Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality

Indexical Realism and Film Theory

While cinema has often been described as the most realistic of the arts, cinematic realism has been understood in a variety of ways: from an aspect of a sinister ideological process of psychological regression to infantile states of primal delusion, to providing a basis for evidentiary status for films as historical and even legal documents. Cinematic realism has been praised as a cornerstone of film aesthetics, denounced as a major ploy in ideological indoctrination, and envied as a standard for new media. I believe the time has come to return to this issue without some of the polemics that have previously marked it but with a careful and historically informed discussion of cinema’s uses and definitions of the impression of reality. In film theory over the last decades, realist claims for cinema have often depended on cinema’s status as an index, one of the triad of signs in the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. Film’s indexical nature has almost always (and usually exclusively) been derived from its photographic aspects. In this essay I want to explore alternative approaches that might ultimately provide new ways of thinking about the realistic aspects of cinema.
Peirce defined the index as a sign that functions through an actual existential connection to its referent “by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object” ("Prolegomena" 251). Thus, frequently cited examples of indices are the footprint, the bullet hole, the sundial, the weathervane, and photographs—all signs based on direct physical connection between the sign and its referent—the action of the foot, impact of the bullet, the movement of the sun, the direction of the wind, or the light bouncing from an object (Philosophical 106–11). A number of these examples (such as the weathervane and the sundial) perform their references simultaneously to the action of their referents. This fact reveals that the identification of the photographic index with the pastness of the trace (made by several theorists) is not a characteristic of all indices (and one could point out that it only holds true for a fixed photograph, but not of the image that appears within a camera obscura).

For Peirce the index functions as part of a complex system of interlocking concepts that comprise not only a philosophy of signs but a theory of the mind and its relation to the world. Peirce’s triad of signs (icon, index, and symbol), rather than being absolutely opposed to each other, are conceived to interact in the process of signification, with all three operating in varying degrees in specific signs. However, (with the exception of Gilles Deleuze, for whom Peirce’s system, rather than the index, is primary) within theories of cinema, photography, and new media, the index has been largely abstracted from this system, given a rather simple definition as the existential trace or impression left by an object, and used to describe (and solve) a number of problems dealing with the way what we might call the light-based image media refer to the world. In fact, Peirce’s discussion of the index includes a large range of signs and indications, including “anything which focuses attention” (Philosophical 108) and the general hailing and deictic functions of language and gesture. Peirce therefore by no means restricts the index to the impression or trace. I do not claim to have a command of the range of Peirce’s complex semiotics, but it is perhaps important to point out that the use of the index in film theory has tended to rely on a small range of the possible meanings of the term.

I have no doubt that Peirce’s concept has relevance for film and that (although more complex than generally described) the index also provides a useful way of thinking through some of these problems; indeed, even the restricted sense of the index as a trace has supplied insights into the nature of film and photography. However, I also think that what we might call a diminished concept of the index may have reached the limits
of its usefulness in the theory of photography, film, and new media.¹ The nonsense that has been generated specifically about the indexicality of digital media (which, due to its digital nature, has been claimed to be nonindexical—as if the indexical and the analog were somehow identical) reveals something of the poverty of this approach. But I also feel the index may not be the best way, and certainly should not be the only way, to approach the issue of cinematic realism. Confronting questions of realism anew means that contemporary media theory must still wrestle with its fundamental nature and possibilities. I must confess that this essay attempts less to lay a logical foundation for these discussions than to launch a polemic calling for such a serious undertaking and to reconnoiter a few of its possibilities.

It is worth reviewing here the history of the theoretical discourse by which a relation was forged between cinematic realism and the index. Without undertaking a thorough historiographic review of the concept of the index in film and media theory, the first influential introduction of the concept of the index into film theory came in Peter Wollen’s groundbreaking comparison of Peirce to the film theory of André Bazin (125–26). But to understand this identification, a review of certain aspects of Bazin’s theory of film is needed. Bazin introduced in his essays and critical practice an argument for the realism of cinema that was, as he termed it in his most quoted theoretical essay, “ontological.” The complexity and indeed the dialectical nature of Bazin’s critical description of a realist style have become increasingly recognized.² For Bazin, realism formed the aesthetic basis for the cinema, and most of his discussion of cinematic realism dealt with visual, aural, and narrative style. Although Bazin never argued the exact relation between his theories of ontology and of style systematically (and indeed, one could claim that Bazin’s discussion of realism across his many essays contains both contradictions and also a possible pattern of evolution and change in his work taken as a whole—not to mention multiple interpretations), at least in the traditional reception of Bazin’s theory, cinematic realism depended on the medium’s photographic nature.

A number of frequently quoted statements containing the essence of Bazin’s claim for the ontology of the photographic image and presumably for motion picture photography warrant consideration. Bazin’s account of the realism of photography rests less on a correspondence theory (that the photograph resembles the world, a relation Peirce would describe as iconic), than on what he describes as “a transference of reality
from the thing to its reproduction,” referring to the photograph as “a decal or approximate tracing.” Bazin extends these comments saying:

    The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from
temporal contingencies. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or dis-
colored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it proceeds, by virtue of its genesis, from the ontology
of the model; it is the model.

He adds shortly after this:

    The photograph as such and the object in itself share a common
being, after the fashion of a fingerprint. Wherefore, photography
actually contributes something to the order of natural creation
instead of providing a substitute for it. (“Ontology” 18)

To cite one more famous description from another essay, Bazin also
describes the photograph as “the taking of a veritable lum0inous impres-
son in light—to a mold. As such it carries with it more than a mere
resemblance, namely a kind of identity” (“Theater” 91).

