters: she published as addressed to herself what Nietzsche had in fact written to others, particularly to their mother; and a few such letters which were printed as letters to the sister were in fact composed out of snippets from letters and drafts for letters to others. All this is fascinating for the student of Nietzsche's relation to his sister and for those interested in her character; yet it is amazing how little it adds to the portrait available in 1950.

The publication of yet further remarks about the sister and her husband,
about Wagner and the Germans, or about Jesus and Christianity could hardly hold many important surprises; I doubt that it holds any. A writer who finished a book a year from 1872, when he was 27, until 1887, fifteen years later, excepting only 1875 and 1877 (but he finished two in 1873, and two in 1883)—and who completed five volumes in 1888—has hardly failed to bear testimony of his views, and we need not rummage through his letters and his Nachlass to find out what he thought. Letters and notes certainly add something to the total picture, and because Nietzsche was never wholly satisfied with his epistemological reflections, for example, some of his tentative ideas are found only in his notes. Elsewhere, too, it is interesting to compare the notes with the finished works or to supplement our understanding of the man by reading his letters.

What is unusual about the forgeries in the letter Podach cites (quoted above) is that here for once the sister interpolated a philosophically relevant sentence, suggesting that Nietzsche thought—as in fact he surely did not—that young Kaiser Wilhelm would understand the conception of the will to power. But even here the evidence in Nietzsche's books, and also in his notes, is so overwhelming that no serious student could ever be taken in by this contemptible ruse. While this little interpolation may have helped to make Nietzsche palatable to admirers of the Kaiser, and while it certainly helped to buttress the sister's stupid misinterpretation of the will to power, it has long been plain that her interpretation was untenable. So one had to assume that this sentence, if genuine, must have been meant ironically: the will to power as a principle might appeal to him, although he certainly would not understand it. The works of that period leave no doubt whatsoever about Nietzsche's positions, and if his attitude toward the German Empire of his day were open to criticism one could at most object that he was too utterly contemptuous and vitriolic. Let anybody who doubts that read Twilight, chapter 8 ("What the Germans Lack"), or Nietzsche contra Wagner, or Ecce Homo.

Knowing the sister's history and prejudices, one did not have to doubt the authenticity of either these books or The Antichrist. They represent such merciless attacks on almost everything that had been dea to her before she became her brother's keeper that it was perfectly plain that they spoke his mind. Indeed, one might ask: what more could anyone want?

Podach, though he keeps cavilling at the errors of previous editors, really performs a service he has no wish whatever of doing us: he confirms conclusively that Nietzsche's "Werke des Zusammenbruchs" is not disfigured in any important way. Nothing that has come out of recent research on Nietzsche's manuscripts requires us to change in the slightest the picture of Nietzsche's thought that was available when World War II ended.
VII

It has been noted before (in the paragraph following footnote 11) that Podach, like Hofmiller, is a dilettante, and this is relevant both to the tone of their claims and to the now widely accepted image of the Nietzsche manuscripts and the Nietzsche editions we know. Consider the case of Hegel, as neither Hofmiller nor Podach has done. Hegel himself wrote four books, but his “works” comprise twenty volumes in Glockner’s Jubiläumsausgabe (not counting the two-volume biography and the four-volume Hegel-Lexikon, which form part of this edition), and the critical edition of the “works” in Meiner’s series, the admirable Philosophische Bibliothek, was to comprise over thirty volumes, but was never finished.