    Bazin’s descriptions are both evocative and elusive, and Wollen
was, I think, the first to draw a relation between Bazin’s ideas and Peirce’s
concept of the index. In his pioneering essay on “Semiology of the Cinema,”
Wollen said of Bazin:

    His conclusions are remarkably close to those of Peirce. Time
and again Bazin speaks of photography in terms of a mould, a
death-mask, a Veronica, the Holy Shroud of Turin, a relic, an
imprint. [. . .] Thus Bazin repeatedly stresses the existential bond
between sign and object, which, for Peirce, was the determining
characteristic of the indexical sign. (125–26)

The traditional reception of Bazin’s film theory takes his account of the
ontology of the photographic image as the foundation of his arguments
about the relation between film and the world. Wollen’s identification
of Bazin’s photographic ontology with Peirce’s index has been widely
accepted, (although critics have rarely noted Wollen’s important caveat:
“But whereas Peirce made his observation in order to found a logic, Bazin
wished to found an aesthetic” [126]).

    I must state that I think one can make a coherent argument
for reading Bazin’s ontology in terms of the Peircean index, as Wollen
did. However, I have also claimed elsewhere that this reading of Bazin
in terms of Pierce does some disservice to the full complexity of Bazin’s aesthetic theory of realism (“What's the Point”). Likewise, in a recent essay Daniel Morgan makes a convincing and fully argued case (different from mine) that Bazin’s theory of cinematic realism should not be approached through the theory of the index at all (“Rethinking”). I would still maintain, however, that parallels between aspects of Bazin’s theory of cinematic realism and the index do exist, even if they cannot explain the totality of his theory of cinematic realism (or, as Morgan would argue, its most important aspects).

I do not intend to rehearse here either my own or others’ arguments about why the index might not supply a complete understanding of Bazin’s theory of cinematic realism, but some summary remarks are in order. The chief limitation to the indexical approach to Bazin comes from the difference between a semiotics that approaches the photograph (and therefore film) as a sign and a theory like Bazin’s that deals instead with the way a film creates an aesthetic world. When Bazin claims that “photography actually contributes something to the order of natural creation instead of providing a substitute for it,” he denies the photograph the chief characteristic of a sign, that of supplying a substitute for a referent. While it would be foolish to claim that a photograph cannot be a sign of something (it frequently does perform this function), I would claim that signification does not form the basis of Bazin’s understanding of the ontology of the photographic image and that his theory of cinematic realism depends on a more complex (and less logical) process of spectator involvement. Bazin describes the realism of the photograph as an “irrational power to bear away our faith” (“Ontology” 14). This “magical” understanding of photographic ontology is clearly very different from a logic of signs. In Peirce’s semiotics, the indexical relation falls entirely into the rational realm.

**Beyond the Index: Cinematic Realism and Medium Promiscuity**

The indexical argument no longer supplies the only way to approach Bazin’s theory. Rather than assuming that the invocation of Peirce’s concept of the index solves the question of film’s relation to reality, I think we must now raise again the question that Bazin asked so passionately and subtly (even if he never answered definitively): what is cinema? What are cinema’s effects and what range of aspects relates to its oft-cited (and just as variously defined) realistic nature? Given the historically
specific nature of Bazin’s arguments for cinematic realism as an aesthetic value (responding as he did to technical innovations such as deep focus cinematography and to new visual and narrative styles such as Italian Neorealism), it makes sense for a contemporary theory of cinematic realism to push beyond those aspects of cinematic realism highlighted by Bazin. Specifically, we need to ask in a contemporary technical and stylistic context: what are the bounds that cinema forges with the world it portrays? Are these limited to film’s relation to photography? Is the photographic process the only aspect of cinema that can be thought of as indexical, especially if we think about the term more broadly than as just a trace or impression? If the claim that digital processing by its nature eliminates the indexical seems rather simplistic, one must nonetheless admit that computer-generated images (cGi) do not correspond directly to Bazin’s description of the “luminous mold” that the still photograph supposedly depends on. But can these cGi images still be thought of as in some way indexical? In what way has the impression of reality been attenuated by new technology, and in what ways is it actually still functioning (or even intensified)? But setting aside the somewhat complex case of computer-generated special effects, is it not somewhat strange that photographic theories of the cinema have had such a hold on film theory that much of film theory must immediately add the caveat that they do not apply to animated film? Given that as a technical innovation cinema was first understood as “animated pictures” and that computer-generated animation techniques are now omnipresent in most feature films, shouldn’t this lacuna disturb us? Rather than being absorbed in the larger categories of cultural studies or cognitive theory, shouldn’t the classical issues of film theory be reopened? I will not attempt to answer all these questions in this essay, but I think they are relevant to the issues I will raise.

Within the academy, the study of film theory has often been bifurcated between “classical film theory” and “contemporary film theory.” Insofar as this division refers to something more than an arbitrary sense of the past and present, “classical” film theories have been usefully defined as theories that seek to isolate and define the “essence” of cinema, while “contemporary” theories rely on discourses of semiotics and psychoanalysis to describe the relation between film and spectator (Carroll 10–15). While the classical approach has been widely critiqued as essentialist, it seems to me that a pragmatic investigation of the characteristics of film as developed and commented on through time hardly needs to involve a prescriptive quest for the one pure cinema. Therefore, if I call for new
descriptions of the nature(s) of the film medium, I am not at all calling for a return to classical film theory (and even less to a neo-classicism!). But I do think the time has come to take stock of the historical and transforming nature of cinema as a medium and of its dependence and differentiation from other media.