Ever since the decade following Hegel’s death, in 1831, when the first edition of his collected works was published, most of the volumes were taken up by Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of art, the philosophy of religion, and the history of philosophy, and two of Hegel’s books were greatly expanded (one of them from one volume to three volumes) by additions, clearly indicated, which were taken from the lectures. Hegel, as we know from his students, lectured slowly, as if he were dredging up his thoughts from immense depths, and this encouraged some of his students to try to write down his every word. But he gave the same lecture courses several times, and they were somewhat different every time. During these years when he lectured in Berlin his system changed, and the second edition of the system (Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften), published by Hegel himself in 1827, was not only about twice as long as the first edition of 1817 but also so importantly different as to be practically a new book; and then Hegel published a revised third edition in 1830. In assigning their additions to the sections of the third edition, which had not yet appeared when Hegel gave the lectures on which these additions were based, the students naturally had to take liberties. And since they did not wish to omit the best formulations or particularly striking pages in publishing the works based entirely on lecture notes, they had to conflate notes taken several years apart. Necessarily, the transitions often had to be supplied by the editors, and the resultant “works” were never presented, even orally, by Hegel himself in the form in which generations have read and studied them. Not only are the words occasionally those of his students and not his own—a fact admitted in the prefaces but not indicated specifically in the texts—but the train of thought is not really his: ideas developed and formulated many years apart stand side by side on the same page without any warning. Yet some of the editors were professors, and the whole edition was considered a triumph of Pietät and scholarship, not only in Germany but also in the English-speaking world where the image
of Hegel was formed at least as much by some of the lecture courses, especially those on the philosophy of history, and by the additions to the "Lesser Logic" (i.e., the first part of the Encyclopedia) as by Hegel's own words. To be sure, this is not as it should be, and the point here is not to defend Hegel's editors; it is rather to see the editing of Nietzsche's works in perspective.

The early Hegel editors were excited about the master's philosophy, which some of them also developed in their own works, and they felt that they owed it to the deceased as well as to their contemporaries to make available to a broader public the stimulating ideas that he had presented in his lectures. It was still in a similar spirit that Georg Lasson, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, began to publish critical editions: he supplied often excellent prefaces, immensely helpful footnotes, and variant readings at the end; and in the case of the lectures, he consulted Hegel's own manuscripts.

At the end of his 1907 edition of Hegel's first book, the Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Lasson says of the first reprinting of that book in the collected works, in 1832:

Moreover, Joh[ann] Schulze, to make the text easier to read, effected many small transpositions, as well as changes and additions of words which in a few places alter the sense slightly and in others are dispensable—and which, even where they seem useful, ought to have been marked as departures from the original text. Otherwise, the printing of this edition was careful (p. 523).

The next edition—the only other one before Lasson's—was less careful and marred by several small omissions, up to two lines in length. Lasson lists all these divergencies, and thousands of students found their way to Hegel through his green volumes.

When Johannes Hoffmeister took over, this contagious enthusiasm disappeared: he was not a philosopher but, like Schlechta and Mette who were laboring over Nietzsche during the same period, a man who had made it his job to edit the definitive historical-critical edition—for the record, as it were. As it happened, neither of the two historical-critical projects got at all far.

It would be wrong, then, to see the development from 1889 to Podach's edition of Friedrich Nietzsche's Werke des Zusammenbruchs as a long battle in which the truth finally wins out over sneaky manipulations. To be sure, Nietzsche's sister did build a legend and committed some forgeries. But there is also another aspect to this story which brings to mind the young Nietzsche's somewhat scornful reflections on the growth of Alexandrianism

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18 For a good account of some of the problems confronting the editors of Hegel's lectures, see Hoffmeister's Preface to Vol. XVa of the Kritische Ausgabe: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Einleitung; System und Geschichte der Philosophie, vollständig neu nach den Quellen herausgegeben (1940), pp. i-xlvi. See also my book, Hegel (Doubleday, 1965).

18 From, e.g., my Nietzsche, "Prologue: The Nietzsche Legend." But the legend should be distinguished from Gast's editorial services to Nietzsche.
as well as his dictum in *Ecce Homo*: "In my case, too, the Germans will do all they can to make an immense destiny give birth to a mouse."

**VIII**

One final question remains: has not Podach shown, as he has plainly tried to do, that the author of *The Antichrist* and *Ecce Homo* was not entirely sane? In reply to this, I have criticized Podach's procedures in detail. But suppose it were said: however that may be, Nietzsche was not so sane as the foregoing pages suggest, and his letters in December, 1888, contain many more incriminating passages than have been quoted here. In answer to that, two things need to be said.

First, similar passages abound in his earlier letters, too, and it is not possible to draw any sharp line in this continuum, except after his collapse in the street, early in January, 1889. For a few days he sent meaningful and moving, but evidently insane, cards and letters; then the rest was silence. Consider this portion from a letter that Schlechta prints (III, 420 f.). Only a copy seems to have survived; the original appears to have been written in 1884. Nietzsche is referring to his *Zarathustra* which was meeting with no response whatsoever:

... Who knows how many generations will have to pass to produce a few human beings who will recapture in feeling, in all its depth, what I have done! And even then the thought still terrifies me what unentitled and totally unsuited people will one day invoke my authority. But this is the agony of every great teacher of mankind; he knows that under certain circumstances and accidents he can become a calamity for humanity as well as a blessing. Well, I myself will do everything to avoid facilitating at least all too crude misunderstandings...