Considering historically the definitions of film as a medium helps us avoid the dilemma of either proscriptively (and timelessly) defining film’s essence or the alternative of avoiding any investigation into the diverse nature of media for fear of being accused of promoting an idealist project. As a new technology at the end of the nineteenth century, cinema did not immediately appear with a defined essence as a medium, but rather, displayed an amazing promiscuity (if not polymorphic perversity) in both its models and uses. Cinema emerged within a welter of new inventions for the recording or conveying of aspects of human life previously felt to be ephemeral, inaudible, or invisible: the telephone, the phonograph, or the X-ray are only a few examples. Before these devices found widespread acceptance as practical instruments, they existed as theatrical attractions, demonstrated on stage before paying audiences. Indeed, the X-ray, which appeared almost simultaneously with the projection of films on the screen, seemed at one point to be displacing moving pictures as a popular attraction, and a number of showmen exchanged their motion picture projectors for the new apparatus that showed audiences the insides of their bodies (and unknowingly gave themselves and their collaborators dangerous doses of radiation). It is in this competitive context of novel devices that Antoine Lumière, the father of Louis and Auguste Lumière, who managed the theatrical exhibition of his sons’ invention, warned a patron desirous of purchasing a Cinématographe that it was an “invention without a future” (qtd. in Chardère 315).

Rather than myths of essential origins, historical research uncovers a genealogy of cinema, a process of emergence and competition yielding the complex formation of an identity. But cinema has always (and not only at its origin) taken place within a competitive media environment, in which the survival of the fittest was in contention and the outcome not always clear. As a historian I frequently feel that one of my roles must be to combat the pervasive amnesia that a culture based in novelty encourages, even within the academy. History always responds to the present, and changes in our present environment allow us to recognize aspects of our history that have been previously obscured or even repressed. At the present moment, cinema finds itself immersed in another voraciously
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competitive media environment. Is cinema about to disappear into the maw of undefined and undifferentiated image media, dissolved into a pervasive visual culture? To be useful in such an investigation where theory and history intertwine, the discussion of cinematic realism cannot be allowed to ossify into a dogmatic assertion about the photographic nature of cinema or an assumption about the indexical nature of all photography.

My history lesson resists either celebration or paranoia at the prospect of a new media environment, seeing in our current situation not only a return to aspects of cinema’s origins but a dynamic process that has persisted in varying degrees throughout the extent of film’s history—an interaction with other competing media, with mutual borrowings, absorptions, and transformation among them. Cinema has never been one thing. It has always been a point of intersection, a braiding together of diverse strands: aspects of the telephone and the phonograph circulated around the cinema for almost three decades before being absorbed by sound cinema around 1928, while simultaneously spawning a new sister medium, radio; a variety of approaches to color, ranging from tinting to stencil coloring, existed in cinema as either common or minority practices until color photography became pervasive in the 1970s; the film frame has changed its proportions since 1950 and is now available in small, medium, and supersized rectangles (television, cinemascopes, IMAX, for example); cinema’s symbiotic relation to television, video, and other digital practices has been ongoing for nearly half a century without any of these interactions and transformations—in spite of numerous predictions—yet spelling the end of the movies. Thus anyone who sees the demise of the cinema as inevitable must be aware they are speaking only of one form of cinema (or more likely several successive forms whose differences they choose to overlook).

Film history provides a challenge to rethinking film theory, arguing for the importance of using the recent visibility of film’s multiple media environment as a moment for reflection and perhaps redefinition. In contemporary film theory, a priori proscriptions as well as a posteriori definitions that privilege only certain aspects of film have given way to approaches (like semiotics, psychoanalysis, or cognitivism) that seem to ignore or minimize differences between media in favor of broader cultural or biological conditions. My view of cinema as a braid made of various aspects rather than a unified essence with firm boundaries would seem to offer a further argument against the essentialist approach of classical film theory.
But we also increasingly need to offer thick descriptions of how media work, that is, phenomenological approaches that avoid defining media logically before examining the experience of their power. And while I maintain the various media work in concert and in contest rather than isolation, I also maintain that the formal properties of a specific medium convey vital aesthetic values and do not function as neutral channels for functional equivalents. An attempt to isolate a single essence of cinema remains not only an elusive task but possibly a reactionary project, yet most earlier attempts by theorists to define the essence of cinema can also be seen as attempts to elucidate the specific possibilities of cinema within a media environment that threatens to obscure or dismiss the particular powers that film holds. In other words, while the naming of a specific aspect of cinema as its essence must always risk being partial, it once had the polemical value of drawing attention to those aspects, allowing theorists to describe their power. This was true of the emphasis given to editing by the Soviet theorists in the twenties, who established that film could function not simply as a mode of mechanical reproduction but that it could create a poetics and a rhetoric that resembled a language. Partly as a corrective to this earlier claim that editing formed the essence of film as a creative form, the emphasis on film’s relation to photography found after World War II in the work of Bazin, Siegfried Kracauer, and Stanley Cavell also performed this sort of vital function of attracting attention to a neglected aspect of cinema. In the current environment, probing the power of cinema, its affinities with and differentiations from other media, must again take a place on our agenda.