This is hardly meek; neither is it insane. If the ideas were utterly out of touch with reality, one might speak of megalomania; as it is, Aristotle's word, *megalopsychia*,\(^*\) is rather more fitting.

Second, the whole notion of possibly discrediting Nietzsche's late works by proving from manuscripts and letters that he was not entirely sane is altogether inappropriate. A parallel may show this better than any argument: it is uncomfortably like trying to discredit Van Gogh's late paintings by pointing out that he was not altogether sane when he created them. As it happens, he was not, and some of them were done while he was in an asylum. To be sure, this is not altogether irrelevant to an appreciation: it adds poignancy to know under what strains he worked and how desperately he tried to cling to his creative work, painting to the last. And if anyone failed to see this by looking at the canvases, the biography would convince him that in

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\(^*\) *Nicomachean Ethics*, IV.3. "... a person is thought to be great-souled if he claims much and deserves much."
these works there is no showmanship, no concern with what might sell, no gimmick. Nietzsche lacked the single-minded purity of Van Gogh and had a more complex and versatile mind. The point is not to show that his character closely resembled Van Gogh's; rather, that a sound judgment of the quality of their late works must obviously be based on a study of the finished works themselves.

Those who want to determine the rank of *The Antichrist* or *Ecce Homo* will find it more pertinent and illuminating to compare them with the writings of Voltaire and Shaw than to look for sensational discoveries. But in whatever light we look at them, these books hold their own.

**IX**

Podach's sixth Nietzsche book—"a glance into Nietzsche's notebooks"—came to my attention too late to be considered in the body of this article. In any case, it is Podach's least interesting book. The lack of organization is striking. The quotations from the notebooks are generally not in quotation marks, nor are they set off typographically from Podach's comments and his ten interlarded "excursuses." Of course, no careful reader need ever be in doubt whether Nietzsche or Podach is speaking. But this is hardly the way to publish the *Nachlass*. And it is doubly ironical that an author who aims to debunk Nietzsche should secure an audience by so closely following the example of Nietzsche's sister: sprinkling generous quotations from hitherto unpublished material into an otherwise unimportant book.

There is little or nothing here that would command an audience if it were not for the fact that Podach prints, e.g., the passages that, when Nietzsche's and Overbeck's correspondence was published in 1916, were deleted to avoid embarrassment to persons then still living (pp. 184–190). But Podach's commentary is absurd: he claims that these passages in Nietzsche's letters to his best friend illustrate Nietzsche's "immoderate public [sic!] criticism of his friends" and says they were suppressed "because they violently contradict the legend contrived by the sister, of the noble and ideal friend Nietzsche who supposedly suffered so from the ignoble behavior of his friends" (p. 184).

Podach's "methodical idea of considering the drafts for titles and plans as an indicator for the state and character of Nietzsche's writings" (p. 10) is flimsy: even after finishing a book, many writers still consider many alternative titles. And Podach's claim that "Thus it appears that the great writer to whom we are indebted for aphorisms of high philosophical esprit was not a philosopher" (pp. 10 f.), certainly cannot be established by a glance into Nietzsche's notebooks. This claim does not rest on new discoveries but on Podach's conviction that philosophy must be systematic. Indeed, the sentence

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just quoted is followed by the words: "His personality and his spiritual organization were not those of a systematic thinker." We did not need hitherto unpublished notes to discover that.

As usual, Podach makes some minor contributions, e.g., he presses some further criticisms against Schlechta's editing of the Nachlass. But Podach shows as little understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy as ever, almost completely ignores philosophically interesting discussions of Nietzsche, and above all fails to see that Nietzsche's philosophy has to be studied and evaluated on the basis of his books.

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22 Pp. 199-209. This final "excursus" also takes issue with some passing remarks I made about Schlechta in an article on "Deutscher Geist heute" in Texte und Zeichen (1957): I was a little too kind though not as laudatory as Podach suggests.

23 The last two paragraphs on p. 35 furnish a striking example.