What Really Moves Me . . .

Photography’s relation to cinema comprises one of the central concepts in classical film theory’s attempt to characterize the nature of cinema, and it remains a rich area for investigation. However, to offer alternative paradigms, I want to return to the generation of film theorists of the twenties, primarily the work of filmmaker theorists such as Sergei Eisenstein, Jean Epstein, and Germaine Dulac, who wrote before the dominance of photography that marks the work of Bazin and Kracauer (and arguably Walter Benjamin). Although photography played a key role in film theories of the twenties as well, (especially in the concept of Photogénie—the claim that film produced a unique image of the world more
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revelatory than other forms of imagery—championed by Epstein, Dulac, and Louis Delluc), I want to focus on the centrality of cinematic motion in the discussions of cinema’s nature that marked this foundational period of classical film theory. Dulac declared in 1925, “Le cinéma est l’art du mouvement et de la lumière” [Cinema is the art of movement and light]. In her writings and her innovative abstract films, she envisioned a pure cinema uncontaminated by the other arts (although aspiring to the condition of music), which she described as “a visual symphony, a rhythm of arranged movements in which the shifting of a line or of a volume in a changing cadence creates emotion without any crystallization of ideas” (394).\(^6\) The concerns that preoccupied both the French Impressionist filmmakers and the Soviet montage theorists of the 1920s—cinematic rhythm as a product of editing, camera movement, and composition; the physical and emotional reactions of film spectators as shaped by visual rhythms; even the visual portrayal of mental states and emotions—were all linked to cinema’s ability both to record and create motion.\(^7\)

The role of motion in motion pictures initially appears to be something of a tautology. Rather than simply recycling this seemingly obvious assumption—that the movies move—theories of cinematic motion can help us reformulate a number of theoretical and aesthetic issues, including film spectatorship, film style, and the confluence of a variety of new media. Further, a renewed focus on cinematic motion directly addresses what I feel is one of the great scandals of film theory, which I previously mentioned as an aporia resulting from the dominance of a photographic understanding of cinema: the marginalization of animation.\(^8\) Again and again, film theorists have made broad proclamations about the nature of cinema, and then quickly added, “excluding, of course, animation.” Perhaps the boldest of new media theorists, Lev Manovich, has recently inverted this cinematic prejudice, claiming that the arrival of new digital media reveals cinema as simply an event within the history of animation. While I appreciate the polemic value of this proclamation, I would point out (as Manovich’s archeology of the cinema also indicates) that far from being a product of new media, animation has always been part of cinema and that only the over-emphasis given to the photographic basis of cinema in recent decades can explain the neglect this historical and technological fact has encountered.

Stressing, as Manovich does, the nonreferential nature of animation implies that only photography can be referential—a major error that comes from a diminished view of the index. But if cinema should
be approached as a form of animation, then cinematic motion rather than photographic imagery becomes primary. Spectatorship of cinematic motion raises new issues, such as the physical reactions that accompany the watching of motion. Considering this sensation of kinesthesia avoids the exclusive visual and ideological emphasis of most theories of spectatorship and acknowledges instead that film spectators are embodied beings rather than simply eyes and minds somehow suspended before the screen. The physiological basis of kinesthesia exceeds (or supplements) recent attempts to reintroduce emotional affect into spectator studies. We do not just see motion and we are not simply affected emotionally by its role within a plot; we feel it in our guts or throughout our bodies.

Theories of cinema's difference from the other arts that appeared in the twenties derived from the excitement that filmmakers of the teens and twenties experienced in their new-found ability to affect viewers physiologically as well as emotionally through such motion-based sequences as chase scenes involving galloping horses or racing locomotives, rapid camera movement, or accelerated rhythmic editing. While kinesthetic effects still play a vital role in contemporary action cinema, nowadays these devices of motion rarely generate theoretical speculation or close analysis. Nonetheless, critical attention to cinematic motion need not be limited to action films, however rich this mainstay of film practice may be. Motion, as Eisenstein's analysis of the methods of montage makes clear, can shape and trigger the process of both emotional involvement and intellectual engagement. Analysis of motion in cinema should address a complete gamut of cinema, from the popular action film to the avant-garde work of filmmakers such as Stan Brakhage, Maya Deren, or Abigail Child.

In many ways these avant-garde filmmakers took up the legacy of Dulac's pure cinema and explored the possibilities of filmic motion outside of narrative development. Although Deren in particular stressed the importance of the photographic basis of film in her theoretical writings, she made the analysis and transformation of motion essential to all her films, especially her later films inspired by dance and ritualized bodily movement such as *Ritual in Transferred Time* (1946), *Choreography for the Camera* (1945), *Meditation on Violence* (1948), and *The Very Eye of Night* (1958). Brakhage's use of hand-held camera movement and complex editing patterns, as well as frenetic kinetic patterns created by painting directly on celluloid, produced patterns of motion that evoked a crisis of perception and lyrical absorption in the processes of vision. Filmmaker
Abigail Child’s recent volume of writings on film and poetry is actually titled *This Is Called Moving*, testifying to her commitment to cinema as a means of deconstructing the dominant cultural forms of media through an intensification of cinematic perception that relies in part on new patterns of motion, often created through editing. As cinematic experience, motion can play an intense role both in sensations of intense diegetic absorption fostering involvement with dramatic, suspenseful plots à la Hitchcock and in kinetic abstraction, thrusting viewers into unfamiliar explorations of flexible coordinates of space and time.

Theoretical exploration of cinematic motion need not contradict, but can actually supplement, photographic theories of cinema such as those of Kracauer and Bazin. Kracauer in particular deals extensively with cinema’s affinities with motion (discussing especially the cinematic possibilities of the chase, dancing, and the transformation from stillness to motion [41–45]) as a part of cinema’s mission to capture and redeem physical reality. Even if movement never receives a detailed discussion as a theoretical issue within Bazin’s work, he clearly sees camera movement as an essential tool within a realist style, as in his analysis of the extended track and pan in Jean Renoir’s *The Crime of M. Lange* (*Jean 43–46*), or his description of the shot in Friedrich Murnau’s *Tabu* in which “the entrance of a ship from left screen gives an immediate sense of destiny at work, so that Murnau has no need to cheat in any way on the uncompromising realism of a film whose settings are completely natural (“Evolution” 27).

**Metz and Cinematic Movement**

While Bazin and Kracauer saw motion as contributing to (or at least not contradicting) the inherent realism of the film medium, another film theorist went farther and made movement the cornerstone of cinema’s impression of reality. I want to turn now to a neglected essay by a theorist usually associated with postclassical film theory, Christian Metz. “On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema,” a short essay that directly superimposes the issues of motion and cinematic realism, opens the first volume of Metz’s writings and is among Metz’s presemiotic essays that the section heading characterizes as “phenomenological” (and that most theorists have zoomed past, treating as juvenilia).

Metz attempts in this essay to account for the “impression of reality” that the movies offer (“Films release a mechanism of affective and perceptual participation in the spectator [. . .] films have the appeal
of a presence and of a proximity” [4–5]). While later apparatus theorists (including Metz himself in later writings) would see realism as a dangerous ideological illusion (while Bazin, on the contrary, would deepen cinematic realism into the possibility of grasping the mysteries of Being), in this early essay Metz simply attempts to give this psychological effect a phenomenological basis. Metz begins by contrasting media, claiming this degree of spectator participation and investment does not occur in still photography. Following Roland Barthes, Metz claims that still photography is condemned to a perceptual past tense (“This has been there”), while the movie spectator becomes absorbed by “a sense of ‘There it is’” (6).

Metz locates the realistic effect of cinematic motion in its “participatory” effect. “Participation” seems to be a magic word in theories of realism that seek to overcome the dead ends encountered by correspondence theories of cinema. For Bazin, participation describes the relation between the photographic image and its object. Likewise, his description of the spectator’s active role in the cinematic style that makes use of depth-of-field composition (“it is from [the spectator’s] attention and his will that the meaning of the image in part derives” [“Evolution” 56]) indicates an active participation by the viewer. For Metz, similarly, participation in the cinematic image is both “affective and perceptual,” engendering “a very direct hold on perception,” “an appeal of a presence and proximity” (“Impression” 4).

Metz points out that “participation, however, must be engendered” (5). What subtends this sense of immediacy and presence in the cinema? “An answer immediately suggests itself: It is movement [. . .] that produces the strong impression of reality” (7). While Metz admits other factors in film’s effect on spectators, he ascribes a particular affect to the perception of motion, “a general law of psychology that movement is always perceived as real—unlike many other visual structures, such as volume, which is often very readily perceived as unreal” (8). In terms that seem to recall Bazin’s claim that a photograph “is the object,” Metz adds,

_The strict distinction between object and copy, however, dissolves on the threshold of motion. Because movement is never material but is always visual, to reproduce its appearance is to duplicate its reality. In truth, one cannot even “reproduce” a movement; one can only re-produce it in a second production belonging to the same order of reality, for the spectator as the first. [. . .] In the cinema the impression of reality is also the reality of the impression, the real presence of motion._ (9)
Metz gives here a very compressed account of a complex issue, and his assumptions would take some time to isolate and explicate (such as exactly what the “reality of an impression” might be and the begging of the question through the assertion that cinema delivers “the real presence of motion”). But the relation he draws between motion and the impression of reality provides us with a radical course of thought. We experience motion on the screen in a different way than we look at still images, and this difference explains our participation in the film image, a sense of perceptual richness or immediate involvement in the image. Spectator participation in the moving image depends, Metz claims, on perceiving motion and the perceptual, cognitive, and physiological effects this triggers. The nature of cinematic motion, its continuous progress, its unfolding nature, would seem to demand the participation of a perceiver.

Although Metz does not refer directly to Henri Bergson’s famous discussion of motion, I believe Bergson developed the most detailed description of the need to participate in motion in order to grasp it. Bergson claims, “In order to advance with the moving reality, you must replace yourself within it” (308). For Bergson, discontinuous signs, such as language or ideas, cannot grasp the continuous flow of movement, but must conceive of it as a series of successive static instants, or positions. Only motion, one can assume, is able to convey motion. Therefore, to perceive motion, rather than represent it statically in a manner that destroys its essence, one must participate in the motion itself. Of course, analysis provides a means of conceptual understanding, and Bergson actually refers to our tendency to conceive of motion through a series of static images—a distortion he claims our habits of mind and language demand of us—as “cinematographic.” Great confusion (which I feel Deleuze increases rather than dispels) comes if we do not realize that the analytical aspect of the cinematograph that Bergson took as his model for this tendency to conceive of motion in terms of static instants derives from the film strip in which motion is analyzed into a succession of frames, not the projected image on the screen in which synthetic motion is recreated.

Cinema, the projected moving image, demands that we participate in the movement we perceive. Analysis of perceiving motion can only offer some insights into the way the moving image exceeds our contemplation of a static image. Motion always has a projective aspect, a progressive movement in a direction, and therefore invokes possibility and a future. Of course, we can project these states into a static image, but with an actually moving image we are swept along with the motion itself. Rather than
imagin ing previous or anterior states, we could say that through a moving image, the progress of motion is projected onto us. Undergirded by the kinesthetic effects of cinematic motion, I believe “participation” properly describes the increased sense of involvement with the cinematic image, a sense of presence that could be described as an impression of reality.

Metz claims that the motion we see in a film is real, not a representation, a claim I take to be close to Bergson’s discussion of the way movement cannot be derived simply from a static presentation of successive points. According to Metz, what we see when we see a moving image on the screen should not be described as a “picture” of motion, but instead as an experience of seeing something truly moving. In terms of a visual experience of motion, therefore, no difference exists between watching a film of a ball rolling down a hill, say, and seeing an actual ball rolling down a hill. One might object to this identification of motion and its visual sensation by pointing out that our sensation of motion (kinesthesia) does not depend entirely on vision but on a range of bodily sensations. But I believe Metz could respond to this in two ways. First, the most extreme sort of kinesthesia primarily refers to the sensation of ourselves moving bodily, traversing space, not simply watching a moving object. Insofar as we do experience kinesthesia when we observe a moving object other than ourselves, the same sensations seem to occur when we watch a moving object in a film. Thus, perceiving motion in the cinema, while triggered by visual perception, need not be restricted to visual effects. Clearly, cinema cannot move us, as viewers, physically (we don’t, for instance, leave our seats or get transported to another place, even if we have a sensation of ourselves moving as we watch films in which the camera moves through space). However, while acknowledging that Metz can only claim that cinema possesses visual motion, not literal movement through space—a change of place—the fact remains that even visual motion, such as camera movement, doesn’t only affect us visually but does produce the physiological effect of kinesthesia.

Metz questions whether there could be a “portrayal of motion” that did not actually involve motion, a representation parallel, say, to the use of perspective drawing to render volumes. In a way, it is not hard to conceive of such a portrayal. A diagram conveying the trajectory of a moving object, such as a graph of the parabola described by a baseball hit by David Ortiz, could be said to portray motion. The speed lines used by comic book artists to indicate a running figure also portray the idea of motion visually but in static form. Indeed, the chronophotographs of
Étienne-Jules Marey, with their composite and successive figures tracing the path of human movement, or the blurred image of simple actions like turning a head found in the photo-dynamist photographs of Futurist Anton Giulio Bragaglia, all portray motion without actually moving. But that is the point, precisely. These diagrammatic portrayals of motion strike us very differently from actual motion pictures. Such portrayals of motion recall Bergson’s descriptions of attempts to generate a sense of motion from tracing a pattern of static points or positions, which miss the continuous sweep of motion. In contrast to these diagrams of the successive phases of motion or indications of its pathways, we could say, perhaps now with even more clarity, that cinema shows us motion, not its portrayal.

Ultimately, I think there is little question that phenomenologically we see movement on the screen, not a “portrayal” of movement. But what does it mean to say the movement is “real”? As I understand Metz’s claim, it does not at all commit us to the nonsensical position that we take the cinema image for reality, that we are involved in a hallucination or “illusion” of reality that could cause us to contemplate walking into the screen, or interacting physically with the fictional events we see portrayed. In the cinema, we are dealing with realism, not “reality.” As Metz makes clear, “on the one hand, there is the impression of reality; on the other, the perception of reality” (15). Theater, for instance, makes use of real materials, actual people and things, to create a fiction world. Cinema works with images that possess an impression of reality, not its materiality. This distinction is crucial.

The Realistic Motion of Fantasy

Metz’s description of cinematic motion supplies at least part of (and probably a central part of) an alternative theory of the realistic effect of the cinema (one I find much more compelling and flexible than the ideological explanation of psychological regression offered by Jean-Louis Baudry and, in a sense, the later Metz of The Imaginary Signifier). But we should keep in mind that this is a theory of the impression of reality (based, as he says, on the reality of the impression), rather than an argument for a realist aesthetic such as that offered by Bazin or Kracauer. Part of the flexibility of Metz’s theory of the reality of cinematic motion lies in its adaptability to a range of cinematic styles. As Metz indicates, the “feeling of credibility” film offers “operates on us in films of the unusual and of the marvelous, as well as in those that are ‘realistic’” (“Impression” 8).
But his description also shows that movement can be an important factor in describing a realist style (one need only think of the role of camera movement in Welles and Rossellini, undertheorized by Bazin, or in Renoir, which Bazin describes beautifully). But the fantastic possibilities of motion, or rather its role in rendering the fantastic believable, and I would say visceral, shows the mercurial role motion can play in film spectatorship and film style.

It is this mercurial, protean, indeed mobile nature of cinematic motion that endows it with power as a concept for film theory and analysis. Not only does the concept of cinematic movement unite photographic-based films and traditional animated films (not to mention the hybrid synthesis of photographic and animation techniques that Computer Generated Images represents), movement displays a flexibility that avoids the proscriptive nature of much of classical film theory. While the formal aspects of cinematic movement (and the range of ways it can be used, or even the number of aspects of cinematic motion possible) make it an important tool for aesthetic analysis (and even useful in a polemical argument like Dulac’s or Bazin’s for a particular style of film), nothing restricts movement to a single style.

The impression of reality that cinematic movement carries can underwrite a realist film style (think of the use of hand-held camera movement in the films of the Dogma 95 movement), a highly artificial fantasy dependent on special effects (the importance of kinesis in the Star Wars films), or an abstract visual symphony (animator Oskar Fischinger). Metz describes the role of the impression of reality enabled by cinematic motion as “to inject the reality of motion into the unreality of the image and thus to render the world of imagination more real than it had ever been” (15). Like Mercury, winged messenger of the Gods, cinematic motion crosses the boundaries between heaven and earth, between the embodied senses and flights of fancy, not simply playing the whole gamut of film style but contaminating one with the other, endowing the fantastic with the realistic impression of visual motion.

The extraordinary writings Sergei Eisenstein produced in the 1930s on the animated films of Walt Disney accent this double valence of movement, tending not only toward realism but also, as the animated film and new digital processes demonstrate, toward fantasy. Movement in the cinema not only generates the visual sense of realism that Metz describes, but bodily sensations of movement can engage spectator fantasy through perceptual and physical participation. Thus, movement created
by animation, freed from photographic reference, can endow otherwise “impossible” motion and transformations with the immediacy of perception that Metz claims movement entails. In some ways this returns us to Dulac’s concept of a pure cinema based entirely on the motion of forms (and the forms of motion). In his writings on Disney, Eisenstein focuses on the possibility of the animated line to invoke precisely this aspect of motion, which he calls “plasmaticness” and defines as “a rejection of once-and-forever allotted form, freedom from ossification, the ability to dynamically assume any form” (27). Rather than simply endowing familiar forms with the solidity and credibility that Metz describes, movement can extend beyond familiarity to fantasy and imagination, creating the impossible bodies that throng the works of animation, from the early cartoons of Emile Cohl to the digital manipulation of Gollum in *The Lord of the Rings.* While flaunting the rules of physical resemblance, such animation need not remain totally divorced from any reference to our lived world. As I once heard philosopher Arthur Danto explain, the cartoon body can reveal primal phenomenological relations we have to our physical existence, our sense of grasping, stretching, exulting. For Eisenstein, this plasmatic quality invokes

*[a] lost changeability, fluidity, suddenness of formations—that’s the “subtext” brought to the viewer who lacks all this by these seemingly strange traits which permeate folktales, cartoons, the spineless circus performer and the seemingly groundless scattering of extremities in Disney’s drawings (21).*

Motion therefore need not be realistic to have a “realistic” effect, that is, to invite the empathic participation, both imaginative and physiological, of viewers. Eisenstein’s discussion of motion as a force that does not simply propel forms but actually creates them not only refers back to the theories of Bergson but makes clear the multiple nature of the participation that motion invokes, from the perceptual identity described by Metz to the realm of anticipation, speculation, and imagination of the possibly transforming aspects of line described by Eisenstein. Unlike the literalness of pointing to an actual individual that a narrow adherence to the diminished indexical theory of film and photography forces on us, as Metz emphasizes, the cinematic impression of reality affects the diegesis, the fictional world created by the film, and thus escapes the straitjacket of exclusive correspondence or reference to any preexisting reality. Metz’s concept of cinematic movement’s “novel power to convince [. . .] was all to the advantage of the imagination” (“Impression” 14).
The realist claim offered for cinema’s indexical quality, based in still photography, actually operates in a diametrically different direction than the role Metz outlines for cinematic movement in the medium’s impression of reality. An indexical argument, as it has been developed, based in the photographic trace, points the image back into the past, to a preexisting object or event whose traces could only testify to its having already been. Metz’s concept of the impression of reality moves in the opposite direction, toward a sensation of the present and of presence. The indexical argument can be invoked most clearly (and usefully) for films used as historical evidence. It remains unclear, however, how the index functions within a fiction film, where we are dealing with a diegesis, a fictional world, rather than a reference to a reality. Laura Mulvey, in her extremely important discussion of indexicality in film, has pointed out how it relates to the phenomenon of the Star, clearly an existing person beyond the fictional character he or she plays and therefore a reference outside the film’s diegesis. The effect of an index in guaranteeing the actual existence of its reference depends on the one who makes this connection invoking a technical knowledge of photography, understanding the effect of light on the sensitive film. Metz’s cinematic impression of reality depends on “forgetting” (that is, on distracting the viewer’s attention away from—not literally repressing the knowledge of) the technical process of filming in favor of an experience of the fictional world as present. As he claims, “The movie spectator is absorbed, not by a ‘has been there’ but by a sense of ‘There it is’” (6).

Even if the indexical claim for cinema is granted, I am not sure it really supplies the basis for a realist aesthetic. Although Bazin invokes something that sounds like an index in his description of the ontology of the photographic image, maintaining the exact congruence of his claims with a strictly indexical claim seems fraught with difficulty. Rather than an argument about signs, Bazin’s ontology of the photographic and filmic image seems to assert a nearly magical sense of the presence delivered by the photographic image. In any case, at best, the index would only function as one aspect of Bazin’s realist aesthetic. Once again, I am not claiming no use exists for the index in theories of film and photography, but simply that it has been entrusted with tasks it cannot fulfill and that reading it back into classical realist theories of the cinema probably obscures as much as it explains.

But I would also have to admit that “motion,” even when specified as “cinematic motion,” probably includes multiple aspects, not just one perceptible factor. The extreme spectator involvement that movement can
generate needs further study, both in terms of perceptual and cognitive processes (which I think call for both experimental and phenomenological analysis) and in relation to broader aesthetic styles. Metz’s description is based on the classical fiction film: what role does motion play in nonclassical films? (I have, of course, argued for its vital role in avant-garde film.) I am offering only a prolegomena to a larger investigation; my comments here aspire to be provocative rather than definitive. Motion, I am arguing, needs to be taken more seriously in our exploration of the nature of film and our account of how film style functions. At the same time, giving new importance to movement (or restoring it) builds a strong bridge between cinema and the new media that some view as cinema’s successors. Like the animated line Germaine Dulac described, whose movement directly creates an emotion, motion involves both transformation and continuity (film history involves both the transformation of its central medium and a recognition of an ever-shifting continuity, a trajectory, to this transformation). As an art of motion, cinema has affinities to other media: dance, action painting, instantaneous photography, kinetic sculpture. But it also possess its own trajectory, one in which I suspect the new media of motion arts will also find a place, or at least an affinity.

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Notes
1 In a series of carefully argued and provocative articles, historian and theorist of photography Joel Snyder has questioned the usefulness of the index argument in describing photography.
2 For a recent reevaluation of Bazin, once dismissed as a naive realist, one could cite Philip Rosen, esp. 1–42.
3 I use here the translation proposed by Daniel Morgan in his essay “Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics,” which revises the widely available translation by Hugh Gray. Gray translates this as “a decal or transfer” (“Ontology” 14). The original French is “transfert de réalité de la chose sur la reproduction” and “un décalique approximatif” (“Ontologie” 16). Unless otherwise noted, translations are Gray’s.
4 Again, this is Morgan’s revised translation (450). Gray has: “The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that
differences

govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model” (14). Morgan discusses the misinterpretation inherent in Gray’s addition of the phrase “and space” (absent in Bazin) in “Rethinking Bazin.” The original French reads “cet objet lui-même, mais libéré des contingences temporelles. L’image peut être floue, déformée, décolorée, sans valeur documentaire, elle procède par sa genèse de l’ontologie du modèle; elle est le modèle” (“Ontologie” 16).

5 Key essays by Dulac and Epstein can be found in Abel. An excellent selection of Eisenstein's essays is in Leyda.

6 The French original appears in Dulac, Écrits 98–105.

7 The recuperation of motion in contemporary film theory will immediately evoke Deleuze’s two-volume philosophical work Cinema: The Movement Image and Cinema: The Time Image. There is much to learn from this work, although its background in and understanding of itself as an essay in philosophy, rather than film theory or history, should be taken seriously. I do not want to undertake a full-scale discussion of Deleuze’s work here, since I feel that will pull us away from the issue of movement to a consideration of Deleuze’s methods, terms, and assumptions. As Deleuze announces about his work in his preface, “This is not a history of the cinema. It is a taxonomy, an attempt at the classification of images and signs” (1: xiv). Although a number of Deleuze’s taxonomic distinctions provide insights into cinematic motion, an in-depth discussion of them would lead us astray from this issue. I want instead to consider the discussion of cinematic motion that preceded Deleuze, emerging primarily from film practice and theory. Most of the issues I want to raise here, while having a relation to Deleuze, remain marginal to his discussions, while they are central to the earlier theorists I will refer to. The best treatment of Deleuze’s book, fully informed of the history and theory of film, is by Rodowick.

8 Notably, Deleuze devotes no real discussion to animation.

9 A key essay in this regard by Eisenstein would be “Methods of Montage.”

10 See also Essential Deren.

11 A fine collection of Brakhage’s writing is Essential Brakhage, edited by Bruce R. McPherson. See also the discussion of Brakhage in Sitney, Visionary Films, and his work in progress “Eyes Upside Down.”

12 Morgan’s detailed discussion of the camera movement in Rossellini’s Voyage to Italy in “Rethinking Bazin” shows one way camera movement can function within Bazin’s realist aesthetic. See pages 465–68.

13 The discussion of motion extends over pages 297–314.

14 Would a focus on movement entail a proscriptive definition that all films must include motion? Insofar as we are referring to the movement of the apparatus, the film traveling through the projector gate, this might be tautological. Duration as a measure of this motion of the film certainly provides the sine qua non for cinematic motion and all cinema,
Moving Away from the Index

technically defined. However, I think we can certainly conceive of films that exclude motion, made entirely of still images. Interestingly, many films that use still images seem to do so to comment on movement. Clearly, the dialectical relation between stillness and movement provides one of the richest uses of motion in film. But I think it would be an essentialist mistake to assume a film could not avoid cinematic motion, even if the examples of such are very rare and possibly debatable.

15 See my discussion of Gollum and CGI-generated characters in “Gollum and Golem: Special Effects and the Technology of Artificial Bodies.”

16 Danto discussed this more than a decade ago at the Columbia Film Seminar in New York City. He specifically referred, as I recall, to the way Mickey Mouse and other cartoon characters often have fewer than five fingers but cogently convey the role of the hand in grasping. If my memory is faulty, I apologize to Mr. Danto (with humble admiration).

17 See esp. 54–66.

18 Kracauer’s arguments for the realist mission of cinema, although also based in its photographic legacy, most certainly exceeds, if it implies at all, the index.

Works Cited


----------. “Methods of Montage.” *Film Form* 72–85.


